Office of the Historian

24. Minutes of a Policy Review Group Meeting1

Washington, March 18, 1987, 1–2 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Secretary Shultz’s Trip to Moscow, April 13–16 (U)

PARTICIPANTS

  • The Vice President’s Office:

    • Donald Gregg

  • State:

    • Ambassador Rozanne Ridgway
    • Ambassador Richard Schifter
    • Mark Parris

  • OSD:

    • Dr. Fred Ikle
    • Frank Gaffney

  • CIA:

    • [name not declassified]
    • Richard Kerr

  • JCS:

    • General John Moellering

  • ACDA:

    • Director Kenneth Adelman
    • Michael Guhin

  • USIA

    • Marvin Stone
    • John Kordek

  • White House:

    • General Colin L. Powell

  • NSC:

    • Robert E. Linhard
    • Fritz W. Ermarth

Colin Powell opened the meeting by stating its purpose as assuring proper interagency support on the broad range of subjects being prepared for visit of Secretary of State Shultz to Moscow, 13–16 April. (C)

Overview

Ambassador Ridgway gave an overview of the trip agenda and trip planning. She stressed we would be pushing our entire four-element agenda (arms reduction, regional conflict, human rights and bilateral issues), seeking convergence in all areas that could then be turned over to other appropriate fora for further work. She noted that we would be prepared for a Soviet stand-pat performance, like Vienna 1986, or a Reykjavik-like package of surprises. On logistics, she noted the need for two aircraft to handle a large delegation, provision for doing secure paper work, the short-handedness of US Embassy Moscow, and the need for herself and Paul Nitze to brief allies on the eve of the trip. Because of Under Secretary Armacost’s recent trip to Moscow on regional issues and the impending US-Soviet commission meeting on [Page 91] bilateral matters, she expected arms control and human rights to get the main attention during the Shultz trip. In response to queries, she stressed that regional conflicts would get full emphasis required by our policy. (S)

Arms Control

Bob Linhard briefly surveyed procedures for interagency arms control work to prepare for the trip, expressing confidence that established patterns would work well. Ambassador Ridgway noted the need to combat a public impression that this would be an INF meeting; the whole US-Soviet agenda would be worked. It was noted that a major Presidential address, probably on 10 April,2 would set the stage for the trip. In the arms control area, a number of difficult issues would have to be worked, e.g., SRINF before the trip. CIA judged that the Soviets were likely to stall progress on INF in Geneva, awaiting a chance to interact at the ministerial level. (S)

Regional Conflicts

Ambassador Ridgway stated the expectation that the full range of regional issues would get attention. The Secretary would assure that our concerns on specific regions and the general critique about Soviet policies would be aired, including the costs and risks imposed by Soviet behavior on the overall US-Soviet relationship. Ken Adelman posed the question as to whether we would be making specific proposals on regional conflicts. (S)

Human Rights

Ambassador Ridgway observed that, while we note some positive gestures on Gorbachev’s part, we have a cautious assessment of his policies toward human rights. In addition to our established set of concerns about known victims of Soviet repressive policies, about Jewish emigration, divided spouses, etc., we would be raising concerns about religious victims, whether the Soviets would institutionalize positive steps. We would also give new emphasis to open communications, including our condemnation of continued jamming and demand for other forms of openness, e.g., non-interference with the mails and telecommunications. In response to a question, Ambassador Ridgway stated our policy toward the Soviet proposal for a human rights conference in Moscow: We neither accept nor reject because to accept would give Moscow a bonus it doesn’t deserve, while rejecting would seem gratuitously negative toward recent Soviet positive moves. (S)

[Page 92]

Bilateral Issues

Ambassador Ridgway noted that the bilateral element of our agenda contained many elements were deserving attention in Moscow. A space cooperation agreement could well be signed there, along with agreements on search and rescue cooperation. (C)

Further Discussion

Marvin Stone stressed the importance of hitting the Soviets on jamming of VOA. Don Gregg asked whether there would be any refinement or narrowing of the agenda between now and the trip. Ambassador Ridgway said normal channels through the Soviet embassy in Washington would be used for that purpose. She added that the Secretary intended to repeat US unhappiness with Soviet nonperformance under the Long-term Grain Agreement. She also pleaded for agencies involved in managing exchanges to remain mindful of the importance the President ascribed to them in their own management decisions, avoiding unilateral steps that harmed them. (S)

Richard Kerr cautioned that we should be prepared for an aggressive Soviet defense of its recent human rights performance and be prepared for some surprise proposals. (S)

Fred Ikle noted that surprises should be met with no more than a commitment to carry them back to Washington for study. (S)

  1. Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, Chron Files January-February 1987 (9). Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Although no drafting information appears on the minutes, Ermarth sent a draft to Powell under a March 19 covering memorandum, recommending that Powell approve the minutes “for records purposes.” Powell initialed his approval. (Ibid.)↩
  2. On April 10, the President delivered remarks at a luncheon hosted by the Los Angeles World Affairs Council. For the text of Reagan’s remarks and a question-and-answer session, see Public Papers: Reagan, 1987, Book I, pp. 365–372.↩