Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

161. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, May 31, 1988, 2:20–3:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Working Group Reports

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • THE SECRETARY
  • Lt. Gen. Colin Powell
  • Amb. Ridgway
  • Amb. Nitze
  • Amb. Matlock

• U.S.S.R.

  • SHEVARDNADZE
  • Marshal Akhromeyev
  • DepFonMin Bessmertnykh

Working Group Participants

• • Notetakers
  • Mr. Robertson
  • Mr. Andrusyszyn

At the beginning of the plenary meeting, THE SECRETARY noted that the President would be speaking at Moscow State University that afternoon and asked that the meeting end punctually at 3:15 p.m.

SHEVARDNADZE opened the session by stating that the Working Groups had worked the previous day into the early morning hours and had resumed their work on the morning of May 31. He asked that the reports be brief, but to the point.

NST: Amb. NITZE led off with a report on the arms control working group, stating that the two sides had long, extensive, and productive discussions on the issues. On ALCM’s, the two sides had reached a large measure of agreement and had produced a paper which recorded the areas of agreement. Similarly, there was a large measure of agreement on mobile ICBM’s, and a paper on these areas of agreement was prepared.

Amb. NITZE continued that work remained on issues in other areas. SLCM’s were discussed at length, but no progress was made. There was also discussion about the relationship between the ABM Treaty and offensive arms reductions. There had been some progress in the clarification of views, but no substantive progress had been achieved.

Amb. NITZE noted that the U.S. side had stressed its concerns over Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty and had demanded the dismantlement of the Krasnoyarsk radar facility prior to ABM Treaty review scheduled for October this year.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV agreed that good work had been done. Work had practically concluded on the issue of notification of Ballistic Missile Launchers. The two sides continued to work toward solutions on the relationship between the ABM Treaty and the future. On mobile ICBM’s, AKHROMEYEV agreed that headway had been made on verification, creating a basis for more specific agreement on numbers. Looking ahead, AKHROMEYEV said that the two sides would try to do something on the relationship between the ABM Treaty and a Strategic Arms Treaty as a basis for the main document.

THE SECRETARY commented that the results of the working group sounded constructive and that it was good to see movement in two areas that had been especially sticky. Amb. NITZE asked that the English versions of the papers on ALCM’s and mobile ICBM’s be made part of the record.

SHEVARDNADZE asked that those responsible for the arms control working group finalize their work. Anything agreed upon had to be reviewed, but it would be desirable that progress on these issues be reflected in the Joint Statement because many would be interested in knowing what had been agreed in Moscow. SHEVARDNADZE wondered whether the arms control portion could not be a separate section in the Joint Statement, as was done in Washington.

THE SECRETARY added that it was important to reflect in the Joint Statement that there had been advances since the Washington summit. The question was the degree of detail. It should be left up to the people working on the Joint Statement to determine how best to record this progress. There were many pages in the arms control report. THE SECRETARY noted that he was thinking about how readable the document would be and the balance of it.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed and suggested that if the entire report was not incorporated in the Joint Statement, the heads of the working group could initial their agreed reports as the basis for future work. THE SECRETARY concurred.

Nuclear Testing: Mr. PALENYKH, for the Soviets, noted that in two working group meetings, the sides had focused on the completion of the elaboration of an agreement on the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE).² There was active work on this issue, and although the sides did not agree on all issues, the two delegations had completed an agreement on the JVE that had been signed that day. It represented the basis for further headway in continuing negotations. On the basis of the results of the JVE, the Soviets would seek to complete the Protocol of the 1974 Treaty and the Treaty’s ratification. The Soviet side would also intensify work on the Protocol of the 1976 Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions.

Amb. ROBINSON added that the Agreements signed that day were in fact fully responsive to the instructions the Ministers had given the negotiators in the December 9th Joint Statement, in that the JVE would fully address all concerns about the methods proposed by either side for verification purposes.

ROBINSON noted that in the work being pursued on the JVE, new levels in on-site presence for verification had been achieved—more than 50 people on each other’s test site today. By the time the tests were carried out later this summer, that level would increase to 90.

In continuing the negotiations on the two testing treaties, the work could be divided into two parts for each: before the JVE and after the JVE. We had set a goal of completing a new Protocol to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty prior to the JVE, and then the TTBT after the JVE tests had been conducted and the results analyzed.

Chemical Weapons: Mr. NAZARKIN, for the Soviet side, said that the two sides had agreed to the following report which he read aloud:

“The draft text of the summit joint statement with regard to chemical weapons was agreed.

“An exchange of views was continued on issues that may be the subject of bilateral discussions. It is proposed to instruct the two delegations at the ninth round of the bilateral Soviet-U.S. consultations on chemical weapons (July 11–29, 1988):

—to elaborate a joint paper on the order of destruction of chemical weapons stocks and CW production facilities;

—to explore criteria and a formula for the composition of the Executive Council;

—to continue discussion of challenge inspections with particular attention to the development of procedures;

—to discuss initial parties to the convention, on an illustrative basis, based on the agreed categories, with a view to ensuring the participation of all CW-possessing and CW-capable states in the convention;

—to discuss views on CW data exchange both on a multilateral and bilateral basis;

—to hold an exchange of views on a multilateral experiment to test procedures for international verification of non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industries and on technical aspects of CW destruction.

“The two sides agreed to review procedures for UN investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons at the fall round of the Soviet-U.S. consultations on the non-proliferation of chemical weapons.

“The two sides agreed that the delegations of the USSR and the United States at the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament would exchange information on their contingency unilateral statements on chemical weapons.”

SHEVARDNADZE said that there were not many steps left for a convention. THE SECRETARY commented that the sides were pushing along on this issue and had made a lot of progress in the last few months.

After noting that this was an accurate rendition of the joint report, Amb. HOLMES noted that he had met Mr. KARPOV the previous day concerning Ballistic Missile Proliferation. They had agreed to recommend incorporating into the Joint Statement that a one-day bilateral meeting at the experts level would be held in September at a location to be agreed. The purpose of this meeting would be to exchange views and information on ballistic missile proliferation, to identify common interests, and means on how to cope with this problem. The date, location, and agenda of the meeting would be transmitted through diplomatic channels.

THE SECRETARY commented that we should get hold of this problem before it got hold of us. SHEVARDNADZE responded that this was a serious subject, and that it had been raised in the proper manner.

Regional Issues: Mr. SOLOMON stated that the two sides had agreed on the text of a joint report to the Ministers. SOLOMON added that he would like to comment on specific regional issues and that Mr. Crocker would comment on Southern Africa, time permitting. SOLOMON then read aloud the following report:

“The regional working group sustained the intensive discussions that have developed over the past three years at the Ministerial, vice-ministerial, and expert levels. It considered a number of issues which, the two sides are convinced, represent a destabilizing factor in the international situation. In particular, situations around Afghanistan, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Central America, Indochina, Southern Africa, and the Korean Peninsula were discussed. The exchanges were marked by increasing candor and a sense of potential for further progress that seems to characterize our overall relationship.

“A frank, overall assessment of these exchanges is that their primary benefit lies in clarifying the concerns, assumptions and the interests of the two sides.

“The sides focused on new developments in individual regions of the world. They reaffirmed that early political settlement of regional problems meets the national interests of the two sides as well as broader interests of peace and security.

“At the same time, they noted that encouraging political processes of national reconciliation in different conflicts is proving to be extremely difficult. Nonetheless, efforts must continue with the potential for progress seemingly greatest in Angola, Cambodia, Nicaragua, and the Arab-Israeli dispute.

“The discussions between the two sides were aimed at finding additional common ground in their respective positions as well as convergence where their positions differ.

“Having taken note of the remaining differences, the sides at the same time favored further development of Soviet-U.S. dialogue on regional issues with a view to actively searching for ways to unblock regional conflicts by peaceful means on the basis of a balance of interests of all the parties involved.”

At this point, SHEVARDNADZE left the meeting for an undisclosed reason for five minutes. Upon his return, Mr. CROCKER presented the U.S. report on Southern Africa.

The exchanges in Moscow, CROCKER noted, indicated that there was important common ground on some aspects of the search for a Namibia-Angola settlement. These included the necessity for a settlement entailing the complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Angola and the achievement of Namibian independence. The two governments had signalled the need to sustain momentum in the negotiations in recent months, notably at the London meetings of early May, and through early follow-up exchanges in which the South Africans were prepared to respond to the Angolan/Cuban proposal discussed in London. The two governments both indicated their support for establishing September 29, 1988—the tenth anniversary of the UN plan for Namibia—as a target for resolving the outstanding differences. We had also agreed that it would be useful to register that fact in an appropriate manner.

CROCKER continued that there were also important differences remaining. On the issue of peace and reconciliation between the parties inside Angola, both recognized the reality that there was an unresolved problem in Angola and that it must be resolved politically, not militarily. The Soviet side continued to believe that this could best be resolved once South African and Cuban withdrawals were agreed, and it urged that all outside support to UNITA cease in this context. The U.S. believed the internal Angolan question had to be addressed in parallel with the other issues in order to avoid an impasse in that negotiation and to resolve the U.S.-Soviet role in Angola’s affairs. We agreed to remain in contact on the timing and content of reconciliation in Angola on which we had exchanged views in Moscow.

In conclusion, CROCKER observed that overall, the regional exchanges underscored the value of continuing efforts to identify areas of common ground that may offer potential for more practical, operational work. From the American perspective, shared general principles were no substitute for concrete actions that addressed the realities of each regional conflict on its own merits.

In response, ADAMISHIN stated that, while he did not differ much with what Mr. Crocker had said, he wanted to make a few points. The Soviet Union supported the search for a political settlement in south-western Africa. There would be more talks in the near future. It was the Cubans who had proposed the anniversary of the UN plan as the target date for resolving outstanding issues. On substance, the Soviet Union wanted a just settlement, taking into account the balance of interests of all sides. The Soviet Union could accept what was acceptable to SWAPO, Cuba, and Angola. This would include a cessation of interference in internal affairs; and the decolonization of Namibia on the basis of UNSCR 435;³ Cuban troops could be removed on this basis. There was also a need for stabilization of the problems in Angola; the Soviet Union did not deny there were such problems. It also supported a political settlement of problems by Angolans themselves and could see security guarantors, perhaps under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council. Adamishin concluded by saying the two sides should not try to come up with more differences, but should try to help both parties in arriving at a just settlement.

SHEVARDNADZE commented that the two sides should agree where possible. The Soviet side was not making a special effort to highlight Southern Africa in the Joint Statement—that would mean similar attention would have to be paid to other regional issues.

THE SECRETARY responded that the Joint Statement would reflect what Mr. Solomon had reported. The presentation on Southern Africa was for THE SECRETARY’S benefit. It was useful to find common ground we could agree on; it was also useful if in respective press statements we had parallel answers. THE SECRETARY added that in this case, as in others, there was a great deal more positive progress on regional issues than when he and SHEVARDNADZE had started two and a half years ago.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the two sides could formalize their progress in the final document. The regional issues should be addressed in general terms; what had been presented was good as a basis for future work and consultations.

Human rights: Mr. SCHIFTER stated that the discussions had once again taken the form of dealing with broad issues on human rights and with specific cases. On the broad aspects, the U.S. side had observed similarities to what had been revealed previously, namely the encouraging developments in perestroika and glasnost. In this round, there had also been useful discussion on new laws in the Soviet Union. In the working group, there had been discussion of collaboration on (1) forensic psychiatry and (2) the administration of justice and the rule of law. The U.S. side looked forward to discussion of these subjects in the near future. On specific cases, there had been truly excellent relations between the two delegations in terms of exchange of information as well as resolution of a significant number of cases. The two sides continued to develop contacts and to have meetings to exchange information for the purpose of resolving cases in between high-level meetings. SCHIFTER noted the excellence of work by the staff of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, adding that the U.S. side deeply appreciated it. He added that if other Soviets shared the work and commitment displayed by Soviet MFA officials, then the Secretary General could sleep better at night.

Mr. GLUKHOV said he shared Mr. Schifter’s assessment except for his compliments addressed to MFA officials. He noted that the two sides had indeed had a dialogue for some time for the purpose of understanding each other better and for progressively working to resolve human rights problems. Some differences remained, but mechanisms for the resolution of cases was beginning to take shape. It was apparent that we would have to abandon a confrontational approach, both multilaterally as well as bilaterally. He also mentioned Gorbachev’s proposals for seminars on human rights problems in which Parliamentarians on both sides could participate.

ADAMISHIN interjected that before the U.S. delegation left Moscow, the Soviet side hoped to resolve several cases to which the U.S. side had drawn attention.

Conventional Forces: Amb. ZIMMERMANN reported that the U.S. side had suggested at the opening that there needed to be a clear understanding between the American and Soviet sides on how to avoid certain problems that arose at the last Ministerial meeting regarding the introduction into the Vienna talks of ideas developed by the two sides in these bilateral meetings. It was very important that discussions identified as confidential in nature be treated as such.

The U.S. side explained why the ideas for meeting the Soviet concern on subjects that had been discussed at the last Ministerial in Geneva and in Vienna now were no longer possible.

ZIMMERMANN added that the U.S. side had laid out three obstacles to progress on achieving a conventional mandate:

—the question of autonomy (the U.S. side had described its views on that subject);

—the need for a balanced outcome to the Vienna follow-up meeting in order to launch the new conventional stability talks; progress in the human rights area is key to progress in this regard; and

—the Soviet Union’s stated concern over the question of the possible exclusion of dual-capable systems.

The Soviet side had indicated that aircraft, with the exception of carrier-borne and fighter aviation, should be included in the subject to the negotiations. On aircraft, the U.S. side recalled the NATO view that the sides should focus on those force elements that were critical to the ability to take and occupy land—such as tanks and artillery—and asked the Soviet side how it would distinguish between fighter and ground-attack aircraft, noting that the U.S. will have only one aircraft that fitted into the pure fighter category.

The Soviet side suggested some additions to the draft joint statement. These did not seem useful to the U.S. side.

The Soviet side, ZIMMERMANN continued, had raised the question of consultations on naval forces. The U.S. side said that naval forces were not accepted on the agenda.

The U.S. side, noting that it continued to believe there was no problem regarding the possible exclusion of dual-capable systems, suggested a potential way to meet the Soviet concern through a unilateral Soviet statement that would be agreed in advance and not challenged by the 23. The Soviet side did not seem to believe that this solved its problem.

In response, GRINEVSKIY stated that the two sides did not have an agreed text or report. The sides had a thorough exchange on the language developed on May 12 in Geneva concerning dual-capable systems, with clarifications added in Vienna and the additions introduced by the Soviet side regarding the exclusion of carrier-borne and fighter aviation. GRINEVSKIY then read aloud the following text:

“The subject of the negotiations will be the conventional armed forces, conventional armaments and equipment of the participating states based on land. No conventional armed forces, armaments, or equipment will be excluded from the subject of the negotiations because they can use other weapons in addition to conventional ones; nor will they be singled out in a separate category in these negotiations. Nuclear charges, carrier-borne and fighter aviation are not included in these negotiations.”

GRINEVSKIY continued that there was broad convergence between the two sides on this text with the exception of aviation. If the U.S. dropped its demand to exclude the mention of aircraft, the sides could agree to this text.

The U.S. presented its considerations on how this language should best be advanced in Vienna, and suggested the Soviet side should table it so that it did not appear to be a U.S.-Soviet agreement. The sides believe the language should be sent to Vienna.

The U.S. side showed great interest in the proposals advanced by Gorbachev. The Soviet side responded to ideas posed by the U.S. side, and there was a business-like and serious discussion of those proposals. GRINEVSKIY concluded by saying the sides had continued their traditional exchange on naval activities. The U.S. side rejected formal talks, but believed that it would be possible to continue informal bilateral discussions in this area.

Bilateral Issues: SUKHODREV read the following agreed report:

“The Bilateral Affairs Working Group focussed its attention, as it has traditionally done, on three categories of issues: the current status of topics on the agenda and the corresponding positions of the two sides; the program of current negotiations, contacts and exchanges; and new ideas and proposals of the two sides.

“In particular, it reviewed the current status: of negotiations on an agreement on cooperation in the area of basic scientific research and its implementing Memoranda of Understanding; on maritime shipping; on delimitation of the Pacific maritime boundary; of consultations on legal issues between the two countries, including legal aspects of law of the sea; on air and maritime transportation safety; and on effective cooperation in combatting illicit international narcotics trafficking; of negotiations on cooperation with regard to emergency clean-up of pollution in the Bering and Chukchi Seas; and of other issues.

“Both sides expressed satisfaction with the preparation, in connection with the Summit, of a number of important new intergovernmental agreements: on cooperation in transportation science and technology; on maritime search and rescue; on fisheries; the implementing program for 1989–1991 under the General Exchanges Agreement; and others.

“The two sides agreed to continue discussion and consideration of steps to expand cooperation on issues involving the Northern Pacific and Arctic areas. The Soviet side recalled its previous proposals for establishing a legal basis (through agreements) for U.S.-Soviet interaction on Arctic issues. The American side believes that the most effective approach to pursuing this discussion is in the framework of existing bilateral and multilateral agreements and fora.

“The Soviet side made a number of new proposals. It proposed consideration of the question of initiating interaction between the border control agencies of the two countries and the preparation of an appropriate bilateral document on practices concerning the boundary between the two countries in the Bering Strait. The Soviet side also drew to the U.S. side’s attention the initiative of the Moscow Aviation Institute concerning establishment of an international center for training space science specialists by U.S. and Soviet institutions of higher learning.

“The Soviet side confirmed its proposals concerning: protection and preservation of the stratospheric ozone layer; the establishment of cooperation in the field of energy; and the Soviet program for launching foreign payloads on Soviet rockets. The U.S. side noted its interest in mutually satisfactory solutions to problems arising from the situation of persons having a claim to citizenship in both countries.

“During the discussions, the two sides also touched on issues concerning the opening of consulates general of the U.S. and the USSR in Kiev and New York, as well as the living and working conditions of their diplomatic and consular representations on the other’s territory.

“The two sides agreed to conduct the next round of consultations on the range of bilateral issues in the spring of 1989.

“Without prejudice to the positions of either side on individual issues, the two sides have thereby put forward a broad program for further work on developing U.S.-Soviet interaction in various areas, including preparation of new agreements.”

SIMONS noted that it was an agreed report. The U.S. side would only note in addition that it was very much looking forward to the negotiations on cultural and information centers under the three year implementation program signed that day.

SHEVARDNADZE asked that the experts complete their work on a Joint Statement. He noted that there were outstanding arms control issues and that there still was not a clear position on conventional arms. The experts, he stated, should do more work so that the leaders could have prepared texts the following day.

THE SECRETARY added that the texts should be completed by the time of the leaders’ meeting—in Washington, we had not quite made it.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that the leaders would not sign the statement. THE SECRETARY agreed, but added that the statement should be available. SHEVARDNADZE added that it could still be signed; it was a good document.

The meeting concluded at 3:25 p.m.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29–6/1, 1988. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting took place in the Foreign Ministry Guest House.
2. For text of the agreement on the Joint Verification Experiment and other agreements signed in Moscow see Department of State Bulletin, August 1988, pp. 42–45.
3. See footnote 6, Document 162.