14. Editorial Note
On January 21, 1987, President Ronald Reagan met with Secretary of State George Shultz and President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Frank Carlucci in the Oval Office at the White House from 2 to 2:48 p.m. White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan attended the meeting from 2 to 2:32 p.m. Reagan wrote in his diary: “After lunch—back to office for some desk work—then a meeting with Geo. Shultz. He brought word—Soviets are suggesting a foreign ministers meeting in Moscow in Feb. & then—based on its success—a summit here in the Spring. We also discussed an arms control strategy to try on them based mainly on getting a 50% reduction in I.C.B.M.s—period. Then we’d negotiate follow up plans.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, Volume II, November 1985–January 1989, page 679. No formal minutes of this meeting have been found, but according to typed notes, (Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, Secretary Shultz (1/21/87–3/12/87)), the participants discussed a set of papers sent to Reagan, which Reagan forwarded to Shultz on January 3 under cover of a handwritten note: “George—a friend who wants to remain unknown sent these and suggested they be passed on to you. They contain some pretty sound thoughts—worth looking at. Ron.” (Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, Box 23, Papers on Central America (01/03/1987–01/28/1987)) In his memoirs, Shultz recalled receiving the package: “Enclosed were papers on the Middle East, Nicaragua, arms control, and other issues. I read them: I could see that the author was knowledgeable, a little off the reservation but in interesting ways, and with some views similar to my own. (I later learned that the author was [former President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs] Bud McFarlane.)” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 864)
“During the first term,” McFarlane wrote in the paper on U.S.-Soviet relations, “you accomplished something truly historic in establishing a new strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union. The greatest testimony to its success is that today we are deterring Soviet expansion.” McFarlane went on to discuss attempts by Reagan’s predecessors to deal with the Soviet Union: “Strength is what gets you good arms control agreements and it is what deters further Russian expansion.”
“But all that you have accomplished in the past six years may very well be lost in the next six months,” McFarlane went on to say. “As congress cuts the Defense budget, Gorbachev will freeze capability by going into space. BUT OF COURSE IF YOU ACHIEVE THROUGH REDUCTIONS A MUCH LOWER LEVEL OF SOVIET WARHEADS, YOU WOULDN’T NECESSARILY NEED TO DEPLOY SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS. YOU COULD DEAL WITH THE LOWER LEVEL USING GROUND-BASED SYSTEMS. When you think about that, you can see the makings of a deal.”
[Page 74]After expressing his support for Reagan’s positions on strategic arms reductions at Reykjavik, McFarlane proposed not deploying space-based SDI on the condition that the Soviets reduced their stockpiles of SS–18 missiles by a fixed percentage each year. He wrote: “This last element is the new wrinkle Mr. President. It is basically using space-based SDI (which would be very heavily funded as part of the deal with the Congress) to leverage the Russians down to ever lower levels of offensive arms. And think what you would get for it here at home.” It would allow Reagan to go to the Congress with tangible evidence that funding SDI was directly reducing nuclear stockpiles. “In short, it locks in support for SDI beyond your administration and keeps the Russians on the path of talks in Geneva, hoping that the Congress will give him what he would otherwise have to bargain for.” (Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, Box 23, Papers on Central America (01/03/1987–01/28/1987))