Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

172. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 22, 1988, 10:55 a.m.–noon

SUBJECT

• The Secretary’s Meeting with Shevardnadze—First Small Group Meeting: Human Rights, CSCE, Conventional Arms Control

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
  • Colin Powell, National Security Advisor to the President
  • Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)
  • Jack Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.
  • Alexander R. Vershbow, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs (notetaker)
  • Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)

• USSR

  • Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Foreign Minister
  • Viktor P. Karpov, Directorate Head, Soviet MFA
  • Sergey Tarasenko, MFA
  • Yuriy V. Dubinin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.
  • Sergey Mamedov, USA & Canada Department, MFA (notetaker)
  • Pavel Palazhchenko, MFA (interpreter)

The Secretary said that the ministers had about an hour to open their discussions, after which they would proceed to a lunch to which he had invited several congressional leaders. He invited Shevardnadze as guest to lead off the discussion.

HUMAN RIGHTS/VIENNA MEETING

Shevardnadze said that, as had been decided, he would begin by discussing humanitarian issues and human rights. The sides had been able to say many times that in the recent period our discussions have become more constructive and have led to some mutual understanding. The results in the human rights area had been reasonably good. These discussions were not only between the Foreign Ministry and the State Department. We were also applying the potential of public opinion, of researchers and the academic community, and discussions in these channels were most welcome.

Shevardnadze said that in this area he wanted to note Secretary Shultz’s personal contribution in making a constructive process possible. He noted that U.S. and Soviet legal experts had recently met in Washington and were continuing their discussions. Physicians were also taking part in this dialogue. In this regard Shevardnadze wanted to note that the U.S. did the right thing when it allowed Soviet medical experts to visit Mr. Peltier.² This initially had been the subject of much discussion and press commentary but now the visit was an accomplished fact. In the near future a group of U.S. physicians would be visiting the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Ministry of Health and would receive full information on all problems, including that of psychiatric care. Again, this was a useful step.

Shevardnadze said that the sides were gradually beginning to implement Gorbachev’s proposal for a seminar of representatives of public opinion to discuss and assess the state of affairs in our two countries. Another useful development was the fact that the Supreme Soviet and the U.S. Congress would be holding a meeting in November and the Soviets were ready for a good discussion there as well. For its part, the Soviet side had established a public commission for cooperation on humanitarian and human rights affairs and this was becoming very active. This organization included authoritative and expert people on these problems. It was looking very seriously and responsibly at all the personal cases that had been raised by the Secretary, the President, U.S. Congressional leaders and the U.S. public. As his colleagues would confirm, Shevardnadze was paying personal attention to this organization to declare it was proceeding in a responsible way. On the one hand this was because the U.S. was raising specific cases; on the other hand it was because these cases affected individuals’ lives, a question to which the Soviet leadership could not be indifferent.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to provide some information about the lists the Secretary and the President had recently presented. He did not know whether the Secretary was interested in the numbers. The Secretary replied that he was indeed interested.

Shevardnadze then proceeded to recount the following: The President had presented a list of 17 names. There had been a positive resolution of 11: six were those who were called refuseniks; three were prisoners who had been pardoned and would not serve any further time; as for one individual, the time of his imprisonment had been reduced by one-half, and in the case of another individual a decision had been made to release him from a psychiatric hospital since he had been judged not dangerous to the community. Two other cases regarding the ending of exile were now being considered. Three further cases were not yet resolved; there was still a problem of knowledge of state secrets. Another individual had not made any official request to leave the Soviet Union. Shevardnadze said the specific names in this context would be given in the Working Group.

Shevardnadze said he had wanted to add one clarification regarding people whom the U.S. had mentioned in its lists of political prisoners. Some of these had been convicted for criminal offenses and the Soviets could not agree with qualifying them as political prisoners. He wanted to note that as a fundamental matter the Soviets could not agree that they were suffering for their political or religious beliefs.

Shevardnadze noted that sometimes the U.S. cited figures in the hundreds or even thousands of people who were imprisoned for political or religious offenses. On September 2, the U.S. Embassy had presented a list of 295 names described as political prisoners. This list had been checked by the competent authorities and the review had shown that the U.S. list was a distortion of the situation. For example, with respect to Article 70 on anti-Soviet agitation (a conviction which in the U.S. is considered to be a political crime), there were at present only three people imprisioned under this article and nine further in internal exile. With respect to Article 190, dissemination of false information insulting to the Soviet system, there were only three people in prison.

Shevardnadze said the numbers of those imprisoned for religious beliefs (Article 227) were very few; under the article separating the State and the Church (Article 142) there was no one presently serving time.

As for the special psychiatric hospitals—all of which had now been transferred to the authority of Ministry of Health—Shevardnadze said only 29 persons were currently committed. These had been checked by experts and deemed to be genuinely ill. Shevardnadze added that these figures had been checked and double-checked.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to inform the Secretary that work on reviewing all these cases was continuing. Before the end of the year there would be no one in prison under any of the articles viewed as political crimes by the West. He wanted to repeat this “with due responsibility”: there would be no people incarcerated for political offenses. With respect to compulsory psychiatric care, he added, the situation was more complex, since the people were in fact ill.

Regarding family reunification cases—divided families, divided spouses— Shevardnadze presented the following survey: of the total of 65 cases, 17 had been allowed to leave, seven further cases were still being reviewed, three individuals had decided not to leave even though they had received authorization, and 18 had not applied officially. Of the remaining cases, 18 continued to be denied visas for reasons of state secrets and this included 10 cases for which the refusal had been confirmed at the highest level by the Commission of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. In addition, one individual had died.

Shevardnadze reiterated that the Soviets were working to improve their legislative procedures and laws. They were continuing to review the period of secrecy limitations and they were doing everything possible to take into account the discussions in Vienna. They believed that in these matters it would be possible to find a reasonable solution.

Shevardnadze said he had one additional concern to raise: namely, that people leaving the Soviet Union to reside in the U.S. were regarded as political refugees. This should be inadmissible. At one time the U.S. had explained that this had been done to facilitate the provision of financial support; but it had turned out that the U.S. side was having difficulties in receiving some Soviet citizens. The important thing, Shevardnadze said, was that the Soviets couldn’t fundamentally agree that these people were political refugees. If this policy continued it would become an obstacle to continuing the process.

Shevardnadze said the Secretary had raised the question of Vienna issues and he wanted to say a few words in this regard. He understood that the priority issue was resolving outstanding problems. To finish the Vienna meeting additional steps should be taken very soon. The Soviet Union was doing things in this respect, and there would soon be new proposals put on the table in the interest of finding a mutually acceptable solution. These included:

1) With respect to contacts among people, the Soviet side was ready to reach an agreement on the basis of the international bill of human rights. The Soviets did not believe new institutions should be invented; rather we should use established international documents;

2) On cases where there is an urgent need to leave one’s country and on which the U.S. insists on 3-day notice, the Soviets believed this matter could be resolved; in fact it was being heatedly debated;

3) With respect to freedom of religion, the Soviets could agree to joint approaches on, for example, religious education, dissemination of religious publications and materials, development of contacts between believers, and the purchase of religious material and cult objects.

These were questions that were now being debated in Vienna, Shevardnadze added. As for exchange of information, he understood that the 35 participants in Vienna were close to agreement. It was important that all the parties show a desire to find a solution. In sum, the Soviet delegation had the authority to make compromise proposals on all these principal issues. Other than these questions, there was nothing very complex outstanding in Vienna.

Shevardnadze said the Ministers had earlier discussed follow-on conferences on human rights, including the possibility of holding such a conference in Moscow. The following suggestions were now taking shape in Vienna: a conference on humanitarian problems in Paris to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution; as a second stage a conference in Copenhagen; and as a third stage a conference in Moscow around 1991. This approach seemed acceptable to most Western countries. If the U.S. did not support it the Soviets could abstain from supporting conferences in Paris and Copenhagen, although he did not think this was the right way to proceed.

Shevardnadze reiterated that the Soviet Union would like to host a human rights conference taking into account all the requirements of the Helsinki Final Act. This was a sincere proposal, he stressed. The Soviets did not have to make the proposal, but had done so because they wanted to show the world what was happening inside the Soviet Union. The Soviets would appreciate it if the U.S. delegation were to change its attitude on this question. He knew that many West European states took a positive view.

Next, Shevardnadze continued, he wanted to raise a few questions which had previously been raised with the U.S. side and which the Soviets believed might have been resolved:

1) Nazi war criminals: The Soviets would continue to raise this question. It was an important concern for the Soviet people and not a capricious matter. He urged the Secretary to appreciate the urgency of the issue. Some things had already been done with respect to prosecuting Nazi war criminals—two people had been deported by the U.S.—but the process should continue.

2) The Brazinskas family.³ This was an old question, but Shevardnadze said he had to raise it again and again in the hope that it would be resolved positively.

Shevardnadze noted that in our bilateral contacts in the humanitarian field, the Soviet intention was to facilitate a constructive discussion and foster all opportunities for cooperation. For this an international legal basis was needed. This was necessary because in the U.S. Constitution such rights as the right to education, housing and medical care were not mentioned. All of these things, however, were being discussed intensively in the world by government officials and intellectuals.

Shevardnadze noted that out of 22 international documents on human rights the U.S. had ratified only six. He emphasized that the Soviet Union believed that these instruments should be the foundation for structuring our relations in this area. The instruments that had not been ratified by the U.S. included basic international covenants on human rights. There might be reasons cited for not ratifying, but he looked forward to the U.S. doing so nonetheless. This, he reiterated, was a necessary basis for progress. Shevardnadze noted that the U.S. had not ratified the covenant on economic, social and cultural rights or, more surprisingly, that on civil and political rights. He was raising these now because Soviet law-makers would be raising them in other fora in addition to personal human rights cases.

Shevardnadze said he had one further concrete question to raise: that of the Soviet scientist Aleksandrov, who had disappeared several years ago in Spain. Based on trustworthy information, the Soviets believed he was residing in the U.S. If so, it should not be a problem to inform the Soviet side of this. If Aleksandrov wanted to remain in the U.S. that was his decision. His wife, concerned about his whereabouts, had written to the President but had received no answer.

The Secretary thanked Shevardnadze for his comments, which were quite helpful. He thought that this two-way dialogue was a good one. He noted Shevardnadze’s statements on this occasion and previously that what was happening inside the Soviet Union was the result of their own review of practices in the context of Soviet interests. Some of these changes might intersect with U.S. concerns and this was the reason for conducting a dialogue. As he had said before, the Secretary sensed that the Soviets were doing things they regarded to be in their own interest and not in response to U.S. concerns. This was fine, indeed it was preferable because the changes would have more staying-power on this basis.

The Secretary noted that we had established a more systematic and broadened dialogue on human rights and they would be hearing from the working group on some of the specific cases. The U.S. had seen a great deal of progress and had not hesitated to say so, expressing the view that what was taking place was positive, but that more needed to be done on an urgent basis.

The Secretary said that the first of the categories on which we focused included release of political and religious prisoners. He noted Shevardnadze’s statement that some of the individuals on the U.S. list had been convicted of some other kinds of crimes and that these needed to be considered in a different context. The U.S. wanted to take up each case one by one. We believed that in many instances the so-called crime was something that did not in fact represent a crime, or else it was questionable that any crime had taken place at all. We asked the Soviets to review all of these cases in this light. Although there might be names on our list that should not be there, we believed that the “true list” was longer than the list the Soviet side had acknowledged to be relevant to the political prisoner criterion.

Shevardnadze intervened to say that he was ready to talk to Ambassador Matlock if given the details of these cases. The Secretary said that we had plenty of details to provide. But certainly the people that were on the Soviet-acknowledged list should all be released promptly.

The Secretary said that a second category on which we sought progress was cases involving family reunification. We saw no reason for denying visas for any of these and would like to see the situation cleared up. The President liked to talk in terms of a “zero option” as he had done with the INF issue. We should get all of these cases out of the way so that they no longer plagued us. He mentioned in particular the family members of Abe Stolar and the case of Kosharovskiy.

Shevardnadze said he believed Kosharovskiy had been resolved. He then consulted a list and admitted this was not correct. A secrecy problem still persisted but the case was being studied again. The Secretary commented that Kosharovskiy’s access to secrets went back 17 years, and there wasn’t much of value in the first place as far as we could see. The Secretary said that there was also a special situation with Mrs. Gordievskaya. While this was a special case, he wanted to point out that we have been willing to facilitate visits to the USSR by Mrs. Souther and Mrs. Howard. This was a humanitarian precedent that he hoped the Soviets would keep in mind with respect to the Gordievskaya case.

A third category about which we did a lot of thinking, the Secretary continued, was emigration. The recent figures for Jewish emigration were very encouraging. The rate had reached a healthy level and we hoped it would continue. In this context he wanted to make a comment about the principle of freedom of choice. In the past, the Secretary noted, Shevardnadze had stated his adherence to this principle. We had had lots of discussions with our friends in Israel on this subject. We believed that the best way to get at the problem was to do everything possible so that Jews who wished to emigrate from the Soviet Union could choose whether they go to Israel or the U.S. (or another country) while they were still in the Soviet Union. In practice this meant that they should not have to show that they had a first-degree relative in the U.S., but rather should be treated in the same way as those with such close relatives—i.e. on the same basis as applicants to Israel. If the choice could be exercised in Moscow rather than in Vienna, it would be a much healthier situation. The Secretary added that we had differences of view with the Israelis, who wanted to put heavy constraints on the choices of Soviet emigrants and insist that they go to Israel. He and Shevardnadze, however, had agreed in the past on the principle of freedom of choice, so we ought to look at how we could arrange things so that Soviet Jews could come directly to the U.S.

The Secretary said that he had already remarked that the secrecy prohibition was often applied arbitrarily. He took note of Shevardnadze’s comments about reviewing some of these cases. There was also a problem when parents were allowed to introduce unwarranted obstacles to the departure of their children from the Soviet Union. Another issue where we looked for further progress was jamming; in this area, however, as in the case of emigration, we recognized there were positive changes to which we already could point.

The Secretary said Shevardnadze had mentioned that the Soviets were working on changing their criminal code. The U.S., he said, would regard changes or the elimination of certain articles as an important step toward institutionalizing the changes underway in the Soviet Union. Changing these articles would assure of the staying power of the changes. We focused especially on Articles 70 and 190 (which involved political crimes) and Articles 142 and 227 (which covered religious offenses). We also would like to see movement, the Secretary said, on permitting the teaching of religion and the distribution of religious materials. The promotion of Jewish culture and religious life in the Soviet Union was particularly important to the American Jewish community.

As for the Vienna CSCE meeting, the Secretary said that we would very much like to see a successful conclusion. We were ready to stay as long as it took to this end. We believed that the neutral/non-aligned (NNA) document on human rights needed strengthening, especially with respect to human rights monitors and the right to form organizations. There also should be provisions in the document limiting the use of access to secrets as an obstacle to emigration. Finally, the Secretary noted, we both had a Romanian problem and needed to see how this could be overcome. On the security side of Vienna there were a number of problems. We could not accept the NNA desire to be part of the conventional stability talks but must insist on autonomy.

As for the Moscow human rights conference proposal, the Secretary continued, Shevardnadze knew we had neither said yes nor no, but had spelled out the things that would influence our opinion on the proposal. The Soviet side had responded on some of these indicators and we would keep our minds open. He expected to meet next week in New York with Western colleagues, some of whom Shevardnadze would meet with as well, and he was sure that they would continue to discuss this question. The criteria the U.S. had laid out were the things that were important and essential from our standpoint. If these conditions were met, and guarantees provided regarding the access and openness for the conference, we would be prepared to consider the question. The Secretary added that he understood Shevardnadze’s viewpoint, and we acknowledged there had been positive steps which would not be overlooked. In sum, the issue of a Moscow conference was under active consideration but the key question was Soviet practices and behavior. The Secretary thought that the two of them might return to the subject later during their talks.

With respect to Nazi war criminals, the Secretary said that the U.S. and USSR were of one mind. We were prepared to work within the limits of our own procedures and would continue to do so. Regarding ratification of international legal documents, the Secretary said that some of these do present problems but he would take Shevardnadze’s comments on board.

With respect to the Brazinskas case, the Secretary said that the two of them had discussed this before and he had nothing new to offer. He was glad to hear Shevardnadze raise the issue again, but would not repeat the problems that we have with this case. Regarding Aleksandrov, he was personally not familiar with the matter. Ambassador Matlock said that we had checked with all U.S. agencies and none of them had any idea on the whereabouts of Mr. Aleksandrov. The Secretary said that we would nonetheless be glad to check again and would try to respond to the letter to the President from Aleksandrov’s mother. We obviously understood the family concerns when someone disappears. Shevardnadze quipped that there was one agency that might know but they wouldn’t tell the Soviet side. The Secretary asked which organization Shevardnadze had in mind. Shevardnadze replied: “Guess.” Ambassador Matlock repeated that we had checked with all agencies.

The Secretary said that he welcomed Shevardnadze’s comment about the physicians who had been able to examine Mr. Peltier and the future visit by U.S. psychiatrists. He noted there was one organization, Physicians for Human Rights, which would like to visit Soviet prisons and he drew Shevardnadze’s attention to this proposal.

Regarding the Vienna meeting as a whole, the Secretary recalled that two years ago the Stockholm discussions were at a stage similar to that where the Vienna talks currently stood. At that time he and Shevardnadze had discussed the contentious issues and had “punched up” their delegations; this had been quite helpful. He was prepared to do this again so that the U.S. could send new instructions to Warren Zimmermann with a view to bringing the meeting to an end.

Ambassador Ridgway said we had a checklist of things we would like to see agreed in Vienna. We were prepared to instruct Ambassador Zimmermann and Ambassador Ledogar to work closely with Ambassador Kashlev to take up the various unresolved issues. Many of these were very complicated and could not be settled here. The Secretary said that the U.S. would nudge Ambassador Zimmermann and hoped the Soviets would do the same with Ambassador Kashlev.

Bessmertnykh intervened to say he wanted to make one correction to a point the Secretary had raised. The Soviets, he said, had in fact replied through Ambassador Schifter to the proposal of the Physicians for Human Rights. The situation had been fully described and all the people that this group wanted to visit were now free. The Secretary said he would check with Ambassador Schifter.

Shevardnadze said he agreed the Ministers needed to instruct their delegations to cooperate more actively. If it were possible to conclude Vienna successfully, many questions of concern to the U.S. would be resolved. He cited in particular the time limits on secrecy prohibitions; there was some difference between the Eastern and Western positions but this could be resolved. Jamming, Shevardnadze continued, was also under discussion and he thought the NNA proposal on this was a good one. He had already covered religious issues and noted again that solutions were possible. As for the Romanians, this was not a simple matter. The Soviets were working with their Romanian friends, but the Romanians had their own proposals. Some of these, he said, were not so complicated—for example, on social rights. Perhaps the West could borrow some of the Romanian suggestions that were not especially out of line.

The Secretary replied that we could look at the Romanian proposals, but in general their attitude was difficult for everyone else, including Soviet allies, to accept. Romania was a peculiar country. Shevardnadze repeated that he thought that this was an obstacle that could be cleared if the U.S. gave the Romanians support on some questions.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

Shevardnadze then began the discussion of conventional arms control. He said there were two questions regarding Europe that he wanted to call to the Secretary’s attention. The first concerned Gorbachev’s proposal in Warsaw for a European Summit on disarmament questions. It would be preferable if the conditions were right to hold such a meeting after the negotiations began. Such negotiations would include all European states plus the United States and Canada. A summit of this kind, the Soviets believed, would give a push to the resolution of issues that needed political impetus.

The second issue Shevardnadze wanted to raise concerned the establishment of a Center for the Reduction of War in Europe. Our two countries had achieved much bilaterally with the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers: many had had their doubts at the beginning, but the NRRCs were now working efficiently. The Soviets did not need an answer now to the idea of an European Risk Reduction Center, but hoped the Secretary would instruct his experts to work on this question. Some European governments supported the idea, others were undecided, and a few were a bit negative on the idea.

The important thing in Vienna, Shevardnadze continued, was to make progress toward agreement on the mandate. He wanted to address this a bit and perhaps continue it after the lunch. It seemed that the two sides’ positions were closer and a great deal of work had been done in resolving disagreements on the objectives of the negotiations and other components. One major question remained, however, as to the subject matter of the talks. The latest language that the sides were working on largely reflected both sides’ interest but had one major obstacle: fighter aircraft. The Soviet side disagreed with the inclusion of fighter aircraft. Taking into account the fact that carrier-based aircraft and other systems were outside the framework of negotiations, and given the fact that on the Western side as well as on the Eastern side fighter aircraft had defensive functions, the Soviet side asked its partners to remove this kind of aircraft from the subject matter of the talks. Perhaps the sides’ experts could sit down together for more detailed discussion of this issue. But he wanted to stress that it was desirable to find common ground. This was a matter of concern to Soviet allies as well.

Shevardnadze said that if agreement could be reached on excluding fighter aircraft, we could expect the Vienna meeting to finish before the U.S. election. This would enable us to conclude in late October or very early November with a very impressive final document and then conclude the Vienna meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers. If we finished the Vienna meeting successfully, Shevardnadze added, it would be the most significant political event since Helsinki. In addition, this would also make it possible for the two Ministers to meet again in Vienna for what would be their “jubilee” meeting (number 30, by Soviet count).

The Secretary replied that we too would like to see the Vienna meeting wound up, but only if it were wound up in a good way. The fighter aircraft issue had been put on the table very suddenly and it puzzled us. If there were anything useful to the offense, the Secretary thought it was control of the air; this gave an essential role to fighter aircraft. The Secretary noted that the Soviets had raised the problem of dual-capable weapons and we had gone back and forth on this issue. We now had language which to a certain extent met Soviet concerns. We had proposed this reluctantly but nonetheless had done so in the interest of reaching agreement. Then along came the fighter aircraft issue. As we understood it, the Soviets had 8000 aircraft in this category, aircraft which were very useful in offensive operations but which would be taken off the table. This was not something we could go along with. The Secretary reiterated that we could discuss language on dual-capable systems and we could have a working group discussion here in Washington. We and our allies would be in New York and could discuss the issue further there, but the Soviets would find that U.S. views and those of our allies on the fighter aircraft question were the same.

The Secretary said there were two other issues by our reckoning which needed to be resolved. One was the area of application, which largely concerned whether the territory of Turkey along the border with Syria, Iraq and Iran should be covered. We believed that given Turkey’s strategic concerns some of this territory should be excluded.

Another outstanding problem was that of autonomy, the Secretary continued. The U.S. felt that a way must be found to construct the talks so that the NNA countries did not end up as part of the process. We had no problem reporting to them, but did not believe they should participate. So these were the three problems that we saw still outstanding: fighter aircraft, zone of application, and autonomy. If these could be resolved—as well as finding solutions to outstanding human rights problems—we could have an agreement to conclude the Vienna meeting on a positive note.

Shevardnadze said the Secretary had mentioned 8000 Soviet fighter aircraft but had not mentioned thousands of U.S. carrier aircraft. The Secretary rejoined that carrier aircraft were not involved in this negotiation. Shevardnadze in turn said the Soviets continued to believe they should be included. On dual-capable systems we seemed to have a good substantial solution. In any case, he said, we should allow the working group to discuss these issues further. If the sides could agree on the subject matter of the talks, then the area question could be resolved. The Soviets were aware of Turkey’s position and believed an agreement could be reached, but the key question for the Soviet side was the subject matter.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Ministerial Memcons. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow; cleared by Ridgway. The meeting took place in Shultz’s office at the Department of State.
2. Reference is to Leonard Peltier. See “Soviet Doctors Examine Inmate at U.S. Prison,” New York Times, June 25, 1987, p. A–25.
3. See footnote 9, Document 66.