28. Memorandum From Barry Kelly of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)1

SUBJECT

  • Follow-up to Longtree2 Espionage Case

Attached at Tab I is the first report submitted to you relating to the potential damage to the national security as a result of the marine guard previously assigned to our embassy in Moscow who was arrested on December 31, 1986, for being a KGB agent. New information has been developed as the Naval Investigative Service has pursued this case and it now appears the damage is far worse than we previously projected.

The NIS located and interviewed last week (March 19, 1987) another marine guard who served in Moscow with Longtree. This individual, Arnold Bracy, a black marine corporal, has admitted knowing about Longtree’s espionage in Moscow as well as helping him in his espionage activity for which Longtree paid him $1000. Bracy confessed to his activity for two days, but was unable to pass a polygraph examination on the completeness of his confession. On Saturday, March 21, he asked for a lawyer and his interview stopped. He is currently in custody pending formal espionage charges being filed against him. The NIS is concerned about their ability to successfully prosecute Longtree; however, Bracy’s information may assist the success of this prosecution and, as such, Bracy may be granted immunity.

Bracy provided the following new information:

Longtree admitted to Bracy that he worked for the KGB in Moscow for some time prior to January 1986. During the time period prior to January 1986, when he was the marine guard in our Moscow Embassy during the evening (the Embassy required only one marine guard on duty during that time period), Longtree allowed 1–4 KGB technicians into the secure areas of our embassy on “numerous occasions.” During the period from January 1986-March 1986 (when Longtree was transferred to Vienna) Longtree and Bracy worked together to allow KGB technicians into every secure area of the embassy. This included access to [Page 101] [2½ lines not declassified]. The KGB team would be granted access to the space by Longtree and Bracy would turn off the alarms and CCTV systems which were put in place to detect surreptitious entry. The KGB teams would normally enter the secure space at 2:00 a.m. and work until 5:00–6:00 a.m. Longtree and Bracy also periodically had the duty of burning the classified trash [less than 1 line not declassified] and Bracy saw Longtree routinely segregate TOP SECRET and SECRET documents out of the burn bags for transmittal to the KGB.

In March 1986, Longtree was transferred to Vienna. Bracy remained in Moscow until August 1986 when he was sent back to the U.S. early for fraternization with a Soviet national who was a cook in the marine kitchen. Bracy was introduced to this woman (Galyia) by Longtree’s female paramour who introduced Longtree to the KGB. Bracy admits being introduced to the KGB in a park by Galyia but does not admit working for the KGB after Longtree departed Moscow.

Damage

[2 paragraphs (14 lines) not declassified]

I am concerned that since so many agencies are involved in potential loss of intelligence, it may be very difficult to determine or willing to admit the extent of the loss. It may be advisable to ask PFIAB to undertake a study of the impact of this espionage loss as they did so well in the Howard matter. PFIAB gave the President a very clear and rapid readout on the damage of the Howard case. When we asked the intelligence community to give us a damage assessment of the Pelton and Walker espionage cases a year ago, we are still waiting and hope we get an answer this summer.

I will follow this closely and keep you advised.

[Page 102]

Tab 1

Memorandum From David Major of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)3

SUBJECT

  • Longtree Espionage Case

As you will recall Marine Sgt. Longtree has been arrested by the Naval Investigative Service and charged with being a KGB Agent while a Marine guard in Moscow and Vienna. The following is an assessment of what we know about this case to date and the policy implications:

Damage Assessment. It appears Longtree was recruited by the KGB in Moscow in February 1986 and continued to work for the KGB when he was transferred from Moscow in March 1986 [to] Vienna. He continued to work for the KGB while in Vienna, until his last known meeting with the KGB in Vienna on December 14, 1986.

The amount of damage to national security he did is still being evaluated. At a minimum it is serious and could prove to be extremely damaging but not anywhere compared to the damage of the Walker or Pelton cases. Our current assessment is based on what he has confessed to which is substantially less than the damage he could have done.

Known intelligence comprised based on Longtree’s confessions:

[The text was redacted in the version of the document on file.]

—He provided personality assessment data on a [less than 1 line not declassified] secretary in Vienna as well as a number of FSNs working in the Embassy.

—He admits making a surreptitious entry into the communication room in Vienna and stealing three Top Secret documents (these have not been identified to date).

—He admits to, being tasked to implant listening devices in the ambassador’s office in Moscow and Vienna but denies having done so.

Worst case damage scenario of what Longtree could have done:

—[1½ lines not declassified] He had the opportunity to steal burn bags containing State Department classified documents on almost a daily basis in Moscow and Vienna. [1½ lines not declassified]

[Page 103]

—He periodically guarded a warehouse outside the Embassy compound in Moscow that contained items placed in the Embassy secure areas and he may have allowed KGB technical teams to place listening devices in these items (desks, chairs, etc.).

—[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

—He could have compromised the communication center on a regular basis.

Longtree’s recruitment:

—He was not blackmailed. In September 1985 he met a 26 year old attractive female Soviet national who worked in the customs section of our Embassy in Moscow. This relationship was facilitated because the female Soviet national was invited to Marine parties held in the Embassy. He began a secret sexual relationship with her in January 1986 using her parents’ apartment. (A number of the other Marines knew of this but did not report it, despite the fact it was a violation of regulations.) In January 1986 she introduced him to her “uncle” in a safehouse. During the second meeting with the uncle Sasha (either a co-opted or officer of the KGB/SCD) he asked for classified information which Longtree willingly provided. The female participated in these debriefing meetings with the KGB in Moscow. (She was fired by the Embassy in December 1985 for poor work performance, and is reported to be currently working for the Irish Embassy in Moscow.) Longtree was not blackmailed in any manner. When he was transferred to Vienna, Sasha continued to meet Longtree in Vienna from June 1986 until December 14, 1986. They had numerous meetings during which period Longtree admits receiving $3500.

Motivation:

—Longtree admits to being motivated by his fascination with the intrigue, was flattered the KGB was interested in him, and sought revenge against the US because of injustices committed against the Indians in the past 100 years (he is an American Indian).

Unlike other cases we have seen in the past the KGB continued to offer Longtree the opportunity to defect openly. This may indicate he had knowledge of doing something for the Soviets in Moscow the KGB wished to protect at all cost. He was scheduled to travel back to Moscow in January 1987 for further training.

Policy Implications:

—This vindicated our policy of excluding Soviets FSN working in the Embassy in Moscow and may suggest we do the same in other Warsaw Pact countries.

—This puts into question the CI training given by the State Department to the Marine guards being assigned to Warsaw Pact countries.

—This could be the impetus to begin giving aperiodic CI polygraphs to Marine guards assigned to Warsaw Pact countries.

  1. Source: Reagan Library, 1987 SYS 4 RWR INT 40151–40200. Top Secret. Prepared by Major. Powell wrote in the upper right-hand margin of the memorandum: “Pres. & VP have seen. CP 25/3”
  2. Reference is to Clayton Lonetree.
  3. Top Secret. The text was redacted in the version of the document on file.