Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

90. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 17, 1985

SUBJECT

• Dobrynin Meeting

Dobrynin came in late the afternoon of September 16 for a follow up to our meeting last week on preparations for the Shevardnadze and Gorbachev meetings.²

Dobrynin’s main point was that Shevardnadze will have a message from Gorbachev on the Geneva talks. The message will “clear up the mystery” of Gorbachev’s Time interview comments on arms control—presumably by giving more details on his expressed willingness to accept radical reductions in offensive forces and “fundamental research” on strategic defense.³ The message will be delivered to you directly. Its substance will then be transmitted to the Soviet delegation at the Geneva arms talks for introduction as a formal Soviet initiative.

Dobrynin stressed repeatedly that Gorbachev wanted his meeting with you to produce results. If immediate solutions were not possible, he hoped for movement toward ultimate solutions. I made clear you were no less eager for a successful meeting, and that if progress which served the interests of both sides were possible before November 19 we would welcome it.

Pointing out that the experience of past summits suggested that thorough preparation was the best guarantee of success, I emphasized the need to develop a specific work program for the period ahead. Dobrynin agreed, adding that, while the Shevardnadze and Geneva meetings would hopefully stimulate progress at the Geneva talks, obstacles could still be expected. It would be important that we be able to “come back to each other” to overcome them. He did not make clear what he had in mind, but may have been signaling the need for another Foreign Minister level meeting before the November meeting.

Comment

While Dobrynin was at pains to suggest that Shevardnadze will come armed with new ideas, the Foreign Minister will have none of his senior arms control negotiators with him in Washington or New York. This suggests he will simply convey whatever message he has rather than seek to engage us in a detailed discussion. Although Dobrynin indicated initially that Shevardnadze would give the message to you alone, he later hinted I might get an advance look at it in New York.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Leaders, 1983–1986, Meetings—Shultz-Gromyko-Dobrynin Hartman-Gromyko 1985 (3). Secret; Sensitive.
2. See Document 83.
3. See footnote 2, Document 80.