166. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan1

SUBJECT

  • Letter from Andropov and Shultz Meeting with Dobrynin

Ambassador Dobrynin gave George Shultz a letter from Andropov to you during their meeting January 30 (TAB A).2 It is in reply to your letter of December 23.3 While it reiterates standard Soviet positions on most substantive issues, it does accept the necessity for an improved dialogue. In particular, it provides a broader formulation of what it would take to get the nuclear arms control process back in motion, thus creating more maneuver room on that issue.

There was little additional substance in the Shultz-Dobrynin conversation (TAB B).4 However, Dobrynin seemed eager to elicit more [Page 594] of our ideas on START and hinted that our views could influence their internal arms control debate. Shultz refrained from going further than we already have on this subject. Dobrynin also confirmed Soviet willingness to listen to our ideas about improving navigation aids on the Pacific route where the KAL flight went off course.

I will shortly provide a more detailed analysis of the Andropov letter and recommendations on where we go from here, but thought that you would want to take a look at the letter and Shultz’s preliminary report immediately.

  1. Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—(1/26/84–2/13/84). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Prepared by Matlock. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it, and wrote at the bottom, “P.2 of Andropov’s letter—he suggests that they want an elimination of nuclear weapons? In Europe that is. Let’s take him up on that.” See Document 164.
  2. See Document 164.
  3. See Document 149.
  4. See Document 165.