Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

63. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 4, 1987

SUBJECT

• Visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Overview

You know full well the problems in many crucial areas of U.S.-Soviet relations. Shevardnadze’s visit is about the possibilities for bridging some of them.

We have advanced far toward the aspirations in the agenda you set with Gorbachev nearly two years ago in Geneva. If we keep at it vigorously, you can have a record of solid achievements and will anchor American policy toward the Soviet Union in a realistic framework for years to come. That framework embodies high standards for measuring progress in the relationship and will serve Western interests well.

The Soviets are engaging us actively across our full agenda. They have tabled a draft START treaty to match ours, moved toward us on CW verification, and cooperated fully in the first-ever military inspection on Soviet territory. Emigration is up and many pressing individual cases have been settled; there is still a long way to go, but human rights are now firmly on the U.S.-Soviet agenda—a far cry from the days when Gromyko and company simply brushed the subject aside. The Soviets are actively pursuing our regional dialogue, have shown some cooperation on the Gulf War, and may inch painfully toward a settlement that will leave Afghanistan independent again. Our exchange programs, including your people-to-people initiative at Geneva, continue to grow.

The Soviets may calculate that apparent movement in these areas will pressure us on arms control, their top priority. But they also may recognize they are coming down to the wire in pushing forward on fundamentals with you. They seem intent on testing the limits of American willingness to deal.

Our challenge is to turn Soviet activism to our advantage, move closer to the arms reductions now within reach, and put our gains on human rights, regional issues and bilateral cooperation on a firm basis for the future. We will need patience in some areas (INF, summitry) and aggressiveness in others (START, human rights). After the visit, we can assess results, consult with Allies, and then continue discussions with Shevardnadze the following week in New York.

Shevardnadze’s Meetings with You

Shevardnadze will call on you on September 15, the first of his three days in Washington, so you will set the tone and direction for the rest of his visit.² My thoughts on the substantive issues are set forth below.

I will meet with Shevardnadze privately that morning and then will pre-brief you. Upon his arrival at the White House, Shevardnadze and I will sign the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center agreement in your presence. John Warner and Sam Nunn, who fathered the concept, and our negotiators, Richard Perle and Colonel Bob Linhard from the NSC staff, should attend. You can welcome the agreement as a useful expansion of our ability to communicate and thus reduce the chance of inadvertent conflict.

In your private meeting, you should review the overall state of relations, outline our areas for priority attention—START, human rights, and Afghanistan—and discuss summit prospects. At lunch, you can elaborate on the calls for “openness” you sounded in your Berlin and “Chautauqua” speeches,³ and perhaps ask Shevardnadze to review domestic developments in his country.

Summit Prospects

In his June letter, Shevardnadze told me he wanted to evaluate prospects for a summit. With the developments in INF, those prospects are good, and the Soviets are giving every sign they want a meeting this fall. Shevardnadze may have specific dates, perhaps late November. He likely will make an INF accord a precondition for a summit.

We should be laid-back about a summit, reiterating that you would welcome a well-prepared meeting that covers all the issues. If Shevardnadze suggests dates and they fit your schedule, you could accept in principle and propose that advance teams begin work. You should affirm that we want to wrap up INF, but stress two points—this is not a summit precondition for us, and you are prepared to wait as long as necessary to make sure an agreement is verifiable, even if that means slipping a summit to later. If, however, Shevardnadze brings what we need on INF and other issues, the stage would be set for you to announce summit dates in your UNGA address.

Arms Control

NST. Shevardnadze told Max Kampelman that the Soviets want progress in all NST areas and both sides should prepare options on key issues. We should press Shevardnadze to follow up.

—We want to focus on START. It indeed is the “root problem” and worth a serious effort, and Soviet actions suggest they may be more serious about pushing ahead. We should think through our own options, encourage Shevardnadze to get into a real discussion of stumbling blocks, and be prepared to negotiate if he has new ideas on issues of interest to us.

—We should not assume we are out of the woods yet, but barring Soviet troublemaking, INF now is down to detail work in Geneva. There are some issues to take up with Shevardnadze, especially the need for Soviet action on verification. We should turn away any demands for further assurances on FRG Pershing missiles or associated warheads, but be ready to look at solutions on phasing of reductions.

—Defense & Space. We should reiterate as necessary our problems with the Soviets’ new treaty, emphasize the constructive nature of the ideas we offered in Moscow in April, and encourage the Soviets to relax their linkage to START.

Other Issues. We should remind the Soviets that progress on chemical weapons depends on their addressing in detail all aspects of a ban. On conventional forces, our message is simple—no neutrals and no nuclear weapons in new talks on conventional forces. How we handle nuclear testing will depend on current discussions on a mandate for future negotiations.

Human Rights

Shevardnadze will press Moscow’s own agenda on human rights. He will probably complain that we have failed to give credit for the limited steps the Soviets have taken over the past year, and will try to focus the discussion on their proposal for a Moscow CSCE conference, and their desire for reduced rhetoric from U.S. officials at international meetings. The Soviets have agreed to send an expert with Shevardnadze to deal with specific cases.

We must block any attempt to sidetrack the human rights discussion to a lower level or divert it from our primary concern—people. You can reiterate our willingness to acknowledge progress where we see it but underscore our need for assurances that any improvements will be sustained. We should press for reliable practices and procedures in a number of areas, as well as a process for systematic, regular exchanges on individual cases. You can reiterate that we have not closed the door to a Moscow conference but emphasize that the burden is on Moscow to meet the strict criteria we have outlined in the Vienna Follow-up Meeting. On rhetoric, you might note that as Soviet practices improve, so will the description—but we are not offering tradeoffs.

Regional Issues

By September, we will be almost through the 1987 cycle of experts meetings, providing a good basis for discussion of regional subjects. I think your time is best spent on Afghanistan and Iran-Iraq. The situation on both these issues is liable to be rather fluid. Both you and I should raise destabilizing Soviet bloc arms supplies to the Third World.

The Iran-Iraq War will provide a highly volatile backdrop to Shevardnadze’s visit. Moreover, U.S. efforts to engineer a second UN resolution may be coming to a head. You should emphasize the importance of this effort for ending the war, reducing the risk of wider conflict, and demonstrating the ability of the U.S. and USSR to collaborate and deal with regional conflicts in the UN context. You can point out that the U.S. and USSR worked together on the first resolution, and should do so on the second.

On Afghanistan, the UN-sponsored proximity talks will resume in early September in Geneva, followed shortly by U.S.-Soviet experts talks, also in Geneva. These sessions should give us a better sense whether the Soviets are prepared for a serious effort to disengage or will stick with their current wait-and-see strategy of ballyhooing the Kabul regime’s attempt at national reconciliation, applying pressure on Pakistan, and attempting to erode broad support for tough UN resolutions on Afghanistan. You should stress the importance of early, significant and realistic Soviet movement on the two key issues—a practical national reconciliation process acceptable to the resistance, and a timetable for prompt removal of Soviet troops.

Bilateral Issues

You can reaffirm the importance of expanding bilateral contacts, including people-to-people exchanges. Since we have just reviewed bilateral questions in Moscow. I plan to focus on two key operational issues. One is Soviet agreement to tying up loose ends in a package of understandings on the functioning of diplomatic missions in both countries; this would take a major load off our Embassy in Moscow. The other is continued Soviet cooperation in getting our Embassy back on its feet after the Marine affair. I hope, too, to outline our plans for dealing with our new chancery, on the basis of the memo Bill Webster and I sent you in July.⁴

Public Affairs

A key part of our strategy will be communication with the Allies, Congress, and the public. We will brief Allies before and after the visit. I will meet with Congressional leaders and various human rights organizations. We will conduct press briefings to lay out the opportunities for progress while keeping public expectations realistic. I plan to say a few words to the media after your sessions with Shevardnadze, and to hold a full press conference at the end of the visit.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, Meetings Files, President’s Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze September 1987 (2). Secret; Sensitive.
2. See Document 67.
3. Shultz is referring to Reagan’s June 12 remarks on East-West relations, made at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin. See Document 54. The text of Reagan’s remarks is printed in Public Papers: Reagan, 1987, Book I, pp. 634–638. The Chautauqua reference is to Reagan’s August 26 remarks on U.S.-Soviet relations made before the Town Hall of California meeting in Los Angeles and broadcast via satellite to a conference on U.S.-Soviet relations, held in Chautauqua, New York. The text of these remarks is in Public Papers: Reagan, 1987, Book II, pp. 977–982. Both addresses are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.
4. See Document 62.