Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

117. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Papers on the Soviet Union: The Soviet Union in the World

You have previously read four groups of papers on the Soviet Union. They dealt with the sources of Soviet behavior, the problems of Soviet society, the instruments of control, and Gorbachev’s domestic agenda.² The attached group looks at the Soviet Union’s international position.

The first paper (Tab A) deals with Eastern Europe and the international communist movement.³ Soviet leaders view control of the contiguous countries of Eastern Europe and East Germany as essential not only to their security but also to the maintenance of their rule at home. The Warsaw Pact command, which is totally under the control of Soviet officers, is used both as a counterforce to NATO and as an instrument for controlling the East European countries. The Soviets have also tried to unify control over the East European economies through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, but this effort has been less successful than the military integration achieved through the Warsaw Pact Command.

Outside Eastern Europe Moscow maintains relations with some 80 nonruling communist parties and tries to assert a leading role among them. These parties vary greatly, however, in their willingness to support Soviet policies, and disunity within the world communist movement promises to remain a fact of life.

The second paper (Tab B) deals with Western Europe.⁴ Here the Soviets employ a variety of approaches, ranging from direct threats to blandishments. Image building and style play a large role, particularly now that Gorbachev has become General Secretary. The Soviets continue to court the European left and work to establish privileged dialogues with certain West European states, particularly France and Italy. They have promoted greater economic ties with Western Europe, which have so far weathered periods of strained political relations. On arms control issues the Soviets try to encourage European fears of an arms race in space and promote regional discussions of arms problems which exclude U.S. participation.

While the Soviets often seem preoccupied with Western Europe and the U.S., China looms as a major factor—and significant potential long-range threat. In addition to the major ideological and tactical disputes which led to the open Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960’s, there were major border clashes between Chinese and Soviet troops in 1969. These have fostered Soviet fears of the potential for alignment among China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States.

However, the Sino-Soviet relationship has improved somewhat in recent years. Trade, for example, has increased and regular political consultations have been established. Some gradual improvement of relations is likely to continue, but there seems little likelihood that the two countries will become allies in the forseeable future (Tab C).⁵

Soviet entree into the developing world as a whole has largely been through arms sales. Arms account for some two thirds of Soviet exports to the non-communist developing world, with most going to the Middle East and North Africa. Soviet successes in the developing world, however, have not kept pace with the early advances of the 60’s (Cuba) and 70’s (particularly Ethiopia and Angola). Many nations have become disillusioned with the Soviet economic model and the Soviets’ inability to provide significant financial assistance, and several Soviet proteges are beset by significant military resistance (Tab D).⁶

Recommendation

That you read the attached papers as background for your upcoming meeting with Gorbachev.⁷

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron October 1985 (6/12). Secret. Sent for information. Drafted by Matlock. The memorandum is unsigned. Matlock forwarded the draft memorandum and the attached papers to McFarlane on October 18. On another copy of the covering memorandum from Matlock, McFarlane wrote: “Forward on 10/25 for Camp David reading. Pls provide cy for me. M.” Matlock recommended that McFarlane also approve copies to Shultz and Regan; McFarlane initialed his approval and added in a handwritten note “and VP.” (Reagan Library, Matlock Files, Geneva Meeting: Background Materials for the President (5/6)) In his book, Matlock explained that “Reagan read these papers with care, often jotting notes in the margins. Sometimes, at his morning staff meeting, he would pass one around and recommend that everyone read it. We organized meetings for him with some of the authors so that he could discuss the questions raised in whatever detail he desired. We also arranged for him to meet specialists from outside the government and to read some of their writings. Nina Tumarkin of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University did a paper on the image of Lenin, and Suzanne Massie, author of Land of the Firebird, a cultural history of Russia, had several meetings to discuss the Russian character. Reagan found their advice helpful as he considered ways to approach Gorbachev personally. He also enjoyed Massie’s book, which he was still reading in Geneva as he prepared for his meeting with Gorbachev.” (Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, p. 134)
2. See also Documents 39, 74, 79, and 109.
3. Tab A, “The Warsaw Pact and the International Communist Movement,” is attached but not printed.
4. Tab B, “The Soviet Union and Western Europe,” is attached but not printed.
5. Tab C, “Sino-Soviet Relations,” is attached but not printed.
6. Tab D, “The Soviets in the Third World,” is attached but not printed.
7. Reagan did not indicate his approval or disapproval of the recommendation.