Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

44. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, April 14, 1987, 9:35–11:55 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Secretary’s Third Plenary Meeting with Shevardnadze, Tuesday, April 14, 9:35 pm to 11:55 pm

PARTICIPANTS

• United States

  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Matlock
  • Ambassador Nitze
  • Ambassador Ridgway
  • ACDA Director Adelman
  • Asst. Sec. Perle
  • Mr. Parris (Notetaker)
  • Ambassador Glitman
  • Ambassador Cooper
  • Ambassador Lehman
  • Ambassador Rowny
  • Gen. Moellering
  • Mr. Timbie
  • (Later)
  • Mr. Solomon
  • Mr. Ermarth

• Soviet

  • Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
  • Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh
  • Ambassador Dubinin
  • Ambassador Karpov
  • Ambassador Obukhov
  • Mr. Tarasenko (Foreign Minister’s staff)
  • Mr. Mikol’chak (Acting Chief, USA Dept.)

Shevardnadze opened the meeting by noting that the Secretary had had an opportunity to discuss a broad range of issues throughout the course of the day. It was important to have such discussions, both in bilateral terms and in terms of the problems of the modern world.

Shevardnadze suggested the two talk for a moment on how to summarize their discussions the next day. Some of the working groups were still deliberating. The ministers should find time to listen to them so they could be in a position to sum up the results of their work. Or perhaps it would be better to listen to reports of each group in turn.

The Secretary asked to make a suggestion. He had certainly found the day’s discussions worthwhile. He had heard some things he had not previously known about, and about which he would like to hear more. With Ryzhkov and the General Secretary he had had a longer range sort of dialogue. There ought to be more such non-confrontational discussions of how the world was changing, since both Ryzhkov and the General Secretary seemed to find them interesting. The Secretary hoped that this would be possible.

As to organizational matters, the Secretary suspected that the working groups were as anxious to hear from the ministers as vice versa. He personally had been able to report only briefly to members of his delegation, as he had spent much of the last several hours handing out ice cream and Easter favors to the children of our Embassy staff.

It was the Secretary’s sense that most progress had occurred in the area of LRINF, or, as the Soviets called it, medium range missiles. The Secretary proposed to summarize his understanding of what had been achieved. Shevardnadze could then comment if he had a different view. After hearing the ministers’ summaries, working groups could get down to work on, as it were, an instructed basis.

The Secretary believed there had also been some progress in the area of nuclear testing. He understood that there was a final paragraph of the paper presented by the U.S. side² which was not agreed. But if sufficient work could be done in Moscow it could lay a basis for something signable before the year was out. The Secretary said he understood there had also been some forward movement in the area of chemical weapons, but he had seen no paper on this.

As for START and Defense/Space (D&S), the working groups’ efforts should be reviewed, but the Secretary thought the Minister would agree that it had proved difficult to move the ball very far forward. At least we should seek to record where we agreed and disagreed. So, if that approach seemed acceptable to Shevardnadze, the Secretary was prepared to proceed.

Shevardnadze responded: “tonight”? Perhaps, he suggested, it would be better to proceed in the morning. Shevardnadze himself had not had time to be briefed by his subordinates. He would like to get a report. Perhaps it would be better to review the arms control agenda the next day. Shevardnadze agreed that INF had priority. Testing was also promising, but he had not had time to carefully review the document the U.S. side had prepared. Why not spend an hour and a half summarizing these points the next day.

Also, Shevardnadze was not sure what the Secretary wanted to do about the Space Cooperation agreement. If he were still interested, perhaps the two ministers could sign the document after their Wednesday meeting.³ Perhaps, then, they should focus on regional and other issues in the current session.

The Secretary agreed—with one amendment. Since there was already some measure of agreement on INF, that working group should have the benefit of the ministers’ views tonight so that their work could proceed. Otherwise they would be flying blind. The Secretary could summarize our understanding of the situation very quickly. If Shevardnadze could do the same, it would be helpful. Shevardnadze agreed and asked the Secretary to proceed.

The Secretary stated that, first of all, both sides agreed on the Reykjavik formula of 100 warheads on a side, on a global basis, with residual U.S. missiles in the United States and Soviet missiles in the Asian part of the Soviet Union. As a side note, the U.S. had pointed up certain considerations which made a global zero desirable, especially from the standpoint of verification. The Secretary hoped Soviet experts could give some thought to the complications and expense inherent in the kind of intrusive inspection regime now being considered at levels above zero.

Continuing, the Secretary said that there was agreement that verification was a central issue. Both sides agreed that it would be necessary to ensure the highest confidence in our ability to certify compliance with any agreement. Our views had been expressed in detailed form in our draft treaty; the General Secretary had indicated that the Soviet side would be responding.

On SRINF, there was agreement that we were talking about the SS–12 and SS–23. These systems would be restrained under any INF treaty. Moreover, the concept for dealing with SRINF was a global concept. This was particularly important in view of the ease of transporting such systems. Finally, it was agreed that immediately after the entry into force of an INF agreement, SRINF would be subject to a numerical limit which would be derived from the formula: the current Soviet total minus those systems which would be taken out of the GDR and Czechoslovakia and destroyed. This would be the maximum number allowed. The U.S. would, the Secretary affirmed, have a right as a matter of principle to match Soviet deployments in this field. Follow-on negotiations on SRINF would determine precisely what their ultimate level would be. The General Secretary had said that the number should be zero.

The Secretary concluded his presentation by noting that the progress which had been made on INF issues had narrowed remaining questions to one: what level of SRINF should be permitted. The Soviet side was proposing zero. The U.S. owed an answer. We would consult with our allies on the subject, which would be the subject of subsequent negotiations.

Shevardnadze repeated that he thought it advisable that the ministers use the evening to work with their respective associates in analyzing what had emerged from the day’s discussions, especially what the Secretary and Gorbachev had had to say on medium range missiles. Certain things could be recorded now as agreed, but many other questions required further discussion. By 2:00 the next day, the Soviet side would be able to take more definitive positions on some of the points the Secretary had referred to, and to identify more precisely fundamental differences. So he urged that working groups labor tonight. Shevardnadze would make himself available if necessary.

As a general rule, Shevardnadze suggested, working groups should base their work on the Reykjavik outcome. He thought both sides saw eye to eye on the points addressed in Reykjavik. There was agreement, for example, on the formula of zero medium range warheads in Europe and 100 in Asia. There was agreement to make decisive headway on verification issues. Shevardnadze noted that Gorbachev’s Prague speech appeared to be consonant with U.S. proposals in Geneva, so there should be no particular problem on verification. Delegations could assume there would be more areas of overlap than otherwise. Shevardnadze confirmed that the Soviets would be tabling a draft of their own in Geneva, and agreed that the key outstanding question was what to do about operational/tactical missiles, or, to use U.S. terminology, SRINF.

On that score, the Soviets had already decided what to do about systems in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, and Shevardnadze assumed the U.S. would have no objections to that decision. Consideration should be given as to how to record the fate of the balance of SRINF systems in an agreed document. It was necessary to decide when to start negotiations on such systems, on the purpose and objectives of such negotiations, maybe even on the time frame for their elimination, in order that these issues not complicate agreement on an INF treaty. Shevardnadze was prepared to record agreement on these points today, but said he could do so in a more definitive way on Wednesday. He would also be prepared by then to discuss the mandate for SRINF negotiations. Bessmertnykh interjected that not all of the points which the Secretary had referred to could be considered agreed.

The Secretary replied that he had described what he had gleaned from the day’s discussions. His working groups would be operating on the basis of those impressions. Shevardnadze should instruct his team on their approach. By the next meeting, the two ministers would want to be able to agree on what had been accomplished and to give their Geneva negotiators instructions. They could also compare notes on where nuclear testing issues stood. In general, they should identify areas where we agreed so that work could go ahead. If agreements were not possible, we would keep struggling. The Secretary asked Shevardnadze if they should spend the remainder of the evening on regional issues.

Shevardnadze first returned to INF. There were no differences, he said, on medium range missiles. On SRINF, there were areas where the two sides’ positions had drawn closer. Others required additional study so it would be possible to reach more definitive agreement the next day. Let the experts work throughout the night, taking into account the General Secretary’s comments to the Secretary.

The Secretary agreed—with one reservation. Shevardnadze had said that he would be available to his experts. The Secretary would not. He intended to sleep.

Shevardnadze said he did as well. The experts could do all the work. They could then report on their accomplishments. But what did the Secretary think? Should the ministers listen to separate reports from each group in their next session? The Secretary said they would have to be concise; there was only limited time. Shevardnadze said another option would be for ministers to summarize their working groups’ understanding of areas of agreement and disagreement. This would probably be more concise. The Secretary quipped that, if the ministers misspoke, their experts would let them know. Shevardnadze said he doubted that they would be “overly courageous” in that respect.

Shevardnadze asked the Secretary how extensive a discussion of regional issues he thought advisable. Should they cover all issues? If so, they would get little sleep. Shevardnadze would be interested in discussing the Middle East. The Secretary had expressed interest in Afghanistan; Shevardnadze was also interested in that problem. He would be interested as well in anything the Secretary had to say on Central America.

The Secretary noted that Under Secretary Armacost had recently had a comprehensive review of regional issues with First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov. But the General Secretary had said earlier that Shevardnadze might have something on Afghanistan, and the Secretary had been interested in some of Shevardnadze’s remarks over lunch the day before on his trip to Southeast Asia. For his part, the Secretary was prepared to address the Middle East, and had a few points to make on southern Africa.

(At this point, Shevardnadze was called out of the room for about five minutes.)

On his return, he suggested that the regional discussion begin with the Middle East and then go on to other areas. The Foreign Minister was prepared to lead off.

Shevardnadze described briefly the state of play on U.N. consideration of an international conference on the peace process. Moscow was well aware of the U.S. lack of enthusiasm for the concept of an international conference and for the establishment of a preparatory commission (prepcom) of the permanent members of the Security Council to set the stage for a conference. Shevardnadze wanted to make clear that, in advancing these fora, the Soviet Union envisaged their serving as a means of bilateral as well as multilateral cooperation, and felt they could provide for the active participation of all parties to a possible settlement.

An alternative approach such as that the Soviets had proposed was increasingly necessary in view of the possible consequences of the Iran-Iraq war. Moscow was not in a position to forecast the results of the war, but they clearly would have an important bearing on an already complex Middle East situation. The permanent Council members, including the U.S. and U.S.S.R., should take the lead in dealing with this problem. The U.S. had extensive political and economic interests in the region. The Soviet Union could not ignore developments so near its borders. They ought to share ideas on reaching a political settlement of the region’s problems. It might be possible to find common ground with respect to a prepcom and possible concerted action in the Security Council.

The Secretary said he had a few questions. As a matter of principle, we neither ruled in nor out the idea of an international conference. It was simply a matter of what a conference could do. If a conference showed some prospect of helping the peace process, we were for it; if not, we were against.

The Secretary said he had the sense from Shevardnadze’s remarks that the Soviet Union agreed that disputes between two countries could best be worked out between the two countries themselves. In effect, what the Soviets were saying was that were an international conference to take place, actual resolution of differences would take place via direct bilateral contacts. Other participants, and the conference as a whole, could give counsel and advice, but it was really up to the parties themselves to come to terms. Specifically: between Israel and Syria the issue was the Golan; between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians, the West Bank; between Israel and Egypt, things were basically settled; between Israel and Lebanon, the problem was security—Lebanon was being used as a platform for attacks on Israel. There was a need for these countries and Israel to discuss and resolve these problems, each in their turn. The Secretary emphasized that he was simply trying to get a clear idea of what the Soviet Union felt a conference could or could not do, and whether Moscow believed that a conference was compatible with the idea that issues should be resolved on the basis of bilateral contacts. He had the impression that that was what was being said, but wanted to be clear about this.

Shevardnadze in reply explained how the Soviet position had evolved. The Soviets did not want a conference for its own sake. They thought it could play a useful role. But as they had discussed the concept, they had concluded it would be most likely to produce concrete results if prepared under the lead of the permanent members of the Security Council. In addition, all the parties most directly involved would have to be active participants in the process: Israel, Syria, the Palestinians, Jordan. Other states in the region, while not directly involved, would have a role as well. But the permanent Council members should take the lead to lay a propitious foundation for the work of a conference.

Why had the Soviet Union taken the initiative to propose a two step prepcom/conference approach? First, because efforts over the previous decade to bring about an overall settlement by means of separate agreements had only complicated matters. Second, as he had earlier noted, the possible consequences of the Gulf war loomed increasingly large. There was no time for delay. It was a time for action, particularly by countries with influence in the region. The U.S. had good (even “confidential”) relations with Israel and other states. So did the Soviet Union. Both countries, as well as other permanent Council members, could do much to prepare the way for a successful international conference. But, Shevardnadze concluded, he felt he had not convinced the Secretary and his colleagues.

The Secretary replied that he had already described the circumstances under which we felt a conference might be useful. We failed to see how the permanent Council members could collectively play a useful role. Their interests in the region differed widely, as did their influence. As he had said earlier, a conference could be useful if it facilitated direct contacts between the parties. We were interested in Soviet views on that score.

But, the Secretary continued, there was another problem. If, by some miracle, the Arab-Israeli dispute were to be resolved, a genuine need would arise in the area for economic development. Syria’s economy was in shambles; Jordan’s was better off, but hurting; Egypt was in rough shape. But there was much that could be done if neighboring countries could work together. An example would be to bring water from the Red or Mediterranean Seas to the Dead Sea to restore its traditional level and, possibly, produce electrical power.

A conference, were it to continue beyond a Middle East settlement, ought to be able to address these kinds of needs and opportunities. This might involve a different set of participants. Countries which had the resources to make a contribution to post-settlement economic development included Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as well as the FRG and Japan. Some permanent Council members, e.g., China, were limited in what they could do. The Secretary did not know what the Soviet approach would be. France had a strong historical interest in Lebanon, and the U.K. in Jordan, but it was not clear what they could contribute. How, the Secretary asked, did the Soviet conference proposal address such economic considerations?

Shevardnadze asked if the Secretary was proposing an international economic conference on the region.

The Secretary said he could envision a number of scenarios. A group could be assembled; direct bilateral contacts could resolve the salient issues; and that would be the end of it. Or, a conference might be conceived as a continuing body which could look at longer-term problems. This might be something to look at. For the moment, it was a question mark.

What was clearer was that, to qualify as a participant in any conference, there were certain tickets of admission. One was acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 on the basis for a settlement.⁴ Another was to recognize Israel’s right to exist. Yet another was to renounce the use of violence—necessary to insulate the process from terrorism. If someone wanted to disrupt the process, they did not belong in it. That should be said right up front.

So, the Secretary summarized, he had been trying to focus on some of the issues. He could envision a useful conference, but certain things had to be so. In the Soviet’s own case, we were aware that they had been talking to the Israelis. Israel thought that diplomatic relations should be reestablished. It was even more interested in problems relating to Soviet Jewry, such as emigration. These questions would inevitably arise in connection with organizing a conference. They would have to be answered.

The Secretary endorsed the concerns Shevardnadze had expressed over the situation in the region. The superficial stability of late was deceptive. Things could explode without warning. So the problems were well worth working on.

Shevardnadze said he would consider all that the Secretary had said. Although he felt some of his ideas might be difficult to implement, they should nonetheless be considered.

The idea of an international conference should also be considered for another reason—growing international support for the concept. A majority of the Arab states were now in favor. Even in Israel, influential voices were being heard in support of the approach. Among the Security Council members, the PRC and France backed a preparatory commission; the U.K. was wavering. Only the U.S. remained adamantly opposed.

Perhaps, Shevardnadze suggested, the U.S. could give additional thought to the idea. Maybe consideration should be given to organizing bilateral discussion on a more “permanent” basis. Maybe the discussions our representatives had been having were not adequate. More “permanent” talks could probably best take place below the Deputy Foreign Minister level. Perhaps our Ambassadors could take a more active role in the process.

To “round out” the discussion of the Middle East, the Secretary summarized briefly his understanding of the conversation. The two sides agreed that, regardless of their sponsorship, the parties most directly involved must decide how to resolve their disputes. So, in the end, the most important thing was to establish bilateral relations.

At this point the Secretary said he had received a note from his arms control back-benchers. They would like to be about their business of following up on the first part of the evening’s conversation. But they did not want to be rude about leaving. The Secretary suggested that they should feel free to depart. Shevardnadze agreed that everyone who was sleepy should leave.

[Glitman, Holmes, Moellering, Cooper, Timbie and Rowny left the room, to be replaced approximately half an hour later by State S/P Director Solomon and NSC staff member Ermarth.]

After Shevardnadze had suggested that there was no need to continue the discussion on the Middle East, the Secretary recalled the General Secretary’s statement that Shevardnadze would have some things to say on Afghanistan. The Secretary would be interested in hearing them, and had a few points of his own.

Shevardnadze said that he really had nothing very novel. Soviet views on the elements of a political settlement were public knowledge. Shevardnadze himself had recently been in Kabul with Dobrynin. Their purpose had been to get an idea of their own of the process at work there. The situation was complex, tense. But major events were taking place. Shevardnadze proposed to share with the Secretary his personal impressions from the trip.

First, Shevardnadze related, the current leadership had adopted a genuine policy of national reconciliation. They had concluded that the Afghan revolution was of a “national democratic” character. They were thus seeking to enroll the active support and participation of the national bourgeoisie, the clergy, and entrepreneurial elements. These efforts had elicited strong popular support. After almost eight years of war, people were tired; they wanted peace.

The leadership was, moreover, taking decisive steps to implement its new approach. Many in the West belittled the significance of these steps. This was a mistake. An important (and wise) decision had been adopted on a ceasefire. The government was trying to follow through on this commitment; wherever there were no challenges from the other side, peace had been established.

The Soviets themselves had taken certain actions. Part of its limited contingent had been withdrawn. The U.S. had belittled the step, but the force in question was significant. Moreover, a timetable for withdrawal of the remainder of Soviet forces had now been established. The final “schedule” was eighteen months. The people and government of Afghanistan fully supported this schedule.

The Geneva proximity process was also going forward under the leadership of the U.N. Secretary General’s personal representative.⁵ Talks were proceeding smoothly, although there was still a difference of opinion on the withdrawal question. The Soviets expected progress in the next round.

As for the Pakistanis, the Soviets had the impression that, left to their own devices, they would be “bolder” in their relations with the DRA. The Soviets had their own contacts with Pakistan, of course, and from these had the sense that Islamabad was interested in a political settlement. For their part, the leaders of Afghanistan had made clear their willingness to cooperate in establishing a real coalition government with Zahir Shah, the king’s former prime minister, and even with those forces currently fighting the government from bases in Pakistan.

Shevardnadze said that he had been very favorably impressed with the Afghan leadership during his visit. He had not known any of them before, and was struck by the level of their political maturity. They took a very broad view of things, and enjoyed strong support from the people. Shevardnadze often found in his discussions with Western leaders a reluctance to deal with the Afghan regime. Shevardnadze was not able to take seriously suggestions that, somehow, the current leadership had to go. If one did not assume that a government of Afghanistan already existed, no coalition government was possible. So the task was to ensure that the program of national reconciliation was successful. No one should stand in its way. The policy of the current regime was correct and held great promise.

As for the U.S., it could, if it wished, play an important role in bringing about a political settlement. The Soviets knew of America’s special relationship with the Pakistani leadership. The U.S. could help Pakistan deal with the Afghan refugees and use its influence to help the Afghan people establish the conditions for true democracy.

Returning to the question of Soviet troops, Shevardnadze emphasized that a deadline for their withdrawal had been announced. The Soviets wanted their troops out. They were not interested in securing any special advantages; theirs was an honest approach. No one should doubt their sincerity.

The Secretary said the U.S. saw the situation somewhat differently.

In the first place, it was hard to view the current government as representative of the Afghan people when a third of the country’s population was in Pakistan or Iran. These people had had to leave as a result of the Soviet invasion. They had a right to a say in considerations affecting Afghanistan’s future, and they were not in a position to make their views known. Of the population which remained in Afghanistan, a high percentage were fighting the Soviet presence. It was difficult to feel that the current government represented these people. We believed that any real policy of national reconciliation would have to be validated by means, e.g., internationally supervised elections, which would enable the Afghan people openly to express their preferences about who would lead them. Traditionally, the Afghans did not want a strong central government.

We were frankly concerned, the Secretary continued, by the tendency of the war in Afghanistan to spill over the border into Pakistan. People were being killed as a result of recent raids. The situation was worsening. We strongly supported Pakistan. We welcomed the Soviet announcement that it would withdraw from Afghanistan, but their eighteen month timetable was far too long. The guiding principle in such a process should be how long it should take from a logistical standpoint. If, as Shevardnadze had said, the current regime was supported by the people, there should be no problems in the wake of a withdrawal; trouble would arise only if it were not.

The Secretary reaffirmed U.S. support for the efforts of the Secretary General’s personal representative on Afghanistan and proximity talks. There had been some headway. As the situation on the ground continued to evolve, we hoped the Soviets would reexamine their view on national reconciliation and the 18-month troop withdrawal schedule. We wanted to see an early political settlement. The conflict was a thorn in the side of our bilateral relations. The situation was a tragedy for the Afghan people. Moscow’s reputation in the Islamic world was suffering as a result of the war. These were all arguments for reaching agreement on a political settlement. The U.S. had no interest in securing advantages in Afghanistan. Afghanistan could never be a threat to the Soviet Union. Our only concern was that the country regain its neutral, nonaligned status. In any case, we would continue to work on the problem, because the continuation of the war was a tragedy.

The Secretary said that he had heard a report that the Soviets might be willing to withdraw their forces in eleven, rather than eighteen months. Was there anything to the report?

Shevardnadze said he knew nothing of it. The Secretary commented that rumors often simply get started. Shevardnadze repeated that he had had nothing to do with any such suggestion. Perhaps the U.S. had some ideas.

Picking up on the Secretary’s reference to Moscow’s “invasion” of Afghanistan, Shevardnadze said that invasions were one thing; the presence of forces of one country on the territory of another on the basis of an agreement between the two sovereign states was another. This had to be reckoned with. If the Soviet Union was leaving Afghanistan, it was not because it was being driven out, but because the current leadership felt it possible to run the country without their presence.

Shevardnadze said he urged the U.S. to look carefully at what was occurring in Afghanistan as the government implemented its national reconciliation policy and ceasefire proposals. In only two months, 10,000 armed rebels had come over to the government’s side. On the basis of agreements with the authorities, they had taken over responsibility for the security of their villages. Over 45,000 refugees had meanwhile returned to Afghanistan, recently responding to Kabul’s offers of land and financing for improvements. This process was taking place despite Pakistani attempts to frustrate efforts to return to relocating camps away from border areas. But the process was deep-rooted and would be impossible to stop.

Shevardnadze again emphasized that the U.S. could contribute to a political settlement if it wished. It would be best, in this context, not to arm “forces” based in Afghanistan with sophisticated weaponry like the Stinger missile. The Soviets knew of the great volume in which such arms were being shipped. It would be better if there were greater restraint. As to Moscow’s relations with the Islamic world, they were good and no great cause for concern to the Soviet Union. But if there were a drop in arms supplies to the resistance, it would be a real contribution to an Afghan settlement.

The Secretary replied that we supported those who fought for the independence of their country. It pained us to see the war continue. We wanted it to end. But we and the Soviets seemed far apart on this issue.

Shevardnadze countered that we were far apart not only on the issue of Afghanistan. He would be candid. The U.S. administration seemed to think it normal practice to fight legally constituted governments that the U.S. chose not to view as legitimate. This was the case with Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola and Kampuchea. But these governments were legitimate. They had been elected. They represented their people. The U.S. approach was a gross and flagrant violation of the sovereignty of these countries, including Afghanistan.

The Secretary said he was surprised to hear Shevardnadze suggest that the Kampuchean government had been elected by the people of Kampuchea. The Secretary knew of no such election. Kampuchea had been occupied by Vietnam. The Vietnamese should not be there; they had no business there. The U.S. supported the ASEAN countries in this matter. The Chinese were also disturbed by Vietnam’s presence in Kampuchea. As in the case of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, Vietnam should get out. There were Kampuchean refugees all over the world. The message of refugees was that something was wrong in their own country.

As long as they had gotten to the subject of Kampuchea, the Secretary continued, Shevardnadze had suggested over lunch the day before that he had gleaned some sense of movement toward a resolution of the problem during his recent Asian trip. What was Hanoi’s current attitude?

Shevardnadze in reply asked the Secretary if he had ever been in Kampuchea.

The Secretary said he had not. He had been in all the surrounding states: Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia. He had not been in Hanoi. But he had the impression from his travels that the pace of economic development in Vietnam compared unfavorably to that of other Southeast Asian States. He supposed that was a function of Vietnam’s having made a career out of war. Hanoi’s withdrawal from Kampuchea would be welcomed by all the countries of the region and contribute to its stability.

Shevardnadze pointed out that the Vietnamese had learned to fight against the U.S. and France. They were good soldiers. The Secretary agreed they fought well.

Shevardnadze said he had asked the Secretary if he had visited Kampuchea because he himself had been to the country for the first time on his trip. While there, he had seen a great deal, including a macabre, sombre museum devoted to the crimes of the Pol Pot regime.⁶

The Secretary interjected that he had nothing good to say about Pol Pot. Shevardnadze asked to be allowed to continue. The Foreign Minister was convinced that, but for Vietnamese assistance, there would be no Kampuchean people on the face of the earth today. The Kampucheans had to be rescued. The Vietnamese had taken the task on their shoulders.

Now the situation in Kampuchea was improving, albeit slowly. Vietnam’s position on the withdrawal of its troops was clear. They could not withdraw in an irresponsible manner. If they did, civil war would break out the next day. Pol Pot forces, armed to the teeth with arms of U.S. manufacture, would make the move they had long been waiting for. So it would be irresponsible for Vietnam simply to pull out.

Shevardnadze urged that the Secretary consider another point. The Kampuchean leadership had said it was ready to cooperate with all opposition groups, including Sihanouk.⁷ They had even sought the good offices of a number of states in this effort. Even those who had taken up arms against the government would be welcome, with the exception of the Pol Pot group. Vietnam had endorsed this approach. The initiative was an interesting one which should be given a chance. Shevardnadze had the impression that the ASEAN countries were as interested in finding a political settlement to the Kampuchea problem as the states of Indochina. In the absence of external pressure, progress should be possible.

As for Vietnam’s economic situation, it was a consequence of the lengthy U.S. experience in the country. This was not just a matter of a year or two; the war had left a deep impression. The Soviets were doing what they could to help. The Vietnamese leadership was itself embarked on a restructuring of its economy. Shevardnadze was convinced that, with time, Vietnam would be a totally different country.

The Secretary said he did not consider this a particularly fruitful area for discussion. Shevardnadze replied that he had not expected it to be. Knowing the kind of person the Secretary was, it was not by chance that Shevardnadze had urged him to visit Kampuchea. It would change his viewpoint. There had been a national tragedy there. One could not just sit in judgement and ignore the legacy of the previous leadership—half of the population had been exterminated. The Secretary repeated that nothing good could be said for Pol Pot. Nothing.

Shevardnadze noted that often in the West it was suggested that the governments of Afghanistan and Kampuchea should be changed. It was said that those in power should be expelled and others invited to form a government. The U.S. had done something of the sort in Grenada in a matter of days. The Soviet Union could not follow suit. It was not prepared to assume the shame for such a move. Shevardnadze acknowledged that such a statement might not be pleasant to the Secretary.

The Secretary said he found it very pleasant. He would tell the Foreign Minister how the U.S. had become involved in Grenada. We had moved at the request of neighbouring governments after Grenada’s rulers had begun killing one another. We had citizens on the island who were in danger. Our troops were there only a short time. The few who had stayed on for a longer period were engineers. Their task was not to repair battle damage, but to deal with the consequences of the Bishop⁸ regime’s economic mismanagement. An election had put the current leadership in power. They were Grenadans. We were not telling anyone in Grenada what to do. So we were quite proud of what had happened in Grenada. U.S. troops were out. Vietnam’s were still in Kampuchea. The Soviets had been in Afghanistan for years.

The Secretary said he saw little purpose to be served by continuing to go around this circle. But a time might come when people in the areas that had been discussed were ready to settle things. He wanted Shevardnadze to know that when such a time came, the U.S. would be on the side of those who reflected what the people wanted. That would be the touchstone of our approach. In Afghanistan, that meant that the views of the refugees would have to be taken into account.

The Secretary noted that Shevardnadze had mentioned the Iran-Iraq war earlier in the conversation. This was an area where U.S. and Soviet views did not diverge so radically.

Shevardnadze said he would come back to the Iran-Iraq war. He wanted to emphasize that the U.S. had no grounds whatever for invading Grenada. Vietnam had gone into Kampuchea to save the Kampuchean people. The U.S. had toppled the legitimate government of a neighbouring country. This could only be viewed as open aggression.

The U.S., Shevardnadze continued, had allies and friends neighbouring the Soviet Union—Turkey, Japan. The Soviet Union had friends in America’s neighborhood—close friends like Cuba and Nicaragua. Moscow was helping these friends. Despite its own needs, it would continue to help them, because it supported their cause. The revolution in Nicaragua was a popular one. The Soviet Union would support it morally and materially. The Soviets were concerned by the Administration’s open support for efforts to subvert the Nicaraguan government and could not be disinterested in the matter.

Shevardnadze said that the Soviet Union attached great importance to the emergence of a mechanism for the settlement of the complex situation in Central America—the Contadora⁹ group. Contadora’s approach was interesting and could be effective. It deserved support. Recent proposals by the Contadora foreign ministers merited close study.

Shevardnadze reemphasized that he was calling the Secretary’s attention to these matters because the Soviets were concerned by the Administration’s policy toward Nicaragua. That was why Shevardnadze had raised Grenada. One must draw conclusions from the past. Nicaragua was a small country, but the Soviet Union supported it.

The Secretary said he, too, was concerned about those fighting in Nicaragua. His concern was that the U.S. was not doing enough to support them. Nicaragua had made itself an unwelcome presence. It was coordinating subversion against its neighbours and harboring terrorists. Without exception, the countries of the region felt Nicaragua must find its way to a democratic form of government. We agreed. We would persist in our approach, and did not welcome the huge shipments of armaments which the Soviet Union was supplying to Nicaragua by direct and indirect means. Indeed, Nicaragua’s continuing military buildup was the major destabilizing factor in the region. Cuba’s actions were also disruptive. For our part, we would continue to help those fighting for their independence and freedom.

The Secretary observed that he had been to Nicaragua. He had met with Ortega¹⁰ in good faith to assess the prospects for a negotiated settlement. They had met again in Mexico. But the dialogue had proven fruitless. Contrary to what had been agreed, Nicaragua had sought to undermine the Contadora process Shevardnadze had just praised. So the U.S. had had to break off talks. We continued to work for peace in the region. There had been some progress.

Shevardnadze asked if the U.S. supported the Contadora process. The Secretary pointed out that we had helped launch it, but felt its prospects would be better if we were not too closely identified with the effort. The Secretary himself had discussed the idea with Foreign Minister Sepulveda when Sepulveda was still Ambassador in Washington. We supported Contadora’s 21 Objectives. If they were implemented, we would be content.

Shevardnadze said it would be well if the U.S. and the Soviet Union both expressed their support for Contadora and the support group. Perhaps the U.S. could consider a joint statement or agreed paper on the subject.

The Secretary replied that the U.S. had expressed its support for Contadora many times. There was no reason to do so jointly. We were playing an active role in the region already.

Shevardnadze said he would leave the matter there. Referring to an expression he had used the day before, the Secretary commented that he and the Foreign Minister had not “rung the bell” very loudly in their present discussion. He asked the Foreign Minister’s concurrence in moving on to southern Africa.

The Secretary introduced the subject by describing the need of the southern African states for a reliable transportation outlet to the sea. Various routes made sense. One was the Benguela Railroad, which a number of states in the region had expressed interest in reopening. The problem was that part of the line ran through territory controlled by Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA. Savimbi had now announced his willingness to have the line reopened if it were guaranteed that it would not carry military cargo, and if it were subject to international supervision. The Secretary personally felt that the Angolan government would be wise to talk to Savimbi on the matter. He was a genuine leader of an important tribal group in the country. He was an impressive guy.

Shevardnadze asked if the U.S. had talked to the Angolan government about the idea. The Secretary said that there had been discussions. Talks had been broken off over the past year, but, a week to ten days before, a “very tentative” meeting had been held under the auspices of OAU chief Sosu.

Shevardnadze said that the reason he had asked the question was that the Angolan leaders were also nice guys. Shevardnadze knew them all. They were interesting people who were capable of a serious dialogue with the U.S. in pursuit of solutions. The Secretary suggested they talk to Savimbi. Shevardnadze said that was their decision to make. The Secretary asked how the Soviets’ hands off approach on Angola squared with their support for national reconciliation in Afghanistan.

Shevardnadze underscored the sincerity of the Afghan and Kampuchean governments’ commitment to national reconciliation. The U.S. may not recognize the legitimacy of those governments, he continued, but Angola was different. The current government had been in power for over a decade. It had problems, but it was running the country. That could not be seriously questioned. Shevardnadze said he could not understand the U.S. mentality on this issue.

The Secretary asked why, if Shevardnadze was correct, the civil war continued. Why were the Cubans still there?

Shevardnadze shot back that he would tell the Secretary why. How many troops did the U.S. have in South Korea? Why should the U.S. have rights that other countries do not. Should only major powers like the U.S. and U.S.S.R. be able to send troops where they wish, while small countries could not?

The Secretary said he had only asked why the Cubans should be necessary if the Angolan government was popular with its own people.

Shevardnadze said the Secretary knew what the main destabilizing factor in the region was. It was South Africa. This was a reality which had been recognized even by the U.S. and its allies. That was why the Cubans were needed: to defend Angola. South Africa threatened not only Angola, but all the countries of southern Africa. It was the only threat to the region.

The Secretary said that the U.S. agreed on the evil of the apartheid system and on the desirability of change on the part of the South African government. We were working toward that end.

With respect to Angola, however, it was simply impossible to ignore the strength and staying power of Savimbi and UNITA. He controlled a major part of the country. He had been a leader in the war against Portuguese rule. It was necessary to put him and the other leaders of the colonial war back together. Savimbi didn’t claim leadership of all of Angola, only a segment.

The U.S. was also committed to a settlement of the Namibia problem on the basis of UNSC Resolution 435.¹¹ This could be brought about if the Cubans left Angola. An independent Namibia would insulate Angola from South Africa.

As for the Benguela Railroad, its reopening would benefit the countries Shevardnadze had expressed concern over. Savimbi had made a forthcoming offer. It had surprised the Secretary.

Shevardnadze pointed out that the conversation was getting into issues which were the exclusive prerogative of the Angolan government. If the U.S. were serious about dealing with the problem posed by South Africa, appropriate means were available. The issue was being discussed at the U.N. Steps could be taken to make South Africa less of a threat to the security and stability of the region. But it appeared that this was another area where he and the Secretary would find conversation difficult.

The Secretary acknowledged that this was probably true. The U.S. was in touch with all groups in South Africa who might have a role to play in the event the government recognized the need for changes. The question was how to manage the process to ensure a negotiated, peaceful transition. The situation did not, for the moment, look promising.

The Secretary suggested that the discussion move on to Chad. Qadhafi had been expelled, or nearly so. We hoped he would stay out. He had had no business being in Chad in the first place. We hoped he had no aspirations to return.

Shevardnadze asked if the U.S. had contacts with Qadhafi.

The Secretary replied that we did only in the sense that we had to deal with his terrorist actions. We didn’t need those kinds of contacts.

Shevardnadze said it was well that the U.S. had left Qadhafi alone. Moscow continued to oppose the presence of any outside interference in the affairs of Chad, whether by the U.S., France or Libya. Qadhafi knew this. The U.S. did, too. There was no problem in this regard.

The Secretary said he hoped that Qadhafi did, in fact, know the Soviet view. Perhaps he would pay attention to it.

Commenting that it was becoming a long day, Shevardnadze recalled that the Secretary had asked about the Iran-Iraq war. Why not take up that issue and call it a day? This was not the first time the U.S. and U.S.S.R. had discussed the matter. The situation was very grave. The Soviets did not know how the war would end. Perhaps it would be best not to be too specific about who had initiated the war, or who had aided and abetted one side or the other. The main thing was how to end this senseless war. Even Qadhafi had called it “senseless.” Did the Secretary know that?

The Secretary said it did not much change his opinion of Qadhafi.

Shevardnadze said the Soviets were aware that the U.S. was in touch with the Iraqi leadership. They also knew of prior American contacts with Iran. Maybe, Shevardnadze mused, they were still going on. For their part, the Soviets had tried to maintain a dialogue with both sides, but to no avail. Iran seemed determined to press the war to a successful conclusion. The consequences of such an outcome would be great. The question was, what to do?

The Soviets felt that only the UN Security Council seemed capable of doing anything about the problem. The Secretary General’s forthcoming visit to the region to promote mediation deserved support. The problem was being discussed in the Security Council. There had even been a proposal that it be taken up by Foreign Ministers. Moscow agreed with the U.S. view that no purpose would be served by such a meeting unless it were well prepared. This might be something the two sides could consider. Sanctions could also be examined, although they were a thorny issue. They were not always effective, but they could be looked at.

Shevardnadze said that they had recently discussed the issue with the Iraqi foreign minister, who had not ruled out the stationing of U.N. troops on Iraqi soil in the event of a ceasefire. Maybe this was not the answer, however. UNIFIL’s presence in Lebanon had not prevented fighting there. In any case, these matters could be studied. The Soviets did not rule out that, if the necessary preparatory work were complete. Foreign Ministers of the permanent Council members might meet on the Iran-Iraq war.

The Secretary thanked Shevardnadze for his ideas and said the U.S. shared many of the concerns the Foreign Minister had expressed. The principal lever was to stop the flow of arms to Iran. The public outcry over the small shipments which had reached Iran from the U.S. last year was a function of the shipments themselves, not of the significance of the contents of those shipments.

The U.S. was also concerned about possible spillover of the war to other countries. We had made clear our readiness to help our friends in the Gulf. We could support U.N. mediation of the conflict, but saw little hope of success. As for the use of U.N. peacekeeping or monitoring forces, experience had shown that such arrangements worked only if both parties to a conflict agreed in advance to their introduction—as in the Golan Heights. UNIFIL had had difficulties because not all the parties welcomed them. The U.S. was prepared to work with the Soviet Union to promote a solution. The Secretary knew that Ambassador Walters had a good relationship with his Soviet counterpart at the U.N. They could continue to talk. But, for the moment, we did not have an answer.

Shevardnadze said he didn’t either. Noting that it had been a long day, he suggested that, since bilateral issues had been discussed in working groups, they need not occupy much of the ministers’ time. If the Secretary agreed, perhaps it would be possible to discuss the exchange of Consulates General in Kiev and New York. As for the other issues on the bilateral agenda, Shevardnadze would instruct his subordinates not to quibble, so that they could be wrapped up before the Secretary’s departure. Perhaps the Secretary could give similar instructions. Economic issues had been taken care of in the Ryzhkov meeting. The remaining elements of the agenda were being considered in working groups. Was the Secretary ready to conclude?

The Secretary said he was. As the delegations rose from their chairs, he asked Shevardnadze to give his regards to the young Communists whom the Foreign Minister would see the next morning. Shevardnadze said that they were good people.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Trip—Memcons 4/12–16/87. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Parris. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the Foreign Ministry Guesthouse.
2. Not further identified.
3. See Document 45.
4. Reference is to UNSC Resolutions 242 (November 22, 1967) and 338 (October 22, 1973), which called for a Middle East peace settlement based on borders prior to the Six-Day War.
5. Reference is to Diego Cordovez.
6. Reference is to ousted Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot.
7. Norodom Sihanouk, the exiled King of Cambodia.
8. Maurice Bishop, the leader of Grenada who was deposed on October 14, 1983, following a U.S. invasion of the island nation.
9. Documents related to the Contadora process toward a peaceful settlement in Nicaragua are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XV, Central America, 1985–1988.
10. Shultz met Nicaraguan leader Daniel Ortega in Managua on June 1, 1984.
11. Reference is to UNSC Resolution 435, adopted on September 29, 1978, which called for the establishment of an independent Namibia. Documents related to U.S.-Soviet negotiations toward this end are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXVI, Southern Africa, 1985–1988.