Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

262. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Ridgway) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, August 13, 1986

SUBJECT

• U.S.-Soviet Relations: Status and Prospects

I. Summary

The “work program” agreed to during Bessmertnykh’s visit is well underway, although we are still nailing down dates for the last individual pieces.² Both sides have the same idea of what is involved: a review of relations across the board, focussed on the most promising elements, for you and Shevardnadze to sift through in September, with a view to identifying and giving a further push to items suitable for the Summit. The Soviets have made clear that their agreement to go to the Summit depends on the results of your meeting with Shevardnadze.

At the same time, just having the work program underway has already energized the machinery on individual issues on both sides, and we want it to keep doing so. The work program is not the only arena where important things are happening for U.S.-Soviet relations—we are engaged in our defense budget debate, and the Soviets are invigorating their Asian diplomacy—but it is more than ever the main ring. I wanted to take advantage of your presence in Washington to give you a snapshot of where we are, a sense of the more promising issues that are beginning to emerge, and a preview of some of the topics on which you will probably need to be personally involved over the coming weeks and months.

An update of the familiar U.S.-Soviet checklist is attached at Tab A.³ This memo concentrates on the highlights. (End summary)

II. Status of the Work Program

Exchanges are underway in every area of our agenda.

1. Arms Control

On NST, the Soviets were waiting for the Moscow exchanges before proceeding further on Gorbachev’s response to the President’s proposals, and at least some of them were disappointed that the delegations (both) turned out as they did, since the final composition made frank exchanges less likely than they had hoped.⁴ The work program format calls for two meetings on each topic, and the idea of choosing a smaller group for the second NST session is in the air. We should keep it in mind as we consider the delegation’s report.

On nuclear testing, the Soviets have held off ending their unilateral moratorium as we discuss another session. I believe the makings of a feasible and useful deal are there to be had for the Summit, and will discuss it in the next section on promising topics. But the Soviets have made clear that they want the delegates to have a negotiating mandate, and there is fierce resistance to the idea here. Our man may be able to get through the next session with his current mandate for technical exchanges, but by September he will need authorization to “negotiate.”

Turning to the three multilateral negotiations (CDE, MBFR and CW), contacts between negotiators have already begun.

In Moscow the Soviets made clear to Blackwill they want to end MBFR with a “graceful gesture,” before folding it into a CDE II. They proposed token U.S.-Soviet withdrawals of 6,500 and 11,500 respectively, with a no-increase pledge but no verification beyond the reductions phase. Conceivably, Soviet interest in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals concept could give us new leverage in MBFR, just as it has in CDE, but at this point they seem to be going the other way, to escape from the negotiation entirely.

In CDE itself, the Soviets are on the move, Bob Barry managed to leave town without being saddled with instructions and will be seeing Grinevskiy in Stockholm this week. We will probably get a modest but significant agreement by the time CDE ends September 19, the day Shevardnadze starts in Washington.

On CW, Lowitz is in touch with his counterpart, and we will just have to see whether Bessmertnykh’s hints of interest in working concretely on some of our suggestions are borne out in the actual exchange.

On the specific topic of CW non-proliferation, we have a second bilateral session scheduled for September 4–5.

On risk reduction centers, we are awaiting the Soviet reply to our proposal for a second round between Perle and Linhart on our side and Obukhov on theirs in Geneva August 25.

2. Regional Issues

It is still unclear what the Soviets have in mind for Mike Armacost’s “super-regional” talks. We suspect they would like to use these talks to inch back toward agreement on some “principles of conduct.” We have no interest in that, and will be looking for things that tend to fit into the matrix of ideas which the President put forward last October 24. This may well be one set of talks that turns up nothing promising for you and Shevardnadze to review.

On Afghanistan, however, the Soviets may have moved in the latest Cordovez round, offering a three-year timetable for withdrawal with half their troops out in the first year, and agreeing in principle to a UN monitoring role. This followed directly on Gorbachev’s Vladivostok offer, which was generally not considered worth much, to pull out 6–8,000 troops in units unilaterally.

There may be less to this than meets the eye. The Cordovez round is adjourned with all the right noises about the inadequacy of Soviet offers being made. We are getting together with the Pakistanis to make sure we know what the factual situation is, and over the next days will be engaged in a very serious review of the bidding. At the very least these moves are timed to make it harder to get another good Afghanistan resolution in the UNGA. At worst they could lead to splits among us, the Pakistanis and the resistance which leave the Soviets in the driver’s seat on Afghanistan. At best they could mean genuine Soviet willingness to risk substantial troop withdrawals in Afghanistan on terms our side finds acceptable, which would be a major victory for U.S. policy.

One of the issues that needs rethinking is the neutrality proposal. Prior to these Soviet moves we thought of it as a way of keeping talks going if this Cordovez round stalemated; now it may be a vehicle for controlling the pace and—since it involves non-reintroduction of troops—content of forward movement.

Meanwhile, the Soviets have confirmed acceptance of Afghanistan talks with us in Moscow September 3–4, but we have held off announcing it while we sort out where we stand.

On Iran-Iraq, our analysts are somewhat less pessimistic about Iraqi conduct of the war than they were some weeks ago, so we are letting our proposal for a U.S.-Soviet joint statement percolate in the Soviet bureaucracy, without special reminders. One spinoff of Murphy’s talks, exchanges on terrorism, is discussed below under the bilateral rubric.

3. Human Rights

We have continued to press home privately that poor Soviet performance, especially on Jewish issues, casts a cloud over the Summit and puts our policy of quiet diplomacy under strain. Recent events show the same picture, mixed but basically lamentable: Shcharanskiy’s family finally allowed out, but the lowest Jewish monthly total, 31 in July, since 1970.

The CSCE follow-up meeting, opening November 4 in Vienna, will provide a high-level, more public forum for addressing the Soviet human rights record. Warren Zimmermann is seeking to arrange consultations with his Soviet counterpart next month. Even earlier, the National Conference on Soviet Jewry wants to present us a paper by respected analyst Bill Korey, and it would be appropriate to respond to it, as a way of making our unhappiness public at a level below the President and you. In the meantime, we have been pressing the Soviets privately for a mechanism which would permit us to compare notes on representation lists and other cases. Tom Simons will be raising this again with Mikol’chak, and proposing to take SOV Bilateral chief Louis Sell with him to Moscow for just this purpose when he goes for the return round with Mikol’chak in early September. We have been giving the Soviets status reports on our handling of oil-and-gas license cases, and pushing the process along, but it is vastly premature to consider lifting foreign policy controls on the whole category.

4. Bilateral Issues

Tom and Mikol’chak will be conducting the review of this agenda area, and it is one where the prospects are relatively good. After initial hesitation, the Soviet inter-ministerial delegation which came here the week before last to discuss “private” exchanges with Rhinesmith ended up signing 13 agreements. Dubinin helped out on this. He is looking for a role in the bilateral area, and it was useful to have the “work program” context. In general, the Soviets appear to be ready to move on individual items, and there are fewer obstacles here, too.

To set the stage for Mikol’chak, Tom told Sokolov last week he saw genuine prospects for agreements before the end of the year on space cooperation, transportation, treatment of dual nationals, three kinds of coast guard cooperation and perhaps even the maritime boundary.⁵ I am somewhat skeptical on the maritime boundary, since it is very complicated and involves the highly politicized issue of Wrangel Island. But this week’s incident of Soviets chasing American crabbers in the area of the disputed zone certainly points up the virtue of settling the boundary in the run-up to the Summit if we can, and I think it is worth a try.

On terrorism, the Soviets appear ready for informal private exchanges here between Sokolov and Oakley/Simons, and they also broached the idea of similar talks with the French and British. At Sokolov’s request Tom gave Sokolov an NSC-cleared list of possible topics for discussion, and offered to begin next week. We have told them and our list makes clear that we are interested in practical cooperation. If anything emerges worthy of Summit attention, it will be icing.

Three Promising Topics

Among the issues which have a realistic chance of ripening to maturity at the Summit, there are three where we may need help from you in the coming weeks (aside from the larger topic of how to conduct NST exchanges).

To start with the easiest, it should be possible to negotiate a new agreement on space cooperation. All the evidence suggests that the Soviets have delinked the topic from SDI. Scientists on both sides have been discussing possible areas of cooperation, and are enthusiastic about the project. The President is on board and has told Gorbachev so. Tom Simons should be in a position to give Mikol’chak a cleared illustrative list of the kinds of cooperation which could be registered in an agreement, and to reiterate our proposal that a group of experts go to Moscow to pursue discussion in early September. If he is not, it will be because DoD continued its blocking stance on the topic in general, and that stance will have to be overcome. Once it is, and provided the Soviets are as willing as they look, the only remaining task will be to get Circular 175 authority and proceed to negotiate and conclude an agreement.

Nuclear testing is the next hardest. I think it is perfectly plausible to envisage language at the Summit which registers agreement on an improved verification regime and ratification of the two treaties, followed by the further discussions already provided for in the TTBT, in a context of reductions in offensive weapons. Although one more technical round may be feasible, we cannot even begin the process that will get us toward this Summit outcome without a mandate for our delegation leader, Dr. Barker of ACDA, to “negotiate” with Petrosyants thereafter. This is a formal Soviet requirement without much substantive content, since he will be “negotiating” our demand that they accept better verification in return for ratification, but this is likely to be fought hard by DoD and others. There seems to be no way around it, as the NSC isn’t willing to make the leap from our public position that we seek an improved verification system to letting Barker get one. We will try to get such a mandate ourselves, but will probably need your support.

Finally, I think we should also shoot for a separate, interim agreement on INF. Both leaders have now agreed to the concept, but we have barely begun to think through the complexities of actually negotiating and concluding such an agreement. Consultations with the European Allies and the key Asians will be an integral part of the process. So far the main sticking point for the Soviets appears to be proportional SS–20 reductions in Asia, but Gorbachev’s new Asian activism may make that easier for them to swallow. I will work with Allen Holmes to develop an informal negotiating mandate for a timeframe that could get us from here to there before the end of the year.

1. Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 4D, 1986 Soviet Union, July–August. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons on August 11. An unknown hand initialed for Ridgway.
2. See Documents 255, 256, 257, and 258.
3. Attached but not printed.
4. See Document 263.
5. Simons provided a read-out of his August 8 lunch meeting with Sokolov in a memorandum for the record. (Department of State, EUR Files, Records of Ambassador Thomas W. Simons, Jr. 1964–1995, Lot 03D256, Chron Files 1984–1987, August 1986)