Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

259. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, July 28, 1986

SUBJECT

• Bessmertnykh Proposal for Schedule of Meetings

In the meeting with Ridgway Saturday, Bessmertnykh proposed an elaborate series of meetings, most in August, to prepare for the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in September.² Clearly the two most important are the ones proposed on NST issues and regional issues.

Consultations on NST

During the Saturday morning session, Bessmertnykh proposed that a small group meet on NST in either Moscow or Washington in the August 10–15 time frame. Since Bob had gotten the impression the day before that they were asking for someone other than the negotiators plus “experts,” I questioned him on these points. In reply, he said that they had in mind three or four people, not necessarily the negotiators, but they would be acceptable if we wished. He said they were not proposing to include “technical experts,” since these consultations would be broader and there would be no need for “narrow specialists.” However, the chairman might wish to have a person at hand who was familiar with each of the three negotiating areas.

The important thing, he said, was for the session not to be a repeat of the sort of negotiations conducted during the formal sessions—i.e., that they be directed not to an explanation of current positions, but at trying out new ideas to resolve problems, strictly ad referendum. He also proposed that the meetings be for only a couple of days, after which the group would break, consult in capitals, and perhaps convene again in a week or so.

When I asked Bessmertnykh directly whether the negotiators would be acceptable as our team, he replied, “In my personal view it would be better to name someone else, but the negotiators will be all right if that is what you want.” He then implied that if Max led our team, Karpov would probably lead theirs.

Regional Issues

Bessmertnykh proposed that we have a general meeting on regional issues around mid-August, involving four or five persons on each side.

I think we should accept, and use the President’s UNGA proposal for the basis of our pitch. I believe that Peter Rodman is ideally placed to head our group. However, Simons tells me that Armacost has expressed a personal interest in doing this. Although I have no doubt Mike could do it well, he is too high ranking for his Soviet counterpart. (They have named Polyakov, a division chief in MFA.) I think it ought to be Rodman, Sestanovich, plus office directors from State who cover Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua.

Other Meetings

The other meetings suggested by Bessmertnykh are as follows:

Nuclear Testing: Continue meetings between Barker and Petrosyants which have already started.

Conventional Arms in Europe: Mikhailov (Soviet MBFR negotiator) prepared to meet with our representative in Moscow during the first ten days of August. (Presumably if we accept, we would send Blackwill; this would give us the opportunity to press the Soviets on a more forthcoming reply to the last Western proposal in MBFR, as the Germans strongly desire.)

CDE: Soviets are prepared to have Barry and Grinevsky meet in Washington during the first ten days of August, unless they prefer to meet in Stockholm. The Soviets are interested in discussing where to take up their proposal for Atlantic to Urals conventional arms reduction: CDE–II, enlarged MBFR or something else. (It may be premature for us to get into these things now, although it is clear that the Soviets are angling for something to announce during the summit. If we agree to the meeting, I believe we should use it to stress that we must conclude the CDE satisfactorily, get some progress in MBFR, and also get some progress in Basket III of the CSCE before we set up mechanisms for the recent Soviet proposals on conventional arms.)

Chemical Weapons: Soviets propose that our CD negotiators meet in Geneva in August to discuss verification of a CW ban. They also agree to talks on proliferation in Moscow in September (Hawes has been designated to do this on our side.)

Risk Reduction Centers: As you know, they proposed this week in Geneva; we have told them this is impossible, but we will propose a date.

Terrorism: Ridgway proposed consultations between Oakley and representatives of the Soviet Embassy here. Bessmertnykh accepted.

Bilateral issues: Bessmertnykh proposed that a group be designated to discuss these various issues, either in Moscow or Washington, in August. He seems willing to include “humanitarian” issues. EUR is interested in putting together a team, probably headed by Simons, to do it.

General Comments

It seems absolutely clear that Bessmertnykh is under instructions to get things moving rapidly across the board. He strongly implied that, if the preparations before the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting are “satisfactory,” we will receive agreement to a summit date from Shevardnadze, or very shortly thereafter. I would infer that the Soviets have decided that they want the meeting this year, and therefore will be inclined, during August, to compromise at least enough to provide enough “meat” to match whatever criteria they have sent for a “minimal result.”

These vibes were all present a day after Bessmertnykh had read the President’s letter.³ Although it was probably too early for him to have received any specific guidance from Moscow, I would conclude that he personally did not react to the proposals in the letter as if they were so tough as to get in the way of summit preparations. Since he is presumably familiar with the bureaucratic scene in Moscow, this may be significant. (Throughout the meetings, both formal and informal, he refrained from any comment on the letter, simply observing that while he might have a personal reaction, he knew that was not of interest to us, and that he would await Gorbachev’s reaction before discussing it.)

I was also struck by the fact that Bessmertnykh’s presentations were totally devoid of propaganda in any form. He was utterly businesslike, and directed his attention on getting the process moving. Once, when he commented on the meetings proposed, he said that the Soviets wanted to use them to find solutions, and did not intend “long speeches and propaganda.” He added that “there are plenty of fora for that,” as if to distinguish the process they propose from their normal behavior—and from the public comments of both sides.

Finally, I would note that during the informal dinner Saturday night the Soviets present spoke spontaneously, at length, and with uncharacteristic candor about Soviet internal difficulties. (Sokolov and Political Counselor Kuznetsov were with Bessmertnykh; Ridgway, her husband, Simons, Parris and myself were there from our side.) They made a number of comments about the dire effects of the “stagnation” brought on by Brezhnev’s last years and Chernenko, asserted that this affected morale and productivity not just among the elite but throughout the population as a whole, and described in some detail the difficulty of changing anything given the fierce resistance of the entrenched bureaucracy. They also observed that the current leadership has maybe a year or at most 18 months to show some palpable changes, or else the entire society will relapse into the torpor of the early eighties.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, 1983–1986, Bessmertnykh Visit July 1986 (2/2). Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Linhard and Rodman.
2. Saturday was July 26. See Document 256.
3. See Document 254.