Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

89. Minutes of a Meeting¹

Washington, September 17, 1985, 4–5:18 p.m.

VICE PRESIDENT’S MEETING WITH GYORGY ARBATOV

SUBJECT

• Academician Gyorgy Arbatov’s Visit (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• Office of the Vice President

  • The Vice President
  • Mr. Craig Fuller
  • Mr. Donald Gregg

• State

  • Mr. James Wilkinson

• NSC

  • Tyrus W. Cobb

Minutes

The Vice President expressed his pleasure at seeing Dr. Arbatov at the meeting at the Aga Khan estate in Geneva.² He indicated he felt the frank and candid discussions they had there were useful and productive. Vice President Bush noted that he had been studying with care recent reports emanating from the Soviet Union with respect to the upcoming meeting between the President and the General Secretary. Vice President Bush indicated that he understood Arbatov had the confidence of the General Secretary and would be conveying the substance of this discussion to Mr. Gorbachev. (C)

Dr. Arbatov replied that, in fact he was only a consultant to the leadership. However, he did have a continuing relationship with General Secretary Gorbachev and knows that the new Soviet leader strongly desires to see serious results come from the November meeting. Arbatov added that the General Secretary believes the preparations for that meeting are firmly under way on both sides. But, Arbatov added, Gorbachev is under the impression that the Americans do not see any chance for real progress in Geneva. (C)

Vice President Bush responded that this was clearly an erroneous impression. He indicated that the Soviets often had problems understanding our true policy because of the quantity of information, true or false, that is conveyed in our media daily. This is a fact of life and the Soviet leadership should only pay attention to what the President himself is saying and doing. He pointedly added that President Reagan is quite serious regarding both the arms control talks in Geneva and for the meeting with the General Secretary in November. (C)

The Vice President asserted that the Soviet practice of floating proposals prior to the meeting is most unhelpful. We must, instead, conduct negotiations in private. He said he would never claim that the United States is without blame in this public debate—both sides employ rhetoric. But what concerns us, the Vice President indicated, is that the Soviet propaganda was much more intense and heated than earlier. The point was that if we didn’t immediately start to negotiate earnestly in private, we ran the danger of locking ourselves into non-negotiable positions. He stressed that there was a real danger of polarizing our stands and prejudicing the outcome of the meetings. (S)

In particular, the Soviet rhetoric was poisoning the atmosphere before the two leaders had even met. The Vice President stated that he felt the personal chemistry between the General Secretary and the President could be good. Vice President Bush stated he knows this President and wanted to convey this to Arbatov straight from the shoulder. (C)

Arbatov replied that, of course many things could be discussed, but in reality having only two sessions leaves a total of eight to nine hours of discussion to cover all of the issues: arms control, bilateral and regional. Arbatov frowned and noted that the introduction of human rights concerns could lead to a negative outcome. According to Arbatov, addressing the human rights issue depends largely on how the Americans attack the problem. If the U.S. pursued this matter strongly, particularly with harsh public rhetoric, the Soviet side would have no alternative but to raise American behavior—at home and in places like Nicaragua. On the other hand, if the U.S. were to offer helpful thoughts on resolving this issue, we may have a productive dialogue. (S)

Vice President Bush told Arbatov that he knows how the President operates. He will speak openly, candidly and frankly—just as this discussion is being conducted now. The President is receptive to such a dialogue. President Reagan would not be harsh in his approach; e.g., if the General Secretary raised Nicaragua as an issue, the President would respond that it is a valid question for discussion that could be addressed by two responsible leaders. (C)

What was important, noted the Vice President, was that the meetings established an agenda for future discussions. Further, that the November sessions establish a climate conducive to conducting a productive Soviet-American dialogue. (C)

Arbatov replied that while he did not know the President, having met him only once, he felt it necessary to stress that if the meeting with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev were as ideologically charged as was the President’s meeting with Shcherbitskii,³ then there would be little chance for establishing any sort of future agenda. Arbatov stated that what particularly concerned the Soviet delegation was the President’s strong ideological stance. Continuing, Arbatov said the most provocative statements were the President’s false quotations from Lenin and his ascribing significance to obscure statements made by some unknown Ukrainian diplomat (probably referring to Maniluiskii’s 1931 comments on the world revolution). (C)

Arbatov continued that he felt no “respect” for the Geneva discussions. He felt they were going nowhere and the buildings housing the negotiations should be referred to as the “tomb of unknown Soviet proposals.” Serious offers on demilitarization of outerspace and prevention of an arms race had not been addressed. The Americans instead sought to propagandize their own approach by belittling Soviet proposals. (C)

The Vice President characterized Arbatov’s presentation as completely false. He noted that it was in fact impossible for us to convey a clear picture of our responsible position to the Soviet public. Unfortunately for us and world peace, President Reagan has no opportunity to speak directly to the Soviet citizenry. The Vice President noted that he wished that we had the opportunity to participate in an interview such as that Gorbachev had with Time Magazine.⁴ All of the questions were thrown up “like a slow, fat pitch” that the General Secretary could knock out of the ballpark. (C)

Vice President Bush added that he was not nearly as pessimistic as Arbatov. Relations were not as bad as they had been in the past; for example, during the Berlin crisis or the 1973 Mid East conflict. He added that it was difficult to understand why the Soviets painted such a bleak picture. The Vice President noted that he was concerned with the cumulative effect of the Soviet actions. (C)

Dr. Arbatov stated that this was a serious and genuine attitude. He commented that the U.S. in fact was even more negative. For example, as was our Defense Secretary on Face the Nation last Sunday.⁵ The Vice President responded sharply that the Soviets had to understand that we were deeply concerned with continuing incidents against our military liaison missions. Further, we didn’t create the “Spy Dust” controversy,⁶ nor were we conducting a “hate campaign” that poisons the atmosphere. Arbatov replied that he understood this but when we go to such “extremes” as preventing Soviet officials from going to a volleyball game, it seems to add up to some sort of American plot. (C)

The Vice President stated that we needed to move quickly off this rhetoric. We were only two months from the November meeting, and if we were to have progress, we needed to be conducting serious negotiations privately. Arbatov said he was in agreement, but our refusal to join them in a nuclear test moratorium and the rejection of the Soviet proposals on ASAT limitations, taken together indicated an unwillingness on the part of the United States to move forward. The Vice President stated firmly that he would not seek to convince Arbatov that there were not divisions within our government on specific issues, but we were united in a desire to move the Soviet-American relationship on to a more stable plane. (C)

Arbatov nodded but asked where the way out of this dilemma lay. He stated that the Soviets pay attention to what the American administration and President says. Specifically, they were very offended by the President’s unkind characterizations of the Soviet system—like evil empire, throwing them on the ash can of history. The Soviet leadership pays close attention to these speeches. (C)

The Vice President asserted that Arbatov now had a definitive high-level source who stated unequivocably that we saw progress in the Geneva discussions. He stated firmly that our characterizations of the Soviet Union paled in comparison to Soviet portrayals of the United States and particularly of this President—as a Nazi regime for example. Thrusting examples of such cartoons and articles from the Soviet press in front of Arbatov, the Vice President stated that this is what contributed to a tense relationship. (C)

Dr. Arbatov summarized that perhaps both sides were at fault but the requirement was to get on with the discussions. He stated that Gorbachev saw the November meetings as a watershed in our relationship. If we do not achieve progress in these meetings, it may be the last for some time. Remember, the last summit was held six years ago. It would be dangerous and foolish to wait any longer. (C)

The Vice President agreed that this was a meeting of great importance. He added that it was important that the agenda be established in advance and not be overly ambitious. Arbatov agreed that this was the case but the impression in Moscow was that Washington saw no hope for any progress. Vice President Bush countered that we were prepared for progress and cited our chemical weapons ban as one proposal the Soviets needed to seriously address. Given the Soviet experience with war, it would seem this is an area where we could achieve progress. In particular, if Moscow were to show flexibility on our requirement for on-site inspection, progress was indeed feasible. (S)

Arbatov did not directly respond but stated that if inspection was an honest U.S. concern, some movement could be found. But likewise, we should be prepared to move on the comprehensive testban. This is an area where we need to resume talks immediately—it was unclear why the Americans refuse to do this. (C)

In conclusion, Dr. Arbatov stated that Mikhail Gorbachev believed that the upcoming meeting should be more than just a get-together session. It must have a serious agenda. He again stressed that the Soviet leader was prepared to establish a good relationship with the President but warned that personal allegations cast against the General Secretary or the Soviet system would imperil the success of the summit. The Vice President countered that we have been subjected to vile propaganda from the Soviet side, and it was time for a cessation of this harsh and untrue rhetoric. Arbatov nodded agreement, but asserted that each society had different regulations and systems of rules. We could not impose one another’s system on each other. In response to the Vice President’s repeated complaint of our lack of access, Arbatov conceded the point and expressed the hope that as relations improve, more opportunities would be created. He did not rule out the establishment of some mechanisms to foster this. (C)

The Vice President thanked Dr. Arbatov for coming to the White House to see him. Arbatov expressed his appreciation to the Vice President for this opportunity to continue their productive dialogue that has continued over the years. The Vice President stressed again the importance the President ascribed to the November meetings and the very real possibilities for progress that could be achieved in Geneva. (C)

1. Source: Reagan Library, Tyrus Cobb Files, Country File, USSR (6); NLR–98–5–1–6–1. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Vice President’s office. Under a covering note dated September 23, Cobb sent Gregg a draft of the minutes and wrote: “Attached are my draft minutes of the Vice President’s meeting with Arbatov. I understand that Willkinson has already sent over his notes, but I have not seen them. If you want, I can revise these by incorporating his, or other changes you may wish. Or, if this is sufficient, stand down. Let me know—we have it on the word processor.” Gregg responded: “I thank you. Excellent memo. One small change on pg 2.” An unknown hand struck through “State’s version attached, FYI” and wrote next to it “you have it.” “Pls send me back a corrected copy.”
2. No record of this meeting was found.
3. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 378.
4. See footnote 2, Document 80.
5. September 15. Reference is to the CBS News public affairs television program then hosted by Leslie Stahl.
6. See Document 78.