Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

260. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Solomon) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, July 29, 1986

SUBJECT

• Gorbachev Plays Triangular Politics: Some Observations on your Meeting with Bessmertnykh

Gorbachev is now actively searching for leverage points on issues that would give him a positive Summit outcome. In this regard, there were several dimensions of your discussion yesterday with Bessmertnykh that seem particularly significant, more for what was implied rather than directly stated.²

Gorbachev Tries “Triangular” Politics: Ambassador Dubinin noted at the end of the meeting that Gorbachev had just given a major speech during his travels in the Soviet Far East.³ Dubinin said that the Secretary General had commented in his speech that U.S. and Soviet territory are only seven kilometers apart. What he did not say is that Gorbachev had given the speech in Vladivostok, and that it contained a major initiative designed to break the decades-long deadlock in Sino-Soviet relations. In his speech Gorbachev expressed a positive attitude toward China’s modernization reforms; he revealed that efforts are underway to resolve long-standing border disputes; and he suggested significant new proposals designed to break the so-called “obstacles” in the way of Sino-Soviet normalization—the reduction of Soviet troops in Mongolia and Afghanistan.

Gorbachev’s speech—perhaps timed for Bessmertnykh’s meeting with you—comes in the context of other Soviet initiatives to both entice and pressure the Chinese into a new relationship, and to broaden Moscow’s dealings with Japan and other Asian states. The Soviets recently sent arms negotiator Karpov to Beijing (although he was identified by the Chinese only as a guest of the Soviet Ambassador) to brief PRC officials on the state of the Geneva negotiations. (In this regard, it is unfortunate, in my view, that we did not send Ambassador Rowny to Beijing on his current round of consultations.⁴ We now face the problem of appearing to play “catch up” with the Soviets in any initiatives we might take in the China relationship.) At the same time, the Soviets have conducted at least ten intelligence overflights in the North Korea-Manchuria area that led to a Chinese interception of Soviet aircraft. There are also rumors circulating in Beijing of a small scale Sino-Soviet border clash. Thus, Moscow is using pressures as well as incentives with Beijing.

While China, unquestionably, will continue to try to “balance” between the Soviets and ourselves, the significant point for our dealings with Moscow is that Gorbachev is now making a major effort to reactivate the Sino-Soviet relationship, in part as a way of putting additional pressure on us in advance of a Summit meeting. We thus face a more complex political environment as we consider putting more activity into our dealings with Beijing.

In this regard, it is probably no accident that I received a call yesterday from a long-known Chinese Embassy official with special responsibilities for monitoring Soviet affairs inviting me to dinner next week. I should receive your guidance on any impressions or messages you want passed on through this channel.

Moscow’s “Indecisiveness” on the Ministerial Meeting and Summit Dates. Soviet waffling on the setting of a final date for your meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, and on the Summit, can, of course, be seen as a negotiating ploy to hold these meetings out as bait and to force us into the demandeur position in order to test our firmness on various substantive issues. Moscow, no doubt, hopes to jam us up against time deadlines that will force hasty and (from our point of view) ill-considered decisions.

At the same time, my political viscera tell me that there may be more than just a negotiating strategem at work here. Bessmertnykh’s disingenuous reference to the now long-passed “circumstances” (i.e., Libya) that led to the cancelling of the May ministerial meeting, seems to me to reflect not just circumstances of the moment but real political defensiveness and uncertainty in Moscow as Gorbachev positions himself for the next Summit. While our Soviet specialists seem to feel that Gorbachev is in a relatively secure position, I would not be at all surprised if, in fact, he is having significant problems building a coalition and a negotiating position that will carry him politically through a second Summit. Hence his current maneuvering for various forms of leverage on us—the added activism with the Chinese, the effort to build time pressures, etc.

“The Hug of the Bear” on Regional Issues. I also find notable—and a matter of concern—the new Soviet proposal for a special working group on regional issues, and Bessmertnykh’s emphasis that such discussions should concentrate on “positive things.” The Soviets, as ever, are trying to create the impression of U.S.-Soviet collusion on various regional issues as a way of compensating for their own weak or exposed positions and of neutralizing our pressures on them. They hope, no doubt, that our interest in a productive Summit will enable them to maneuver us into positions on Afghanistan, Angola, the Middle East, etc., which will compromise our independent standing and room for maneuver on these areas of conflict. They will attempt to worry our allies and friends—including the Chinese—that we are actively working with Moscow to “resolve” these issues rather than to sustain support for their interests.

Our management of these regional talks, if we are to successfully bridge the distance between Soviet purposes and our own objectives in eroding Moscow’s exposed positions, will take some skillful footwork as we maneuver through the next two Summits (assuming they are held).

1. Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 4D, 1986 Soviet Union July. Secret; Sensitive. In a July 29 handwritten covering note attached to another copy of this memorandum, Solomon wrote: “Nick Platt: This is the memo I mentioned at the morning staff meeting interpreting the Secretary’s meeting yesterday with Bessmertnykh. Given its subject, I assume you will want to restrict its circulation. I suggest that it go to Charlie Hill, Mike Armacost and John Whitehead—apart from whomever else you think should see it. Bernie Kalb and Mort Abramowitz also asked to see it. You decide. Thanks, Dick.” (Department of State, S/P Records, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, 1986 July) No record of the morning staff meeting has been found.
2. See Document 257.
3. See footnote 5, Document 257.
4. In an undated memorandum to Poindexter, Platt noted: “In accordance with their July 18 instructions, Ambassadors Nitze, Rowny and Holmes are consulting with key allies on the President’s proposed reply to Gorbachev.” (Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1986 July–August). See footnote 1, Document 254.