218. National Security Decision Directive 2231
IMPLEMENTING THE GENEVA EXCHANGES INITIATIVE (U)
A major emphasis in my discussions with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva was to seek ways to increase and broaden direct contacts between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union. The [Page 922] objectives underlying expansion of such contacts are: 1) to deal more constructively with the problems arising from the open and closed nature of the respective societies; 2) to reduce, in particular, the misconceptions that the people of the Soviet Union have about the United States and the world in general; 3) to promote understanding by Americans of the realities of the Soviet system; 4) to build individual bridges of cooperation in a variety of fields; and 5) to mitigate the many international security and humanitarian problems that arise from existing barriers to free movement of people, information and ideas.2 (U)
While we hope we can develop real cooperation with the Soviet people through expanded exchanges, we recognize that the Soviet government’s interest in these exchanges differs from ours in important respects. But the contest of ideas is a competition in which we can engage confidently so as to build a basis for a more secure peace. (U)
Prior to Geneva, the US made a number of proposals to the Soviets for contacts, exchanges, and cooperation which were to go beyond the traditional exchanges covered by the US-USSR General Exchanges Agreement. In turn, we asked the Soviets for their ideas for programs to promote better understanding, to work cooperatively on some of today’s most difficult human problems, and to open up our societies to each other. (U)
In Geneva, General Secretary Gorbachev and I agreed on the utility of broadening exchanges and contacts in a wide variety of fields, and agreed to begin on a reciprocal basis, with six areas in education, medicine, and sports, with others to follow:
—cooperation in the development of educational exchanges and software for elementary and secondary school education;
—measures to promote Russian language studies in the United States and English language studies in the USSR;
—the annual exchange of professors to conduct special courses in history, culture and economics at the relevant departments of Soviet and American institutions of higher education;
[Page 923]—mutual allocation of scholarships for the best students in the natural sciences, technology, social sciences, and humanities for the period of an academic year;
—holding regular meets in various sports and increased television coverage of sports events;
—resumption of cooperation in combatting cancer diseases. (U)
General Secretary Gorbachev and I agreed that relevant agencies in both governments would be asked to develop specific programs which could be reviewed by both sides at our next meeting. (U)
A primary objective of the Geneva Exchanges Initiative is to enhance bilateral cooperation at all levels. Given this emphasis, it is imperative that our planning be coordinated early and frequently with the corresponding designated officials in the Soviet Union. In the development of these programs, a continuing emphasis must be on mutually beneficial and fully reciprocal programs. Highest priority is to be given to programs which emphasize participation of youth between the ages of 16 and 25. We consistently must make clear to the Soviets that we are not looking for token programs, but rather those which are imaginative, bold, and hold the most promise for meeting the objectives of this undertaking. (U)
However, I view this as just the beginning of a process to expand dramatically contacts and communications between the peoples of our two countries. My objective is to stimulate a process that goes well beyond these initial programs, both in numbers and in developing new kinds of exchanges to increase cooperation and mutual understanding between our two countries. Thus, we should continue to pursue on a reciprocal basis the full range of initiatives that we outlined to the Soviets and others which appear promising. These would include:
Educational and Student Exchanges
—substantial exchanges of undergraduates;
—an ambitious youth exchange program for secondary school children;
—establishment of university positions in each other’s country to teach national studies;
—nomination of distinguished American and Soviet educators or public figures to study ways of improving understanding through language studies;
People-to-People
—expansion of “sister-city” relationships;
—increased exchanges of civic, religious, and other groups;
Media and Information Exchanges
—inauguration of regular media exchanges;
—establishment of out-of-embassy cultural centers and/or libraries in each other’s capital;
[Page 924]—facilitation of direct satellite transmissions to each other’s country;
—increased publication and distribution of each other’s books and publications;
Consultations
—broader consultations on a variety of topics of mutual interest, including health and social problems such as alcoholism and drug abuse and trafficking. (U)
I attach high priority to the exchanges initiative, and am requesting that all United States Government agencies which have responsibilities in the areas of agreed cooperation give high priority and render every possible assistance to their implementation. (U)
To provide overall policy guidance, a new Interagency Group on the President’s Geneva Exchanges Initiatives (IG/GEI) has been established. It is chaired by the NSC’s Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs, and includes representatives of all concerned U.S. Government agencies. The IG will review programs and implementation to ensure that they are in conformity with U.S. policy and objectives toward the Soviet Union. (U)
In addition, I have asked USIA Director Wick to create a new office of the Coordinator for the President’s U.S.-Soviet Exchanges Initiative, established at USIA with the express purpose of working with USIA, other concerned U.S. Government agencies, and the private sector to develop concrete programs in each of the six agreed areas and others which appear promising. The Coordinator will also chair a working group to develop and coordinate proposals for new initiatives, establish guidelines and operating procedures for the programs, coordinate the response to other U.S. and Soviet proposals, and identify other innovative proposals which could form the basis of additional programs. Upon agreement of the working group, the Coordinator will pursue implementation of the programs with Soviet counterparts. (U)
Additional responsibilities of the Coordinator will be to inform the American public about the possibilities for new exchanges with the USSR, to generate support for the Initiative, either through fundraising or matching private support with potential programs, and to serve as the central point of contact with the private sector. (U)
The Coordinator will be located in the Office of the Director, and will work closely with the staff of the United States Information Agency, the Department of State and other U.S. Government agencies concerned with administrative, programmatic and security aspects of the exchanges, and with the American Embassy Moscow. The coordinator will rely principally upon the USIA staff for operational support, calling upon other U.S. Government agencies for support as needed. He should [Page 925] seek the advice, guidance, involvement, support and services of academia, private agencies which are engaged in US-Soviet exchange activities, and other elements of the private sector which have an interest in this important bilateral effort. (U)
It is essential that programs established under the President’s U.S.-Soviet Exchanges Initiative provide for reciprocity and the protection of U.S. national security interests. Our objective of increasing contacts and dialogue between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union should not obscure the realities of the Soviet system and the differences which exist between our open and their closed society. Accordingly, the working group will develop, with the participation of concerned agencies, procedures to ensure that U.S. participants in the exchanges are informed of these realities, including the regulations and the conditions governing foreigners in the Soviet Union, and that U.S. hosts are informed of the elements of the program and the conditions under which Soviet citizens are admitted to the United States for these exchange programs. These programs will continue to be governed by adherence to the existing Export Control guidelines and subject to U.S. Government mechanisms to prevent the transfer of sensitive technology. (C)
In implementing the Exchanges Initiative, priority will be given to programs which can be implemented expeditiously and become either self-sustaining within a period of one to two years or incorporated into an existing United States Government program. These programs are not to replace existing programs called for under the General Exchanges Agreement or other bilateral agreements, but will be in addition to them. (U)
- Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 223 [Implementing the Geneva Exchange Initiative]. Confidential. A January 23 covering memorandum from the NSC Executive Secretary to the Executive Secretaries of State, Defense, Justice, Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. Information Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Immigration and Naturalization Service forwarded a draft NSDD for consideration at the “first meeting of the Interagency Group on the Geneva Exchanges Initiatives on Friday, January 24.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 223 [Implementing the Geneva Exchange Initiative]; NLR–751–10–9–6–1) With the work of the interagency group completed (see Document 211), on April 21 Poindexter forwarded Reagan a revised version of the NSDD, explaining: “The NSDD translates your vision of opening Soviet society through dramatically expanded people-to-people contact into broad policy guidance, recognizing the need for reciprocity and measures to deal with the security and counterintelligence implications.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 223 [Implementing the Geneva Exchange Initiative]; NLR–751–10–10–1–4) Reagan initialed his approval of the recommendation to sign NSDD 223.↩
- Poindexter’s April 21 memorandum continued: “Cap Weinberger feels that additional language is needed (at Tab B) in the NSDD to spell out our strategic vision of using the exchanges to end the Soviets’ monopoly on information to their own citizens, and thus undermine their political controls. While this reflects our ‘strategic’ goals, saying so as explicitly as this language does in this kind of document which could leak, could undermine our ability to achieve those objectives, and give the Soviets a pretext for stonewalling. We have, therefore, amended the old version of the NSDD to include language which addresses Secretary Weinberger’s concerns, but which expresses his points more delicately and thus avoids undercutting our objectives. (The new language appears in the first two paragraphs of the NSDD at Tab A.)” (See footnote 1, above) For the original memorandum from Weinberger on this language, see the attachment to Document 211.↩