28. Memorandum From Barry Kelly of the National Security Council Staff to
the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)1
Washington, March 24, 1987
SUBJECT
- Follow-up to Longtree2 Espionage Case
Attached at Tab I is the first report submitted to you relating to the
potential damage to the national security as a result of the marine guard
previously assigned to our embassy in Moscow who was arrested on December
31, 1986, for being a KGB agent. New
information has been developed as the Naval Investigative Service has
pursued this case and it now appears the damage is far worse than we
previously projected.
The NIS located and interviewed last week (March 19, 1987) another marine
guard who served in Moscow with Longtree. This individual, Arnold Bracy, a
black marine corporal, has admitted knowing about Longtree’s espionage in
Moscow as well as helping him in his espionage activity for which Longtree
paid him $1000. Bracy confessed to his activity for two days, but was unable
to pass a polygraph examination on the completeness of his confession. On
Saturday, March 21, he asked for a lawyer and his interview stopped. He is
currently in custody pending formal espionage charges being filed against
him. The NIS is concerned about their ability to successfully prosecute
Longtree; however, Bracy’s information may assist the success of this
prosecution and, as such, Bracy may be granted immunity.
Bracy provided the following new information:
Longtree admitted to Bracy that he worked for the KGB in Moscow for some time prior to January 1986. During the
time period prior to January 1986, when he was the marine guard in our
Moscow Embassy during the evening (the Embassy required only one marine
guard on duty during that time period), Longtree allowed 1–4 KGB technicians into the secure areas of our
embassy on “numerous occasions.” During the period from January 1986-March
1986 (when Longtree was transferred to Vienna) Longtree and Bracy worked
together to allow KGB
technicians into every secure area of the embassy. This included
access to
[Page 101]
[2½
lines not declassified]. The KGB
team would be granted access to the space by Longtree and Bracy would turn
off the alarms and CCTV systems which were put in place to detect
surreptitious entry. The KGB teams would
normally enter the secure space at 2:00 a.m. and work until 5:00–6:00 a.m.
Longtree and Bracy also periodically had the duty of burning the classified
trash [less than 1 line not declassified] and Bracy
saw Longtree routinely segregate TOP SECRET and SECRET documents out of the
burn bags for transmittal to the KGB.
In March 1986, Longtree was transferred to Vienna. Bracy remained in Moscow
until August 1986 when he was sent back to the U.S. early for fraternization with a Soviet national who was a
cook in the marine kitchen. Bracy was introduced to this woman (Galyia) by
Longtree’s female paramour who introduced Longtree to the KGB. Bracy admits being introduced to the
KGB in a park by Galyia but does not
admit working for the KGB after Longtree
departed Moscow.
Damage
[2 paragraphs (14 lines) not declassified]
I am concerned that since so many agencies are involved in potential loss of
intelligence, it may be very difficult to determine or willing to admit the
extent of the loss. It may be advisable to ask PFIAB to undertake a study of the impact of this espionage loss
as they did so well in the Howard matter. PFIAB gave the President a very clear and rapid readout on the
damage of the Howard case. When we asked the intelligence community to give
us a damage assessment of the Pelton and Walker espionage cases a year ago,
we are still waiting and hope we get an answer this summer.
I will follow this closely and keep you advised.
[Page 102]
Tab 1
Memorandum From David Major of the National Security
Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Carlucci)3
Washington, January 15, 1987
SUBJECT
As you will recall Marine Sgt. Longtree has been arrested by the Naval
Investigative Service and charged with being a KGB Agent while a Marine guard in Moscow and Vienna. The
following is an assessment of what we know about this case to date and
the policy implications:
Damage Assessment. It appears Longtree was
recruited by the KGB in Moscow in
February 1986 and continued to work for the KGB when he was transferred from Moscow in March 1986 [to]
Vienna. He continued to work for the KGB while in Vienna, until his last known meeting with the
KGB in Vienna on December 14,
1986.
The amount of damage to national security he did is still being
evaluated. At a minimum it is serious and could prove to be extremely
damaging but not anywhere compared to the damage of the Walker or Pelton
cases. Our current assessment is based on what he has confessed to which
is substantially less than the damage he could have done.
Known intelligence comprised based on Longtree’s
confessions:
[The text was redacted in the version of the document
on file.]
—He provided personality assessment data on a [less
than 1 line not declassified] secretary in Vienna as well as a
number of FSNs working in the Embassy.
—He admits making a surreptitious entry into the communication room in
Vienna and stealing three Top Secret documents (these have not been
identified to date).
—He admits to, being tasked to implant listening devices in the
ambassador’s office in Moscow and Vienna but denies having done so.
Worst case damage scenario of what Longtree could
have done:
—[1½ lines not declassified] He had the
opportunity to steal burn bags containing State Department classified
documents on almost a daily basis in Moscow and Vienna. [1½ lines not declassified]
[Page 103]
—He periodically guarded a warehouse outside the Embassy compound in
Moscow that contained items placed in the Embassy secure areas and he
may have allowed KGB technical teams to
place listening devices in these items (desks, chairs, etc.).
—[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]
—He could have compromised the communication center on a regular
basis.
Longtree’s recruitment:
—He was not blackmailed. In September 1985 he met a 26 year old
attractive female Soviet national who worked in the customs section of
our Embassy in Moscow. This relationship was facilitated because the
female Soviet national was invited to Marine parties held in the
Embassy. He began a secret sexual relationship with her in January 1986
using her parents’ apartment. (A number of the other Marines knew of
this but did not report it, despite the fact it was a violation of
regulations.) In January 1986 she introduced him to her “uncle” in a
safehouse. During the second meeting with the uncle Sasha (either a
co-opted or officer of the KGB/SCD) he asked for classified information
which Longtree willingly provided. The female participated in these
debriefing meetings with the KGB in
Moscow. (She was fired by the Embassy in December 1985 for poor work
performance, and is reported to be currently working for the Irish
Embassy in Moscow.) Longtree was not blackmailed in any manner. When he
was transferred to Vienna, Sasha continued to meet Longtree in Vienna
from June 1986 until December 14, 1986. They had numerous meetings
during which period Longtree admits receiving $3500.
Motivation:
—Longtree admits to being motivated by his fascination with the intrigue,
was flattered the KGB was interested in
him, and sought revenge against the US
because of injustices committed against the Indians in the past 100
years (he is an American Indian).
Unlike other cases we have seen in the past the KGB continued to offer Longtree the opportunity to defect
openly. This may indicate he had knowledge of doing something for the
Soviets in Moscow the KGB wished to
protect at all cost. He was scheduled to travel back to Moscow in
January 1987 for further training.
Policy Implications:
—This vindicated our policy of excluding Soviets FSN working in the
Embassy in Moscow and may suggest we do the same in other Warsaw Pact
countries.
—This puts into question the CI training given by the State Department to
the Marine guards being assigned to Warsaw Pact countries.
—This could be the impetus to begin giving aperiodic CI polygraphs to
Marine guards assigned to Warsaw Pact countries.
