36. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)1
SUBJECT
- Shultz Conversation with Dobrynin on Meeting between the President and Gorbachev
Secretary Shultz has sent a Memorandum to the President reporting a conversation with Dobrynin May 24,2 when Shultz provided a reply to the suggestion Gromyko made in Vienna regarding the time and locale of a summit meeting. Shultz suggested the week of November 18, and pressed for a meeting here, to be followed by a visit to the USSR by the President.
This puts the ball back into the Soviet court regarding time and place, and it will be appropriate to await an answer before doing anything further. However, I detect a distinct difference in tone between what Gromyko told Shultz in Vienna and what seems to be emanating from Gorbachev more directly.3 In sum, I believe Gorbachev is in fact interested in coming to the United States, while Gromyko is discouraging it and pushing for a third country. This is speculation on my part, but it is speculation based on a number of clues. Since these clues have a relevance not only to arrangements for a summit meeting, but also for dealing with Gorbachev on substantive issues, I will review some of them.
Evidence of Gromyko-Gorbachev Differences
1. The curious way Gromyko introduced the question in Vienna. According to our interpreter, Gromyko said literally the following: “Please tell the President that in my informal personal opinion the General Secretary is thinking along the lines of November, most likely the second half. As for the place, the General Secretary will not be attending the UNGA and thus the meeting could be held in the Soviet Union. This invitation stands, and if the President wishes, we would be prepared to host him in the Soviet Union. If for some reason that did not suit [Page 133] him, the meeting could be held in some mutually acceptable European country.”
The question arises: Why, if Gromyko was passing a message, did he say it was his “informal, personal opinion”? Gromyko is careful with his words, and it seems to me the implication is clear that what he was saying is not necessarily identical with Gorbachev’s personal view.
2. The earlier intelligence reports that Gorbachev was seeking various invitations in the U.S. [less than 1 line not declassified]. I have checked these out with the Agency in detail and they are convinced that the reporting of the messages was accurate. The reports indicate not only that Gorbachev is definitely thinking of coming to the United States (in contrast to Gromyko’s comment that a visit to Washington is “out of the question”), but also that he has not necessarily kept Gromyko fully informed and indeed prefers to resolve the question without using Gromyko.
3. Protocollary slights to the Foreign Ministry: Except for Sukhodrev, the interpreter, no Foreign Ministry officials were present for Gorbachev’s meeting with Baldrige, and none for his earlier meeting with Andreas.4 Also, Gorbachev made a point of telling Baldrige that, as regards a summit meeting, Baldrige could say to the press that Gorbachev and the President agree that one would be useful, and that “arrangements will be made between the President and the General Secretary.” I was struck by his implication that this is a matter between the two personally, and not necessarily one to be settled through diplomatic channels.
4. Anomalies in Soviet comment on the issue: Somebody authorized Pravda editor Afanasiev to tell foreign correspondents that Gorbachev was thinking of coming to the U.N. in September.5 That almost had to be Gorbachev or someone close to him, since Pravda is the organ of the Party Central Committee. Gromyko and Dobrynin have denied that this statement was authorized. What this seems to mean is that Gromyko thinks it should not have been authorized.
5. Some evidence of Gromyko-Gorbachev political rivalry: Actually, what we have is more gossip and inference than real evidence, but many Soviet intellectuals and some East European officials are convinced that Gromyko opposed Gorbachev’s accession to power, and therefore assume that Gorbachev will move against Gromyko when [Page 134] and if he has sufficient power to do so. Even if this is not the case, it would be natural for the General Secretary to try to assume direct control of foreign policy, which would require, at a minimum, some denigration of Gromyko’s predominant role.
Conclusions:
1. If the Soviets fail to accept our suggestion regarding a meeting here, we should not rush to think about a site in a third country, but attempt to get a message to Gorbachev directly [less than 1 line not declassified], in an attempt to arrange the meeting here.
2. We should bear in mind the growing evidence of tension between Gromyko and Gorbachev, and not rely entirely on the Foreign Minister for an accurate portrayal of Gorbachev’s positions.
3. Some means of communicating directly with Gorbachev would be in our interest, not only as regards summit questions, but also on substantive issues.
Recommendation:
That you send the memorandum at TAB I to the President, if he has not already seen Secretary Shultz’s report.6
- Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron June 1985 (1/4). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action. McFarlane wrote in the top margin: “I agree.”↩
- See Document 35.↩
- See Documents 28 and 29.↩
- See Document 32. Dwayne Andreas, the U.S. Co-Chairman of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council (USTEC), met with Gorbachev on December 3, 1984, prior to Gorbachev’s appointment as General Secretary. (Telegram 15339 from Moscow, December 4, 1984; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840774–0127)↩
- See footnote 3, Document 24.↩
- Attached but not printed at Tab I is a June 1 memorandum from McFarlane to Reagan, to which Shultz’s May 25 memorandum to Reagan is attached as Tab A. McFarlane approved the recommendation.↩