Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

157. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, May 29, 1988, 7:30–9:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Organizational questions; summit documents, Afghanistan

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • THE SECRETARY
  • Senator Baker
  • General Powell
  • Ambassador Ridgway
  • Mr. Parris (Notetaker)
  • Mr. Zarechnak (Interp.)

• U.S.S.R.

  • SHEVARDNADZE
  • Deputy FonMin Bessmertnykh
  • Marshal Akhromeyev
  • Mr. Mamedov (Notetaker)
  • Mr. Sredin (Notetaker)
  • Mr. Palazhchenko (Interp.)

SHEVARDNADZE opened the conversation by noting that the President and General Secretary had had a good initial meeting. THE SECRETARY concurred.

SHEVARDNADZE welcomed the Secretary and his colleages on behalf of the General Secretary and other leaders of the Soviet Union. The summit had begun. The first meeting had been a good one. The two leaders had discussed a number of major problems and several specific issues. The first plenary meeting would be the next day.

Shevardnadze expressed satisfaction that practical work on a summit document had already begun. It would be clearer later what there would be to sign. But first the ministers ought to discuss organizational matters. As for the President’s schedule, Shevardnadze thought that there were no outstanding issues. If there were, Shevardnadze was prepared to hear them.

THE SECRETARY said he thought the program was in good shape. He agreed that the first meeting had been good. It had been cordial and businesslike. That was not surprising, as the two leaders knew one another well by now. So there was a good start. The Secretary welcomed the idea of putting working groups to work early to take advantage of the momentum the leaders had established. The U.S. had brought a qualified team in each of the areas of the agenda, and was prepared to work hard.

The Secretary observed that both sides had hoped there would be a START agreement to sign by the summit. But they also agreed that they wanted a good treaty, not a fast one. Concluding an agreement would take a lot of long, hard work; but it could be done. But more important than the progress which had been made on a START treaty was the fact that the summit had focused attention on the changes which had taken place in U.S.-Soviet relations since the Geneva summit. The Secretary had had a chance to read that morning the theses circulating in advance of the 17th CPSU Conference and had been impressed by their profundity. He was certain the President would be interested in hearing about Gorbachev’s plans.

SHEVARDNADZE invited the Secretary to attend the Conference. THE SECRETARY declined on grounds that it was an internal Soviet affair. He asked Sen. Baker to comment.

BAKER said the President felt he had been well received in Moscow, and was gratified. The President was realistic about the difficulties with respect to the various issues to be discussed, including strategic arms. But even though it was the last year of his Presidency, he was determined to accomplish as much as possible.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that, even though it had not proved possible to complete a START agreement, much basic work had been done as a result of the Reykjavik, Geneva and Washington summits. There was a good foundation to build on. There was greater experience than in the past on such issues as verification, and implementation of the INF agreement would provide “unique” additional opportunities. Both sides had also acquired some experience with treaty ratification as a result of the INF Treaty. This had required some discussion, but the results were now in hand. One could therefore say that both sides were ready to continue work on strategic offensive arms on the condition of preserving the ABM Treaty. Shevardnadze turned to Akhromeyev to say the General Staff shared that view. AKHROMEYEV heartily concurred.

THE SECRETARY said this was something we would want to say in the joint statement, i.e., that we would want to take efforts to achieve treaties on strategic arms reductions and defense and space (D&S) as far as possible. We also wanted to move the substance as far as possible at the summit itself. The Secretary said he thought there were two main areas of START where progress was possible: how to count nuclear ALCM’s and mobile ICBM verification. We had some ideas in both areas.

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed. Most of the necessary work would have to be done at the expert level. Here, too, there was some useful experience. Expert groups could probably get about their business without instruction at this point, but it would be useful briefly to call them together. They could start work immediately and see how far they got.

Shevardnadze said that the most important task was to prepare the basic documentation of the summit. He had discussed with the Secretary in Geneva the possibility of two documents: one on strategic arms and the ABM Treaty and the other a summary of results and future tasks. Shevardnadze understood on the basis of additional working level contacts that the U.S. now preferred a single document, with language on START and ABM an integral part. If that was agreeable, instruction to that effect should be given to representatives.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed that there should be a single document which would include START and D&S issues. Work could proceed on that basis. Amb. Ridgway would coordinate on the U.S. side.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that this process was already well established. He asked if it might be possible to agree during the summit to a text on missile launch notifications. The Soviet side was aware of the U.S. proposal. It had discussed it and sought clarification on a few points. The remaining issues would not be major. If the Secretary agreed, experts could seek to complete a text for signature.

THE SECRETARY said he was glad to hear this and agreed to proceed on the basis that Shevardnadze had outlined. We did not feel that the “add-ons” that the Soviet delegation in Geneva had proposed were appropriate. It would be better to proceed on the basis of the discussion the Ministers had had in Geneva. The Secretary agreed to instruct experts to that effect.

Raising an organizational point, SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the ministers plan to meet again at 2:15 May 31 for an hour. THE SECRETARY asked if this would be the normal “reporting” session for working groups. SHEVARDNADZE confirmed this. THE SECRETARY said that would be a good idea.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the single document which would be prepared for release at the summit be signed by the two leaders. They could also exchange signed protocols ratifying the INF Agreement.

THE SECRETARY agreed with respect to the INF ratification instruments. As for signing the overall document, he would take up the issue with the President. But this had not been past practice, and things thus far had worked out fine. Signing the INF protocol would lend special significance to any formal ceremony. But the President would raise the question of signing the omnibus joint statement, because it had not been discussed with him.

SHEVARDNADZE said he was not insisting, but simply felt the idea was a good one. The document could cover all aspects of the relationship, and could serve as the basis for future cooperation. Documents of this sort had been signed in 1973, 1974, and 1979.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that President Reagan thought the development of relations under his and General Secretary Gorbachev’s guidance had been better than during previous periods. A means of reflecting that had been to focus in previous documents on what had actually taken place. The Secretary agreed it was important to emphasize the breadth of the relationship—they were not dominated by any single set of issues. But this was something which would have to be discussed with the President. The Secretary needed to see how he felt about it.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that the leaders’ initial meeting had dealt with some serious issues, e.g. the idea of reflecting in the final statement some basic concepts, such as that disputes should not be resolved by military means. The President had reacted positively. The General Secretary had also raised the possibility of joint exploration of Mars. Human rights had come up as well, and the General Secretary had suggested the establishment of an interparliamentary forum on such issues to improve each sides’ understanding of circumstances in the other’s country. Often issues arose out of simple lack of knowledge. So it had been a short meeting, but it had addressed major issues. And Shevardnadze did not rule out additional new ideas being broached the next day. Signing the INF protocol was a fait accompli; but a document which recorded broad based achievement and defined future activities would be even more significant.

THE SECRETARY said the President had briefed his senior staff on the General Secretary’s suggestion for incorporating language of the sort Shevardnadze had mentioned into a joint statement. Our initial thought was that it would be preferable to describe the relationship in operational terms, rather than to put things the way we had in the seventies. This got back to what the Secretary had said earlier about the President’s view that what he and the General Secretary had accomplished was sounder than the achievements of earlier periods. So our initial reaction was reserved. Perhaps the issue could be looked at in the context of developing language already in the draft joint statement. The Secretary asked Ridgway to comment.

RIDGWAY observed that the current draft contained not only language which had proved “tried and true” since the Geneva summit, but sections on regional and bilateral issues which sought to capture the spirit of the relationship the General Secretary seemed interested in documenting. THE SECRETARY suggested that she and Bessmertnykh work on the problem and see what they could come up with.

As for Mars, the Secretary said we would be responding in a considered way. At this point, the U.S. had no firm plans for a Mars mission of its own. To sign on to a joint mission thus put us a bit ahead of ourselves. But we would respond to the General Secretary’s proposal. We were not clear on one point: was a manned or unmanned project envisioned?

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the two sides express themselves in general terms. The concept would be well received around the world. THE SECRETARY said it might be possible to say we were talking to one another and would be sharing information in a systematic and regular way. This was, in effect, a subcategory under the General Secretary’s original idea. We would work through the problem and see what might be doable. SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviet side would meanwhile consider the ideas the Secretary had raised.

THE SECRETARY noted that he and the minister needed to talk about human rights in the joint statement, since we had mutually developed an unprecedented approach to the problem. It was an approach which seemed to be working well. Schifter had already had two days of meetings in Moscow. Both sides seemed to be satisfied with the systematic dialogue which was evolving. The joint statement should reflect this. As for the General Secretary’s idea of parliamentary exchanges on human rights, it was his understanding that they were already in progress. SHEVARDNADZE confirmed that he and the Secretary had discussed the concept earlier; what the Soviet side had in mind now was to institutionalize the process and involve members of the public as well as legislators.

THE SECRETARY said he had two additional issues to raise on human rights. The first had to do with the Vienna CSCE Follow-up meeting. The ministers had discussed this in Geneva some weeks before. There had been some progress since. But there was still quite a distance to go. Amb. Zimmermann and his counterpart were now in Moscow. If Shevardnadze were agreeable, they could be instructed to see what could be done to take advantage of the positive atmospherics of the summit.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Amb. Kashlev had returned to Vienna. But this would not be a problem. Other experts were available to talk to U.S. representatives. The Vienna meeting was of great importance to the Soviet side. Moscow was in close contact with the neutral states and believed there were good possibilities for finding a solution in consultation with each side’s allies. The neutral draft was a good basis for concluding the meeting.

THE SECRETARY agreed that it was worth our attention. But an additional important issue was performance, particularly with respect to prisoners of conscience. Schifter had gone over the appropriate lists with his Soviet colleague. This was an area in which there was great interest in Vienna, and the Secretary just wanted to flag it.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviet side was studying the various lists which had been presented and seeking to resolve the issues involved. The General Secretary had suggested the establishment of a sort of standing committee to eliminate misunderstanding. For example, Shevardnadze had heard somewhere—he couldn’t recall where—that there were 11,000 political prisoners in the U.S. What sort of people were these? Who were they? Under what laws had they been jailed? Experts needed to discuss the issues. The two sides had travelled an important road together of late on humanitarian issues, but it was only the first part of the road. The task now was to get a serious discussion going. That meant involving experts.

THE SECRETARY said he had seen the 11,000 figure and could not imagine where it came from. Could Shevardnadze provide lists?

SHEVARDNADZE said he had no lists; he had only heard the figure somewhere. But there should be some way to determine if this was a serious issue. The Soviet side had no interest in launching a polemic. But experts ought to address these kinds of issues.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed. The approach the two sides had developed of putting issues on the table in an attempt to understand them better was a good one. We were prepared to proceed on that basis. SHEVARDNADZE said, “OK.”

The Foreign Minister said he wished to raise several organizational points. The U.S. had proposed that two documents be signed at the ministerial level with leaders present. The Soviet side did not want a cumbersome procedure. It thus suggested that signatures be divided into two stages: two documents would be signed in the Kremlin by the leaders on May 31 after the plenary session. THE SECRETARY asked if Shevardnadze meant “signed” or “witnessed.” SHEVARDNADZE said, “witnessed.” These documents were not of sufficient stature to be signed by the leaders. THE SECRETARY agreed.

SHEVARDNADZE continued that the two documents the Soviet side had in mind for the Kremlin signing were the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) document and the Marine Search and Rescue Agreement. If it were completed in time, the agreement on ballistic missile launch notifications might be substituted for the Search and Rescue agreement. Shevardnadze believed this was possible. THE SECRETARY agreed. He also felt it would be possible to complete the JVE, even if negotiators had to work all night.

SHEVARDNADZE said that other agreements (he mentioned fisheries, cultural programs, and transportation science and technology) could be signed in a separate ceremony at the Osobnyak by representatives of the two sides, but without the leaders’ being present. The second ceremony could take place May 31 before the ministers’ 2:15 meeting, and should take no more than ten minutes.

THE SECRETARY said he thought this would be appropriate. He noted that the cultural program agreement still needed to be completed. USIA Director Wick was in Moscow and ready to work to wrap up the negotiation. The President attached particular importance to the area of exchanges, and was proud of the process he and the General Secretary had set in motion in Geneva: If it were possible to build on that start by agreeing to the establishment of cultural centers, he would regard this as an especially satisfying accomplishment. The President was from the cultural world, and so it was logical he would be attracted to anything which gave it special prominence. While the Secretary was making no specific proposals, perhaps the cultural agreement could be signed by Wick in the presence of the President. The Marine Search and Rescue agreement could slip to the second signing ceremony.

SHEVARDNADZE said this would depend on whether agreement on a cultural program was reached. But if there was an agreement on test launches, the Soviet side would prefer that it replace Search and Rescue for the Kremlin signing. AKHROMEYEV underscored the desirability of signing something in the arms control area.

THE SECRETARY said he had already described the President’s attachment to the cultural area. He suggested that the two sides work further on the question of what would be signed when. The Secretary understood and agreed with the Soviet desire to reflect the full range of the relationship in the Kremlin signing ceremony. He was sure satisfactory arrangements would be worked out.

SHEVARDNADZE said much would depend on what was completed. He was not sure if the cultural agreement could be finished in time. There were financial considerations which had to be addressed. If they could be resolved, there was no reason the agreement could not be signed.

THE SECRETARY suggested giving the negotiators a good swift kick in the pants to get them going. He noted that Ridgway had reminded him that we expected the Maritime Radionavigation Agreement to be ready for signature. Did the Soviet side expect to be able to sign? SHEVARDNADZE asked if it were ready. BESSMERTNYKH said it was, adding that it would be signed at the Osobnyak.

SHEVARDNADZE asked if that was all for now. THE SECRETARY said he had two more issues to raise.

First, he wanted Shevardnadze to know that the U.S. side looked forward to some discussions at the summit of a variety of regional issues. The Secretary would be going to the Middle East after the summit—although he must be a masochist to do so.² So that might be one area to focus on.

A second could be southern Africa, where the two sides had begun to work effectively, and where we felt progress was possible. Agreement had been reached to have Crocker and Adamishin work on the margins of the leaders’ meetings. We would like to highlight this work in order to stimulate further movement in the region.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviet said [side] also favored setting up a regional working group. It might be possible in such a context to develop language on priority regional problems for inclusion in a joint statement. Moscow attached importance to the Middle East and the Iran-Iraq conflict, and felt that prospects for a southern Africa settlement were getting out of the doldrums. On Kampuchea, the Vietnamese leadership had just announced that 50,000 of its troops would be brought out.

THE SECRETARY said that this was a very welcome statement. SHEVARDNADZE said it was welcome in Moscow as well. THE SECRETARY suggested that perhaps Moscow deserved some of the credit. SHEVARDNADZE replied that the U.S. knew first hand that the Vietnamese leadership was very independent. They had taken the decision on their own, although Moscow had been informed in advance of the announcement.

Shevardnadze said that in approaching their regional discussion, Afghanistan would be the touchstone. This was the first time it had proved possible to go beyond searching for a solution to actual agreement. Unfortunately, Moscow had now been compelled to state publicly that Pakistan was acting in violation of the obligations it had assumed in Geneva. The Soviets knew this to be true. They had the facts.

Shevardnadze said that Gorbachev had said to him just before the present meeting that Afghanistan was the “touchstone” in U.S.-Soviet relations with respect to the settlement of regional disputes. The Soviet Union, Shevardnadze affirmed, was complying “to the hour” with the withdrawal schedule it had decided upon and intended to continue to do so. But if it saw that the other side was violating the Geneva accords, this could change. AKHROMEYEV said that another 1,000 troops had just come out, making the total withdrawal to date 11,000, along with their aircraft and other hardware.

SHEVARDNADZE pointed out that many had predicted that, with the Soviet withdrawal from Jalalabad, the city would fall to the resistance. That had not happened. AKHROMEYEV added that in Khandahar, in fact, a former rebel was now in charge of the province for the central government.

THE SECRETARY recalled that the U.S. had consistently said that it was up to the Afghan people to determine their future ione [when] Soviet forces withdrew. There had also been extensive discussions with the Soviet Union about the two guarantors’ obligations. The U.S. had proposed a moratorium on arms supplies, but the Soviet Union had been unable to accept. We understood that, and had suggested a different form of symmetry, in which reciprocal rights to supply were understood. Acting on that basis, we wanted the Afghans to decide their own fate. We had no interest in trying to influence internal developments there.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Moscow’s only interest was in ensuring that Pakistan lived up to its obligations. The Soviet statement which had been issued on Afghanistan had reflected this. There had been no mention of the U.S., even though the United States had agreed to be a guarantor.

THE SECRETARY said he wished to raise another problem—the Krasnoyarsk radar. His concern was in the context of the defense and space talks and the requirement for a review by October of the ABM Treaty. Shevardnadze had addressed these concerns on one occasion in private. It would be useful to have something authoritative so the two sides would not be tripped up as they proceeded.

SHEVARDNADZE said he did not want to comment on what he had said earlier. The U.S. called for dismantlement. But of what? If the U.S. wanted to resolve the issue, the Soviet side had given it some options. They should be considered. The problem need not be intractable. AKHROMEYEV said the working group could take up the issue. THE SECRETARY said, “OK.” SHEVARDNADZE jocularly warned Akhromeyev that he shouldn’t agree to dismantle the radar without authorization.

THE SECRETARY said that he wanted to reemphasize before they adjourned how much he had been impressed by the Party conference theses. They were a very powerful and important document. If, in the course of the next few days, he could hear something of Shevardnadze’s thinking on the subject, the Secretary would very much welcome it. The theses seemed to him to presage something of great importance, not just for the Soviet Union, but for the world.

SHEVARDNADZE quipped that if he and the Secretary started to discuss perestroyka and democratization, it would require the whole Moscow program. The issues the Secretary had found so interesting was, more seriously, a daily concern. Shevardnadze could say that the plans which were being developed created real opportunities for relations with the U.S. and other countries. The Soviet leadership was acting in this spirit. It was not afraid of self-criticism. Maybe there was a lesson in this for the U.S. as well.

THE SECRETARY repeated that he was very impressed. He had read the General Secretary’s book and a number of relevant documents. They were clearly important. But the Secretary would welcome hearing from Shevardnadze his views on the process now underway, because of the special relationship they had established.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that the ministers should find time to talk. He would be glad to share his impressions and concerns.

[At this point the ministers adjourned to meet with delegations.]³

In welcoming remarks, SHEVARDNADZE noted that this fourth summit reflected the fundamental changes underway in U.S.-Soviet relations. He noted that success in building on the considerable progress which had already been achieved in many areas would in large part depend on the success of the delegations in establishing new momentum by their work. He lauded the ratification of the INF Treaty and called for accelerated work on a treaty to reduce strategic arms. He stated it would be a good thing to sign such a treaty during the term of office of the Reagan administration. Quickly reviewing progress in other parts of the agenda, Shevardnadze complimented those present for their dedication and contributions to the process. He then quickly summarized the organizational arrangements to which the ministers had just agreed.

THE SECRETARY seconded Shevardnadze’s assessment of the importance of the process the President and Gorbachev had set in motion over the previous three years. Noting Shevardnadze’s reference to the INF agreement, the Secretary pointed out that the Senate’s overwhelming vote in favor of ratification reflected not only confidence in the Treaty itself, but in the general course of development of U.S.-Soviet relations. He confirmed Shevardnadze’s description of procedural matters and identified Nitze and Ridgway to oversee, respectively, arms control and other working groups. He reiterated his private comments to Shevardnadze on the appropriateness of seeking to conclude agreement on cultural exchanges, including the establishment of new cultural centers, at the summit.

The Secretary concluded by noting that the ministers had agreed every effort should be made to conclude an agreement on ballistic missile test launch notifications in Moscow. Handing over a draft text of such an agreement, SHEVARDNADZE asked with a grin when he could sign.

Before the meeting adjourned, the Secretary called Shevardnadze’s attention to the importance of completing work in Moscow on the nuclear testing Joint Verification Experiment document. He also felt it would be possible to make concrete progess on southern Africa and the Vienna CSCE Follow-up meeting.

The meeting concluded and working groups began meeting at 9:30 pm after the ministers’ departure.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit May-June ’88, Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place at the Guest House of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.
2. Shultz traveled to Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and Syria to discuss his Middle East peace initiative June 3–7.
3. Brackets are in the original.