12. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary’s Delegation1
10182/Tosec 10265. Subject: 1/12 Ridgway-Dubinin Meeting.
1. Secret entire text.
2. Summary: Dubinin affirmed that Soviet nomination of Vorontsov to head next round of NST talks reflected a genuine desire to move the negotiations forward, rather than an attempt to gain propaganda advantage. Asst. Sec Ridgway used the opportunity to confirm that Ambassador Kampelman would remain Chairman of the U.S. Delegation in Geneva, and informed Dubinin of Kampelman’s appointment as Counselor of the Department.2 End summary.
3. Dubinin, who “urgently” requested the meeting, was accompanied by Soviet EmbOff Churkin. EUR/SOV Director Parris attended on U.S. side.
4. Dubinin indicated he wished to return to the subject of their conversation the previous Thursday3—the Soviet decision to name First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov head of the Soviet Delegation to the next round of the Nuclear and Space Talks. The Ambassador wanted to emphasize that, for Moscow, the motive for that action was not propaganda but substance. The Soviets were looking for a means to move the talks ahead, to give them a new impulse. Raising the level would, they felt, expand the possibilities. Solutions could be explored both in official meetings “with pen in hand” and in less formal settings “over teacups.” In a word, the most important thing for the Soviets was not the external impact of their decision, but the results it produced in Geneva.
5. Ridgway expressed appreciation for Dubinin’s elaboration of his message of the week before, but assured him there had been no misunderstanding on our side of the text he had left. She drew on the following talking points in welcoming Vorontsov’s nomination and confirming that Ambassador Kampelman would remain the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation.
Begin text.
[Page 71]—We welcome your decision to appoint First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov to head the Soviet Delegation to the NST round beginning January 15 in the interest of more “active and dynamic” work at the negotiations.
—The U.S. attaches the highest priority to the Geneva negotiations and the objectives we have set in reaching deep, stabilizing reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces.
—I can affirm that the U.S. is prepared to move forward on the basis of progress already made in Reykjavik and Geneva. Agreements can be made in all three fora if both sides are willing to work without preconditions and without holding progress in one area hostage to progress in another. Forward movement at Geneva could lead to meetings at higher levels.
—Ambassador Kampelman is the President’s personal representative and will remain Chairman of the U.S. Delegation. The President has nominated Ambassador Kampelman to be Counselor of the Department of State, a rank equivalent to that of Under Secretary. He has the full support of the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congressional leadership.
—Ambassador Kampelman and the other negotiators enjoy the President’s highest confidence. They have full authority in all matters of negotiations and I can assure the Soviet side that they are ready to work creatively and energetically with their Soviet counterparts to achieve concrete progress at the NST negotiations.
End text.
6. Ridgway added her personal view that, now that the two sides had exchanged positions on the composition of their respective delegations, the task at hand was to get down to business in Geneva.
7. After thanking Ridgway for her remarks, Dubinin asked whether he would be correct in interpreting them as the official U.S. response to his demarche of the week before. Ridgway confirmed this. Dubinin next asked if Kampelman’s appointment as Counselor represented a “new element in his position.” Ridgway indicated that the appointment, which had been under consideration for some time, meant that Kampelman would return to Geneva with two titles. Dubinin expressed thanks for the clarification, noting that he had been “concerned” by weekend press coverage of the Vorontsov appointment, and especially by references to Kampelman. But, he quipped, “the press is the press.”
8. The meeting concluded with Ridgway and Dubinin sharing the hope that the forthcoming round in Geneva would be a productive one.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N870001–0195. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to Moscow. Drafted by Parris; cleared by Platt in S/S and Tracy in S/S-O; approved by Ridgway. Shultz traveled to several African nations including Monrovia to meet with President Doe on January 14.↩
- The Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) in Geneva resumed on January 15.↩
- January 9.↩