Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

138. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, November 6, 1985, 1550Z

15987. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting With Gorbachev, Nov. 5, 1985.²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. This is uncleared memcon being cabled to be distributed by Charlie Hill only.

3. Memorandum of Conversation

Place: Moscow, Kremlin, Gorbachev’s Office

Date: November 5, 1985

Time: 10:00 a.m.–2:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS:

Soviet Side:

General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev

Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze

Ambassador to U.S. Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

N. Uspenskiy³ (Interpreter)

U.S. Side:

Secretary of State George P. Shultz

National Security Advisor Robert C. McFarlane

Ambassador to Soviet Union Arthur A. Hartman

D. Zarechnak (Interpreter)

4. After some initial exchanges in which Gorbachev suggested that disinformation in the U.S. about the Soviet Union made it impossible to build healthy bilateral relations, the Secretary said that President Reagan had a saying that we should talk to each other rather than about each other. Gorbachev said he was married to a philosopher and they had a saying that you move from less to more complete knowledge. He felt that was what experience teaches us, but philosophers joke that sometimes we move from small knowledge to even greater lack of knowledge. Secretary said he was an economist and they say they are the profession that can go straight from an unwarranted assumption to a foregone conclusion.

5. Gorbachev indicated that the two delegations had worked so late the previous evening that Shevardnadze had only the chance to convey a short account of the results. But morning is the time for serious work with a clear head. This was, after all, the last meeting before our two leaders would meet in Geneva. He, therefore, wanted to ask the Secretary to briefly give his assessment of where things stand. What luggage are we carrying? He wanted to know if we are going to build this bridge across the river or along the bank. After hearing from the Secretary, he would then ask the Foreign Minister to comment.

6. The Secretary thanked Gorbachev for the courtesy and cordiality with which the U.S. delegation had been greeted. He said that he and Shevardnadze had developed a good personal rapport since their first meeting in Helsinki, which had been followed by meetings in New York and Washington. There were no barriers to communication. He also pointed out that Mrs. Shevardnadze and Mrs. Shultz get along even better than the two Ministers. Gorbachev interrupted to say that maybe we should put the wives in charge in place of the Ministers—a little bit like a column that appears in newspapers here where people can say what they would do if they were directors or ministers.

7. The Secretary said that he had given a warning to President Reagan and he would give it also to Gorbachev. He said, “you will end up liking President Reagan as a person,” and he had told the same thing to the President about Gorbachev, whom he had described as an attractive and stimulating person to talk to. Gorbachev interrupted again to say that this just illustrated the caution of the State Department because they were afraid such a meeting might actually lead to improved relations. He said, “now if you were cautioning me about Weinberger I could probably understand that better.” But he said “We know all about that. We know that the two of you worked together in the same company.” The Secretary interrupted to say that the important person to focus on was President Reagan because he is the boss, and Gorbachev said that he understood that.

8. The Secretary said that the President has a great deal of support from the American people. He won the last election in an unprecedented sweep and the polls show that he is still immensely popular. He speaks with authority and if he makes an agreement, he will get support for that agreement. It was important to know in negotiations that the person you are dealing with can deliver on his promises.

9. Gorbachev replied that it was indeed important, especially if you take account of previous agreements which had been signed but not ratified. Those who signed them did not bring them to fruition. In preparing for Geneva, he said, he had looked at many old documents and agreements, including the Basic Principles of Relations which had been signed in the early 70’s between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.⁴ He said that this last document, which had been signed by Brezhnev, was an excellent one. He could sign it today and maybe we could save the State Department and the Soviet Foreign Ministry a lot of suffering by using it instead of trying to prepare a new document.

10. The Secretary replied that we have an old saying that “actions speak louder than words.” He said he did not wish to downplay the importance of words. But we should mean what we say and carry it out. He said that both of us needed to reflect on how actions in one area can have an impact in another quite different field. For example, Gorbachev had mentioned agreements which had not been ratified. This was obviously a reference to SALT II, but he would like to recall that President Carter withdrew that treaty from Senate consideration because the Soviets had just invaded Afghanistan. Thus it appeared to him that the action of invading Afghanistan was not in accord with the spirit of the words that had been spoken.

11. Gorbachev immediately interrupted again and in a very animated way said that such arguments were best left to the press. He said that we are not un-instructed on these issues and the U.S. Government representative should not resort to such arguments with people like us who know the real story. He said that he knew full well that SALT II had been buried and was long dead before the events of Afghanistan. The problem was of quite a different nature. He said that we are well aware that U.S.-Soviet relations were deteriorating even before the Reagan administration came to power and that there was a process at work brewing in U.S. society a deep distrust. He had thoroughly studied this question and he knew all about the Vietnam and Watergate syndromes. He knew that there was a feeling that America had been weakened and that the Republicans had played on this and pushed for greater military activity to give America a feeling of having come back. He said that we have books about this period and he particularly cited the Hoover Institute study called “America in the Eighties.”⁵ He said that he understood Ronald Reagan was close to this institute and perhaps had been an honored member. “Everything in that study has come to pass in present-day U.S. politics. Social programs begun under previous administrations have been curtailed. Military expenses have been increased. Indeed, American military strength has been used and demonstrated. So,” said Gorbachev, “don’t use such arguments with us. It shows that you do not respect us. The SALT II Treaty was buried because scientific achievements had come along which required that the U.S. drop the restraints contained in that treaty. So you had to get rid of it to carry out your programs and thus the invasion of Afghanistan was used as the excuse.”

12. Gorbachev went on to say that it had been an idea of Nixon’s to call for linkage. “But,” he said, “this was old hat and should be put in mothballs.” He said he wanted to speak frankly.

13. This was the start, he hoped, of a process and we should not play games on how to build this relationship. We should be trying to take advantage of the present juncture. But if it is to the liking of the American administration that we not make a change in this relationship, then we can go on forever as we are and we on the Soviet side will lose interest if you continue to argue as the Secretary had just done. He said that would not be a conversation person-to-person, but rather like reading each other’s newspapers. “If that is what you want to do, we don’t have to have a meeting.”

14. He said, “I really don’t want to dwell on this anymore, but if we don’t reach agreement on the fundamental principles in the main area (arms control) and if we don’t try to avoid confrontation and move toward cooperation to benefit everyone, then we are not going to be able to solve smaller specific problems. Our side has tried to signal a desire to improve relations and the only response we get from you is that you call this ‘propaganda.’ We must try to reach agreement on basics because there are inseparable links in these issues. To solve issues across this gap of seven years requires courage. To move toward improved relations requires courage and struggle and honesty. We sincerely want a change for the better, but you say that this just shows we are weak, and then when we don’t show an interest in building a better relationship, you say we are intransigent. So, (and here Gorbachev repeated himself) if we do something and make suggestions, you say it is propaganda and we are weak. If we don’t, you say we are intransigent.”

15. Gorbachev then gave his analysis of U.S. politics by saying that if the U.S. Republican administration wishes to stay in power, it would be worthwhile to look around and see how progress can be made in this area. The administration should not be so tied to the military-industrial complex, which just chews up money and programs by the billions. “You need new policies and space is right there in the forefront if we are going to tackle the question of security. Without that, there can be no progress. All other issues are peripheral questions and these could be easily resolved once the main ones are out of the way.”

16. Gorbachev continued that the Soviet Union wishes to know the desires of the Reagan administration: does it wish to improve relations with the Soviet Union or rather to complete its eight years in office with no change, and, therefore, not disappoint the military-industrial complex. Peace demands not only the appearance of peace, but also actions. If our two countries do not come to agreement now, it will be even more difficult to do so three years from now. We are ready to meet you half way and not because we are weak, but rather because we recognize we cannot afford delay. The dangers will increase if we wait.

17. Gorbachev went on in still heated fashion to say that he asked for this meeting to be kept to such a small restricted group so that he could speak more frankly and with the utmost candor. The basic question, he said, is whether our two countries will continue this tug of war, trying to out-play each other, or whether instead a sober assessment is not still possible. We could think about how to improve the relationship on the basis of reality and a correct evaluation of present and future policies. Or does the United States consider that its present policies of force—exercising pressure, strength—that these policies have brought the Soviet Union back to the negotiating table. If that is the type of thinking which seems to motivate people who surround the President, then no success is possible.

18. Gorbachev said that as he reads our interviews, including the President’s, he finds that the administration is sticking with old positions and, therefore, he does not feel that this will lead to an improvement in Soviet-American relations on the basic issues. He indicated that he had decided to refrain from answering positively any of the requests—and he had received some 57 already—for interviews at the present time since this would force him to react to these statements. He said that he had decided to give no interviews before Geneva because he hoped that there would be a serious impetus to something positive. But maybe this is also the view of the American side. Or perhaps the American side doesn’t see any chance. Or maybe this is all being said for public consumption. He hoped that the United States would consider it to be in its national interest to improve relations with the Soviet Union. He was offering this as free advice. He noted parenthetically that Dobrynin had told him that Kissinger was getting 150,000 dollars a year for advice, but he was offering this advice freely. He also added that Kissinger seemed to be making more money than he had when he was Secretary of State. The Secretary interrupted to say that he too was earning more money outside than he is currently earning as Secretary of State and, what’s more, he was earning his living building things, which was a lot more positive than some of the things he does in the government.

19. The Secretary went on to say that he had found much in what Gorbachev had said with which he could not agree, but he did not wish to go back and argue over all these points. Rather he wished to come to the main question of “where do we go from here?” This is the real question. (He also at this point handed over to Gorbachev the two letters from the President, one of which he already knew the contents, and the other of which discussed and replied to the question of channels of communication.⁶ Gorbachev said at this point that he agreed with the suggestion for channels and welcomed this as a first agreement.)

20. The Secretary said that what he really wanted to do today was to discuss the President’s approach to the coming meeting in Geneva, and also his approach and his view of the general state of relations between our two countries. He indicated that he had known Ronald Reagan for over two decades. He had worked with him when the latter was Governor of California and he had also worked in the President’s election campaign. Now he was Secretary of State. So he believed that he knew very well how President Reagan looks at things. He said that he had not the slightest doubt that President Reagan has a great desire to see a more constructive relationship between our two countries which would enable us to deal with one another in a realistic and pragmatic way. Realistic because each side should know that we operate under two very different systems. “You think yours is better and we think ours is better. But there is a responsibility on these two great powers which is tremendous and which leads to the conclusion that they both must work for a more constructive relationship. We know that the present state of our relationship is unsatisfactory, but the reason for the coming meeting was to do better and that is the way the President wished to approach in a very serious manner the upcoming meeting in Geneva.” (Gorbachev interjected at this point that “if that is so, and these words are carried out, then perhaps we can succeed.”)

21. The Secretary continued that the reasons why this meeting is so important are not just negative ones, although negative reasons like the avoidance of war, especially nuclear war, are important, but there are positive reasons as well. For example, what sort of world do we want to build for the future? And these weigh very heavily with the President. The world is changing very rapidly. You wish to see progress and so do we, but this progress is going to be a reflection of what happens in the world and how we handle the opportunities presented to us.

22. The Secretary recalled that when he had come to Moscow with Vice President Bush, he had been impressed and struck by a comment made by Gorbachev about the number of new countries in the world and his view about the changes that this would bring about. “You were right, but it is not only the creation of new national entities that is going to bring change to the world, but rather also the great variety that will exist and the stimulus that this will bring to innovation and creativity, but obviously with differences in different parts of the world. So the United States and the Soviet Union will be interacting all over the world as it changes, sometimes in volatile situations which may not even be created by the two big powers, but which would affect them. We would need to see how these could be managed.”

23. The Secretary said that beyond these changes we realize that science and technology are moving very quickly and that this affects everything, including military weaponry, but it also affects how we produce things and how we live. We may, in fact, be reaching the end of the industrial age and moving into what we might think of as the information age, where we will have to think about new ways of working, how people behave, possibly relocating populations, and how decisions are made. Society was beginning to reorganize itself in profound ways. In fact, this reorganization was so advanced in scope that, at least in our country, there is a search by people for their roots. He said all of this creates opportunities for us to work together and there are many possibilities for the United States and the Soviet Union to mutually grasp these opportunities or to move in a different direction and abort these possibilities.

24. The Secretary said that the President has a deep sense that we should be moving toward greater stability in the world and an improvement in our relations. He is sincerely committed to this. The question was how to proceed. The Secretary thought we could move on two tracks. One track would involve the development of increased confidence between us through exchanges that bring about greater realism to justify this confidence. The other track would involve finding ways to deal with the substance of issues. Obviously the central ingredient is in the type of issue being dealt with in Geneva in the negotiations, but there are other things as well that must be dealt with in our relationship. The Secretary indicated that he and Shevardnadze had had long and serious exchanges. They had had a full review of the whole range of issues between our two countries. The previous evening, representatives from both of our delegations had met and listed 26 specific issues—some big and some small.⁷ From that number—and perhaps I would not agree with these categories—they agreed that four can be easily solved and we can find language to express our agreement. Seventeen others were put in the possible category where we might be able to achieve agreement, but it was not clear whether it could be achieved before our meeting later in the month. The chances were perhaps fifty/fifty at best. And then there was a last category of issues where we were unlikely to achieve agreement. This list covers everything that we have talked about.

25. Gorbachev interrupted to ask what were the issues in the unlikely category. The Secretary replied that these included the President’s regional initiative, specific regions, Berlin issues, nuclear testing and radars. But this was not really the point. We were actively working on all these areas and perhaps progress was possible in all of them. But it is true that the Geneva negotiations are of central importance. Some of the issues we have listed are big and also there is possible linkage between them, although each issue should stand on its own feet.

26. Now, however, the Secretary said, he would like to talk about Geneva and the problems in the negotiations there. And after he is finished, he would like his close friend and collaborator, Mr. McFarlane, to speak as well. The proposals which President Reagan wrote you about last week will prove that arms control is important to us. In Shevardnadze’s speech to the U.N. he spoke of the centrality of deterrence.⁸ Stable deterrence is what we all agree is critical. We believe a stable deterrent, as provided for in SALT I and the ABM Treaty, is threatened today from two directions, and what we seek in our positions is to address these threats to deterrence. First, certain given assumptions were spelled out on both the offensive and defensive side, but these assumptions have not held up. What we now have is a situation that is vastly different from what we expected when these two treaties were signed. One assumption was that as we constrained defense, offensive forces would be significantly reduced, but the situation today is that we both have more missiles and warheads. This accounts for our interest and perhaps your interest in radical reductions. We both said that our objective is to reduce to zero, but in the meantime we are interested in a drastic lowering of offensive arms. This is why we were attracted by your fifty percent reduction proposal, and we have tried to respond in that framework of fifty percent.

27. The second assumption was that while defenses were held in check—some were permitted, others were restricted—critical path items were constrained in order to stop the creation of a national anti-ballistic missile defense. We abandoned our strategic defense plans—you kept yours around Moscow as was permitted under the ABM Treaty—although I just want you to know that we believe certain things you have done are contrary to the treaty. But we recognize that you have long had an interest in defense and this is perhaps understandable for a country that has been repeatedly invaded as short a time ago as forty years. We also know that you are doing major research and that, therefore, the assumption of deep constraints on defense is not as strong as it was in 1972 when these treaties were signed.

28. There are also, the Secretary went on, other classes of development in science and technology, for example, that have gone on since the early seventies. What we see is the development of ballistic missiles with extraordinary accuracies, MIRV’d, and now we see mobile systems which, because of their great mobility, make them difficult to count and verify. Gorbachev interrupted at this point to say, “but if you are mistaken by ten missiles, that does not change the strategic equation. The real question is what can we do or what are we going to do. Are you saying that the ABM Treaty is obsolete because of the quality of weapons? What are you suggesting?”

29. The Secretary went on to say that the ABM Treaty remains of tremendous importance and the President had ordered that all our activities should remain within the bounds of that treaty, in its narrow definition. But what we need to address even before research results are available is how in the future we might wish to handle deployment or manage the transition to an increased dependence on defense. In other words, how can we have a cooperative transition which would be safer? The Secretary said that Soviet leaders have pointed out in the past that deterrence based on some elements of defense is more stable. We have, in effect, switched to your line of argument. All these issues that I have mentioned are related. We need deep reductions in offensive arms. This would relieve the offensive threat to the stability of deterrents. We should examine the collaborative management of a transition to some defense, and we are prepared to talk and negotiate about all that, but reductions and eventual elimination of offensive weapons are the key. (Some of the above was never translated because when the interpreter got to the question of the ABM Treaty, Gorbachev interrupted vociferously, as follows:)

30. Gorbachev said that we are now finding new interpretations of the ABM Treaty. He said he was amazed that McFarlane would base his judgment on the advice of a lawyer who had previously only had experience prosecuting drug and pornographic cases. He knows that McFarlane has a high reputation and he wonders how he could take such a study as the basis for his speech. Gorbachev said that the Strategic Defense Initiative was an attempt to justify an ABM system by unworthy means. He said that we are knowledgeable people and we know what is going on in the United States and why the United States is doing this. “You,” he said, “are inspired by illusions. You think that you are ahead of us in information and technology and that you can somehow use these things to gain superiority over the Soviet Union. But this is an illusion. Others in the post-war period recognized this, including some of your leaders. It was President Johnson who said that he who dominates space, dominates Earth.”

31. The Secretary interrupted and said that there were no illusions on the part of the Secretary of State or the President about the capabilities and strengths of the Soviet Union. “That is why we are sitting here today.”

32. Gorbachev then came back and said, “We don’t have illusions either but I can tell you that I know that you do.” He said, “I have special information about what was said in the meeting of the Six.”⁹ (He looked genuinely angry at this point, but never did reveal what his secret information was.)

33. The Secretary replied that everyone in the meeting of the Six was impressed by the offensive missile strength of the Soviets and by their preoccupation with defense. (At this point it became difficult to follow the argument because Gorbachev was interrupting the translator.) “In reference to statements by Soviet leaders,” he said, “I suppose you are referring to Kosygin’s statements, but I’ll talk about that later. You always make it seem that you are catching up with us.” (All during this rather heated exchange, Dobrynin was pumping up Gorbachev and egging him on. It seemed clear to our side that Dobrynin must have supplied a lot of his ammunition.)

34. Gorbachev then drew a solemn conclusion, in which he said that you can rest assured that we will not help the United States get out of its ABM Treaty obligations. We will not assist you with the politics of it or in a technical way so that you can take the arms race into space. The Secretary said that we have not had to have statements by Soviet leaders to tell us what your policy is on defense—we have figured that out for ourselves just by watching your programs, and we don’t see anything wrong with defending yourselves. Gorbachev shot back that the Soviet Union will not retreat on the ABM. It is carrying on only fundamental research. It is interested only in peaceful uses of outer space. Of course, some of these things it is working on could be used for defense purposes, but everything that the Soviet Union is doing is strictly within the ABM Treaty, and the Soviet Union is resolutely against transferring the arms race to outer space. He went on to say that it is very difficult to continue to sit at the table (presumably in Geneva) with the United States while it plans these programs. If the U.S. goes ahead with its space program, as President Reagan seems fervently to wish, we will be in the most arduous times.

35. Gorbachev then warmed even more to his theme and said that there was a basic flaw in the way the U.S. approached these problems. He said that we were full of illusions and he offered to list some of them. First, we believed that the Soviet Union was less economically powerful and, therefore, it would be weakened by an arms race. Second, that we had higher technology and, therefore, the SDI would give us superiority over the Soviet Union in weapons. Third, that the Soviet Union was more interested in negotiations in Geneva than we were. Fourth, that the Soviet Union only thinks of damaging our interests in regions around the world. Fifth, that it would be wrong to trade with the Soviet Union because that would just raise its capability. He described all of these as illusions and said that we apparently fail to draw lessons from history. He recalled that even when the Soviet Union was very weak immediately after the Revolution, they were able to restore their economic health and prepare themselves for their greatest challenge in the Second World War. But the question was, was the U.S. interested in improving relations? You have economic problems. You have this big budget deficit, a large part of which is due to military expenditure. Eighty percent is financed by borrowing money and this causes high interest rates. Your military program creates employment (he mentioned the figure of eighteen million) but everyone knows that those jobs cost three times as much, and therefore, this is a wasteful use of resources. He went on to say that perhaps the Soviet Union could place orders in the U.S. and relieve the U.S. economy of having to be dependent on making arms. Perhaps the American administration has lost its way in trying to find a policy toward the Soviet Union. Even the signals that we send to you are distorted by you. It is not easy for us to advance peace proposals. We also have military circles—maybe not like yours—but if there is no reaction from your side, we will have to abandon our attempts and then there will be nothing to hope for. They tell us stop trying, but we say, “No, the U.S. has all the necessary qualities to evaluate the situation and to understand that we need to think about what we are doing.” (This last sentence was not translated, as the Secretary attempted to interrupt.)

36. The Secretary attempted to interrupt by saying that we recognize we have certain problems. Gorbachev said, “Maybe we will help you tackle those problems. Look at all those social programs you have cancelled.” The Secretary responded rather heatedly to all of this “analysis” of the U.S. society and economy by pointing to the rising general quality of life in the United States. The fact that eight million jobs have been created since the beginning of the Reagan administration. That infant mortality is down and the average age expectancy is up and per capita income is up. Americans are better off than they ever have been before, but we are not satisfied. We don’t want to devote resources to unproductive activities. The Secretary said that he had a sense of tragedy when seeing all of this spending for military purposes.

37. The Secretary said that he would like to now come back to the nuclear area and ask Mr. McFarlane to comment. But before that he wanted just to mention that in talking about collaborative efforts the Soviet idea of building a fusion reactor was one of great interest to us. Gorbachev said, “Yes, that would be wonderful,” and the Secretary said that we responded positively and you only suggested this one week ago. Gorbachev said something about this could be worked on in Vienna. The Secretary said that we have a very large effort if we are to proceed. This is based on talk between our scientists and we have learned a lot from them. If created, it would be a great boon to mankind. We would be working together with a vast range of science and high technology because, after all, we would be creating conditions on the sun. Gorbachev said we are ready, but he said, “Not if you take the arms race into outer space. This is what we are trying to persuade you not to do. Dobrynin tells me that people in the United States are still listening to those who think in terms of illusions.” He then asked rhetorically, “Are you afraid that you might lose your position if you admitted this?” and the Secretary replied that he had news for the General Secretary—he has tenure on a university faculty and that shows how he thinks ahead. Gorbachev said that is what we ought to be doing—we ought to be thinking ahead—If one thinks only of today, our policies won’t be worth anything and we will lose our way. He continued quite excitedly, saying that it isn’t easy to make policy. For seven years he had headed up the committee developing economic policies to prepare for the 26th Congress, but it was not easy. It was a struggle, there were many opposing voices. But finally it has all been published. But it is not easy to make the right policy. He said that deep convictions are most difficult to challenge, but they must be challenged if there are good grounds. There is nothing so expensive as mistakes in policy. We don’t want to open a stage where it will be hard to deal with each other. Is this the way that we should be going? Are you interested in just today? Or do we want to look at the policy of the future and what our national interests are? I hope it is the latter, but I don’t see anything new in U.S. policy. Only a propagandistic repackaging of yesterday’s policies. We favor peaceful cooperation. Both sides should change. We are prepared for new constructive relations, but we can’t go alone. We must do this together, but you have no new proposals, only old ones. We have suggested new policies. Yours are only propaganda. Mr. McFarlane sells these with a new technological basis because he knows that modernization is needed. Gorbachev concluded by saying that he wanted to talk before Geneva because he wanted to try and move things in a positive direction. He wasn’t attempting to have an argument, but we have been talking very frankly, perhaps like you do in your office. The Secretary said that we think there is an opportunity now to make progress and we should work at that. We should be doing everything that we can to have something for the meeting with the President, but he would now like Mr. McFarlane to speak about this situation.

38. Mr. McFarlane began by welcoming the chance again to present his views. He said that we have needed to have this occasion to talk to each other for more than five years (Gorbachev nodded his agreement). McFarlane continued that in preparing for this trip, his wife had read some of the TASS accounts and was astonished at the way he was portrayed. At this point Gorbachev went off like a rocket and said that we should know how the American press had treated him after the French visit and the ways that they discussed the personality of the General Secretary and his wife. “Why should our press spare you?” In fact, President Kekkonen of Finland used to deliberately put negative things about himself in the newspapers because he thought this made him even more popular. McFarlane tried to continue by saying that perhaps all this is caused by the absence of an exchange between our two governments on fundamentals. This allowed a body of misinformation to grow up and color the thinking of our leaders. We don’t want to waste time but it is important to have some perspective on the effects of substantial changes on our thinking. These are really in two areas. First, on the military side, we have seen a tremendous expansion in very accurate missiles that create a military risk that the other side might see the benefit of a first strike. And this destabilizing tendency we would want to see eliminated. Secondly, on the political side, the expansion of nuclear power has been accompanied by attempts by the Soviet Union to expand its influence in distant areas. Neither of these trends is healthy. How do we restore the balance? In Geneva we are looking for major reductions in offensive forces to avoid the first-strike threat, but we are also conscious of new Soviet programs which are going to create a new set of problems. The new mobile land-based systems are particularly upsetting to the offensive balance, because it makes it very difficult for us to count and, therefore, to see what the balance is. We cannot count with confidence that an imbalance could not develop without our knowing it. We have said that mobility can add to stability if it preserves the invulnerability of our deterrent, but that is true only if you know how many missiles there are. President Carter had a plan for mobile missiles that would be survivable, but he wanted to put them in a geographically limited area so that there would be no question of quantity. What worries us is that the entire Soviet Union could be the area for the new mobile missiles.

39. McFarlane went on to say that in the past we have relied on a strategy of damaging the other side. “You don’t like being the target for missiles and neither do we. So we pose the question—if today, unlike ten years ago, there isn’t a technical system for deterring weapons and, therefore, not threatening anyone with the weapon? We are conscious, however, that if defenses are built while keeping offensive strength, then there could be a first-strike capability.” Gorbachev then interrupted to say that Weinberger had said it would be a catastrophe if SDI was not built and he did not say anything about helping a first-strike capability. McFarlane came back, however, and said that every morning he sees the President and he can assure the General Secretary that he, the President, is committed above all to reducing tensions with the Soviet Union. That he wants a more stable and safer relationship and this, indeed, is why he has stressed major reductions in offensive systems. But he would like to begin today to see how defensive systems might be introduced for greater stability. We don’t know today if the technology can be produced, but first we need a concept so that dangers will not be increased. That is the President’s intent. Now you have been portraying me as having an aggressive intent toward the ABM Treaty. But that is wrong. You can acknowledge that the treaty allows certain things, but that is different from saying that you intend as policy to pursue that goal. Like the Soviets, we think the authority is there, but we don’t intend to use it.

40. Gorbachev interrupted heatedly to say that we had only invented this interpretation last spring. Before that our interpretation was like that of the Soviet Union, but then, he said, “You got a new idea on what Article 5 meant because you wanted to get out of the ABM restraints. Thus you needed a broad interpretation. We are very suspicious of what is going on.” McFarlane then picked up again and said that the Secretary of State had made a constructive contribution. We could cite public concern in our country over broader interpretations given by Marshal Grechko or others, but we wanted to be more constructive and to see what to do in the future, so we decided to define our intentions. President Reagan is clear that we are shaping our program on the basis of the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Gorbachev did not agree with this and did not think SDI was compatible with the ABM Treaty. He said it is like people putting rumors around that prices are going to be raised ten percent, all the while intending that they will only go up three percent and that way people will not be unhappy. The Secretary said in a real capitalist system, all that would be frustrated because the market tells what the real price is. Gorbachev came back and said, “All right, let’s take taxes then. Let’s raise them by twelve percent next year. Then everyone can breathe a sigh of relief when they are only raised three percent. It’s a way to get people to do what you want. You have always intended as part of the political game to bring the broad interpretation back to the narrow one. We understand what is going on. It isn’t our intention to create a ruse or a trap. We are not addressing the crowd. The Soviet Union doesn’t want unilateral advantage. You should not try either.”

41. Gorbachev then said something about having to go to dedicate a Lenin statue and that, therefore the meeting would have to end in another half hour, but he went on in vigorous terms to say that he understood that we were moving in a unilateral direction. He said, “We have put our proposal forward in Geneva. You have made your proposal. You have rejected ours. As Mr. McFarlane has done, you should speak of balance and security. The talks can go on, but negotiations need compromise. We will only compromise on condition that there is no militarization of space. You want us to help you legitimize the introduction of an arms race in space.” He added solemnly, “I hope this is not your last word. If so, nothing will result from the negotiation. There will be no fifty percent reductions. You are operating from a different logic. If you want superiority through your SDI, we will not help you. We will let you bankrupt yourselves. But also we will not reduce our offensive missiles. We will engage in a build-up that will break your shield. We don’t want war, but neither are we going to allow unilateral advantage. Therefore, we will increase nuclear arms. But we are patient and we still have hope.”

42. Mr. McFarlane tried to get the focus back on Geneva by saying that our concept was to try and relieve a problem that had arisen in the past—trying to reduce the incentive on either side toward a first strike. We, therefore, had proposed lowering ballistic missiles on both sides to 4,500. Second, avoiding new systems that destroy confidence in the balance, namely, mobile missiles. Third, we want to jointly explore over time moves away from threats of offensive nuclear weapons and instead to come to rely more on defense rather than offense. We did not consider doing this except that (1) Soviet moves to build mobile missiles forced us in this direction; (2) Soviet defensive efforts were much more than ours for ten years; and (3) we need greater reliance on defense in order to avoid the threat of accurate land-based offensive missiles. The basis of our position is equality, verifiability and stability.

43. Gorbachev then began a kind of summing up of his attitude toward the current situation. First, he said that the Geneva meeting is important as a starting point. Second, he was against an approach on this meeting that was too restricted, e.g., to get acquainted, setting an agenda for the future. In other words, no new steps. They would not be good as a way to avoid worsening the situation. Third, he said we are not idealists, however, and we realize the difficulties which have piled up over the years will not be solved in one meeting. Fourth, we also take the view that if there is only the fact of the meeting, that would be a disappointment to our people and the world. We will try to explain the meeting, but if that is all, why is it necessary and should we have another one? What we should be thinking about is the interests of the world and how they can be served by moves that would lead to a major political impetus to get a drastic improvement of our relations. Gorbachev went on to say that we had stated that we need a realistic assessment of the world and “You, Mr. Secretary, reminded me of the conversation we had earlier this year. Reality should be the source of our policies. It is international business to build an international life. All countries must be involved, not just ours. But we can help because we have great weight in these affairs. Certainly, we need policies that meet this preoccupation with world problems. As far as present policies are concerned, the great question is of war or peace. That is in the forefront and that is what preoccupies people everywhere. How can we stop the arms race and the threat of nuclear war? We should have as our intent the development of a dialogue to reduce confrontation, encourage detente and peaceful co-existence. That is what the world wants. The reality of the present world is that economic, social and ecological concerns are evident in capitalist and socialist countries and, most particularly, in the developing world where there is a grave threat to living standards. Never before have we seen such an inter-dependence among all of us. All this should be taken into account in all our policies, but especially in the Soviet Union and the United States. As far as we are concerned, we want to take steps to improve our relations. You have our peace proposals. We have made proposals in Europe, in Asia, in Africa and we are ready to cooperate with you.”

44. Gorbachev went on to say, coming back to his old theme, that the U.S. should think of making new proposals and not sticking with old policies. “You should understand that the Republican administration can’t leave office with only old proposals. You can’t continue to wrap these up as if they were new. You need to re-think these questions, to catch up with the new reality. We must take account of national interests in all countries and not just see the hand of Moscow everywhere. Much depends on what is going on in the less developed world where transnational corporations are milking these countries. They can’t pay their debts; they are starving. I said this to Congressman O’Neill and the Ambassador was here at that time.¹⁰ The countries of Latin America are being robbed. What they need to do is to raise their productivity. There is no hand of Moscow. That is not true. Africa and Asia are exactly like Latin America. The reality is that we are not plotting maliciously to do things there.”

45. Gorbachev went on to say that they were exercising restraint and engaging in mutual help, but he wanted to say that because of their belief in their principles they will continue to support national liberation movements. “You want us to give up, but we cannot. It is a matter of principle with us. You, on the other hand, should give up your illusions and then we can move along together even on such questions as human rights. For example, there have been more than 400 marriages and almost all the people involved have left. The only ones who have stayed behind have state secrets. But everyone (sic) does that. But we are reviewing even these cases. It is in our self-interest to keep our security and for both of us to take account of the other’s security. This is a universal truth. The key is trying to get security at lower levels of deterrence and we are ready for that search, even to reduce to zero on condition that we prevent the militarization of space. This would apply not only to the U.S. but to the U.S.S.R. as well, if it were signed by both sides. The Soviet side would also be prohibited from having such systems. Such an agreement would be in the two countries’ interest and would improve the international climate. Sometimes it is presented that if the United States were to change its position on outer space, this would be a defeat for the United States, but this is not true. It would bring a huge political gain if the United States were capable of taking a step of such importance.”

46. Gorbachev continued his peroration by saying that we could think about the formulation to use to describe this, but it was clear that we could recognize research directed at the peaceful uses of space and the mastering of new technology. But only research, not development or testing of elements of a space-based ABM system. We will not agree to that and would need to re-evaluate our position in such circumstances. It certainly will be unproductive to try and persuade us that weapons in space are useful. We have concluded that this is not the case based on solid analysis and not on whim. We are not amateurs here. We have experts.

47. On other subjects, Gorbachev said that he was prepared to discuss at Geneva regional, bilateral and other problems. Consultations on these subjects to get a better understanding of each other’s position could lead to a better atmosphere and they would maybe do some good. He ended by saying that the Secretary should convey to the President his earnest request that we think all this over.

48. The Secretary thanked Gorbachev for his time. He said that he could find some things to agree with without reservation. Geneva should be full of as much genuine content as possible. That was why we had been making all our efforts. We have a broad agenda that indicates the scope of our concern. On some of the remarks about economic development, we certainly see things in a different way, and we have never really discussed how to solve these problems. Our approach to different problems in different regions may vary. There are some areas where tension may arise. President Reagan has a process for our deliberation regarding regional problems; we have in one area a war that is going on—in Iran and Iraq, but there are no tensions between us. This is a quarrel between them, but maybe we could cooperate to help end this war. We think that would be worthwhile. (Gorbachev agreed.) The Secretary went on to say that as we prepare for Geneva, we welcome the Soviet proposal for reductions in nuclear weapons and we hope that it will be possible to go all the way to zero. We don’t obviously see the Strategic Defense Initiative in the same way, but we need to talk to see if we can deal with that problem. We also need to remind ourselves that perhaps we have gotten into the habit of disagreeing, both in your country and in mine. It takes courage to disagree, but maybe it takes equal courage to agree. Our list of issues includes some large and some small ones. We hope that we can get into a position to deal with as many of these as possible in the Geneva meeting. Do we think the meeting can be successful? Well, it could be if we can make progress, and it is in that spirit that we will try to make this a significant meeting. Meantime, we ought to keep negotiating in the Geneva arms talks because perhaps they could make some progress.

49. Gorbachev ended the meeting by saying that he will think over what we have said and he hopes that we will think about what he has said. He hopes that we appreciate the utter frankness with which he conveyed his strong views. He said he has not given up his optimism and he looks forward to the meeting with the President and sends him his best regards.

Hartman

1. Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Memoranda of Conversations 1985. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Adam. Special Encryption.
2. Talking points prepared for Shultz for this meeting are in the Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Official Personal Notes of Secretary Shultz (10/01/1985–10/23/1985); NLR–775–23–61–1–8. Secret. On November 6, Reagan wrote in his diary entry: “Then George S. & Bud came upstairs with Don R. & George B. to report on their Gorbachev meeting. It seems Mr. G. is filled with lots of false info about the U.S. & believes it all. For example Americans hate the Russians because our arms manufacturers stir them up with propaganda so they can keep selling us weapons.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 537)
3. Nikolai Uspensky is the correct name for the Soviet interpreter. In several meetings, the notetaker used a variation in the name or mistakenly recorded the Soviet interpreter as Yuri Uspensky.
4. See footnote 7, Document 96.
5. Presumably a reference to Peter Duignan, ed., “The United States in the 1980s,” (Palo Alto, Hoover Inst. Press, 1980).
6. See Documents 127 and 128.
7. See footnote 3, Document 142.
8. See footnote 3, Document 120.
9. Presumably a reference to the leaders of six nonaligned countries meeting in New York during the UN to discuss nuclear issues. See Don Oberdorfer, “Six Nonaligned Countries Offer to Monitor a Nuclear Test Ban,” Washington Post, October 29, 1985, p. A14.
10. See Document 19.