Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

220. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, November 29, 1984

SUBJECT

• U.S. Strategy on World War II Anniversaries

Background

1985 will mark the fortieth anniversary of the end of World War II and the many wartime and postwar events associated with it. These anniversaries will also highlight the several steps taken by the United States and other victorious powers to establish a postwar order. 1985 also happens to be the thirtieth anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty,² West German entry into NATO and establishment of the Warsaw Pact, and the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act—all major milestones in the political settlement which emerged from the war.

These anniversaries are already drawing considerable worldwide attention. The world’s media will focus on US-Soviet relations and on our ties to the democratic states of Europe and Asia. In Europe, especially in the FRG, there will be debates over the historic decisions which divided Germany and created two military alliances. The West Germans are already nervous about being isolated from their Western allies in the anniversary festivities and the Japanese will probably be anxious as well. In the US, Congressional interest will be high, and various private veterans, Jewish or peace groups will wish to participate in these occasions to further their own causes.

The focal point of the anniversaries in Europe will be V-E Day—May 8. You and the leaders of all the major participants in the war except the Soviets and the Chinese will be in Bonn May 2–4 for the 1985 Economic Summit. Chancellor Kohl undoubtedly scheduled the Summit on these dates in order to draw a connection to the V–E Day anniversary. We will need to consult closely with our allies to ensure that an appropriate commemoration is arranged.

If well handled, events connected with these anniversaries can serve important American interests. We can use the public attention focussed on the commemorations to stress the unity of democratic nations which emerged from the war, while at the same time stressing our desire for reconciliation among all nations, East and West. However, without a well thought-out, positive and forward-looking approach we could find ourselves at odds with important allies and at a disadvantage vis-a-vis Soviet efforts to use the commemorations for their own purposes. The Soviets have already launched a major program at home and abroad, stressing their role and downplaying the contribution of the US and other Western allies. The Soviets are arguing that the postwar order is unchangeable and are attacking us for trying to alter it.

Policy Implications

Our policy concerning the anniversaries will take account of several basic questions, including:

— How to deal with the Soviet Union. Ideally, these anniversaries could provide an impulse to improved ties with the USSR, but the Soviets must be willing to cooperate. If they concentrate their commemoration on anti-American or anti-German themes, we must reply. There is also likely to be considerable pressure for a US-Soviet summit in connection with these anniversaries. I am considering how best to approach the issue with the Soviets. My January meeting with Gromyko might provide an opportunity to broach this issue.³

— The best means to organize a Western commemoration. The Bonn economic summit is the most likely focus for a Western commemoration. Chancellor Kohl may wish to add a commemorative ceremony to summit activities. We should discuss this aspect in detail with the Germans and other allies. Kohl’s visit this week could provide a chance for a first exchange.⁴

— Whether to add more events to your German trip. We can expect a German request that you visit Berlin again in May. Visiting Berlin would provide an excellent opportunity to stress our view of the meaning of V–E day. If we desire, it could also provide an opportunity for a joint commemoration with the Soviets, but managing the symbolism of such an event—the victorious Allies meeting in the still-divided German capital—would be difficult.

— How best to include Japan. We will of course work with the Japanese on the special V–J day aspects, but we should also seek to include Japan in the “Western” observance. Again, the economic summit provides an excellent vehicle. Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone’s January visit could provide a chance for an initial exchange of views.⁵

— Which themes to stress. The best way to turn the anniversaries into opportunities with our allies and with the USSR is to offer a positive message. A strong and attractive approach would be:

• We and our allies used the defeat of fascism and militarism to build a new world on the basis of democracy, reconciliation, freedom, prosperity and peace, while the Soviets did not;
• We have built further on these achievements at Helsinki and elsewhere to ease the tensions and hardships caused by Soviet rejection of a democratic course.
• While we are not seeking to revise the post-1945 territorial settlement in Europe, our goals remain to overcome the division of Europe and erase the danger of war between East and West. We intend to pursue this approach and invite the Soviets to join us in seeking mutual arrangements permitting reduction of tensions and peaceful change in Europe, to the betterment of all our peoples.

Our message to the Soviets should stress our desire for peace. To our allies, we should underline the important contribution our democratic experience has made in realizing our common goals. We should also underline our common conviction that peace and democracy must go together. Peace cannot be assured if human aspirations are not set free. We should not hide our cooperation with the Soviets during World War II, but we should stress the kind of world we had hoped to build and which we are still striving for. This is the positive lesson to be learned from World War II.

I have directed the Department’s European and East Asian and Pacific Bureaus to take the lead in coordinating our official participation in these World War II commemorations, consistent with the general policy considerations outlined in this memorandum. We intend to commence discussions with major allies, especially the West Germans and the Japanese, as soon as possible. I will provide more detail to Bud McFarlane as our discussions progress and will keep you informed of policy issues as they arise.

1. Source: Reagan Library, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, NSC Records, Subject File, U.S. Foreign Policy; NLR–170–13–47–8–9. Secret. Telegram Tosec 180030/348345 to Shultz, November 24, contains the text of an action memorandum to Shultz from Burt and Wolfowitz, recommending approval of “the general strategy” concerning the World War II commemorations discussed in the action memorandum and signature of Shultz’s memorandum to the President. They noted: “To promote our own goals, we must use the anniversaries to offer a vision of the future to our allies, to the Soviets, and to world public opinion. Our themes should be peace, reconciliation, and—with the Soviets—the ability to work together despite the gulf that separates us. Our approach must recognize the sacrifice of Allied nations in the defeat of Hitler and Japanese militarism while at the same time celebrating the dynamic democratic order which emerged in the West and Japan.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840013–0513)
2. See footnote 12, Document 8.
3. Shultz was scheduled to meet with Gromyko in Geneva to discuss strategic arms, January 7–8, 1985. Documentation on their meeting is in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 355–358.
4. November 29–30. Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VII, Western Europe, 1981–1984.
5. Nakasone was scheduled to make an official working visit to Los Angeles, January 1–2, 1985. Documentation on the President’s January 2 meeting with Nakasone is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXXI, Japan; Korea, 1985–1988. Following their meeting, the President and Nakasone offered remarks to the press. For the text, see Public Papers: Reagan, 1985, Book I, pp. 2–4. Also, on January 2, Shultz paid a courtesy call on Nakasone at the Century Plaza Hotel. In telegram 4340 to Tokyo, January 5, the Department sent a summary of the meeting, indicating that Nakosone “noted that this year marks the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II. He would emphasize the progress Japan has made in developing a true democracy, and in connection with the ceremonies commemorating the 40th anniversary, he would also stress the importance of U.S.-Japanese friendship.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850001–0105)