37. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) to Secretary of State Shultz1
SUBJECT
- Some Observations On the Current Soviet Scene
I pass along as of possible interest some brief rough reflections on three days of conversations in Moscow with Soviets, Americans, and foreign diplomats.
—Gorbachev has created an obvious stir in the Soviet Union. People are impressed with his leadership and particularly his style of direct, highly personal communication. Since he is new the Soviet people probably remain skeptical that he can produce; they have heard many of his words before. They are, nevertheless, expectant and relieved that a real human being seems finally in charge. Gorbachev still doesn’t have the respect as well as fear that Andropov generated, but that could be a function of time. Curiously, almost every Soviet I talked with said his open style reminded them of Lenin.
—The First Secretary Gorbachev may be, but he is not yet truly preeminent and there is a sense that his leadership still remains to be consolidated. Most expect it to take place, but it hasn’t happened yet.
—The economy is foremost in Gorbachev’s approach. This means dealing with what the Soviets see as the three evils of the system—bribery, drunkenness, and loss of morale. I have no sense, however, from anyone except Americans that the Soviets think they have a crisis or that it requires fundamental change in the Soviet economy a la China or even Hungary. Gorbachev evidently believes he can move economic growth from two to three percent to three to four percent simply through greater productivity, reducing vast Soviet inefficiencies and abundant labor waste. This, it is said, can be accomplished by managerial reforms and greater discipline. At some point in his emphasis on discipline, Gorbachev sounds like Stalin, but there is no indication yet that this message is not going down well. This strictly reformist approach, of course, does not deal with the technological and societal problems of the long term, but it could buy time. Gorbachev does not [Page 136] appear deeply stricken with any notion of the inferiority of the Soviet economic system. He clearly recognizes the Soviets are behind in technology but it does not seem to faze him.
—SDI is on everybody’s lips. Troubled though the Soviets are about SDI and its defense implications, I find few observers who believe that the Soviets are not prepared to compete militarily or to mobilize the necessary resources. They did so in the ‘30s in the case of mechanized warfare and in the ‘50s and ‘60s in strategic missiles. The Soviets clearly are worried about the arms race, but much of the concern arises from its economic impact. They also believe that the US economic activity will soon turn downward.
—Whether tactical or not, the Soviets do not appear in any hurry to talk turkey to us nor are most of them obsessed with competition with the US, as many in Washington think. This, of course, is an impression they would want to convey.
—Gorbachev has said nothing new either domestically or in foreign policy, particularly toward the West. All his present economic proposals have been heard before and in foreign policy statements and conversations he keeps reverting to old chestnuts like the Asian collective security concept. Gorbachev has not shown himself an innovator and until he does I will be skeptical that this posture is the result of his still unconsolidated leadership or waiting for the Party Congress. None of this is inconsistent with an activist diplomatic posture, with a major public relations component, toward the US and Western Europe.
—In foreign policy the focus is much less on developing countries than on improving the Soviet position essentially around their periphery—North Korea, China, India, Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, and Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe clearly remains their biggest headache, one which they recognize is worsened by Soviet economic stagnation.
In short, while the Soviets are greatly concerned and clearly surprised with American developments since the advent of the Reagan Administration, they are presently more focused on getting greater economic growth and without generating too much second thinking about the system.
On the question of Soviets working in our Embassy I have gotten something of a different perspective which I will pass on at another time if you are interested.2
- Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, May 1985. Confidential. Not for the System. Drafted by Abramowitz on May 28. A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley wrote in the top margin: “See the Secretary’s request p. 3.”↩
- Shultz wrote in the margin: “Pls do so. G.” A typed note indicates that the marginalia was written May 30.↩