Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

118. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, October 19, 1985, 1155Z

14821. Subject: Akhromeyev Article on Arms Control: The Military Stakes Out Its Position.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary. In a major Pravda article October 19 Chief of Staff Akhromeyev provides authoritative military endorsement for major elements of the Soviet arms control proposals tabled at Geneva.² Akhromeyev is sharply critical of McFarlane’s October 6 statement on the ABM Treaty, while ignoring subsequent statements by Secretary Shultz of the U.S. intention to pursue the SDI program in accordance with a more restrictive definition of the treaty.³ Akhromeyev also mounts a vigorous defense of the role of land-based ICBMs in the Soviet strategic forces structure. The Akhromeyev article may be calculated to demonstrate military support for Gorbachev’s arms control initiatives. But it also strikes us as a strong military warning that further steps toward more restrictive limits on Soviet ICBMs could pose an unacceptable risk to fundamental Soviet security interests. End summary.

3. The Akhromeyev article is the first public, authoritative military comment on arms control since the tabling of the Soviet counterproposal in Geneva and Gorbachev’s visit to France.⁴ Akhromeyev provides a strong endorsement of the Soviet proposals and accuses U.S. spokesmen of efforts to discredit Moscow’s initiatives. The Chief of Staff also provides detailed, although standard, refutations of major U.S. criticisms of the Soviet proposals.

4. In a lengthy passage on SDI and the ABM Treaty, Akhromeyev is sharply critical of National Security Adviser McFarlane’s October 6 remarks and statements on the meaning of Agreed Statement “D” of the ABM Treaty by U.S. spokesmen. Akhromeyev ignores Secretary Shultz’ San Francisco speech and Brussels news conference on U.S. intention to pursue SDI in accordance with a more restrictive definition of the ABM Treaty.⁵ (Comment: Akhromeyev’s approach contrasts with that of authoritative MFA officials who have told us privately this week that the Secretary’s most recent statements on the ABM Treaty were welcome and more positive. End comment.)

5. Akhromeyev provides a lengthy but standard discussion of the distinction between fundamental research permitted under the ABM Treaty and activities which are proscribed. He adds a warning that the U.S. has underestimated Soviet capacity to respond to SDI. If the program goes forward, Akhromeyev asserts that the Soviet Union will answer with new offensive and defensive weapons, including space-based weapons.

6. The article devotes considerable attention to a defense of the role of land-based ICBMs in the Soviet strategic force structure. Akhromeyev rejects U.S. arguments that Soviet ICBMs are more destabilizing than SLBMs and bomber weapons (including cruise missiles) in which the U.S. has an advantage. He notes that Moscow has proposed a sixty percent limit on the number of warheads that could be concentrated in any one leg of the triad, but rejects proposals that would focus reductions disproportionately on ICBM warheads. Akhromeyev asserts that it is precisely strength in such forces which has created the existing strategic balance and which enables the USSR to retaliate against any U.S. attack. He concludes that there will be no “onesided” disarmament of the USSR.

7. Comment: The Akhromeyev article represents an authoritative military endorsement of Gorbachev’s recent moves in arms control on the eve of the Warsaw Pact summit and Shevardnadze’s trip to the U.S. At the same time, the Chief of Staff minces no words in setting forth military concerns about both SDI and strategic offensive forces. In this sense, the Akhromeyev article may be an implicit warning that the current Soviet proposals are the maximum consistent with military views of Soviet national security. Specifically, Akhromeyev appears to argue that more restrictive limits on ICBM warheads than those envisaged by the 60 percent ceiling would pose an unacceptable risk. While this is far from the open debate that shapes U.S. arms control policy, it is as clear a statement of military concern as we are likely to see in the Soviet context.

Hartman

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850747–0686. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to the Moscow Political Collective.
2. See Documents on Disarmament, 1985, pp. 718–725. See also Gary Lee, “Soviet Warns of Retaliatory SDI Move,” Washington Post, October 19, 1985, p. A14.
3. For the full text of McFarlane’s October 6 “Meet the Press” interview, see the Department of State Bulletin, December 1985, pp. 32–34.
4. See footnote 2, Document 112 and footnote 6, Document 114.
5. In a memorandum to Reagan, Shultz reported: “At a meeting of NATO Parliamentarians in San Francisco yesterday [October 14] and in Brussels at a special session of the North Atlantic Council today, I had an opportunity to continue our consultation with the Allies on where we are in the run-up to Geneva, with some emphasis on arms control. The reaction, both from legislators in San Francisco and from my colleagues in Brussels, was encouraging. I found that our allies recognize the Soviet arms control counterproposal for what it is—a one-sided repackaging of old ideas with a couple of new twists. Gorbachev’s effort to portray it in positive terms for Europe has not found many takers.” He continued: “I used my speech in San Francisco to describe in some detail the principles that drive our arms control position, our comprehensive proposals, and our evaluation of the Soviet counter proposal. I stated our position on the ABM Treaty, emphasizing our belief that a less restrictive interpretation of the Treaty is justified. I told them of your decision to carry out the SDI research program within the bounds of the more restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty; this was greeted with an ovation.” Shultz continued that he repeated much of the same messaging in the Brussels sessions. (Telegram Secto 21011 from Shultz’s aircraft, October 15; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850011–0102) For the full text of Shultz’s speech to the North Atlantic Assembly in San Francisco, see the Department of State Bulletin, December 1985, pp. 20–25.