167. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)1
SUBJECT
- What If Andropov Dies?
The sudden cancellation of Ustinov’s visit to India suggests some major development on the Soviet internal scene,2 and the possibility which comes most readily to mind is that Andropov’s condition has taken a turn for the worse. Without trying to make a prediction regarding what may in fact be happening, I believe we should give some preliminary thought to how we would react to Andropov’s demise.
I believe that Andropov’s passing should not be used as an argument for changing our basic policy: it is sound and should be pursued regardless of the identity of the Soviet leader. However, the President will have to make a quick decision as to whether to attend the funeral, [Page 595] and the decision could have an effect both on our public diplomacy and on our dialogue with Andropov’s successor.
Most of the pros and cons regarding Presidential attendance at the funeral are readily apparent. On the “pro” side, it would relieve pressures for unplanned summitry and strengthen our stance in favor of dialogue. Among the “cons” are that it would be paying homage to a man even more inimical to U.S.-Soviet relations than Brezhnev, who was a secret policeman to boot, and in an election year it might smack of grandstanding.
My initial view is that the “pros” would slightly outweigh the “cons” if a successor has been named as General Secretary, since pressures for premature summitry could be relieved by a 30-minute meeting, and direct understandings reached regarding channels of communication. On the other hand, I would see no point in the President’s going if a successor has not been named.
You may wish to ask George Shultz to give some thought to this question when he returns Wednesday.3 I have asked Rick Burt to have his people put together the relevant material on a very close-hold basis. I don’t believe we need interagency tasking, which would risk press leaks, although Weinberger and Casey should presumably be consulted before a recommendation is made to the President.
- Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/04/84–2/11/84). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. McFarlane’s stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.↩
- In telegram 1455 from Moscow, February 8, Hartman reported: “The sudden postponement of a trip already announced, which was seen by both the Soviets and Indians as a substitute for an Andropov visit, cannot have been a decision taken lightly. It is possible that Ustinov’s health was the cause, given the heavy program prepared for him in India. It is also possible that a new turn in Andropov’s condition led the leadership to exercise caution about having such a key figure out of the country. At this moment we believe the evidence is too scanty to draw firm conclusions about this virtually unprecedented last-minute cancellation.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840078–0581)↩
- Shultz was on official travel to El Salvador, Venezuela, Brazil, Grenada, and Barbados from January 31. He returned to Washington on Wednesday, February 8.↩