83. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECTS
- INF Verification Issues
PARTICIPANTS
-
US
- The Secretary
- National Security Advisor Carlucci
- Asst. Sec. Ridgway
- Ambassador Nitze
- EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)
- Mr. Zarechnak (Interpreter)
- Members of U.S. Arms Control Working Group
-
USSR
- Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
- Deputy FornMin Bessmertnykh
- Ambassador Karpov
- Shevardnadze Aide Stepanov
- Shevardnadze Advisor Tarasenko (Notetaker)
- Mr. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)
- Members of Soviet Arms Control Working Group
SHEVARDNADZE opened the session with the comment that there was little time. He asked that the leaders of the two working groups summarize the results of their work to date. While there appeared to have been progress in some areas, the Foreign Minister had the impression that there were still issues which required effort.
[Page 451]THE SECRETARY commented that as far as he could see there had been no progress at all by the working groups. The Soviet group had even bracketed language on which the ministers themselves had agreed.
VORONTSOV said that the brackets were honest ones. The Soviet delegation had not been informed of the ministers’ decisions the night before. Now they were informed. SHEVARDNADZE quipped that the experts should be given a C− for their work.
THE SECRETARY observed that the meals in Geneva were obviously too good, because the Soviet delegation wanted to refer everything to Geneva. The Secretary had been under the impression that Moscow, not Geneva, was the Soviet capital.
In response to the Secretary’s invitation, NITZE briefly reported that the working group had identified six areas of agreement and 14 unresolved issues. He pointed out that, when presented by the U.S. side with such a tally, the Soviet team had added 6 more unagreed items. So there were a total of 20 outstanding issues, mostly dealing with inspections, and most of those dealing with suspect sites.
VORONTSOV remarked that all of the issues on the list which had been drawn up were important and would need to be resolved before a treaty was signed. Some, however, were of special importance. For example, the U.S. appeared determined to have ICBM’s inspected along with missiles covered by the treaty; there was also the question of inspections of U.S. bases in third countries. Resolution of these two key questions would, Vorontsov thought, make it possible to resolve many others. He asked that the ministers provide instructions which would make this possible.
THE SECRETARY said that Vorontsov’s first point had to do with the U.S. desire to inspect bases where missiles similar to the SS–20 were located, i.e., where ground-mobile ballistic missiles were located. That narrowed the focus considerably. Our objective was not to look at all ICBM bases.
As for third country basing, the relevant bases were those where U.S. INF had been deployed. We had made specific proposals on that subject, and were prepared to discuss it further.
SHEVARDNADZE said he feared the experts had not fulfilled their main task—to find solutions. The two sides were at a crucial stage. The Secretary was about to meet with General Secretary Gorbachev.2 A full 25 issues remained unresolved, many of by no means secondary importance. As Shevardnadze had said the day before, the moment [Page 452] called for bolder approaches by both sides if there were to be an agreement. Instead, the experts had given their ministers 25 issues to take before the General Secretary. What kind of an agreement could one expect from such a process?
THE SECRETARY noted that, in Geneva, the Soviet delegation had been inclined to say it needed instructions from Moscow. Now it wanted to refer everything to Geneva.
SHEVARDNADZE said that some issues could be left for Geneva. But the fundamental questions needed to be resolved during the Secretary’s stay. The experts should be instructed to reach solutions to as many problems as possible by the end of the day. Even at this stage, however, was it not possible to report to the General Secretary that all the outstanding issues lent themselves to solutions, including the central verification issues which had been mentioned? The Secretary’s statement suggested he believed this to be the case.
THE SECRETARY said he agreed. He did not want to tell the President that there were as many issues as ever. All could be resolved. The Secretary had gone over them with his experts that morning. They could all be worked out.
SHEVARDNADZE noted that the question of data exchange had been worked out the day before. Non-circumvention, which had been the subject of a fruitful discussion by ministers on Thursday,3 was not bracketed.
THE SECRETARY suggested putting the experts back to work.
VORONTSOV said that the experts still lacked instructions on how to handle the question of verifying ground-mobile ICBM’s similar to the SS–20.
THE SECRETARY said that the U.S. side had developed a statement which might help solve the problem, and read the following text:
—The primary purpose of our proposal to inspect facilities for GLBM’s over 500 km in range is to look at facilities where clandestine SS–20 activity (production, deployment, training, etc.) might be carried out under cover of ICBM activity.
—Of special concern are ground-mobile ICBM facilities, since these systems most closely resemble SS–20’s.
—Therefore, we are prepared to consider narrowing our proposal from all ICBM’s to ground-mobile ICBM’s.
—The precise idea would be to subject facilities associated with road-mobile GLBM’s with range over 500 km to suspect site inspection.
—Paying special attention to road-mobile ICBM’s is appropriate here, since, as your people say, there is great similarity between SS–20’s and mobile ICBM’s.
[Page 453]—This is a significant step in your direction on an issue your people say is very important to you, although, as you know, we believe the real solution is to ban mobiles entirely.
VORONTSOV noted in response that such a approach had been discussed in Geneva. The Soviet side had proposed to respond to U.S. concerns by providing information which would enable the U.S. to distinguish between the SS–20 and Soviet mobile ICBM’s through use of national technical means (NTM). If the U.S. were prepared to consider this approach, perhaps in the context of its own new proposal, it might provide a path to a mutually satisfactory solution which did not require on-site inspections.
THE SECRETARY expressed doubt that such an approach would obviate the need for on-site inspections. CARLUCCI seconded his reservations.
VORONTSOV said that an effort should be made to determine if NTM were sufficient by themselves. BESSMERTNYKH pointed out that it would be a military absurdity for the Soviets to attempt clandestinely to replace mobile ICBM’s by less capable SS–20’s. SHEVARDNADZE said this was not the time for horse-trading.
THE SECRETARY noted that both sides had to deal with the reality that they had to go the extra distance where necessary to satisfy themselves that any treaty could be verified. That was the source of the U.S. insistence on adequate arrangements with respect to ICBM’s similar to the SS–20. No one was seeking unilateral advantages.
BESSMERTNYKH noted that the Soviet side had doubts of its own about verifying a GLCM ban. The U.S. could conceivably disguise GLCM’s in SLCM cannisters. But this kind of approach led to a blind alley.
CARLUCCI acknowledged that there were enormous problems in verifying SLCM’s. But one had to apply the rule of reason. When one confronted a truly impossible situation, there was no choice but to make compromises. But where a reasonable solution presented itself, it should be explored.
THE SECRETARY said that the U.S. would be prepared to listen to the Soviet explanation of how SS–20’s could be distinguished from mobile ICBM’s through NTM. But we also wanted to be sure that any questions could be addressed through on-site inspections. CARLUCCI pointed out that we were only talking about fifteen on-site inspections per year.
Noting that time was running short, SHEVARDNADZE suggested that experts resume their work.
NITZE pointed out that they would still run into difficulties. He thought it unlikely that it would be possible to verify an SS–20 ban [Page 454] solely through NTM. VORONTSOV said the same could be said for a GLCM ban.
CARLUCCI pointed out that the Secretary’s earlier statement should have made it much easier for the Soviet side to accept ground inspections of ground-mobile ballistic missile facilities. It narrowed the scope of the problem considerably.
SHEVARDNADZE asked what should be done.
BESSMERTNYKH noted that the concerns Nitze had expressed should be taken care of by the Soviet offer to allow inspection of production sites on a continuous or near-continuous basis. NITZE replied that the U.S. side had not found the proposal satisfactory. SHEVARDNADZE asked why not.
THE SECRETARY noted Bessmertnykh’s use of the word, “continuous.” That was a key point. Less than a continuous regime would be worthless, but a continuous arrangment would be another thing. KARPOV noted that that was what the Soviets had proposed.
THE SECRETARY said that perhaps it would clarify the situation if the ministers went through the entire list of 20 outstanding issues. SHEVARDNADZE felt it would be better to ask the experts to continue to work the details, leaving the ministers to address main questions.
Noting that the ministers were to meet with the General Secretary at 11:00 THE SECRETARY concurred.
Before leaving, the Secretary took the Foreign Minister aside for a three-minute discussion of Soviet insistence that visitors of U.S. Embassy personnel who were not immediate relatives purchase expensive Intourist packages. Shevardnadze undertook to look into the matter.
- Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow/Washington Oct. 1987. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in the Guesthouse of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.↩
- See Document 84.↩
- October 22; see Documents 80–82.↩