Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

255. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 25, 1986, 3:40 p.m.

Visit of Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh
July 25, 1986

• U.S. PARTICIPANTS

  • EUR/DAS Thomas Simons
  • Ambassador Paul Nitze
  • COL Robert Linhard (NSC)
  • SOV Director Mark Parris
  • SOV Dep Dir Bruce Burton (notetaker)

• SOVIET PARTICIPANTS

  • Deputy ForMin Bessmertnykh
  • DCM Oleg Sokolov
  • Minister-Counselor Victor Isakov
  • Counselor Vadim Kuznetsov

Simons opened by welcoming Bessmertnykh to Washington and congratulating him on his appointment as deputy foreign minister. Simons then handed him the signed original of the President’s letter and said it was being delivered nearly simultaneously in Moscow.² Bessmertnykh and company took about 15 minutes to read the letter. After doing so, Bessmertnykh said he had an “urge to say something but I think I won’t”. He commented that this was a crucial time in U.S.-Soviet relations and we would discuss the letter later, but he thought the main point of the President’s proposal seemed to be to allow testing of space-based systems without limitations.

Nitze answered that this interpretation was incorrect. The President is saying that testing and development, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, will continue. Nitze continued that some testing and development is permitted by the treaty, and some is not; both sides can do what is permitted. Bessmertnykh asked if that meant we could “test and develop only what is permitted,” and Nitze answered that was correct. Bessmertnykh then commented that “it comes again to the question of defining what is permitted by the treaty.”

Nitze emphasized that the President intends to advance the process of discussions and believes that it is important to make a move forward. He said the President had tried to take into account the concerns of both sides. The proposal itself demonstrates the President’s desire to address the issues broadly. Nitze added that it also our intent to move forward on the purpose of Bessmertnykh’s visit, i.e., to organize the work ahead. Simons added that we want a thorough discussion of all areas in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Bessmertnykh, referring to the passage in the President’s letter which said the U.S. would present the new proposal at the NST negotiations, then asked if there was any chance for a “working” meeting on NST before the round formally opens on September 18. He suggested a meeting of a small group of three or four experts on each side, not necessarily at the Karpov-Kampelman level, since that would give the appearance of formal talks. Bessmertnykh said he realized that we were not going to develop a treaty in the next few months but we need to examine the issues closely. Simons, referring to the President’s conversation with former Ambassador Dobrynin in April, said Bessmertnykh’s suggestion made sense and that we saw Bessmertnykh’s visit as a chance to initiate such discussions.

Bessmertnykh, turning to Linhard, asked the origin of the references in the President’s letter to banning space-based weapons of mass destruction. Linhard started to answer that this was a subject raised at the summit and in the Geneva talks, but Bessmertnykh broke in to quip that since the U.S. and Soviet Union already had a treaty [i.e., the Outer Space Treaty] on this, the presence of so many references in the President’s letter to space-based weapons of mass destruction began to make him nervous.

Simons then said that the American press was aware that Bessmertnykh was here. We intended to answer queries by noting that Bessmertnykh was in Washington for a review of U.S.-Soviet relations and that we hoped the visit would provide new energy to our discussions. If the media sought to portray the visit as a special event, we would say it was special only because it was being held at the deputy foreign minister level, but that it was a part of a process of exchanges the two sides had agreed to and had been conducting for some time.

Bessmertnykh, laughing, then said he had something to bring up. At the May talks on nuclear risk reduction centers [NRCC], the U.S. had proposed that a second round be held at the end of July.³ The Soviets, he said, would like to propose that the NRCC experts meet in Geneva on July 29–30—and the Soviets needed an answer that evening. Linhard answered that, at the May meeting, the two sides seemed to agree that the experts talks were intended to explore the concept of risk reduction centers and that we would not rush the issue. In any case, the U.S. had offered to host the next meeting in Washington, although we were flexible on venue. It was pointed out that a meeting next week would pose difficulties but that we would get back to the Soviets as soon as possible. Bessmertnykh seemed to indicate that one factor in the Soviet suggestion was that Ambassador Obukhov will be in Geneva next week.

1. Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, July–August 1986. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burton. The meeting took place in the EUR Conference Room at the Department of State. Brackets are in the original.
2. See Document 254.
3. In telegram 166678 to Moscow, May 28, the Department provided a summary of the May 5–6 U.S.-Soviet meetings on the development of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860410–0575)