Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

142. Memorandum From Peter Sommer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, November 12, 1985

SUBJECT

• SWM Breakfast, Wednesday, November 13: Meeting with Gorbachev²

My understanding is that tomorrow’s weekly breakfast agenda will have only one topic: the President’s meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev. Defense reportedly has asked that Geneva be the sole topic because of a general feeling that they have been left out of the non-arms control side of the process. Thus, my further understanding is that Secretary Weinberger does not plan on raising any specific arms control items. As you know, tomorrow’s NSC meeting will also cover the non-arms control aspects of the Geneva agenda.

State is well aware of Defense’s complaints and is positioning Secretary Shultz to take the lead in going over in detail all aspects of the Geneva meeting. In blunt terms, State sees tomorrow’s breakfast as a hand-holding session.

The two items that apparently have caused Defense specific heartburn are the nuclear fusion reactor project and certain aspects of the U.S.-Soviet exchange agreement. In both instances, I am told that Defense’s problem is technology transfer. However, I understand that any relevant exchanges would have to be approved by the Technology Transfer Committee.

Beyond these points, the overall subject of a joint communique is a sore point with Defense.³ This is basically because Defense did not see the original draft communique language before it was handed to the Soviets. Defense also reportedly believes that the current communique language is vague in a way that papers over differences. Furthermore, Defense is convinced, despite assurances to the contrary, that State is continuing to work with the Soviets on a joint communique. I do not believe that Defense is aware that the Soviets have provided us a revised draft communique.

I believe you are aware that all the specific arms control questions, to include not only NST but also CDE, MBFR, and CW, are all being worked in the arms control support group, with Defense participation.

Recommendation

That you draw on the above for tomorrow’s breakfast.⁴

1. Source: Reagan Library, Tyrus Cobb Files, Country File, USSR 1985 (12); NLR–98–5–20–7–9. Secret. Sent for action. Matlock, Linhard, and Cobb concurred, with Sommer initialing for Matlock and Linhard. An unknown hand wrote “Copy for Ty” in the upper right-hand corner.
2. SWM: Shultz, Weinberger, McFarlane.
3. In his memoir, Shultz recalled: “The mere thought of a joint communiqué with the Soviets alarmed Cap Weinberger and others in the Defense Department. They were driving Bud McFarlane wild with charges that he had to ‘stop Shultz’ from doing any such thing.” He continued: “The president did not like the acrimony and decided that we should put ‘on hold’ efforts with the Soviets to develop what they described as a possible joint communiqué. But he did agree with me on the importance of developing language for what we called an ‘agreed statement’ privately so that I would have some ideas and language ‘in my pocket’ should we have the opportunity for something constructive in Geneva. We would just skip over this interagency squabbling.” Of the breakfast with Weinberger, Shultz wrote: “On November 13, I went over to the Defense Department for breakfast with Cap. I reviewed for him the twenty-six items that we planned to take up with the Soviets. I was on top of my brief and felt confident. The breakfast went well, to my surprise.” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 596–597) A list of 26 issues for discussion in Geneva is in Shultz’s preparatory materials for a November 6 meeting with Reagan. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Secretary’s Meetings with Shevardnadze (09/24/1987) (2); NLR–775–21–40–1–3)
4. McFarlane did not approve or disapprove the recommendation