Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

82. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, October 22, 1987, 9–11:45 p.m.

SUBJECTS

• Gomel radar, Hawaiian missile test, Embassy demonstration, SLCM limits, CW, conventional arms mandate, Murmansk proposals, regional issues (Cambodia, Korea, Southern Africa, Central America, Iran-Iraq war)

PARTICIPANTS

• US

  • The Secretary
  • National Security Advisor Carlucci
  • Asst. Sec. Ridgway
  • EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)
  • Mr. Zarechnak (Interpreter)

• USSR

  • Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
  • CPSU Secretary Dobrynin
  • Deputy FornMin Bessmertnykh
  • Shevardnadze Advisor Tarasenko (Notetaker)
  • Mr. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

SHEVARDNADZE opened the meeting by noting that working groups were continuing to work on arms control questions, particularly INF. Agreement had been reached on language to cover the Pershing 1a problem. It might be useful for the ministers to hear a report later, but not at this time.

THE SECRETARY acknowledged that there was agreement on P–1a language. Agreement had also been reached during the ministers’ afternoon session² on the phasing of the elimination of missiles, although a few points remained to be worked out.

There were also a number of verification issues to be dealt with. Referring to a note that Carlucci had just passed him, the Secretary suggested that the working groups be told they should work all night, if necessary, to resolve as many such issues as possible. He was inclined to agree with the suggestion, since it was more likely that the experts would produce results under such circumstances. So, the Secretary suggested, perhaps the ministers could let INF stew in its juices and review the experts’ work the next morning.

CARLUCCI interjected that it was important that verification issues be handled right, or it would come back to haunt both sides.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed, but wondered if it might not be useful for the ministers to share their sense of where the main differences lay on verification. CARLUCCI responded that the issues involved, e.g., procedures for inspection of suspect sites, were technical and probably not worthy of the ministers’ attention. What was needed was to tell the experts to solve the problems and refer those they could not to the ministers. SHEVARDNADZE agreed to that approach, and to the suggestion that the ministers should receive reports the next morning.

THE SECRETARY asked whether there should be joint reports, or whether the ministers should be briefed separately by their experts. Perhaps separate reports, which could then be reviewed in a joint session after a meeting with the General Secretary, were the way to go. SHEVARDNADZE said he thought it would be best to have a clear picture before the meeting with the General Secretary, and proposed a half-hour meeting beginning at 9:30 the next morning.³ THE SECRETARY agreed, and asked Carlucci to inform working groups of the ministers’ decision.

The Secretary asked Shevardnadze if he could quickly touch on a few unrelated issues.

First, he wanted to call the Foreign Minister’s attention to a recent Soviet missile test which was supposed to have overflown the Hawaiian Islands. This was the sort of thing which didn’t help as the two sides sought to deal with important issues.

Second, the Secretary advised Shevardnadze that the U.S. had raised in the Standing Consultative Committee (SCC) in Geneva the question of the Soviet radar located at Gomel.⁴ We had as yet received no answer. This was the kind of issue which raised serious questions in the areas of compliance and verification, and the Secretary urged a prompt and constructive Soviet response.

Finally, the Secretary referred to an incident that afternoon in which Soviet citizens had been beaten and seized in front of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. He wanted to register officially our objections to the Soviet authorities’ handling of the matter.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that he had no information on the Embassy incident. It would be looked into, but if there had been a violation of Soviet law; the perpetrators would answer for it.

As for the missile test the Secretary had referred to, the trajectories involved did not go over Hawaii. They terminated 900 kilometres to the north of the Islands.

THE SECRETARY reminded Shevardnadze that the announcement of the test series had given coordinates which would have involved an overflight of Hawaii. CARLUCCI pointed out that the test could complicate ratification of an INF Treaty; he was confident of ratification, but incidents like the test did not help. DOBRYNIN said that the splashdown had been a long way from Hawaii. CARLUCCI replied that it had gotten closer with each conservative Senator who stood up to denounce it.

SHEVARDNADZE, now reading from prepared papers, affirmed that the test had been conducted in accordance with standard procedures, and that there had been no violations of “the rules.” Moscow had given the required three days’ notification to all concerned. No objections had been raised, and reentry had been 900 km from Hawaii.

THE SECRETARY acknowledged that the facts Shevardnadze had recited were correct, but added that the announcement in question indicated that the trajectory extended over Hawaii. The U.S. was not charging that anything “illegal” had occurred.

SHEVARDNADZE took the point, suggesting that in the future both sides be careful about test launches. The SECRETARY said he thought that a good idea.

On the Gomel radar, SHEVARDNADZE, again reading from a paper, told the Secretary that a detailed response to the U.S. query had been given the day before in the SCC. Perhaps it had not caught up with the Secretary because of his train trip.

The substance of the Soviet reply, Shevardnadze continued, was that the radar previously located at Shary Shagan was not an ABM radar. In any case, when the facility had been dismantled and physically destroyed, the U.S. had been informed. One of the vans associated with the radar had been given to an industrial enterprise located in Gomel, and this was probably what U.S. national technical means had detected. An second radar had been destroyed along with its van; a third van had been transferred to Moscow. The Soviet side would be prepared to show U.S. inspectors the vans in Moscow or Gomel to satisfy their concerns.

As for allegations that a large radar had been set up at Gomel, Shevardnadze indicated that some components of the dismantled Shary Shagan facility—notably a rotating device and the van he had mentioned—had been transferred to Gomel. But the van had been stripped of its associated equipment consistent with ABM Treaty requirements. Shevardnadze reiterated the Soviet side’s readiness to show the vans in Moscow and Gomel to U.S. inspectors.

After confirming that the information Shevardnadze had just provided had also been conveyed to the U.S. SCC delegation, the SECRETARY said we would follow up there.

SHEVARDNADZE took the opportunity to express dissatisfaction with the operation of the SCC in recent years. It did not work like the ministers worked. The Soviet side had proposed that Defense Ministers become involved in the Committee’s operations to remedy the problem, but that had not worked out. Perhaps the ministers should instruct their own deputies to look into the matter. For his part, Shevardnadze would be prepared to assign Bessmertnykh the task.

Noting that the U.S. had in the past raised the Krasnoyarsk radar in the SCC, Shevardnadze pointed to the recent Soviet decision to allow U.S. congressmen to visit the site as evidence of Moscow’s desire to “solve” the problem. Perhaps, Shevardnadze suggested, Deputy Foreign Ministers could look into this matter as well and develop proposals for resolving it before a summit.

CARLUCCI noted that, in the context of the INF Treaty, the two sides were looking at alternatives to the SCC to deal with compliance questions. The basic idea was for a senior group which could be convened on an ad hoc basis, rather than a permanent body. DOBRYNIN said that that was exactly what the Minister was proposing for the issues he had mentioned. CARLUCCI said the U.S. was not happy with the SCC either. THE SECRETARY said that this was something the two sides could consider. SHEVARDNADZE said that the notion should be put on the agenda and, if possible, resolved.

Moving on to strategic arms matters, Shevardnadze said he had an item to raise which had not been covered in the afternoon discussion—specifically, sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM’s). At the Reykjavik meeting, he recalled, the problem had been discussed at length. Ultimately, the Soviet side had agreed to separate out the issue, but only on the understanding that agreement would subsequently be reached on numerical limits for SLCM’s. The Soviet side was aware of U.S. arguments with respect to verification, but did not believe the issues involved to be insoluble.

But the first step, Shevardnadze believed, was to define a SLCM ceiling. Moscow proposed 400. Once this was done, means could be found to verify compliance. Shevardnadze said he could tell the Secretary informally that Soviet scientists had some ideas on the subject that they would soon be in a position to share.

THE SECRETARY said that it was the U.S. sense that verification of SLCM’s was not possible. The fact that it was impossible to distinguish between nuclear and conventional warheads on ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM’s) had led us to the reluctant conclusion that all GLCM’s should be banned. We were nonetheless willing to listen to Soviet ideas.

SHEVARDNADZE said that, in addition to the ideas being developed by Soviet scientists, another approach might be to limit the number of submarines capable of carrying SLCM’s. It was possible to determine the number of SLCM’s each vessel could carry. But scientists could also get together to share ideas on how to resolve the problem. Resolution of the SLCM issue, Shevardnadze emphasized, was particularly important in the context of 50% reductions. THE SECRETARY said the U.S. was prepared to work at the problem. SHEVARDNADZE suggested it be turned over to experts.

THE SECRETARY commented that the experts should give priority attention to the verification of the more basic ingredients of a START agreement, notably mobile missiles. If the Soviet side had ideas on that subject before a summit, the U.S. would be particularly interested. SHEVARDNADZE agreed that experts should also address that issue.

The Foreign Minister next raised nuclear testing, noting that there appeared to be progress in getting negotiations on that subject underway. He suggested that the ministers hear a report from experts at some point. THE SECRETARY said it was his impression that work on that subject was well in hand.

With respect to chemical weapons, SHEVARDNADZE remarked that experts appeared to be discussing some specific ideas, and proposed that ministers hear a report the next day. THE SECRETARY agreed, commenting favorably on the progress which had recently been made in the Geneva CW negotiations. But as differences narrowed, the importance of ensuring that any agreement would adequately cope with the formidable dangers presented by chemical weapons and their proliferation became clearer and clearer. To do the job right would not be easy.

SHEVARDNADZE observed that, the longer the conclusion of a convention on a global ban was put off, the harder it became to deal with the problem. He suggested that “some ideas” be prepared by experts for adoption at a summit, since the two leaders had addressed chemical weapons when they met in Geneva.

THE SECRETARY agreed that the effort could be made, but emphasized the difficulty of the issues involved. It was not just a matter of the U.S. and the Soviet Union; verification provisions would have to apply to the whole world.

DOBRYNIN said that as much as possible should be prepared for a summit. CARLUCCI pointed out that, while we might be able adequately to verify compliance in the U.S. and Soviet Union, under a global ban it would be necessary to be able to go into every corner of the planet. SHEVARDNADZE said on-site inspection could handle that. The Soviet Union was not afraid. CARLUCCI said the U.S. wasn’t either. SHEVARDNADZE acknowledged that more than just the U.S. and Soviet Union were involved. But cooperation between the two could have a tremendous impact.

THE SECRETARY agreed that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. had to show leadership on CW if anything were to be accomplished. The most threatening aspect of the problem, of course, was the dispersion of the capability to produce CW. This was what had to be addressed, but the more one worked on the problem, the greater the difficulties involved appeared to be. The Secretary said he did not want to sound discouraging, but only wanted to be realistic. He proposed that the ministers listen to what their experts had to say. He could tell Shevardnadze that much work was being done in the U.S. on the problems he had mentioned as prospects of agreement on a convention grew.

SHEVARDNADZE welcomed the Secretary’s statement. He noted that, if the sentiments the Secretary had expressed were added to statements by U.S. allies in favor of early conclusion of a convention, there was a good chance of achieving that objective.

Shevardnadze noted, however, that the U.S. binary program was still on the agenda. THE SECRETARY pointed out that the Soviet Union also had CW, adding that replacement of U.S. stocks by binaries would create a safer situation than the present one. SHEVARDNADZE said he did not understand why, if there was agreement that all CW should be destroyed, new weapons should be created. Binaries did not worry the Soviet Union from a military standpoint. CARLUCCI interjected that that was because Soviet forces had more modern stockpiles.

SHEVARDNADZE acknowledged that the Soviet Union had in the past produced CW. What did Carlucci want, that it should now be placed before the International Court? Moscow had ceased production. It was not proposing to destroy all CW. It was willing to accept mandatory challenge inspections. What else did the U.S. want? The Soviets had opened up their CW facilities for inspection. Everything the U.S. had asked for, they had agreed to.

CARLUCCI pointed out that it was in the interest of neither side to eliminate its stocks entirely when states like Libya or Syria or Iran retained a CW potential. SHEVARDNADZE replied that this could be handled by making the entry into force of a convention dependent upon the adherence of certain countries. If they did not adhere, implementation of the convention could be delayed.

Moving on to the the question of conventional weapons, Shevardnadze said that he understood that experts were engaged on that subject. He proposed that ministers review their work the next day. THE SECRETARY agreed, noting that he agreed with what Shevardnadze had said earlier in the day about the need to reach early agreement on a CSCE mandate for conventional stability discussions.

SHEVARDNADZE said that, before moving on to regional issues, he wanted to call to the Secretary’s attention one additional point—General Secretary Gorbachev’s recent Murmansk proposals.⁵ They had, Shevardnadze recalled, been quite specific with respect to a huge area of interest to the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and many European countries as well. Perhaps the Secretary was not in a position to discuss the specifics of the proposal, but Shevardnadze proposed that the General Secretary’s suggestions be considered by experts, including military experts. Such a discussion could conceivably lead to agreement on regional confidence building measures, including bilateral measures.

THE SECRETARY said the U.S. was still studying the Murmansk initiative and would like to do so further before making any commitments to consultations of the type Shevardnadze had suggested. Our initial response was cautious.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that many of the ideas advanced in Murmansk were not new. The nuclear free zone proposal had been around for some time. Shevardnadze again suggested that experts study Gorbachev’s proposals.

THE SECRETARY said that we would need first to consult further with our allies. He was aware that the nuclear free zone concept was not new; indeed, it had a “long beard.” The U.S. would look further at the Murmansk proposals and be in a position to discuss them in more detail when next the Secretary and Shevardnadze met.

THE SECRETARY said he had some items he would like to mention in the area of regional affairs.

Starting with Cambodia, the Secretary noted that there had recently been some encouraging developments with respect to national reconciliation in that country. The main stumbling block remained Vietnam’s occupation, since it was difficult for a genuine process of dialogue to develop under such circumstances. Prince Sihanouk, we felt, could be an important figure in such a process, and we felt it would be a good idea if the Soviet Union could use its influence to encourage Vietnam to enter into negotiations with the Prince and the ASEAN countries. The U.S. considered ASEAN a serious, responsible organization, and we thought highly of its efforts. Hanoi, on the other hand, was paying a price for its isolation.

SHEVARDNADZE said he thought that, despite the two sides’ differences of principle over Cambodia, he detected some convergence of views. He knew that both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. supported the notion of a neutral, nonaligned Cambodia, as well as a political settlement of the problems of that country. Both sides opposed the return of Pol Pot (THE SECRETARY interjected: “absolutely”).

SHEVARDNADZE said that what was required now was to look at the situation in the region from a new angle. There were new processes and trends which needed to be encouraged. The withdrawal of Vietnamese forces should not be a problem: Hanoi had set a timeframe; its own economic difficulties provided an incentive to withdraw.

As for the Heng Samrin⁶ regime’s national reconciliation policy, Shevardnadze had a somewhat different view. A practical dialogue was, in fact, underway. The Cambodian leadership was prepared to meet with Sihanouk. What was wrong with that? Why did such contacts need to be linked to the question of Vietnamese withdrawal? Could there not be parallel movement in these areas? The present Cambodian leadership, Shevardnadze reiterated, was ready for a dialogue. It had recognized Sihanouk’s influence and was willing to have a dialogue with other opposition elements, except for Pol Pot.

Another point to keep in mind was the emerging relationship between the Indochinese states and ASEAN. The Indonesian “cocktail” proposal was an interesting one. THE SECRETARY remarked that the Vietnamese did not appear to want to come. SHEVARDNADZE replied that Vietnam and Indonesia had had an understanding, but the situation had changed.

If a solution were desired, Shevardnadze continued, the U.S. and Soviet Union might be able to help, but only on the basis of national reconciliation. The U.S. had good contacts in the region. The Soviet Union would be willing to use its own. There were some interesting ways to approach the problem, but it was important that any approach be realistic.

THE SECRETARY said the U.S. was prepared to work. There was a difficult problem, however, similar to that the Soviets themselves had in Afghanistan—Cambodia was occupied by forces of another country. The Cambodian government was supported by those forces. So it was hard to organize national reconciliation around that government—even though it might include truly nationalistic elements who could be useful—because it was seen as a government put there by an occupying power. In any case, the Secretary was glad to have had the discussion, and glad to see that the Soviets were thinking about Cambodia.

On Korea, the Secretary said it was important that the Olympics go off without difficulties.⁷

On Southern Africa, there seemed to be some headway being made with the Angolans on the Cuban problem. Cuba now wanted to join the talks, and that was hard to understand. It was also hard for us to understand the unwillingness of the Angolan government to join in a process of national reconciliation with Savimbi.

Thus, the Secretary felt that it would make sense for Under Secretary Armacost and First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov to get together to go over such issues in detail. If there were to be a summit, perhaps they could meet before the event.

SHEVARDNADZE said he would have no objection to such a meeting.

Noting that the Secretary had run through a number of issues, Shevardnadze first returned to Cambodia. He urged that the U.S. give further thought to the situation there. He did not want to argue over the Secretary’s characterization of Vietnam’s military presence in Cambodia: the U.S. might call it an occupation; the Cambodians called Vietnam’s intervention “salvation.” But this could be discussed at the Deputy Foreign Minister level.

On Korea, Shevardnadze was glad that the Secretary had mentioned it, but felt that the problem should be viewed in a broader context than just the Olympics. The U.S. must have noted recent DPRK confidence-building proposals: their proposal for a high-level bilateral meeting; their expression of readiness unilaterally to reduce by 100,000 their military forces; and their proposal for the creation of a nuclear-free zone on the peninsula. These initiatives could provide a solid basis for peace and tranquility on the peninsula.

As for the Olympics, the Soviet Union had given the issue a good deal of thought. The games were not just an athletic event. If there were a sincere interest in the political unification of the peninsula, some sort of parallel arrangements—perhaps not on a 50–50 basis—should be held in the North. This would be an important step toward the establishment of mutually good relations between the Koreas.

THE SECRETARY reminded Shevardnadze that the U.S. had for some time been seeking to bring about bilateral discussions between the leaders of the two Koreas, but that our efforts had always run into North Korea’s preference to talk directly to the U.S. After the December elections in South Korea, there would be a new leadership in Seoul, and we would see where the process went.

On the Olympics, South Korea had made an offer, and it was not a bad one. The Secretary expressed the hope that it would be possible to settle the question, which, he agreed, had a heavy political component. But it was also an athletic event which could contribute to confidence building on the peninsula.

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed, and suggested that both sides consider how they could help in practical terms.

Moving on to “Angola,” Shevardnadze agreed that some interesting trends were underway. Angola’s dialogue with the U.S. was good, but Cuban participation in that dialogue was natural. It would be inappropriate to exclude the Cubans, since the issue was the reduction of their forces.

The key question, however, remained Namibia; and the key source of tensions in the region, South Africa’s policies. Shevardnadze acknowledged that the U.S. did not approve of all of South Africa’s positions.

THE SECRETARY interjected that we did not approve of any of South Africa’s racial policies, as his recent speech had made clear.⁸ We agreed that these policies were the root of the problem in the region. As for Namibia, we felt there were good prospects for achieving progress. There were positive trends. But the Cuban role remained a problem. As the Angolan government had invited the Cubans in, the Secretary saw no reason why Cuba should be at the negotiating table. We did not object per se, but we wondered what that said about the Angolan government.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that it was the sovereign right of Angola to do what it considered best. There was no need to argue that point.

On a broader plane, Shevardnadze was encouraged by currents of growing opposition to the South African regime. What was happening was akin to the Contadora process underway in Central America. The progressive countries of Africa were uniting their efforts; perhaps the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could support those who were opposing South Africa.

On Namibia, Shevardnadze said that UNSC 435⁹ remained a good basis for a resolution. He suggested both sides intensify their efforts on behalf of its implementation, either jointly or in parallel.

Finally, Shevardnadze raised the possibility of joint efforts to provide humanitarian aid to the countries of Southern Africa. Famine and poverty were becoming growing problems. Perhaps the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could help in some way.

THE SECRETARY said that this would be a good subject for further discussion. He invited Carlucci, as an old African hand, to comment.

CARLUCCI pointed out by way of introduction that he had served in South Africa, Zanzibar and Zaire. SHEVARDNADZE quipped that he had left a heritage behind. CARLUCCI said he was familiar with the various books and articles which had been written by the Soviets and other communist-backed organizations about his service in Africa.

On the substance of Shevardnadze’s remarks, Carlucci said he welcomed the Foreign Minister’s indication that Moscow would be prepared to provide more economic aid to Africa and the world. This was interesting, because the Soviet Union had in the past contributed such a small percentage of its GNP for aid. Properly applied, such assistance could make a real contribution in Africa, and could help bring about a peaceful evolution of the situation in the region.

Carlucci took strong exception to Shevardnadze’s comparison of the situation in Southern Africa to that of Central America. Central America was an area of traditional American influence into which there had been an intrusion of foreign influence. Carlucci wanted to put down a marker that such influence should be withdrawn.

SHEVARDNADZE asked whether Central America was a plum that the U.S. had inherited. He said that he was against such a “spheres of influence” approach. The Soviet Union, for example, would never seek to apply such an approach to a country like Iran. CARLUCCI asked about Afghanistan. SHEVARDNADZE said that Moscow supported a neutral, nonaligned Afghanistan. CARLUCCI said that the U.S. supported a neutral, nonaligned Nicaragua.

SHEVARDNADZE asked Carlucci what kind of Soviet presence he objected to in Nicaragua. CARLUCCI replied we objected to the presence of Soviet military equipment. SHEVARDNADZE said, “So what?” CARLUCCI said it was out of all proportion to Nicaragua’s legitimate needs and therefore posed a threat to its neighbours. The U.S. was for democracy in Nicaragua; the Soviet Union could contribute to the successful implementation of the Arias plan by reducing Nicaragua’s reliance on military aid and encouraging it to live in peace with its neighbours.

SHEVARDNADZE said he would respond to Carlucci’s comments point by point. With respect to Carlucci’s remark that the Soviet Union did not carry its weight in terms of foreign aid, Shevardnadze claimed that Moscow regularly allocated 1.8% of the Soviet budget for assistance. His suggestion had simply been to see if the U.S. and Soviet Union could work together in this area.

Shevardnadze said he could not understand a mentality which said Nicaragua had no right to import weapons to defend itself while Pakistan had a right to receive billions of dollars worth of armaments free of charge. What was the difference? Shevardnadze could not understand the spheres of influence approach which Carlucci had articulated. There were no Soviet military personnel in Nicaragua, although there were Soviet weapons.

THE SECRETARY said he would like to pursue the discussion, but also wanted to get to the Iran-Iraq war. CARLUCCI said that he would like to reserve the right to return to the points Shevardnadze had made. SHEVARDNADZE said he would too, adding that the Arias plan was a “beautiful precedent.”¹⁰

THE SECRETARY noted that U.S.-Soviet experts talks on Central America and the Caribbean would be held in London the following week. This was an area where our experts had in the past made little headway. But the Guatemala plan¹¹ had potential if implemented. The main obstacle to implementation appeared to be Nicaragua’s refusal to talk to the resistance, despite the fact that all the Presidents of the region were urging Ortega to do so. The Secretary suggested that both sides try to ensure that the London discussion was a constructive one. Such exchanges had in the past been dry and confrontational, but there had been fruitful conversations in other areas. Perhaps the same could take place on Central America. The Secretary said he would talk to Elliott Abrams about it.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Moscow was following very closely what was happening in the region. Nicaragua was living up to the pledges it had made. CARLUCCI said, “to some of them.” SHEVARDNADZE repeated that Nicaragua was observing those pledges it had made. CARLUCCI pointed out, inter alia, that there were still 7,000 political prisoners, that there had been no ceasefire. DOBRYNIN said that Nicaragua had already done a great deal. CARLUCCI said we welcomed what had been done, but could not ignore what had not.

THE SECRETARY noted that the Guatemala City agreement was quite explicit about what the various parties should do. There were explicit requirements for freedom of the press, of association, of political expression—which meant, in effect, no political prisoners. One of the good things about the agreement was its concreteness, for example on the question of a ceasefire. If there were no ceasefire, it would be hard to get people talking to one another. It thus appeared to us that Nicaragua was less than serious.

SHEVARDNADZE acknowledged that Nicaragua had made certain commitments, but pointed out that the Guatemala City plan imposed collective commitments as well, including a commitment of non-interference. Yet by financing anti-government groups in Nicaragua the U.S. was directly interfering in the affairs of a sovereign country. Nothing should be done to hinder the process of seeking a political settlement, Shevardnadze concluded. If the U.S. had complaints about Nicaragua, Managua had equally valid complaints against the U.S.

CARLUCCI asked if Shevardnadze was suggesting that Nicaragua was not financing anti-government forces in El Salvador.

THE SECRETARY interjected that the important thing was that various things were supposed to happen together. If one element failed, all would fail. As for the U.S. funds which Shevardnadze had alluded to, we had made clear that, were the Guatemala City agreement to be implemented and conditions of political stability established, those funds could be used for economic reconstruction. Thus, they provided as much an incentive to compromise as to fight. The problem was that the right circumstances were not emerging despite our efforts to be constructive.

CARLUCCI said that one area where the Soviet Union could be helpful was to encourage Nicaragua to stop subverting its neighbors, especially El Salvador, but also Honduras. This would be a constructive contribution. He wanted to emphasize that he was saying this in a non-polemical way.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Presidents of five countries had agreed on the fundamental questions with respect to a settlement in Central America. Shevardnadze had been encouraged by this to believe that a regional solution was emerging. Some might not be doing everything that they could, but the Soviet Union was encouraging the process. As for the threat allegedly posed by Nicaragua, the idea was ludicrous. Nicaragua could threaten no one; its economy was in shambles.

CARLUCCI reiterated U.S. support for the Guatemala City agreement, but again stressed the importance of Nicaragua’s living up to its commitments and abandoning attempts to subvert its neighbors.

Moving on to the Iran-Iraq war, the Secretary said he would like to describe how we viewed the situation. The key point was that Iran was becoming more, not less, aggressive. The Secretary General had a good brief as he set off for the region to see if the parties would accept UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 598¹² in the wake of the New York meeting of the permanent members of the Security Council. The U.S. felt that he should receive a prompt reply from the parties, and that the permanent members should reach their conclusions on next steps on the basis of that reply.

For its part, the U.S. was sympathetic to the Secretary General’s view that active work in the UNSC by permanent members on a second resolution would have a positive impact on his diplomatic efforts. We thus hoped it would be possible for visible work in the UNSC to get underway. Our concern was that, if the process dragged on, a potentially strong stand of the UNSC would be made to look foolish.

The Secretary pointed out that he had agreed with Shevardnadze during their New York meeting that the unity among permanent members which had been achieved on this issue was something special and should be preserved. But we had to build up the UN to make it work. The first resolution had made a contribution. Although we were not prejudging the outcome of the Secretary General’s mission, we believed now there was a need for a follow-up. So perhaps the U.S. and Soviet Union should say something about the Iran-Iraq war and follow-up in the UNSC. The Secretary said he would welcome Shevardnadze’s views.

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed that the Secretary General was well equipped at present to undertake next steps. Resolution 598 contained “reserves” which had not yet been used. The Secretary General should now undertake more intensive efforts, consistent with the additional authority given him by the permanent members in their New York meeting.

The situation was by no means hopeless. There was agreement by both parties to a ceasefire, even though Iran had reserved its position in some respects. A decision had been made in New York by UNSC permanent members not to limit the flexibility of the Secretary General with respect to the sequence of his discussions with the parties. Thus far, it was true, there had been no practical steps except for an initial visit to the region and subsequent consultations with the permanent members. Now was the time, Moscow felt, for intense diplomatic efforts vis-a-vis the parties. In the event Iran refused to implement a ceasefire, the Soviet Union, for its part, would favor the establishment of an international body to deal with the situation. This would demonstrate the seriousness of UNSC. But at this point it was premature to speak of a second stage; the important thing was to help implement the first.

Shevardnadze recalled that, during their New York meeting, he had told the Secretary that the massive, unjustified U.S. military build-up in the Gulf could only lead to an aggravation of the situation and to unpredictable results. This was, in fact, happening, regardless of U.S. motives. The results of the massive U.S. presence were very serious, the situation in the Gulf increasingly grave. The area was close to the Soviet Union, which could not be indifferent to the situation, and the dramatic events it could produce.

What then, did the Soviet Union propose? It was one thing, Shevardnadze observed, when so imposing a military presence was assembled by the U.S. It was another were it to occur under UN auspices. The latter was the only reasonable approach. Shevardnadze did not suggest that the U.S. should just pull out. But preparations should be made to replace U.S. forces by forces under UN auspices. There was no other way out for the U.S. and its allies.

Shevardnadze thus recommended that the UN Military Staff Committee be convened at the level of heads of general staff to discuss the situation in the Gulf. This would be the first step in a discussion of how to replace the U.S. presence in the Gulf with a UNSC force. The problem, Shevardnadze emphasized, was a real one, and one the U.S. should be prepared to address soberly, particularly in light of recent clashes in the Gulf.

Shevardnadze pointed out that he had also warned in New York that a situation could emerge in which the Iran-Iraq war itself would become a secondary matter, with the situation in the Gulf assuming major multilateral significance. The Soviet Union neither welcomed nor approved of such a development. The situation in the Gulf should remain a function of the Iran-Iraq war. One should react to events in the Gulf not on the basis of emotion, but of a sober assessment of the realities.

Shevardnadze recalled that Carlucci had complained about Soviet arms shipments to Nicaragua. Moscow did not provide Iran with arms. But even if the U.S. and Soviet Union were to agree on an embargo of Iran, the Iranians would obtain arms. They had an indigenous industry; there was a black market. The Iranian leadership was multiplying its efforts to whip up a war hysteria among its people. While the U.S. might complain about Nicaragua’s leaders, the Secretary and Shevardnadze had discussed and agreed upon the nature of those of Iran. But one had to deal with the fact that they were the Iranian government. So the situation was not just disturbing; it was explosive. Moscow did not consider it too late to find a solution. But against the backdrop of the massive U.S. military presence, the Secretary General’s own efforts were undermined.

THE SECRETARY said he was very discouraged by Shevardnadze’s remarks. It almost sounded as if the Foreign Minister were saying that Iran should be forgiven for mining international waters. The problem was that Iran had gotten use to getting away with anything it did. The Iranians needed to be called to account.

What would happen, the Secretary asked, if the Secretary General reported that Iraq had accepted his call to implement UNSC 598, but Iran had not? The UNSC’s card would be called. We would have to move on a second resolution in that case. On the basis of their previous discussion, the Secretary had thought Shevardnadze would as well.

SHEVARDNADZE said that he agreed that a second resolution had to be prepared. It was important that Iran and Iraq know that the UNSC would be consistent. But the U.S. should think about the impact of its presence in the Gulf. A second resolution should be implemented in the context of UN, not U.S., forces. The permanent members could provide the necessary vessels. The necessary machinery was in place. Perhaps it should not be engaged tomorrow, but, if there was a genuine desire for an effective second resolution, there was no other way to deal with the situation.

THE SECRETARY said that there was a problem with a UN military force. What Shevardnadze had said suggested that the Soviet side had in mind a blockade of some sort. No oil would get out; nor arms in. So that was one purpose for such a force.

Another possibility would be a peacekeeping force of some kind. But experience had demonstrated that such arrangements worked best when both parties agreed that the UN should assume such a role. In the present instance, however, that would be tantamount to the two parties having accepted UNSC 598, which was not the reality. As we had said before, the U.S. was in the Gulf in response to a problem which threatened our friends, the flow of oil, and international navigation. When the problem ended, the level of our forces would recede.

If UN forces were in the Gulf to take military actions against the aggressor in the war, and had rules of engagement to enforce the peace, it would be an anomalous situation. Our own vessels were there in a very different spirit. There was also the complication that Iran—because of asymmetries in oil export patterns—would be willing to see the war in the Gulf end in order to pursue the land war without distraction. So when one spoke of a UN force, it was important to have a clear conceptual and operational understanding about what was involved.

We were not, the Secretary emphasized, simply being negative. We had given the matter a good deal of thought. We had considered, for example, the possibility of UN-flagged tankers. But if those tankers were attacked, who would react?

The U.S. was not, the Secretary said frankly, entirely comfortable in the Gulf. If a way could be found to do the job we were doing, we would not object.

But the key point the Secretary wanted to underscore was that, if the SecGen returned a negative report, the UNSC would have to do something. The U.S. wanted to maintain the unity of the UNSC. If the Council could do something constructive it would be a good thing for the UN’s reputation. The Soviet Union had itself called for strengthening the organization; this would help.

SHEVARDNADZE asked flatly why U.S. ships were in the Gulf.

THE SECRETARY said the reason was two-fold. First, to protect U.S.-flag ships plying the oil trade through international waterways. Iran had also been aggressive—to put it mildly—against the Gulf states, most recently with its Silkworm missile attacks, but before that with its pressure on Saudi Arabia and attacks on Islamic holy places there. It had no support whatever throughout the Muslim world, as a recent speech by Egyptian Foreign Minister Meguid had made clear. Shevardnadze had, as he had indicated, shared with the Secretary in the past his views of Iran, and the Secretary had agreed.

So these were the reasons the U.S. fleet was in the Gulf. If the Soviet Union were there instead as protectors of oil in the region we would not find that acceptable either. But that was not the main reason. And, the Secretary reemphasized, the level of our presence would recede once these problems were resolved. We had better uses for our forces.

SHEVARDNADZE commented that, if freedom of navigation were the problem, it would be dealt with by the UNSC. That was why the Soviet Union was proposing a meeting of the Military Staff Committee. As to how the force should operate, that could be referred to the military themselves. THE SECRETARY said he did not see how the concept would work.

SHEVARDNADZE said that it would first be necessary to define a UN force’s task. The chiefs of staff would be able to decide the best way, operationally, to ensure freedom of navigation. It would be better to activate the Military Staff Committee than to let the U.S. or the Soviet Union try to establish order anywhere they wanted. So if one defined the overall task as freedom of navigation, the Military Staff Committee was the appropriate instrument to carry out the task. That instrument should be used.

Shevardnadze said that on a parallel track it would then be possible to prepare for a second UNSC resolution. But implementation of a second resolution against the backdrop of the massive U.S. military presence in the Gulf did not follow.

Thus, Shevardnadze proposed convening the Military Staff Committee. The Committee could work out the operational details if given a clear task. Freedom of navigation was the task. If Iran did not comply, there would be a need for an appropriate follow-up. For such a task, the machinery provided for in the UN Charter should be used. Convening the Military Staff Committee would send a strong signal.

THE SECRETARY said that the U.S. believed that U.S. ships had a right of innocent passage anywhere in the world. If they were challenged, it was the duty of our Navy to help them.

The Secretary felt that Shevardnadze’s remarks on the use of the Military Staff Committee did not quite track. It was true that the military could tell one how to implement a particular decision. Often, the Secretary noted, their recommendations caused the political leadership to review its original decision. But rather than start with the military, one should start with the political concept of what to do. Only then should military advice be sought. In the present case, the concept was lacking.

The Secretary said that perhaps it would be possible to return to the subject at a later date. For the moment, he welcomed the chance to have heard Shevardnadze’s thoughts on the Gulf. He wanted to underscore once more in closing his strong view that, in the event the Secretary General’s efforts were unsuccessful, the Security Council must act.

The meeting ended on that note.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow/Washington Oct. 1987. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in the Guesthouse of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.
2. See Document 81.
3. See Document 83.
4. Reported on in telegram 10962 from Geneva, October 15. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870848–0686) Shevardnadze’s response is in following paragraphs.
5. Reference is to Gorbachev’s October 1 speech in Murmansk proposing to make the Arctic a nuclear-free zone.
6. Reference is to the pro-Vietnam Communist leader of Cambodia.
7. The Olympic Summer Games were scheduled to take place in Seoul in September 1988.
8. Reference is to Shultz’s September 29 speech before the Business Council for International Understanding in New York City. (Department of State Bulletin, November 1987, pp. 9–12)
9. Reference is to UNSC Resolution 435, passed on September 29, 1978, which called for the establishment of an independent Namibia.
10. Reference is to the Central American Peace Agreement, proposed by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, to resolve Central American conflicts, signed by Presidents of five Central American governments in Guatemala City on August 7, 1987. Also known as Esquipulas II or the Guatemala accords.
11. Reference is to the Central American Peace Agreement.
12. See footnote 5, Document 67.