Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

140. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Shevardnadze Visit

Shevardnadze and I concluded his visit with six hours of intense discussion.

The principal focus of our talk was Afghanistan, where it became clear Shevardnadze lacked authority to accept an arrangement which balanced obligations between ourselves and the Soviets as guarantors of a Geneva agreement. Shevardnadze walked away from my final suggestion—a joint moratorium on arms supplies for a period coinciding with the Soviet withdrawal period, plus three months. I had hoped such a formula, which would have been without prejudice to either the Soviets’ or our own rights to supply those Afghans we had previously supported, would be a face-saving way out for Moscow. Shevardnadze would not bite, indicating instead that our stance would force the Soviets to make their own arrangements. I told him that was their decision, but made clear we stood ready to sign in Geneva if our concerns were met.

Colin and I pressed hard on the need to clarify the Washington Summit Statement’s language on defense and space activities permitted during the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM treaty. Colin persuasively summarized the factors which made movement on this issue so important for us, and Shevardnadze seemed to agree to my suggestion that they join us in Geneva in work on a joint draft treaty text. It is clear, however, that we still have a lot of convincing to do. Nor was the picture much brighter in our discussion of START, where I urged that the Soviets take some relatively simple steps to remove brackets in the texts prepared thus far.

On other issues, Shevardnadze first agreed to language in our final statement which would have committed him to “strong action” on Iran-Iraq, but pulled it when it became clear we would not agree on Afghanistan. We had a lengthy discussion of Central America, with Shevardnadze ducking our efforts to engage him seriously on Soviet suspension of arms shipments to Nicaragua, as Gorbachev suggested at the summit. We reviewed progress in our bilateral affairs working group, where our experts were able to identify a half-dozen agreements which may be ripe for signature in Moscow.

In our concluding assessments, both Shevardnadze and I expressed disappointment over the results of his visit. I told him, however, that we should not be discouraged. The issues we are now addressing are by definition the tough ones. Some, like clarifying the Washington Statement and a range of START issues can be resolved by the time of the Moscow summit, given a realistic approach on both sides. Others—such as, it’s turned out, Afghanistan—may have to be handled outside of the bilateral framework. The important thing is to end up with agreements we can live with, rather than agreements for their own sake.

In taking my leave of Shevardnadze, I told him we remained committed to making as much progress as we can across our full agenda between now and May 30. He said the Soviet side is as well, and I felt he was sincere in stressing the importance of doing everything possible to ensure that your visit to Moscow is a success.

We have planted some important seeds this week. We will see whether they bear fruit when I go to Moscow next month. In the meantime, there will be plenty of work to do here, in Moscow and in Geneva.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Ledsky Files, Soviet Union (USSR) (1). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.