Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

78. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, August 19, 1985

SUBJECT

• Soviet Use of Chemical Agents to Track U.S. Officials

Bill Casey has sent you a letter describing an intensive Soviet effort to “tag” U.S. officials in Moscow with a chemical substance which, when transferred to persons with whom the tagged officials are in physical contact, would permit tracking of contacts.

The fact that the KGB has occasionally used chemical agents as “tagants” has been known for some time. But Casey’s letter contains the very disturbing news that laboratory analysis has indicated that one compound used by the Soviets is strongly mutagenic (and thus potentially carcinogenic), and also that the practice is much more widespread than we had earlier assumed.

We have planned the following actions:

—John Whitehead will deliver a strong protest to the Soviet Charge d’Affaires this afternoon, and demand that the practice cease forthwith. Dick Combs, our Charge in Moscow, will follow up with a parallel demarche there tomorrow morning.²

—A team of specialists will be sent to Moscow Wednesday to brief Embassy personnel.³ [1½ lines not declassified]

—We intend to task NIH and EPA to study the potential effects of the substance and to advise on precautions which should be taken.

Since we are under an obligation to brief our own personnel regarding the possible risks they and their families are running, and probably should also brief Allied Governments and other resident Americans in Moscow (e.g., resident journalists), we must assume that this matter will soon become public knowledge. We are, therefore, considering the advisability of making a public statement as soon as our personnel are briefed.⁴ One of our problems, both in briefing and in the public handling of the issue, is that we do not now know what procedures will be effective in removing the substance from personnel and their belongings. The objective of the NIH/EPA study mentioned above would be to seek such procedures.

It is self-evident that a big public issue over this reprehensible KGB practice will not contribute to a constructive atmosphere at your upcoming meeting with Gorbachev. The Soviets may even claim that it has been introduced as an “artificial issue” in order to doom your meeting. Nevertheless, I believe we have no alternative but to go ahead with the procedures described above. It is an issue we cannot sweep under the rug, even if we desired to do so—and we should not do so, since the Soviets should be forced to face the consequences of their own actions when these are totally irresponsible as regards health and safety.

In addition to our diplomatic demarches, I would recommend that you send a personal message to Gorbachev, drawing his attention to this matter and making clear that you expect him to see to it that the practice of contaminating American personnel with chemical compounds be terminated forthwith. Such a message might be more effective if delivered orally, since a message in writing will almost certainly simply result in a written denial of the facts (though the practice could, nevertheless, be stopped).⁵

Recommendation

That you authorize John Poindexter to deliver to the Soviet Charge tomorrow morning the oral message at Tab A from you personally to Gorbachev.⁶

Tab B

Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan⁷

Washington, August 17, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

Over the last year or so we have had the greatest successes ever in getting detailed information about the operations of the KGB. [9½ lines not declassified]

Over the last week or so he has given us greater detail about a KGB activity conducted against United States officials in Moscow and elsewhere which we believe calls for an immediate response on our part. We have had sporadic intelligence reporting for some time that the KGB has used chemical tracking and tagging substances against US personnel in the Soviet Union. We collected positive samplings of yellow powder from the clothes and cars of US officials in Moscow in 1976, in 1977, and in 1979, three samplings in 1980, none in 1981, and three more in 1982. Our evidence through this period indicated that the exposure of our personnel was infrequent and unsystematic, and we were unaware of any potential health hazard. The three samplings in 1982 resulted in identifying this yellow powder as nitrophenyl pentadiene (NPPD). [less than 1 line not declassified] had this material subjected to something called the Ames/Salmonella test. This test was developed ten years ago at the National Institute of Health and is currently the most widely used short-term test to determine whether a chemical can cause genetic mutations. Damage to genetic material (mutations) can result in adverse genetic effects in future generations, specifically cancer and inherited birth defects. Substances failing the Ames test have been shown to have a 75–90 percent probability of being carcinogenic in humans.

[3 paragraphs (20 lines) not declassified]

In May and June 1985 we implemented a sampling program for NPPD in the Soviet Union and East European countries. Laboratory testing is still incomplete, but the preliminary results indicate that the contamination of US personnel in Moscow and Leningrad is more widespread than we had previously assumed. Further sampling will be required to determine the full extent of the exposure of official US personnel in the USSR to NPPD and other chemical substances, but it is clear that several US officials and their family members have been contaminated. NPPD does not occur in nature so the presence of the chemical is not accidental. The exposure is deliberate and specifically directed against US officials. Additional sampling and laboratory testing are required to identify conclusively what other substances are involved and to determine whether they are also potentially harmful.

[1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]

Just this week I received a telegram [less than 1 line not declassified] which specifies half a dozen of our people in Moscow who are scratching themselves and relating it to powder or sprays placed in their automobiles, in the train compartments, which they reserve for week end visits to Helsinki, and picked up in other ways. [less than 1 line not declassified]

Yesterday, John Poindexter and I reviewed all this with John Whitehead, representing State, Will Taft, representing Defense, Clair George, chief of our clandestine service, and Jack Matlock. We saw it as containing implications similar, but more direct, provocative and ultimately dangerous than the Soviet microwave radiations against the American Embassy in Moscow which, during the Ford and Carter Administrations, created great concern about health risks among our people in Moscow and public questioning of whether we had responded strongly enough to the Soviets and adequately protected the health of our people.

At yesterday’s meeting there seemed to be general agreement about the need to promptly lodge a strong protest to the Soviet Government and take steps to advise and protect our people against possible hazards to their health and welfare.

Respectfully yours,

William J. Casey⁸

1. Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1985, 400938. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Matlock. A copy was sent to Bush. According to another copy of the memorandum, on August 19, Matlock sent a copy to McFarlane requesting he send the memorandum to Reagan. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, “Tagants” Issue)
2. In telegram 11461 from Moscow, August 20, 1440Z, the Embassy reported that Combs “protested Soviet use of potentially harmful chemical tracking device per instructions reftel. First Dep For Min Korniyenko categorically rejected protest as fantasy and without foundation, reminiscent of earlier microwave charges when USG subsequently was forced to admit there was no harm to US personnel. Chargé disputed Soviet version and stressed Soviet responsibility for this development.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]) In telegram 255692 to Moscow, August 20, 0006Z, the Department noted that the Acting Secretary would be meeting with Isakov at 4 p.m. that day to deliver the same message in Washington. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])
3. August 21.
4. In telegram 258597 to all diplomatic and consular posts, August 21, the Department provided instructions and the text of a public statement released at noon on August 21 on the “KGB use of potentially harmful chemicals to track the movement of diplomats in Moscow.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850596–0223) For the text of the public statement, see the Department of State Bulletin, October 1985, p. 37.
5. The draft message is attached at Tab A but not printed.
6. Reagan initialed his approval of the recommendation. See footnote 2, above.
7. Secret.
8. Casey signed “Bill Casey” above his typed signature.