Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

258. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 28, 1986, 10:30 a.m.–12:05 p.m.

Visit of Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh
July 28, 1986

• U.S. PARTICIPANTS

  • Ambassador Ridgway
  • Ambassador Kampelman
  • Ambassador Nitze
  • ASD Richard Perle
  • DAS Thomas Simons
  • COL Robert Linhard (NSC)
  • SOV Director Parris
  • SOV Dep Dir Burton (notetaker)

• SOVIET PARTICIPANTS

  • Dep FonMin Bessmertnykh
  • Ambassador Dubinin
  • Minister-Counselor Sokolov
  • Second Secretary Churkin

The discussions began after Bessmertnykh’s meeting with Secretary Shultz. Referring to the all-night negotiating session on the joint statement at the Geneva summit, Bessmertnykh remarked, “When I see Richard Perle in the room, I have the feeling we’ll have a joint statement.” Perle rejoined, “Well, at least it’s a decent hour.”

Ambassador Ridgway opened by noting that the discussions this morning would focus on the Nuclear and Space Talks. She said the Soviets had received a copy of the President’s letter.² The USG’s review of Soviet proposals was thorough and careful. We realized the Soviets had had only a short time to study the President’s proposal, and we had seen the general reaction of General Secretary Gorbachev in his speech, but we would be interested in any further comments reaction.³ At this point, she would turn to Ambassadors Nitze and Kampelman to discuss the President’s proposal.

Bessmertnykh said that the U.S. side was assured from the General Secretary’s speech that the Soviets are going to study the President’s ideas very carefully. He saw the General Secretary’s statement as a good reaction. Soviet experts will look it over closely and this process will take some time. He said he didn’t want to comment beyond that, but would appreciate hearing anything the U.S. side wanted to say which would help the Soviets understand better.

With regard to INF, he continued, the letter from Gorbachev and the letter from President Reagan each expressed interest in a search for an interim agreement. This is an area of great importance. The President’s letter also referred to the talks on nuclear testing about verification and about a test ban. Of course, the crucial area involves the Nuclear and Space Talks.

Ambassador Nitze said he could not add much to the President’s letter, since the President had tried to make it as clear as possible, but he did want to review the main parts. First, the President had tried to take into account Gorbachev’s concerns as the President understands them. One such area was the right the U.S. has, under the supreme interest clause in the ABM Treaty, to withdraw from the treaty on six months’ notice. The principal part of the proposal is that both sides would confine themselves to research, testing and development, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty. The purpose of this research is to determine the feasibility of advanced defenses against ballistic missiles. That is the intent of the proposal.

Bessmertnykh said the intent is understood but he had some questions on the interpretation. The basic question is whether one of the most important provisions of the treaty will be respected, and that is the provision against establishment of a space-based ABM system.

Nitze answered that both sides recognized in the past—as the U.S. does now—that there are two important provisions of the treaty. Article V relates to the definition of ABM systems and components, based on the technology that was understood when the treaty was negotiated in 1972. Agreed Statement D is directed at systems based on new technologies which were not well understood at that time. Nitze continued that we worked hard in the negotiations to define a “component” in light of technology at the time and eventually agreed on a definition of components as ABM launchers, radars and interceptors. Concerning future technology, there was much discussion about a definition of “components”; the Soviet side took the position that it could not be defined what these components might be. As a result of lengthy negotiations—from September to February, as he recalled—the two sides worked out Agreed Statement D. (Nitze then asked if Perle wanted to add anything; Perle shook his head).

Bessmertnykh said there are provisions of the treaty which have to endure. One is not to violate the prohibition against a space-based ABM system.

Nitze asked: “Where does that appear? Article V?”

Bessmertnykh said yes. The thrust of the Soviet position is to preserve the ABM Treaty. Bessmertnykh did not want to get into details but wanted to ask whether the two sides now could agree not to take measures against the thrust of the Treaty. Nitze agreed that we could but the question is, what are the measures? Article V and Agreed Statement D are relevant.

Nitze continued that the President has proposed a five-year period of research, and after that, a two-year negotiating period. Both sides would sit down and try to work out the details. If either party decided to go beyond research, development and testing in the sense of Article V, they would enter into negotiations to share the benefits of such a system provided there was agreement on the elimination of ballistic missiles. This means that we would sit down now to negotiate a treaty about what we would do at the end of the five-year research period. In those negotiations (i.e., after the research period), the Soviets might say that their research had been successful, or we might say ours had succeeded, and we would talk about sharing the benefits of those efforts.

Bessmertnykh asked what “sharing the benefits” means?

Nitze said that was something we would have to sit down and discuss. The sense is that both sides would share the results of that research. What the President wants is to agree that we would sit down and discuss this question—it would be the substance of a negotiation.

Perle said the logic of the President’s proposal is that there could be a kind of instability if we both gave up our ballistic missiles. Each side would leave itself vulnerable under such an outcome to ballistic missiles held by third countries, or to cheating by the other. Sharing the benefits of a defense against ballistic missiles would give both sides assurances about the significant change in the strategic situation that would be brought about by the elimination of their ballistic missiles.

Nitze continued that the President made clear in his letter that his proposal makes sense only in the context of deep, stabilizing reductions in offensive nuclear weapons. This presupposed progress in START and INF. Nitze did not want to get into the details of these negotiations other than to note the President’s strong affirmation of 50% reductions, that we should go down to that level. Nitze recognized that the Soviet position is different, in part on definitions.

Bessmertnykh asked Nitze to clarify which definitions.

Nitze answered, the definition of a strategic offensive system. The Soviets have one view. We think the definition should be that used in SALT II regarding limitations on strategic offensive systems.

Bessmertnykh said the Soviets have decided to go a different way, that is, towards smaller reductions. There is a question, however, on systems to be covered. For instance, the Soviets had proposed limits on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). The President’s letter mentioned nothing about this.

Nitze said the U.S. would be interested in any ideas the Soviets have on verifying such limits.

Bessmertnykh answered that the Soviets had presented some ideas in Geneva on this. There was no mention in the President’s letter about this. The U.S. side wanted to ban land-based mobile missiles because they were “uncontrollable”. They did not want to deal with SLCMs because they were “uncontrollable.” This led the Soviets to conclude that if there are American systems that are “uncontrollable”, they are not to be discussed. If there are Soviet systems that are “uncontrollable”, they are to be limited. But today, the two sides are not discussing the President’s letter. Perhaps Ambassador Kampelman would care to comment.

Kampelman said he thought Ambassador Nitze’s comment about verification was quite appropriate. The U.S. is not questioning the good faith of the Soviet proposals at Geneva, but we do feel they are far from adequate.

Bessmertnykh asked whether the two sides should abandon the SLCM question or continue discussing it.

Kampelman said that we have repeatedly made clear at Geneva that if there is an issue of concern to the Soviets “The U.S. is not going to tell you we won’t discuss it. We want you to explain your concerns to us, and we hope you’ll listen to ours.”

Bessmertnykh said this not an issue of academic concern to the Soviets.

Kampelman answered that, again, as Ambassador Nitze said, and in light of the President’s letter, there is a great deal more work that needs to be done on offensive reductions. General Secretary Gorbachev is concerned about this, too. “We should do more to stimulate that side of the discussion.”

Bessmertnykh said the Soviets see their proposal on SLCM as an important compromise on their part. They didn’t insist on a ban, as before, and thought this should have been appreciated by the U.S. side. There are long-range issues that may take years to discuss, but there are things that can be done before then. The President had said in the past that both sides have staked out ideal positions but there may be something in between. Gorbachev had said “I like that idea, we should try to find that.” That is the thrust of the Soviet approach—to find something that perhaps is not ideal for either side, but acceptable to both.

Kampelman said that is the President’s idea, as well. He continued that he had a question regarding the INF aspect. The negotiators in Geneva are quite unclear about Soviet thinking in the INF area, and efforts to explore this had not provided answers—perhaps because the Soviets themselves were uncertain about how to proceed. After the summit, we expected a discussion at Geneva of an interim agreement. In January, however, we saw something quite different, so we moved in that direction in our own thinking. The U.S. was ready to work on either approach. After reading Gorbachev’s letter, it appears that the Soviet side has reached the conclusion it would be more fruitful to go back to discussing an interim agreement.

Bessmertnykh said he could confirm today that the Soviets are interested in trying to find an interim agreement. Both sides have basic positions. The Soviets are not demanding theirs. The Soviet side realizes that an interim agreement means some level of U.S. medium-range missiles would stay in Europe. If there is interest on your part, we want to share ideas the two sides can develop together. Perhaps we can discuss this in the next several weeks. We do not want to table old proposals. The Soviets want “fresh” ideas to refer to Ministers and then the leaders at the summit.

Kampelman then referred to the idea of eliminating ballistic missiles, and asked for Soviet reactions.

Bessmertnykh said the Soviets would have to look at the concept—what are the conditions, the terms of agreement. The General Secretary has said the Soviets want to eliminate all nuclear weapons, and so has the President, so there is a general framework. But we have to study which way it is put. It would be helpful if the U.S. could give more information.

Perle said the logic of the proposal is a powerful point, apart from the question of developing practical ways of getting there. A central part of the question of strategic defenses is the proper relationship between offensive and defensive forces. In the defense area, we are talking about a defense against ballistic missiles that would render ballistic missiles “irrelevant” as an element of power. Neither of us would want to be vulnerable to a country that could obtain ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. There are lots of countries that have space programs. There is not much difference between a missile used for civilian purposes and a missile that can carry a nuclear weapon. After eliminating our own ballistic missiles, neither of us should feel exposed to the first country that develops a ballistic missile of its own. That is the logic. It is difficult to get there. But it is such an appealing notion that we think it is worth looking at.

Bessmertnykh asked about the threat from airplanes and cruise missiles.

Perle answered that there is no practical way to eliminate all nuclear weapons at one time. The U.S. has always emphasized ballistic missiles. These are more dangerous compared to aircraft, which move slowly. Both sides have many ballistic missiles and they cost lots of money.

Bessmertnykh said that when the U.S. says cruise missiles are less destabilizing, that is relative to ballistic missiles. If we eliminated ballistic missiles, aircraft and cruise missiles would be what’s left, and they would become the most dangerous in their own right.

Perle assured him it was not the U.S. intention to leave other systems such as cruise missiles outside of a reductions regime. No one is interested in seeing ballistic missiles eliminated and other systems increased. Kampelman joined Perle in emphasizing that this was why the President called for reducing nuclear weapons significantly in a way that is stabilizing for both sides.

Nitze added that we have to consider other arms control areas as well. There is a whole panoply of interests which will become of greater concern as we reduced nuclear weapons—conventional forces, chemical weapons. As Perle had said, if you can deal with the most dangerous systems, then it makes it easier to deal with the others as you go along. The two sides need to work out a road map, since if you can work out some problems, you have a much better chance of getting at the others.

Bessmertnykh said that is why we have the various groups at work in these areas. We had spent a good deal of time during his visit to go over these groups. The concept is the same—to work on all areas. All nuclear weapons should be slowly eliminated, we can’t just deal with one part. One side is liable to feel insecure.

Kampleman said we are not replacing talks already under way, we are supplementing them. We can focus on the central issues now and, as we go along, in other areas.

Perle said we constantly hear from our Allies and others that we cannot just work in one area. It is clear that we have to deal in other areas. But ballistic missiles are different in important respects. For one thing, there is no defense against them; this means both sides can calculate with considerable precision the effects of an attack with them. Regarding aircraft, the Soviets are better off—they have an elaborate defense against aircraft, we have virtually none. In a world without ballistic missiles, where deterrence depended on aircraft and cruise missiles, the U.S. would be required to make significant changes, and we cannot do it overnight. In his view, a world free of ballistic missiles, and where, accordingly, decisions did not have to be made in 20 minutes, would be safer for all parties.

Perle continued that strategic defenses would protect against third countries; it could even deter third countries from acquiring ballistic missiles. As it stands now, the U.S. has no defense against ballistic missiles, and the Soviet Union only has an ABM system around Moscow. Thus, both the U.S. and Soviet Union, with the exception of the Moscow area, are vulnerable to third countries. This is not a very desirable situation for either of our countries.

DAS Simons said he wanted to make one point to Bessmertnykh. It was important to study the President’s letter carefully, not from the standpoint of intentions, but for its implications. The President’s letter is constructive. The U.S. knows that the Soviets are very thorough in their analysis, but he hoped they would not get enmeshed in an effort to speculate about the intent of every word—in other words, don’t carry things too far. Any conclusions on the President’s intentions probably would wind up overdrawn.

Bessmertnykh referred again to Gorbachev’s speech and said the Soviets believe the President’s letter deserves intensive consideration. The Soviets do not want to rush into reactions. Fortunately, both sides recently have been more careful in this respect. Sometimes there has been a practice of launching a proposal and then “running around trying to score propaganda points.” However, he can assure the U.S. that the Soviet proposals were worked out very carefully with the Minister of Defense and the Soviet military.

Simons interjected “In other words, you can live with them.”

Bessmertnykh said yes. They are very serious. They are attempts to move things along. The Soviets were dissatisfied with the progress at Geneva, as in other aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations. He had the sense both sides are trying to work seriously with each other, and the President’s letter will be examined in that light.

Nitze, referring to Bessmertnykh’s comments on Friday about references to space-based systems of mass destruction,⁴ said there were some who argued in the USG that it wasn’t a serious Soviet concern, but the President determined that we should address it.

Bessmertnykh said it is a Soviet concern and they want to find a more practical way to address it.

Perle quipped that it is always easier to deal with something when you don’t have to take it away (i.e., from existing forces).

Bessmertnykh agreed. He said that in some cases in the past, we failed to deal with certain things because they did not exist—for instance, MIRVing on the American side, and perhaps some things on the Soviet side as well—and they got away from us, and both sides learned to regret it.

Perle said that, over time, some things have gotten relatively better. For example, our weapons now are a lot safer than they were. Both sides should be grateful that we have avoided any serious accidents. Smaller forces on both sides would make forces more manageable and thus reduce the possibilities of unintended incidents. We should look at ways to make the situation safer and more stable.

Bessmertnykh said modernization questions were important. The Soviet side would like to constrain this. However, on defensive arms, there should be no illusions, at least within some circles, that the Soviet Union is not up to the challenge. The Soviets want to explore ideas with the U.S. in order to give our leaders the chance to have some new thinking.

Perle said that if he understands the President’s thinking when he first raised SDI in March 1983, the President did not see it as a “menacing development”. The President’s instinct then, and in everything he has said since, is that SDI is an attempt to deal with an undesirable situation, to see if there is a better way than destroying each other’s societies. The President is trying to find a way to do this and to deal with the General Secretary’s concerns. He is searching for the right relationship between offenses and defenses. He has never envisioned SDI as a way to gain unilateral advantage.

Bessmertnykh said he believed that. The General Secretary has talked to President Reagan. There is no doubt that the President wants to protect his nation—“there is not a single doubt about the integrity of the President’s thinking.” But for the rest of us, Bessmertnykh continued, we must see how it is translated into reality. If we do not define the steps, there could be a very different result, no matter how unintentional on the President’s part. Before now, there had never been a time when the leaders of both sides wanted such dramatic reductions; whether 50% or something less, both sides were saying let’s try to do it. We should try to avoid a new arms race, and with leaders like President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, the chances are good. Under Gorbachev, you may have noticed, “we’re more open, more mobile.” Now is a good time to try to do something.

Kampelman, referring to Bessmertnykh’s earlier comment about being up to the challenge, said he did not know of a single responsible American official who did not believe that the Soviets can do whatever they want in the military field, regardless of the economic consequences. There is no responsible American official who does not believe that the Soviet leadership will do whatever it feels it must to ensure Soviet security.

Bessmertnykh said if that is, that is good, because we are both in a better position to negotiate. He had the strong feeling that there might be misconceptions on this. What Kampelman had said is a very important starting point. If each side believes that the other can compete in a space arms race, then it creates a basis for negotiation. If one side believes that it could gain unilateral advantage, then there it makes a different situation.

Ambassador Ridgway then recommended that we conclude the discussion of NST. We would discuss non-nuclear arms control subjects in the afternoon.

Bessmertnykh thought we had already covered those issues sufficiently. As for CDE, his sense was that the negotiations are going into a much more active phase and were on the move.

Ridgway and Bessmertnykh then decided to take a coffee break, after which the group would discuss other arms control subjects.

NOTE: During the break, it was decided not to resume the meeting, and the group broke up for the 1 p.m. lunch in the Department.

1. Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, July–August 1986. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burton. The meeting took place in the EUR Conference Room at the Department of State.
2. See Document 254.
3. See footnote 5, Document 257.
4. July 25. See Document 255.