30. Memorandum From Fritz Ermarth of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)1
SUBJECT
- Briefing Shultz on President’s View of Afghanistan, Today, 3:30 p.m.
In your 3:30 p.m. meeting with Secretary Shultz today, you should aprise him of the exchange that took place at yesterday’s 9:30 a.m. NSB2 about the treatment to be given Afghanistan during the Secretary’s visit to Moscow. The bottom line: The Secretary should convey a very strong message about the importance of the Soviets getting out, and should instruct those preparing his materials accordingly. Suggested talking points are attached.3
After Linhard briefed the President on arms control issues, I chimed in with the point that any letter the President sends to Gorbachev and Shultz’s instructions must hit the Soviets hard on Afghanistan and other regional issues. I noted the potential embarrassment should the President submit an INF agreement for ratification when there are more Soviet troops in Afghanistan than there were in 1980. I said that we should avoid a mechanical linkage that made agreement on INF dependent on Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, but the record must show a great US effort to put pressure on them.
Senator Baker spoke for some degree of linkage, saying that the political situation is very different from 1980: The Soviets do want out of Afghanistan; they also want an arms control agreement; and the President is politically stronger than was Jimmy Carter. The President endorsed the thrust of this conversation, although not in detail. He certainly wants any letter and the Secretary’s instructions to be very stern on Afghanistan.
I suspect that Secretary Shultz will not welcome this message. His people (Roz Ridgway, who is coordinating his trip materials) expect to hit regional issues only perfunctorily because they were “covered” in Armacost’s recent trip. Mike did hit them hard on Afghanistan; but that is no reason why the Secretary should not.
[Page 109]We know from intelligence materials that the Soviets perceive exploitable daylight between the Secretary and some of his key advisors, on one hand, and that portion of the President’s policy outlook (SDI, anti-Soviet biases, Reagan Doctrine on freedom fighters) which they ascribe to the influence of the “military industrial complex”, on the other. They want to use differences within the Administration to amplify differences between it and the Congress and within the Alliance. For this reason it is vital that the Secretary work to alter this Soviet perception. They are much more likely to bite the necessary bullets on arms control and the regional issues if they see the Secretary taking very tough positions. If they see him trying to soften Administration positions, they are likely just to play along without clean decisions to determine how much softening will occur.
On Afghanistan and arms control specifically, it would, in my view, be a mistake to declare a mechanical linkage or conditionality. The Soviets won’t believe it and the Administration will be roundly attacked for it. Moreover, the Administration doesn’t have to go this far because it is doing so much more than its predecessor to fight the Soviets in the field in Afghanistan. We have to sound three kinds of messages from the highest levels to maximize our pressure:
The invasion of Afghanistan prevented ratification of an arms control agreement very much favored by Congress and the Executive in 1980 and demanding less political trust than anything we are now negotiating.
Failure of the USSR to make a clean break and to withdraw places a grave and continuing burden on all decisionmaking within the Administration and the Congress on how far to go with the Soviets on any issue. Attacks on Pakistan are not only politically counterproductive, they present a risk of confrontation.
A clean Soviet decision to get out of Afghanistan would signal that Gorbachev really intends to reform Soviet external policy and to seek a healthier, more tolerant relationship with the outside world. This would generate good will and concrete positive responses from the US and other countries.
This would fit well with the President’s four part agenda with the Soviets and also within Shultz’s plan for a broader discussion of global trends.
Rodman, Linhard and Oakley concur.
RECOMMENDATION
That you use the talking points (Tab I) in your meeting with Secretary Shultz.4
- Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, Secretary Shultz’s Moscow Trip April 1987 Pre-Trip Background Material (3). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.↩
- Reagan met with Bush, Powell, Ermarth, Baker, and Duberstein for a national security briefing on March 25 from 9:22 to 9:45 a.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary)↩
- See footnote 4 below.↩
- Tab I, undated talking points, is attached but not printed. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation.↩