91. Editorial Note
In August and September 1985, Robert McFarlane, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, worked closely with members of his staff, mainly Robert Linhard, Senior Director for Defense Programs and Arms Control in the National Security Council Staff and Jack Matlock, Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs in the National Security Council Staff, to make the interagency process more responsive to the challenges of formulating a policy on arms control with the Soviet Union. This process resulted in the formation of the Arms Control Support Group and in a memorandum and Presidential tasking, “Contingency Planning Against Potential Soviet Arms Control Positions,” September 17, 1985 (see Document 92), prepared by Linhard under instruction from McFarlane.
Starting in early August, in a series of electronic messages (or PROFs notes), McFarlane, Linhard, and Matlock discussed how to approach possible contingencies that Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev might present to President Ronald Reagan at the upcoming Geneva Summit in November 1985. In an August 5 electronic message to Linhard, Matlock wrote: “I think Bud is absolutely right to anticipate that we will need to think through our response to a possible Soviet offer to combine a reduction of offensive weapons with some limitations on SDI.” He continued: “The question is: what are the dangers in moving in this direction? Also, the dangers in not moving if the Sovs make the offer? I defer to your judgment regarding the delicacies of interagency management. But I think Bud is right in trying to get a handle on the substance of the issues. If we are not prepared to move rapidly when and if the time comes, we could quickly be pushed off the high ground.” (Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Responding to Soviet Arms Control Options Special Tasking—Creation of ACSG (Arms Control Support Group) September 1985; NLR–334–6–44–5–1)
In an August 8 reply, Linhard agreed with Matlock’s assessment and wrote: “we need to do the contingency work. Our problem is how [Page 355] to do it without it (1) blowing up into an interagency fight that spills over into the press, (2) or that puts Bud in the lead in such a way that it feeds an assault on him, or (3) that it gets framed initially in such a way that the system will fight the problem vice work the problem in the national interest. Bud wants to talk to this in some way at tomorrow’s SACG [August 9]. I’m not sure this is the wisest course. I think that what we need is for Bud to charter a small, close-hold ‘strategy group’ reporting to him and the SACG without identifying immediately this as a first project.” (Ibid.)
On August 13, McFarlane forwarded to Linhard an August 5 electronic message: “All of us are conscious of the growing possibility that the Russians may try to grasp the propaganda high ground with an offer to accept the US position on ballistic missile warhead reductions (or something close to it) in exchange for limits on SDI. We have tried in various ways—our NSDD after the SALT II decision and today’s memo to Cap on MX basing—to try to generate the intellectual elements of a sensible response if they should do the unexpected. But I’m not sure that Defense will tackle the point of dealing with a Soviet initiative as outlined above unless we congeal it for them in writing with formal tasking, i.e. a memo which says ‘What if the Russians make the following proposal . . . how would it affect the military balance; what risks would it create; to what extent can we pursue a sensible SDI program to identify feasible systems without transgressing the ABM Treaty; if the latter is not possible what should be our approach and when, if changes in the treaty are warranted, should we propose such changes . . . etc? I am not naive as to the bureaucratic risks in such a memo nor to the press vulnerabilities if such a memo leaks.” Linhard responded, August 14, that a “direct tasking” for this might “be misinterpreted. Since at the end of the day this will have to be worked by a small ‘select’ group feeding the SACG, I still think that we could better protect our options by establishing the group now (perhaps via Presidential tasking) to look at contingencies.” NSDD 173, June 10, and the memorandum to Weinberger are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988. See also footnote 2, Document 41.
On August 14, McFarlane wrote back to Linhard: “I would appreciate your doing a memo from the President to Cap and Vessey saying that he is concerned that the conventional wisdom is driving toward the prediction of a deal—the trade-off of SDI testing, development and deployment for deep offensive cuts. It is not at all clear that such a deal would be consistent with our national security interests although a return to a stable offensive balance at or about 4–5000 ballistic missile warheads could be constructive if we were able to continue a vigorous research program in SDI. The dilemma we face is that to even task the [Page 356] study of such an option would risk, through leaks, the forfeiting of capital with the Russians to the extent that it signalled we were interested in a deal. Go on to say that Bud has hesitated to even introduce the subject in the SACG for this very fear. Still I (the President) have to deal with the real prospect that Gorbachev may indeed introduce such a proposal and consequently I need to know what the facts are from a military point of view in order to avoid being put on the defensive. As to how to wring this out, it seems to me (the President) that we need to try to form a ‘Skunk works’ consisting of no more than 4 or 5 trusted aides to do the close hold analysis to put us in a position to deal with this issue.” (Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Responding to Soviet Arms Control Options Special Tasking—Creation of ACSG (Arms Control Support Group) September 1985; NLR–334–6–44–5–1)
In an undated electronic message to McFarlane, likely later on August 14, Linhard wrote: “Per your guidance, provided below is a draft memorandum tasking contingency work requested. Even with best efforts to fireproof this memorandum, even in draft, it remains pure dynamite—therefore, have tried to use the PROFs system to get it to you (and Admiral Poindexter) and let you decide who else sees the document. Jack Matlock has not seen this draft. (If successful in my attempt to get directly to you privately via PROFs, and even more so if not, hope our fine gentlemen in the Secretariat will understand the reasons for this attempt.) Remain very concerned that this links the work too directly to the President, but have made the arguments fully to you before and need not repeat them again. You need to consider carefully to whom this memorandum is sent. You had indicated that it should go to SecDef and CJCS. This would permit us to work a military assessment. The DCI would be a useful participant even in this, and would recommend you consider this add. State and ACDA should be considered also from a process point of view, but their participation hinges on what you wish to do with the product.” (Ibid.) McFarlane responded, on August 14, at 10:22 p.m., “Many thanks Bob for busting your ass to do this. At first blush it is what I asked for. You ought not share it with anyone at this point. Let me think about it overnight.” (Ibid.)
The development of this contingency paper and the discussion between McFarlane and Linhard led to the creation of the Arms Control Support Group (ACSG). In a memorandum to President Reagan, August 31, drafted by Ronald Lehman, Director for Defense Programs and Arms Control in the National Security Council Staff, McFarlane explained: “The attached draft Memorandum establishes a working level group to do sensitive contingency planning in support of the Senior Arms Control Group and asks the Secretaries of State and [Page 357] Defense, the Directors of the Central Intelligence and Arms Control and Disarmament, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to nominate a qualified representative.” Reagan initialed his approval of the recommendation. In a September 4 memorandum to Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Director of Central Intelligence Casey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Vessey, and Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Adelman, the President stated: “Whether the Soviet Union undertakes serious negotiating initiatives in the various negotiating fora or not, we can expect a number of fast breaking events and significant arms control milestones throughout the next several months. To assist the Senior Arms Control Group in its endeavors to make certain that the U.S. Government is well prepared for all major contingencies, I hereby establish the Arms Control Support Group. This group, chaired by the National Security Council Staff, will prepare sensitive contingency planning materials to be considered by the Senior Arms Control Group and will perform other related tasks as the Assistant to the President for National Security may deem necessary.” (Ibid.)