Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

152. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, May 12, 1988, 2:40–4:10 p.m.

SUBJECTS

• Working Group Reports

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • THE SECRETARY
  • Gen. Powell
  • Amb. Ridgway
  • Amb. Kampelman
  • Amb. Nitze
  • Amb. Matlock
  • Amb. Glitman
  • Mr. Parris (Notetaker)
  • Mr. Afanasenko (Interp.)

• U.S.S.R.

  • SHEVARDNADZE
  • Dep. FM Bessmertnykh
  • Amb. Karpov
  • Gen. Chervov
  • Amb. Obukhov
  • Mr. Stepanov
  • Mr. Tarasenko
  • Mr. Mamedov (Notetaker)
  • Mr. Palazhchenko (Interp.)

SHEVARDNADZE opened the meeting by suggesting it be used to take stock. THE SECRETARY agreed. SHEVARDNADZE asked Amb. Nitze to lead off with a report of his working group’s discussion of NST issues.

NITZE indicated that the two sides had begun by addressing nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles. The Soviet side had made a proposal responding to the proposal the U.S. had made in Moscow on distinguishing nuclear-armed ALCM’s covered by START from conventional air-to-surface cruise missiles. As a result, there had been some convergence on this question, and the U.S. had given the Soviet side a paper documenting what it believed to be areas of commonality in ALCM limitations.

In particular, Nitze could report that: all currently existing long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles would be considered nuclear armed; future conventionally armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles would be distinguishable from nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface missiles; and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles would be distinguishable from other bombers. While a number of questions remained to be resolved, including the nature of the differences that would distinguish conventional from nuclear systems, agreement on the basic point that conventional missiles were not subject to START constraints was a significant step forward.

Nitze said that the two sides had also discussed approaches to attributing numbers of ALCM’s to heavy bombers. The U.S. proposed to attribute ten warheads to each bomber equipped for ALCM’s. The Soviet Union proposed to attribute a number that reflected the number of ALCM’s that could be carried for one operational mission.

There had also been extensive exchanges on mobile ICBM verification, suspect site inspection, and sea-launched nuclear armed cruise missiles. While these discussions had been useful in clarifying each side’s concerns, Nitze could not report convergence of views on these subjects at the present meeting.

In response to the data the U.S. had provided in Moscow on its strategic forces, Nitze continued, the Soviet side in Geneva had provided certain data of its own. The U.S. had welcomed the start of exchange of data, and looked forward to further exchanges of more detailed information on a reciprocal basis.

On defense and space, Nitze said that the working group had discussed an agreement which would build on the Washington Joint Statement.² The U.S. had put forward its ideas for reflecting in the agreement the standard right to respond in the event supreme national interests were jeopardized, and the concept that the two sides’ leaders had agreed upon in Washington that, after the expiration of the nonwithdrawal period, each side would be free to decide its course of action. The U.S. ideas had taken into account and responded to the proposal made by the Soviet side the previous Sunday. We hoped that the Soviet side would carefully examine the U.S. counterproposal to resolve the issues standing in the way of working out a joint draft treaty text by the time of the summit. While there had been a useful exchange of views, Nitze could not report progress on the subject at that time.

Nitze said that the U.S. team had elaborated further its idea that neither side object to the other side’s space-based sensors. The Soviet response was to distinguish between sensors which were ABM-capable and those which were not. The U.S. proposal was to agree not to object to any space-based sensors.

The U.S. had also emphasized the need to correct Soviet non-compliance with the ABM Treaty, and the particular importance of dismantling the Krasnoyarsk radar prior to the ABM Treaty Review, which is required to begin by October of the current year.

Asked by SHEVARDNADZE to respond, Obukhov read a statement of his own, key points of which included:

—A reiteration of the Soviet position on dealing with the ABM Treaty in a separate agreement, and of the Soviet offer to discuss the threshold between activities permitted and not permitted by the ABM Treaty;

—Acknowledgement that there had been some convergence of views on mobile missiles;

—Confirmation that SLCM’s remained an area of dispute, despite Soviet urging in the working group that the U.S. respond seriously to previous verification proposals and provide a number. Obukhov said that the U.S. proposal for a unilateral declaration offered no basis for an agreement.

—ICBM and SLCM sublimits had been discussed, with the U.S. still insisting upon excluding SLCM’s;

—The view that the two sides seemed to be thinking along similar lines with respect to suspect sites, with the U.S. to provide additional data, including the criteria for identifying suspect sites;

—A statement that the Soviet side would study the U.S. proposal for an agreement on mutual notification of test launches;

—Agreement that agreement had been reached in the areas Nitze had indicated on ALCM counting.

THE SECRETARY commented that three things emerged from the two presentations. Building on work done at the Washington summit, further work since then had clearly produced further progress. The most significant advances had come in the area of verification. It was no mean achievement to have pulled together a joint draft text for the verification protocols and MOU, and to have gotten well into an exchange of data. So there was a need to work on how to express this at the summit.

The Secretary recalled that the two leaders had also emphasized in Washington the importance of completing a START agreement. Ultimately, that goal would be achieved. But it was now apparent that it would not be by the time of the summit. In their previous meetings, the Secretary and Shevardnadze had always said that they would keep trying to conclude a treaty by the time of the Moscow visit. They both understood that, once one admitted that the goal could not be reached, there would be a slackening of efforts. But at some point they had to start briefing in such way that the public would focus not on the absence of a treaty, but on the progress already made and both sides’ determination to keep working on the problems that remained.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that the working group report underscored the progress which had been made in some important areas since the Washington summit. The Foreign Minister’s view was that delegations in Geneva should now direct their efforts to seeking more progress between then and the summit in key areas. They should also begin intensive work to prepare documents for the Moscow summit. Such documents could give some sense of how much had been done both before and after the Washington summit. Shevardnadze agreed there had been progress; a good foundation had been built for future work.

The two sides’ representatives should now work hard to prepare the necessary documents, Shevardnadze repeated. It would also be a good idea to have a good document on non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The fundamental issues had already been discussed. There was agreement that the basis for an agreement should be the Washington statement; everything else should be in the protocol. The object should be to have the agreement itself in time for the summit. It might be possible to agree on the period of non-withdrawal at the summit itself.

As for mobile ICBM’s, Shevardnadze sensed some progress had been made. Now was the time to complete things, especially if the U.S. came forward with a number on launchers and warheads. Given the progress already achieved on verifying mobiles, it should be possible to develop some concrete language on the issue in Moscow. Any document should also reflect the progress made on ALCM’s. On verification, Shevardnadze agreed with the Secretary that much had been achieved.

Shevardnadze said he remained concerned over the “passive” situation with respect to SLCM’s. There had been no movement at all on this issue; it would be well if there were some before Moscow. Everything at this point depended on the U.S. The Soviets had put forward their ideas and were ready for a serious discussion.

That then, Shevardnadze concluded, was the task to be set before the negotiators—to work toward these objectives by the summit. The Foreign Minister agreed with the Secretary that the time had come to admit there would be no START agreement by then. But the progress which had been achieved could be noted. It would be possible to state that there should be a Treaty.

Responding to some of the areas Shevardnadze had singled out, THE SECRETARY noted that the U.S. thought the Washington Statement’s language on the ABM Treaty was fine. Unfortunately the two sides differed over what it meant. So that language could not simply stand alone. That was what lay behind our desire to discuss the issue. The Secretary did not believe that the question of where to put what as between the agreement itself and a protocol was as important as reaching agreement on the substance of the matter. But the key was to agree on the main points of what we were discussing. The Secretary felt that some progress had been made. Since the last ministerial, there had been movement on developing a joint draft text. That was a good sign, but there was still work to do.

As for mobile ICBM’s, there was progress being made. We did have a number in mind. We were ready to share it when we were comfortable with verification. The Secretary could tell Shevardnadze our number was substantially lower than that the Soviet side had put forward. But we felt that if verification could be dealt with satisfactorily, mobiles could be a positive element in the strategic structure. So we were prepared to continue to work on the issues between Geneva and the summit. This could lead to a discussion of numbers.

The Secretary noted that there seemed to be some convergence of views on ALCM’s. On SLCM’s, we had already advised the Soviet side of our view that the verification schemes which had been advanced were, on the one hand, not sufficiently reliable, and, on the other, very intrusive. They gave insufficient confidence but would impose serious operational difficulties on our Navy. These considerations had led us to propose that the issue be dealt with by means of unilateral declarations. We had not been able to put a number to the verification concept proposed by Moscow. If, on the other hand, the Soviet Union could accept our concept, we could provide a number.

SHEVARDNADZE said he did not understand one thing. The Soviet side had made SLCM verification proposals which covered the main elements. Why could not a discussion begin on that basis, maybe even after the summit, with the objective of identifying positive and negative elements in the Soviet proposal.

THE SECRETARY said that Shevardnadze seemed to be suggesting something between a unilateral declaration and a verifiable number, i.e., a situation where there would be a number established and there would be things which gave comfort on verification, even though there was agreement that the verification regime was not totally satisfactory.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the declaratory approach was not consistent with dealing with the problem. Moscow saw SLCM’s as a component part of all other strategic offensive arms. They should therefore be treated the same as other such weapons. A unilateral declaration was not sufficient. That was why there was a need for discussion.

THE SECRETARY said that we were working on this within the USG. As we had something new to say on the subject, we would want to talk about it. But the question did arise as to whether the standard of verification both sides had thus far demanded could realistically be applied to SLCM’s.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that unless the discussion began, there would never be an answer. He asked what the ministers should take up next.

THE SECRETARY suggested that Glitman report on the work he and Chervov had done.

GLITMAN said that his discussions in Geneva had been fruitful. If the ministers approved what he and Chervov had worked out, all of the verification issues which had arisen in the course of the Senate’s ratification debate could be considered resolved. CHERVOV seconded Glitman’s assessment, emphasizing that the issues were complex ones which had required much patience by both sides to resolve.

KAMPELMAN said he had a comment on a practical question. Technical groups were scheduled to meet again May 18. Kampelman had to confess he had some concern . . .

SHEVARDNADZE said he did as well. How should that be handled?

THE SECRETARY said that, as the matter had been explained to him, the issues which would be discussed were highly technical—dealing, e.g., with the number of times working garments should be laundered. The date of the meeting had been set and was known. If it did not take place, some might draw the conclusion that we were trying to put it off until after ratification. This was not, in fact, the case. The group might meet Monday, May 15, to get it out of the way.

The Secretary said it was his understanding that there were two issues which might come up at the technical meeting which might be relevant to the Treaty. One had to do with the SS–20 canister and the potency of the x-ray apparatus to be used in examining it, as well as the sweep of that machinery. The basic principle here seemed to be that the purpose of the exercise was to determine the absence of SS–20’s. That should guide the technical specifications of the apparatus used. It should be able to do the work, but need not be so strong as to blow up what it was examining.

The other Treaty-relevant issue had to do with the equipment to be used to examine the end of a canister. The fact was that at this point we did not know precisely what equipment we would use. Thus we were not in a position to address the issue authoritatively. This was an issue we would need to address, but not right now.

Noting that all other issues now on the agenda could probably be worked out, the Secretary suggested that the meeting take place. It might take place early if that proved possible; but the important thing was that it take place in a good spirit. Perhaps the easy issues could be resolved first. On the two issues he had raised, the Secretary urged that neither side see problems which were not there. The U.S. team would be ready to work reasonably and sensibly.

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed that cancellation could lead to speculation.

THE SECRETARY asked when the materials documenting resolution of the INF issues would be ready. GLITMAN said he hoped they had already been delivered from the U.S. Mission.

THE SECRETARY asked about the notes which would be exchanged on “futuristic” weapons. KAMPELMAN said they were ready now. He explained that the Soviet side had expressed a preference that Karpov and he sign. They could go ahead and do that now. SHEVARDNADZE suggested that they sign. THE SECRETARY agreed, and Kampelman left to make preparations.

The Ministers agreed they should next hear from the nuclear testing working group, and Robinson, Holmes and Palenykh were summoned.

At SHEVARDNADZE’s invitation, Robinson reported that agreement had been reached in six areas: on the text of the Joint Verification Experiment and 34 of 37 detailed annexes; that the text should be signed at the summit; that preparations for the JVE would be guided by the document even before it had been signed; that the two sides would attempt to complete a new verification protocol for the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty to replace the old protocol; that work would continue in parallel to develop effective verification means for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty with the understanding that final agreement on the TTBT protocol must await JVE results; and, finally, on language on nuclear testing for inclusion in a statement at the summit.

PALENYKH said he would only add that the two sides would spend the next two weeks in intensive work on the final JVE annexes.

SHEVARDNADZE quipped that the nuclear testing team not only spoke fast, they worked fast. THE SECRETARY agreed they had done a very fine, professional piece of work. SHEVARDNADZE thanked the nuclear testing group leaders for their efforts, saying that their work was approved.

Nazarkin then entered the room to join Holmes in reporting on the CW working group activities.

NAZARKIN reported that the group had agreed on language to be included in a Moscow joint statement. There had also been a discussion of issues which, in the Soviet view, would be appropriate for U.S.-Soviet bilateral discussion. The preliminary U.S. response had been positive, but Holmes had said additional study would be necessary. It appeared that the Soviet ideas could be taken up at July bilateral consultations on the margin of the CD.

HOLMES confirmed that Nazarkin’s report was accurate, adding that, if it were decided to have working groups on CW in Moscow, the Soviet suggestions might be taken up there. Otherwise they could be dealt with at the CD, as Nazarkin had indicated.

SHEVARDNADZE asked the Secretary if he had seen the draft language the CW group had produced. THE SECRETARY had not. SHEVARDNADZE said he had. It was pretty good. It would be a good idea to work further on CW in Moscow. So the experts had done a good job; their work was approved. THE SECRETARY said he had no problem with a CW working group in Moscow if Shevardnadze wished.

After reading a note from Redman, the Secretary noted that there had been a suggestion that the signing of the note of futuristic weapons and of the paper on INF verification issues be opened to the press. It might be useful to have TV or photo coverage. The Secretary was thinking of what Powell would have to do in Washington the next day. Filming the event would grapically show what progress had been made. SHEVARDNADZE said he was agreeable.

Thomas and Grinevskiy were summoned to report on the results of the conventional forces working group.

GRINEVSKIY led off by reading a joint report on the working group’s discussion of a mandate for conventional stability talks. Both sides, he said, saw favorable conditions for a positive outcome and for the development of a mandate text. The Soviet side had proposed a formula for describing the subject matter of the negotiations, especially as regarded dual capable systems. The proposal had been made with an eye to announcement at the Moscow summit, after consultations with the allies of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. A part of the formula was “nuclear charges will not be included.”

Grinesvkiy explained that his discussion with Thomas had been paralleled by discussions between the U.S. and Soviet delegations in Vienna. The U.S. delegate there had proposed certain additions to the Soviet formula which required some clarification. Grinevskiy said he and Thomas had also dealt with the Soviet proposal for talks on naval activities. The U.S. preferred to hold such discussions in the context of the Akhromeyev-Crowe meeting later this year.³ The two sides, he concluded, had engaged in a useful conceptual exchange on future conventional arms negotiations. The question of the autonomy of those talks had also come up. It had been agreed that the issue was best dealt with in Vienna.

SHEVARDNADZE asked if his understanding was correct that Grinevskiy had given an agreed report. GRINEVSKIY said, “yes.”

THOMAS confirmed that Grinevskiy had spoken from an agreed text. He would only clarify that it had been agreed that the summit should deal only in general terms with the Vienna negotiations on conventional arms. On naval activities, the U.S. position was that Akhromeyev and Crowe could consider whether to discuss the subject. Thomas noted that the U.S. understood the phrase Grinevskiy had read on the mandate to mean “in these negotiations.”

THE SECRETARY observed that, in order to make the process in Vienna work, there had to be some distance between talks there and bilateral U.S.-Soviet discussions. The Stockholm end-game was a good example of how things should work. The Secretary thought his discussions with Shevardnadze had given delegations in Vienna an impulse. We would continue to explore the procedural aspect and help to make it work better.

SUKHODREV was then summoned to give a read-out on bilateral discussions.

After running through agreements likely to be ready for signature at the summit, he called to the ministers attention certain problems which had arisen in connection with the exchange of consulates in Kiev and New York, and in connection with dealing with certain problems—notably provision of cable television—of interest to the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

In the absence of Simons, who had been Sukhodrev’s interlocutor in the working group, PARRIS volunteered that the two sides list of possible agreements for the summit appeared to jibe. On Kiev, he acknowledged that Sukhodrev had accurately described the problems which had arisen with respect to use by the Soviet consulate staff of the building they had intended to occupy. He described the legal and domestic political factors underlying the situation, and sought to put in perspective the Embassy-related problems Sukhodrev had cited. Finally, he noted that Sukhodrev had failed to mention the possibility that agreement in principle could be announced in Moscow on the establishment of cultural centers in Moscow and Washington.

THE SECRETARY asked Ridgway to describe what progress she and Bessmertnykh had made with respect to possible summit documents.

RIDGWAY said that good work had been done that morning on the omnibus joint statement, and that there was now a joint draft text. There were still some issues to work, and a major conceptual problem on how to handle regional issues.

THE SECRETARY interjected that the way to handle this was through briefings by each side after the statement was issued.

RIDGWAY continued that she felt the joint statement could be wrapped up in a day or day and a half if the Soviet side could send the right people to Washington by, say, the end of the following week.

On the second document that the ministers had discussed, the working group had kept in mind the possibility that it could be collapsed into a single, overall document. The U.S. had nonetheless tabled a new “report” which took into account some Soviet ideas. Our draft had contained a large blank where substantive details could later be added. The Soviet side believed that Defense and Space as well as START language should be reflected in that section. The U.S. had insisted that only START was appropriate. So the question was whether the document focused exclusively on START. Ridgway said she and Bessmertnykh would need guidance on that point.

BESSMERTNYKH said he agreed with Ridgway’s assessment. It was good that work had begun on a preliminary text. The two sides were working according to the recipe given them by ministers: i.e., that there should be two documents, one a more traditional summary of work in a broad range of areas; a second concerned with issues being discussed in the Geneva negotiations—50% reductions in strategic offensive arms coupled with preservation of the ABM Treaty. It was impossible to conceive of a second document which dealt only with the first set of issues. The Soviet side would have to insist on the concept agreed in Washington.

It was clear, Bessmertnykh said, that of the two the second document would be the more difficult to produce. Part of the problem was that the “core” of the document depended on the result of discussions still underway in Geneva. Bessmertnykh thus seconded Shevardnadze’s idea that delegations in Geneva should focus not only on the substance of their negotiations, but on developing material for the concluding document on what had been achieved since Washington. It was of course understood that work would proceed not just in Geneva, but in capitals. Moreover, Bessmertnykh added, the second document should include not just achievements, but instructions for future work. He believed it would be possible to develop the outlines for the kinds of documents which had been discussed. If the second could not be done as a separate piece, it could be included in the overall statement.

THE SECRETARY agreed that work should continue.

SHEVARDNADZE said he believed that Ridgway and Bessmertnykh had good material to work with. There was agreement in principle that there should be two documents. Shevardnadze was convinced it would be possible to pull together a good statement on the ABM Treaty and strategic arms. It should indeed include instructions to negotiators.

So work should continue. Bessmertnykh would be able to go to Washington. He might also be in Helsinki. Perhaps Ridgway could come to Moscow. The goal should be a solid document for the summit.

Moving to conclude the meeting, Shevardnadze mused that the more the two ministers met, the more problems arose. But the present meeting had showed that they could also be solved. It had been a useful, productive and necessary exchange. The discussions had been good ones. Otherwise it would have been impossible to work through the difficult questions which had arisen. That was how he would plan to characterize the meeting when asked by the press.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed with that assessment, and would follow suit.

After discussion of the state of preparations of the two INF documents, the Secretary and Shevardnadze moved to a side-room for a five-minute one-on-one.

Immediately thereafter, they witnessed the signing of the note on “futuristic” weapons, and their meeting concluded. The separate paper on INF verification issues was signed the following morning by Glitman and ?⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Untitled Folder. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place at the Soviet Mission.
2. See footnote 3, Document 125.
3. Documentation on this meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLIV, National Security Policy, 1985–1988.
4. Presumably reference is to an unidentified member of the Soviet delegation.