46. Memorandum of Conversation1

PARTICIPANTS

  • U.S. Participants

    • Secretary Shultz
    • D. Zarechnak, Interpreter
  • Soviet Participants

    • Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
    • P. Palazhchenko, Interpreter

After the end of the final plenary, the Secretary asked Foreign Minister Shevardnadze for a short private meeting. He told Shevardnadze that he had described to President Reagan the meetings he had had in Moscow, and the President was glad to hear the report. He had told the President that General Secretary Gorbachev had indicated a willingness to have a meeting with the President in Washington within a general time frame, which was mentioned. This was in the form of a general statement, and not a specific commitment. The President had asked the Secretary to convey to Shevardnadze that as possible dates for the visit were examined, and bearing in mind that it was important that these dates be convenient for the General Secretary, the President thought that a convenient time would be late September or October of this year. Fall would be a suitable time. More specific dates could be agreed as the time got closer.

The Secretary continued that the President and he had agreed that if the Summit became more tangible and the dates were set, it would be good to have another meeting of the Secretary and Foreign Minister. He had indicated to the President that the General Secretary and Shevardnadze had agreed that a Summit would need to be well prepared and, therefore, the U.S. would be glad to welcome the Foreign Minister in the U.S. for this purpose.

The Secretary indicated that in reply to questions from the press on this issue, he would say that other than the General Secretary’s replies to the questions shouted to him before his meeting with the Secretary, the topic had not been discussed very much, but it was agreed that a useful meeting would need to have content and be well prepared.

Shevardnadze agreed, and said that the Soviet side felt that if there were an arms control agreement, a Summit would be realistic. Gorbachev agreed with this. The Soviet side felt that the two sides [Page 245] were now in a situation where real results could be expected, especially in the area of INF. Shevardnadze realized that there were difficulties to be resolved on the U.S. side, and that all viewpoints needed to be considered. Different countries had different approaches. Each side had its own ideology, concepts, approaches and interests. But the Soviet Union also had its allies, who had their interests and concerns. For example, the GDR and Czechoslovakia were concerned about the movement of missiles from their territory. But all of these difficulties could be surmounted.

Shevardnadze continued that late September and October was a good time of year, but he thought that in order to finalize a draft of a treaty, it was necessary to have a foreign ministers’ meeting. It would also depend on the work done in Geneva.

The Secretary said that he would relay this to the President.

Shevardnadze added that he thought, and Gorbachev and Ryzhkov had said this as well, that the Secretary’s meetings, on the whole, had been positive. The Secretary could convey to the President that this was the common opinion of the Soviet leadership. The discussions had been frank. Of course, not all frank discussions were useful. But the discussions of the last several days had had many useful elements which could permit the two sides to lay a basis for a Summit meeting. The Secretary might recall that during their first one-on-one with him, Shevardnadze had asked him if the U.S. were interested in an agreement on INF missiles. After his discussions with the Secretary, he had told Gorbachev that the Secretary was interested in such an agreement.

The Secretary thanked Shevardnadze.

Shevardnadze indicated that now the two sides would have to roll up their sleeves and get down to work.

  1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Trip—Memcons 4/12–16/87. Secret. Drafted by Zarechnak. A stamped notation indicates that Levitsky saw it. The meeting took place in the Foreign Ministry Mansion.