Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

211. Memorandum From Jack Matlock, Judyt Mandel, and John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, April 4, 1986

SUBJECT

• Geneva Exchanges Initiative

Attached for your approval at TAB I is a memo to the President forwarding the text of the NSDD on Implementation of the Geneva Exchanges Initiative.² The text and related policy issues have been worked out in meetings of the subcommittee on security issues, chaired by Steven Rhinesmith, the new Coordinator for the US-Soviet Exchanges Initiative, and the Interagency Group on the Geneva Exchanges Initiative (IG/GEI), chaired by Jack Matlock.³

Per your instructions, the text of the NSDD contains general language outlining our security concerns, but leaving the specifics for a separate directive from you to the concerned agencies. The subcommittee on security issues has agreed on the language for that directive, which will be forwarded to you shortly.⁴

OMB has also informally reviewed the NSDD, and has expressed some concern about the possible cost of the new programs. They suggested that we add a sentence indicating that the new programs would be funded within existing budget plans, which is true for the short run. However, we would prefer to have flexibility to request additional money should the Soviets agree to a dramatic expansion of these programs at some time in the future.

In addition, the IG has reviewed and approved a package of program proposals which Steve Rhinesmith presented to the Soviets in Moscow.⁵ The Soviets have indicated they want a return visit to the US in late April to work out further details. Our aim is to have Soviet agreement to at least some of the programs by May, so that the people-to-people exchanges can get underway this summer.

OSD previously concurred with the NSDD, but Cap Weinberger sent you a memo (at TAB B) suggesting the inclusion of two additional paragraphs spelling out our strategic objectives in proposing the new exchanges. He argues that the additional language is needed to distinguish this Administration’s policy from that of its predecessors, and avoid giving the impression that the exchanges are an end in themselves, rather than a means of ending Moscow’s monopoly on information to its citizens and about it to the outside world. Moreover, he argues that without such language, officials implementing the initiative will have no guidance on the question of our larger objectives, and the public may get the impression that the exchanges are indicative of a return to the “detente” era.

Although this language aptly defines our long-term objectives, including it in the largely unclassified NSDD could undermine our ability to achieve that objective. We believe that this language is a little too explicit to be fully consistent with the President’s own approach to treating our objectives confidentially if they are to have a prospect of success. Even if the OSD language were classified, it could leak and be used by the Soviets to vilify and reject the kind of programs and contacts we are proposing.

John Lenczowski has alternative language at TAB II which deals with Secretary Weinberger’s suggestion in a more nuanced manner.⁶ He believes we should not put the President in the position of having to flatly reject the Secretary’s constructive suggestion, and has therefore modified the language of the introductory paragraph in a way that: 1) makes our objectives sound less “detentist”; 2) supplies guidance on the broader strategic purposes of the exchanges; and 3) is not so explicit as to risk undermining our objectives if the language of the NSDD is made public. (Most of the text is unclassified and intended for public use.) We have incorporated the two paragraphs of this language into the NSDD as a replacement for the first paragraph of the old version (which appears at Tab III).⁷

We did not have time to submit the substitute language to the other concerned agencies. However, State has informally indicated that it has no objection to the substitute language, and we believe USIA will not have any objection.

Walt Raymond feels that the Weinberger/Lenczowski modifications are unnecessary and inconsistent with the President’s Geneva and post-Geneva statements, and thus he prefers the old version. Others on the staff believe the Lenczowski language is a reasonable compromise.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo forwarding the NSDD to the President.⁸

Tab B to Tab I

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)⁹

Washington, March 12, 1986

SUBJECT

• Draft NSDD on Geneva Exchanges Initiative

The draft NSDD has, in my view, a serious shortcoming. It depicts the initiative as an end in itself—i.e., an exchange, like virtue, is its own reward. None of the sober and analytical realism regarding US-USSR relations that distinguishes President Reagan from his predecessors (or from his current domestic opposition) finds expression in the document. This creates two problems: Officials implementing the initiative will find in the NSDD no guidance on the question of its grander or “strategic” purposes. And if the NSDD is made public—by leak or authorized release (most of it is unclassified anyway)—the President is likely to be embarrassed by the apparent aimlessness of this exercise and by the rhetoric in the NSDD that is redolent of the “detente” era and Carter Administration pronouncements.

These problems can easily be remedied through an addition to the draft of the following paragraphs:

The primary objective of the Geneva Exchanges Initiative is to mitigate, along with the other US information programs, the many international security and humanitarian problems arising from the Soviet government’s monopoly on information to Soviet citizens about the West, East-West relations, and the USSR itself, and its monopoly on information to the outside world about the USSR. Through increasing the flow of people and information in and out of the USSR—through whittling away at the monopoly—we can serve the cause of peaceful relations by inhibiting the Soviet government’s ability to gain acceptance for aggressive or anti-democratic action. We can also usefully broaden American appreciation of the realities of Soviet life in ways as little controlled by the Soviet government as possible.

These fundamental aims necessarily conflict with aims that the Soviet government will pursue through the exchanges. It can be expected to try to maximize its access to otherwise denied information and technology, enhance its ability to press its own propaganda and political lines in the United States, and insulate its own citizens as much as possible from influences beyond its control. Thus the GEI must be seen as part of our continuing contest with the Soviet system and its ideology of secretiveness and control. It is a contest of incalculable consequences, one in which we can engage confidently so as to build a basis for a secure peace.

I would hope that the foregoing paragraphs, even after inclusion in the NSDD, could remain unclassified and accompany any public release of the document or of the official rationale for the initiative.

I would greatly appreciate it if you will give this memorandum to the President, since it embodies a matter I think is very important.

Cap

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 223 [Implementing the Geneva Exchange Initiative]; NLR–751–10–10–9–6. Confidential. Sent for action. Rodman, Raymond, Major, and deGraffenreid initialed their concurrence.
2. Attached but not printed. For the final text, see Document 218.
3. See footnote 1, Document 218.
4. Not found.
5. In telegram 4762 from Moscow, March 20, the Embassy reported that “Rhinesmith informed the Soviets that the 37 exchange proposals handed over to them had been selected from a total of 169 received by his office. The U.S. side also has ideas for additional exchange programs, and is prepared to offer them as formal proposals if the Soviet side expresses interest. Rhinesmith said both sides must do all they can to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the exchange initiative agreed upon by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva—an opportunity, he stressed, that is extremely fragile, depending as it does in great part on other aspects of bilateral relations.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860216–0748)
6. Not found attached.
7. Not found attached.
8. Poindexter initialed his approval of the recommendation.
9. Confidential. Weinberger wrote “John” above the addressee line.