35. Electronic Message From Fritz Ermarth of the National Security Council Staff to Sandra Kelly of the National Security Council Staff1

SUBJECT

  • NSPG Notes, 7 April, Non-arms-control

A Document is attached to this message.2

NSPG 7 April 1987, WHSR, chaired by the President. Fritz W. Ermarth minutes of discussion on subjects other than arms control. Transmission to Robert E. Linhard.

Opening the meeting, the President stressed that our total agenda with the Soviets—human rights, bilateral contacts, and regional conflicts, along with arms control—should get fully balanced treatment. He invited the Secretary of State to give an overview of his impending trip to Moscow.

Secretary Shultz noted that the Soviets appeared to be evaluating the situation and putting out different kinds of views about prospects, as they had after Geneva and around Reykjavik. We have to listen and focus on what we want. Gorbachev decided to delink INF from the other talks to spur the process of engagement with us. Impressive progress was being made on bilateral issues, following Ambassador Ridgway’s agreement with the Soviets at Reykjavik. We had a bilateral review commission which had recently met. Human rights had been placed squarely on the agenda.

The Secretary of State saw improved quality in our regional discussions with the Soviets lately, especially in talks of Undersecretary Armacost in Moscow. Secretary Shultz stated his intent to hit the Soviets hard on human rights, while noting some improvements, and on Afghanistan, where they had to recognize the need simply to get out as the condition of a settlement. He thought there was some prospect [Page 129] for movement on Angola, where Savimbi—with whom Shultz had met secretly—wanted to explore compromise.

On arms control Secretary Shultz thought an INF agreement was now most accessible but that a START agreement was of primary importance to the President and his Administration. We were approaching this soberly but fully ready for business. The Secretary said he felt no pressure to come home with agreements and was prepared to walk away from tempting agreements that were faulty.

He also noted that throughout President Reagan’s tenure, US-Soviet relations had suffered atmospheric ups and downs, with the KAL shootdown,3 the Daniloff arrest,4 and now the Soviet penetrations of our Moscow embassy. This latter development, which the Secretary termed sickening, made it difficult to do business with the Soviets just now. Unlike President Carter’s surprise over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, the Reagan Administration was not surprised by Soviet misbehavior of this kind although it produced situations hard to handle. He noted that Ambassador Matlock had made a strong protest to the Soviets this morning.

The President remarked that, on human rights issues, the Secretary should draw attention of the Soviets to his pledge not to exploit or claim credit for positive moves the Soviets might make.

The Secretary agreed he would stress this to Shevardnadze. He noted that the Orlov release, the return of Sakharov, and some other cases meant that some two thirds of our pleas to the Soviets about specific individuals had been met.

Arms control discussion

Frank Carlucci asked the group to return to non-arms control issues for the balance of the meeting, noting that Secretary Shultz had treated most of them in his opening remarks.

Secretary Shultz repeated that he would hit the Soviets hard on Afghanistan and saw some positive signs on Angola. He was more pessimistic about Nicaragua and Cambodia. The message on Nicaragua would be “keep your cotton picking hand off Central America.” On human rights he said we planned to go beyond our usual lines (divided spouses, political prisoners, emigration, and fulfillment of Helsinki) to press on religious prisoners, freedom of mails and international telecommunications, jamming and other media issues. He noted that the Soviets had proposed a human rights conference in Moscow (agreed [Page 130] by all to be an oxymoron); we were in consultation with allies on how to treat this and believed that stating some firm conditions, such as freedom for non-governmental groups to participate openly, would give us leverage.

Responding to questions on how he would treat the Soviet invasion of our embassy, Secretary Shultz said he was struggling with the right way to phrase a strong protest. He was considering a message to the Soviets that said: You are creating an environment so hostile and difficult that perhaps we shall decide to limit our representation to an ambassador and a few other people, limits that would also apply to the Soviets in the US. He found this unappealing but was angry and felt that something needed to be done.

The President cited this matter as an illustration of his argument that military competition springs from mistrust, not the other way around, and here we had a Soviet action calculated to generate mistrust.

Secretary Baker asked whether this was not the perfect time to cancel the Soviet claim on their new chancery building on Mount Alto.

Secretary Weinberger said stress must be on complete reciprocity in these matters. He noted that there was no security for official Americans in Moscow and that none could be provided by vans and trailers introduced in a hurry. The President asked whether advanced technologies could nullify Soviet penetrations; Secretary Weinberger responded that this was being explored.

Secretary Shultz reported that efforts were being made to provide secure voice, messaging, and conferencing for his trip to Moscow. He was being told that he could be confident in the security being provided. If needed a small plane would be available to fly messages to Helsinki for transmission. In response to continued expressions of doubt about Moscow security, Secretary Shultz opined that not to go would be a political defeat. Secretary Weinberger stressed that he was calling merely for consideration of alternate sites, e.g., Geneva or Helsinki. The President repeated his plea that we look to advanced technology to outfox the Soviets in this business.

The Secretary of State observed that, despite intermittent flaps over espionage and such matters, the President’s agenda was dominating the US-Soviet relationship and steady progress had been made since 1984 in pushing this agenda. Frank Carlucci thought this was a good closing point, and the President adjourned the meeting.

  1. Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, SecState Moscow Trip: April 13–16, 1987 (1) NSPG—April 7, 1987. Secret. An unknown hand wrote in the top right-hand corner of the messages: “Fritz’s Points.” The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room from 11:08 a.m. to 12:08 p.m. Reagan, Bush, Craig Fuller, Shultz, Ridgway, Nitze, Rowny, Lehman, Weinberger, Ikle, Crowe, Moellering, Adelman, Gates, Douglas George, Meese, James Baker, Martin, Miller, Graham, Duberstein, Howard Baker, Carlucci, Linhard, and Ermarth attended. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) The full minutes of the meeting are in Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, 1981–1987, NSPG 0151 04/07/1981 (1).
  2. Not found attached.
  3. See footnote 8, Document 123.
  4. Reference is to Nicholas Daniloff, a U.S. journalist who was arrested on September 2, 1986, in Moscow by the KGB and accused of espionage.