Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

242. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, May 28, 1985

SUBJECT

• Sino-Soviet Relations and the Strategic Triangle

China’s handling of the U.S. ship visit,² and its recent gestures toward Moscow,³ warrant a reexamination of the state of the strategic triangle.

These developments, in my view, do not suggest a change in the PRC’s fundamental orientation. China continues to fear the Soviet Union as its principal security threat and long-term strategic rival. It remains committed to modernization and to the opening to the world on which this depends. For both reasons, it continues to value close relations with us.

Nevertheless, Chinese tactics toward Moscow and Washington are evolving, in a way that reflects internal politics as well as China’s interest in maximizing its advantage with respect to both superpowers. Such an evolution is probably inevitable. We can expect China to continue to play down a “strategic partnership” with the U.S. and to flaunt its “independence;” China seeks in this way to play a role of Third World leadership and to induce both superpowers to pay court. Gorbachev is likely to try to work the triangle vigorously. There are objective limits to a full Sino-Soviet rapprochement, however, owing to Moscow’s unwillingness to make major concessions and to the profound mutual fear and suspicion. We will need to distinguish between Chinese rhetoric and those actions that are really harmful to us—and respond forcefully to the latter.

Background

Efforts to improve Sino-Soviet relations date to the initiation in 1979 of regularized political talks, which China broke off over Afghanistan, and to the Chinese adoption of an “independent foreign policy” line in 1981–82. These efforts reflect Chinese probing for an accommodation that would reduce tension with Moscow and establish greater balance in PRC foreign relations. They reflect the reality of a Soviet threat diminished in immediacy if not in magnitude, and of a fairly reliable U.S. relationship which they can essentially count on. Recent developments fit this pattern. There are, however, several new elements:

— PRC references to the USSR as a “socialist” country;⁴

— movement toward restoring party-to-party ties;

— Chinese denial of “strategic relations” with the United States and (as in the ship-visit case) attempts to limit military cooperation with the U.S. which could compromise Chinese “independence” or provoke Moscow;

— signs of PRC readiness to improve relations with Moscow even without progress on the “three obstacles.”⁵ Although the PRC insists that the “obstacles” remain preconditions to full normalization—and its policy on the ground remains firm on all three issues—they are no longer a barrier to improvements in Sino-Soviet political relations.

These explicit gestures toward Moscow have been accompanied by other suggestive Chinese actions. China has toned down and/or omitted criticism of the Soviets in Afghanistan. It has avoided significant military actions along the Vietnamese border during Hanoi’s offensive in Cambodia (though its options were limited). It has agreed to set up a joint scientific and technological commission with the Soviet Union (with possible implications for technology transfer).⁶ China has also conceded that it could live with Soviet naval bases in Vietnam if the Soviets induced Hanoi to leave Cambodia.

At the same time, China has flaunted its “independence” by:

— reviving its theme of “double hegemonism,” equating the U.S. and USSR in Central America, Afghanistan, and elsewhere;⁷

— asserting that West Europeans can no longer rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and urging greater European “independence” from us; and

— praising New Zealand for its anti-ship-visit policy.⁸

By such moves toward equidistance, Chinese leaders probably hope to serve several purposes, domestic and foreign:

— mollifying domestic critics of China’s reform policies by establishing greater balance in PRC foreign policies;

— exploiting a perceived “window of opportunity” with Gorbachev;

— reducing the dangers from the Soviets as China pursues its interests in Southeast and Southwest Asia; and

— putting China in a better position to play off both superpowers against each other.

In addition, the Chinese may seek to gain leverage over us to get us more directly involved on the Taiwan issue. They may believe they can induce U.S. pressure on Taipei to be more responsive to Beijing’s overtures. Some PRC officials may also think that military cooperation with us undercuts their leverage over American arms sales to Taiwan.

The Shanghai ship-visit snafu shows, perhaps most of all, a certain lack of competence and cohesion in the Chinese leadership as compared to earlier times. The result is to leave China’s American policy more vulnerable to domestic and international pressures.

Risks to U.S. Interests

For a brief time at the beginning of the 1970s, the United States was in the catbird seat, with both China and the USSR seeking our favor and each worried about our warming relations with the other. Today China claims the “swing” position, which is perhaps natural for China as the weakest of the three states. In any case, the strategic triangle is no longer the asset in our relations with the Soviets that it was a decade ago. Our minimum task is to prevent its becoming an asset for the Soviets. There is a distinct possibility of a PRC or U.S. miscalculation which could cause real deterioration in our relationship. This is especially true as long as U.S.-Soviet relations are immobilized, while Moscow and Beijing are increasing contacts. The dangers are:

— First, improvements in Sino-Soviet relations could be greater than we anticipate. Gorbachev might agree to draw back some troops along the Sino-Soviet border or in Mongolia, as part of a bolder policy to undo the Sino-American rapprochement. Party-to-party ties may well be restored within a year or two. We should appear relaxed about such prospects in public, lest we maximize their impact. But privately we need to take them seriously.

— Second, China’s effort to maximize its maneuvering room, in and of itself, could cause us problems. Beijing’s interests are not identical to ours, and its recent posturing has tended more and more to touch on important interests of ours. The PRC is clearly testing the limits of U.S. tolerance. We can expect them to keep pressing until they know.

Implications for U.S. Policy

Our fundamental stake remains the same: perpetuation of the basic Sino-Soviet rivalry to complicate the Soviet Union’s strategic position. We want, where possible, to strengthen the U.S.-PRC relationship, while preventing damage to other important U.S. interests. This requires that we create facts that increase Beijing’s incentives to cooperate with the United States. A few basic guidelines follow:

First, we should be careful not to appear as the demandeur in the Sino-American relationship. While the war scare of 1969 is long past, and China has grown in strength, the magnitude of the Soviet military threat arrayed along China’s border is greater today than 16 years ago and is likely to grow over the coming decade. The Chinese understand this reality. Therefore, we should:

— refrain from badgering the Chinese about the “three obstacles.” This would only make it appear that we are unduly worried about Sino-Soviet reconciliation.

— continue to downplay our rhetorical emphasis on the U.S.-PRC “strategic” relationship: In the past, this fueled Beijing’s already exaggerated sense of self-importance and belief that we need them more than they need us. At the same time, we should stay on our basic track of seeking to improve U.S.-PRC political, economic, and military ties—with the strategic dimension of the relationship always in mind. The Soviets will pay attention to what we do on the ground without its being trumpeted.

— strengthen U.S.-PRC military relations, while guiding them in accordance with our strategic and political purposes. These ties are turning into an important cement of our relationship (and a restraint on Foreign Ministry obsession with Chinese “independence”). We should continue to ensure that John Lehman’s vigorous efforts to build up China’s navy are focused on areas (like ASW) that are relevant to the Soviet threat and less unnerving to Taiwan, ASEAN, and Japan. We also have an interest in building up China’s land forces, which are of even more direct utility in coping with the USSR and Vietnam.

Second, we should always make clear the limits to U.S. tolerance of PRC posturing and hit the Chinese hard when they exceed them. China’s real independence is more a problem for the Soviet Union than for the United States. Precisely because we can be confident about the long-term nature of the basic Sino-Soviet competition, we don’t have to pander to Beijing. We have a number of points of potential leverage:

— In the wake of the ship-visit snafu—and our firm response—the Chinese may well be worried about a further fraying of their U.S. relationship. Thus our leverage may well be somewhat higher over the next few months—particularly as the leadership faces some major internal events such as a big party meeting in September, when they will not want to have all their external relations in disarray.

— In the wake of the ship-visit episode, our public statements—e.g., your speech at ASEAN—should convey the appropriate sense of U.S. aloofness, firmness, and non-pandering.⁹ The United States, too, has the right to an “independent” foreign policy.

— The Chinese defense establishment, as noted, may be the sector that feels the greatest stake in a relationship with us. We can communicate to friendly Chinese our willingness to move forward quietly in the security field—while noting the dangers of excessive Chinese posturing.

— Western technology transfer is critical to China’s future. Our interest in Chinese modernization is fundamentally derivative of our larger strategic interest in a China that stands with us against the Soviet Union. The Chinese should understand the link between their external behavior and our behavior in COCOM and on tech transfer. Thus we must resist efforts to drop tech-transfer controls on China entirely.

— I have suggested in a separate memo the political and economic merits of supporting higher IFI lending levels for India—if need be, at China’s expense.¹⁰ Such a decision would send a signal to Beijing, as well as New Delhi.

— The U.S. already “carries water” for the Chinese on the SS–20, Indochina, Pakistan, and other issues. Although this is based on broader considerations, we can remind the Chinese of how U.S. policies in these areas also benefit China.

— Trends on the Korean peninsula are basically more favorable to us than to Beijing. We should approach such issues as President Chun’s cross-recognition proposals on their merits, but we should not ignore their potential utility for making points to Beijing.¹¹ The Chinese themselves have represented Pyongyang’s interests in rather blatant fashion.

— Although Taiwan is too sensitive an issue to seek to manipulate, we can simply note that a loss of domestic support for close U.S.-PRC relations would provide American supporters of Taiwan greater room for maneuver.

— We can encourage Japan to echo U.S. warnings if China pushes its “independence” theme too far. We can also urge Pakistan and ASEAN to press Beijing hard when it vacillates on the critical issues of Afghanistan and Cambodia.

Third, we should play up any improvements that might occur in Soviet-American relations. The poor state of the superpower relationship alleviates China’s fear of either a Soviet attack or a Soviet-American deal at Beijing’s expense. This enables China to pursue its own interests vis-a-vis the superpowers more freely than would otherwise be possible. An improvement in our relations with the USSR will probably have a beneficial effect on our relations with the PRC—and vice versa. On my trip to China last fall, for example, I was struck by the strong Chinese concern about the U.S.-Soviet arms talks which had just been announced.¹² Regional talks with the Soviets could keep the Chinese off balance even if they lead nowhere on the issues. We should not pay the Soviets any substantive price merely because of some potential effect on the PRC, but the strategic triangle seems to work best for us when we have good relations with both countries and each one fears our “collusion” with the other.

Fourth, we should recall that our central goal is to perpetuate the Sino-Soviet split and China’s present orientation. We cannot directly affect Sino-Soviet relations, but we can work to discipline the U.S.-PRC relationship. China must understand the limits beyond which it is weakening our sense of common interest. Occasional disputes are inevitable. But they should not be allowed to precipitate a downward spiral in the bilateral relationship, nor permit the Soviets to draw comfort or advantage from such incidents. This would enhance neither Chinese nor American leverage with the Soviet Union.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Files, Memoranda and Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and Other Seventh Floor Principals: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons 5/1–31/85. Secret. Drafted by Levin; cleared by Kaplan. Staff Assistant Edward Smith initialed for both Levin and Kaplan.
2. Reference is to a proposed visit of U.S. Navy ships to the People’s Republic of China. In April, Chinese officials sought assurances from the Reagan administration that the ships would not have nuclear weapons aboard; the administration refused to confirm or deny the presence of weapons. In telegram 7557 from Beijing, April 11, Hummel summarized his meeting with Chinese ambassador-designate to the United States Han Xu, stating: “The Chinese tried to lie their way out of this problem, and I didn’t let them. At my meeting with Han Xu on April 11, Han claimed that US Naval officers had given Chinese military officials assurances that the ships visiting Shanghai would not be nuclear armed nor would they carry nuclear weapons. I told Han we never gave such assurances anywhere, and I was confident my staff had not given them here.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850249–0205) In mid-May, the Department announced that the ship visit would be postponed. At a May 13 briefing “Djerejian said that the ship visits to China remain under consideration but that both sides are still discussing ‘a number of issues’ through diplomatic channels.” (Daniel Southerland, “Post-Call Issue Affects Ties With China: Ship Visit Put Off, Officials Confirm,” Washington Post, May 14, 1985, p. A13) Documentation on the ship visit is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXIX, China, 1984–1988.
3. In telegram 4485 from Beijing, March 6, the Embassy provided an overview of Soviet-Chinese relations following Soviet First Deputy Premier Arkhipov’s visit to China in December 1984. The Embassy noted that the Sino-Soviet relationship looked as if it “is moving into a new phase, with a more definite agenda and greater interaction in the economic sphere but continued competition in the political sphere.” Moreover, the Embassy stated: “Their main objectives in dealing with the Soviets, and in their foreign policy more generally, are to enhance their national security, to promote economic development and to gain international legitimacy and prestige. The USSR remains China’s major security threat, but China’s perception of the immediacy and manageability of the threat has been changing, largely because of increased contacts bilaterally and a more secure environment internationally. On the economic side, the two sides are talking about an ambitious package of cooperation which will increase trade five-fold in five years and bring Soviet goods and people back to China in large quantities. As for legitimacy and prestige, better ties with Moscow serve China’s interest in pursuing an ‘independent’ foreign policy.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850151–0404)
4. In telegram 3340 from Moscow, March 18, the Embassy reported on a March 15 Chinese Embassy reception, at which U.S. Embassy officials had discussed with several Chinese Embassy officials Gorbachev’s recent bilateral meeting with Chinese Vice Premier Li Peng, during which, Li had referred to the Soviet Union as “a socialist country.” According to the Embassy, “To our knowledge, Li’s reference to the Soviet Union as a great neighboring ‘socialist’ country is the first Chinese official recognition of this status in two decades, and constitutes an important political signal.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850183–0651)
5. The “three obstacles” included Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Soviet forces on the northern Chinese border and Mongolia.
6. Telegram Topol 10090/74321 to Islamabad, March 12, transmitted the text of a typescript memorandum from Ermarth to Armacost, dated January 22, in which Ermarth indicated that Soviet and Chinese officials had signed “two agreements on scientific, technical and economic cooperation” during Arkhipov’s December 1984 visit (see footnote 3, above). Ermarth explained that “the scientific and technological cooperation agreement calls for the exchange of scientific and technological groups as well as students and other experts, the exchange of scientific and technological information, and unspecified joint projects.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850166–0906)
7. In telegram 10248 from Beijing, May 10, the Embassy indicated that a front-page editorial in the May 9 issue of the People’s Daily “calls for the world’s peoples to unite in safeguarding peace and calls the ‘superpowers’ struggle for hegemony’ and their willingness ‘even to invade other countries’ a threat to world peace.” The Embassy commented, “China has used this V–E Day editorial to reassert its own independent foreign policy line. The Soviets will no doubt be enraged at the very small bow in their direction, and we are dismayed by the Chinese use of ‘double hegemonism’ slogan, equating us with the Soviets.” In concluding its summary, the Embassy recommended “that both here and in Washington we express to the Chinese our strong dismay with their return to rhetorical attacks.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850328–0431)
8. In February, Lange turned down a U.S. request for the USS Buchanan to visit New Zealand as part of the ANZUS “Sea Eagle” exercise, scheduled to take place in March. As a result, the United States withdrew from the exercise. (Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Is Rebuffed On Visit by Ship To New Zealand: Nuclear Policy Cited—Maneuvers Called Off,” New York Times, February 5, 1985, pp. A1, A13, and John M. Goshko, “U.S. Withdraws From ANZUS Exercise,” Washington Post, February 6, 1985, p. A20) Documentation on the “Sea Eagle” exercise is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXXII, Southeast Asia; Pacific.
9. Shultz was scheduled to participate in the ASEAN six-plus-six meeting and ASEAN post-ministerial consultations in Kuala Lumpur, July 10–12. His July 11 statement at the six-plus-six meeting and his remarks at the July 12 post-ministerial consultation are printed in Department of State Bulletin, September 1985, pp. 24–30. Documentation on the ASEAN meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXXII, Southeast Asia; Pacific.
10. Not found.
11. Presumable reference to Chun’s proposal that Japan recognize North Korea if the People’s Republic of China recognized South Korea. Documentation on the cross-recognition proposal is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXXI, Japan; Korea, 1985–1988.
12. Rodman and S/P officials met with representatives of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the Beijing Institute of Strategic Studies, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and the Center for Contemporary International Relations in Beijing, October 23–24, 1984. (Telegram 20658 from Beijing, November 2, 1984; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840702–0194)