Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

219. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Solomon) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, April 24, 1986

SUBJECT

• Keeping the USSR on the Defensive after the Libyan Operation

SUMMARY

The recent USG attack on Libya provides opportunities for the US to keep the Soviets on the defensive.² The Administration’s action against Qadhafi has not only given renewed credibility to our willingness to use military force in support of Western interests (thus reinforcing the Grenada success), it has also exposed the weakness of the Soviet position in Northern Africa and the Mediterranean. This memo suggests steps we can take now to improve our position in this vital region, as well as to counter the downside costs to ourselves of the Libyan action. END SUMMARY

The Libyan Operation: Impact on the Soviets

The US attack on Libya has set in motion a number of forces which the Soviets may or may not be able to control. This must give them reason for concern on a number of fronts. Seen from Moscow, there is the possibility of:

(1) Further US military strikes against Libya in reaction to continuing terrorist initiatives by Qadhafi (which the Soviets are likely to discourage, with uncertain effects on the Colonel).

(2) Destabilization of the Libyan leadership, with uncertain consequences for internal stability, and the future position of the Soviet Union. The Soviets may hope for the emergence of a more docile pro-Soviet leadership, but they must also worry that any change at the top could move Libya into a more pro-Western orientation.

(3) Nervousness by other client states, (Syria, South Yemen, Ethiopia), who may interpret Moscow’s hesitant support for Libya as a sign of Soviet weakness or opportunism.

In sum, the US operation against Libya has probably compounded Moscow’s concerns about dealing with a United States which has demonstrated the will to forcefully defend Western interests and confront a Soviet Third World client.

Downside Costs for the U.S.

The Soviets will not be blind to their own opportunities, based on the significant downside effects of our Libyan actions. They will certainly try to exploit our vulnerabilities with some of our West European allies, and especially with those population groups in Europe (Greens, peace activists, churches) who have taken to the streets to protest our raid on Libya. They will also work in the Middle East to see if they can drive a wedge between us and the moderate Arabs, who would have welcomed the fall of Qadhafi but who now must make some kind of accommodation with him for as long as he is in power.

Operational Strategy:

How can we exploit Moscow’s demonstrated vulnerabilities in the Mediterranean region, prevent a consolidation of a more docile Soviet-client government in Tripoli, and defend ourselves against the downside costs of our actions against Libya? Here are a few suggestions:

1. Put more pressure on those East European regimes directly involved in supporting Qadhafi. Thus far we have limited our demarches in Eastern Europe to complaints about the presence in their capitals of Qadhafi’s “Peoples’ Bureaus.” We should expand our presentations by pointing to direct East European involvement in Libya in support of Qadhafi and the Libyan economy. (The East Germans provide Qadhafi with intelligence and security support.) Our demarches could take the following form:

“We are aware of the activities of your nationals inside Libya. We want to stress the volatile nature of the situation in that country, and warn that your nationals may get caught in the middle of the conflict. We suggest therefore that you repatriate your nationals.”

We do not harbor illusions that the East European regimes will cease their activities inside Libya overnight. Yet, just as they may move quietly to restrict “Peoples’ Bureaus” in their own capitals, they may also begin to balk at Soviet insistence that they work inside Libya, particularly if their nationals come to believe they are in personal danger.

2. Seek to sever the Maltese connection with Qadhafi. We have made demarches in the past both in Valletta and in the Department warning Malta against its close relationship with Libya. Our warnings have gone unheeded. Indeed the Maltese-Libyan relationship is today in one of its warmest phases. Our recent airstrike against Libya provides us with a useful opportunity to make another try. Our demarches should emphasize (a) that Maltese involvement with Libya makes a mockery of their professed stance of neutrality, (b) that Maltese nationals inside Libya are in physical danger, and (c) the Maltese government should stop backing a losing horse, lest it fall into our permanent black list for providing moral and material support for Qadhafi’s aggression and terrorism.

3. Work to stabilize the situation in the Sudan. Our air strike against Libya comes at a crucial moment in Sudanese politics, and we should use this opportunity to try to end Libyan influence, and bring the northern and southern parts of the Sudan closer together. It is worth considering in this context a new direct U.S. approach to John Garang.³ The two main Sudanese parties have already sent emissaries to Garang in Addis Ababa, and we should support their effort by going to Garang and (a) blackening the Libyans for their air attack on southern towns held by Garang forces, (b) stress the malevolent Libyan role in the Sudan and elsewhere in the area, and (c) urge reconciliation with the two main parties and the new government in Khartoum.

4. Counter the Soviets in the Maghreb. Soviet involvement in Libya provides an opportunity to arrest the warming trend in Tunisian and Moroccan relations with Moscow. Morocco and Tunisia have concluded agreements with Moscow on trade and economic cooperation, and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze is expected to visit both countries later in 1986.

We should launch a diplomatic effort to warn Tunisia and Morocco of the dangers of closer relations with the Soviets, emphasizing that the poor performance of Soviet weaponry and the Soviet Union’s failure to assist Libya makes Moscow an unreliable ally. In addition, we should reaffirm our commitment to assist Tunisia if it is attacked by Libya, and encourage our Allies (e.g., France, Italy, Japan) to increase their support for Tunisia and Morocco. Finally, we should warn the Algerians that their effort to improve ties with Libya, given Libyan support for terrorism and Libyan dependence on the Soviet Union will seriously harm U.S.-Algerian relations.

There may be still other areas where action on our part will contribute to improving Western coordination, keeping the Soviets off-balance, and reducing the chances for renewed Libyan mischief. We are preparing a follow-on memo outlining what approach we might take with Libya’s closest neighbors.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, April 1986. Secret. Drafted by Pieczenik and Ledsky on April 23.
2. See footnote 2, Document 216.
3. John Garang, Sudanese rebel leader and founder of the Sudanese Liberation Army during the civil war. Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXIV, North Africa.