Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

39. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, June 3, 1985

SUBJECT

• Briefing Papers on Soviet Union for President

In response to your profs note, I am attaching at TAB I a suggested list of topics on which briefing papers might usefully be submitted to the President.² I believe that this exercise can be most useful in dealing with broad and fundamental factors, and should not be used as a surrogate for specific briefings on issues requiring decisions. I would anticipate papers about 4–6 pages long, which would avoid voluminous data but aim at illuminating the underlying issues and principles.³ I also believe that the suggested list should not be considered sacrosanct, but rather as a suggestive outline, subject to alteration as we go along. We may find that the President wishes further discussion of some topics, and that some can be combined into a single paper.⁴

In addition to this exercise, I would also suggest that you schedule an occasional discussion (maybe as often as once a month) to give the President a chance to discuss some of these issues. At some point a meeting with some emigres might be useful, and there are also U.S. scholars, and USG specialists who can deal perceptively with some of these topics. In regard to Gorbachev’s personal style, having observed him for over two hours with Baldrige, I believe I could “role play” his mannerisms and mode of presentation, if this would be useful at some point.

I will also pursue the idea of having the Agency work on one or more video tapes. They have done one on ideology in Soviet society, but it is very poor and needs considerable work before it would be appropriate to show to the President. There may be one or two additional topics amenable to video presentation.

If and when a date is set for a meeting, the schedule can be adjusted to allow the final 2–3 weeks to concentrate on the specific issues relevant to the meeting.

Recommendations:

1. That you approve the outline at TAB I as a general guide for the papers to be produced.

2. That you authorize me to ask Gates and Abramowitz to supply research material relevant to these topics.⁵ (I will attempt to do most of the final drafting myself.)⁶

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron June 1985 (1/4). Secret. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Fortier.
2. Tab I, listing 24 potential paper topics, is attached but not printed. In a May 28 electronic message to Matlock, McFarlane wrote: “We may be heading for a summit and we may not. Under any circumstances, however, it will be important for the President to develop a much more thorough knowledge of the Soviet Union, their history, culture, bureaucratic process, Gorbachev, the man and the survivor as leader, their negotiating style etc. I would like to initiate the practice of sending the President about one paper each week as pure background on the top 25 dimensions which bear on the relationship. Could I ask you to think about this Jack and to rough out an outline of the several topics which it would be useful to treat and in what order. Then let’s get busy with the first paper to be submitted no later than next week. Many thanks.” (Ibid.)
3. In his memoir, in a section entitled “Education of a President,” Matlock wrote: “Even before it was decided when and where Reagan and Gorbachev would meet, Bud McFarlane asked me to think about how we could see that the president had more and better knowledge of the Soviet Union before he faced the Soviet leader. Dealing as he did with Reagan every day, he was struck by the president’s spotty command of historical facts. Reagan had had very few contacts with Soviet officials and still tended to base many of his judgments more on generalities, even slogans, than on a nuanced understanding of Soviet reality. To his credit, the president was acutely aware that there were serious gaps in his knowledge of our adversary, and always welcomed thoughtful discussions and well-written articles that provided insights into the country and its people. I suggested a series of papers for the president to read and then discuss. Together they would cover the ground of a college textbook on the Soviet Union, but with particular emphasis on the Soviet leaders and the way they thought. These briefing papers would be supplemented by periodic meetings with specialists from inside and outside the government, with some recommended books and films, and with video presentations of appropriate topics—such as, for example, Gorbachev as a public leader.” (Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, pp. 132–133)
4. In his memoir, Matlock wrote: “We began work in early June on what came to be called ‘Soviet Union 101,’ as if it were a college course. I suggested twenty-four individual papers, most eight to ten single-spaced pages long, organized to give a rounded picture of the country and its people. The first section, entitled ‘Sources of Soviet Behavior,’ included three papers covering topics such as psychology, the Soviet view of the country’s place in the world, and whether the Soviet Union was Russian or Communist (I said it was both). The second segment included nine papers on ‘The Soviet Union from the Inside,’ and others went on to cover foreign policy, national security, and U.S.-Soviet relations in Soviet eyes. Finally, two papers assessed Gorbachev the man and his aims for his meeting with Reagan.” (Ibid., p. 133)
5. As Matlock subsequently wrote: “I called my friends Morton Abramowitz, director of the Bureau of Intelligence Research in the State Department, and Robert Gates, deputy director of the CIA, and asked each to assign his most knowledgeable analyst to write a paper on each of the topics I listed. These were to be sent to me, with no more than minor stylistic editing, with the name of the author. I reserved the right to select the paper I considered best, or to combine elements of both drafts, but any product sent to the president would bear the name of the author and not be the responsibility of the agencies where the analysts worked. In effect, I asked them to show which agency had the best specialist on the topic in question and promised to give credit to that individual for his or her work.” (Ibid., pp. 133–134)
6. McFarlane did not indicate his approval or disapproval of either of the recommendations. See Document 60.