214. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)1
[Omitted here is information concerning the Secretary’s upcoming meeting with Dobrynin.]
I attended the Secretary’s lunch with Bill Casey today. Much of it was devoted to the Secretary’s outraged statements about the views of some people being against any agreements with communist countries and particularly against any Contadora agreement.2 He said that a position that no Contadora agreement of any kind was in the U.S. national interest was completely untenable. We would not be able to sustain our policy in Central America if that became our policy, because there would be no support in the Congress or in the public for such a position nor would there be support in Central America, even in El Salvador, because people were not willing to put up with another ten years of killing. He also made the point that Jeane Kirkpatrick, who is now arguing against any Contadora agreement, had been the person who had forced us into the Contadora process in the first place, going to the extent of getting Tom Enders fired because, in part, he opposed a [Page 920] regional Contadora approach.3 Bill Casey tried to distance himself from the views that the Secretary was imputing to him, even though he had taken those positions at the beginning of the lunch, but did argue that a Contadora agreement would be a mistake because it would seal the fate of the Contras and would work to our disadvantage over a two to five-year period. It was a heated lunch with the Secretary going so far at one point as to say that if the position of the Reagan Administration in a second term should turn out that we didn’t want to reach any agreements with Communists, he would find it impossible to operate in such a situation because our foreign policy would not be sustainable. He also was very outspoken about how he had been undercut during his trip to Central America by unauthorized backgrounding by Administration officials.4
[Omitted here is information concerning both SDI and Berlin.]
- Source: Department of State, D Files, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Apr. 1984–Oct. 1984. Secret. Dictated on October 26.↩
- Reference is to the ongoing negotiations regarding the conflict in Central America. The foreign ministers of the nine Contadora participating governments met in Panama, September 7–10, 1983, and on September 9 agreed on a “Document of Objectives,” consisting of 21 points, as the basis for continuing negotiations on the conflict. In June 1984, the Contadora Group presented a Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America (Acta de Contadora) for comment by mid July. On September 7, the Contadora Group and five Central American foreign ministers formulated a revised draft Contadora agreement and also issued a joint communiqué at the conclusion of their meeting in Panama City. In telegram 9799 from Panama City, September 9, the Embassy transmitted an informal embassy translation of the joint communiqué. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840572–0267) In telegram 9855 from Panama City, September 11, the Embassy forwarded the Spanish text of the revised Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840576–0066) In late October, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Costa Rica met in Tegucigalpa to discuss the September 7 draft and subsequent modifications; Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica endorsed and forwarded modifications to the Contadora Group and Nicaragua.↩
- Reference is to Ender’s removal as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and his reassignment as Ambassador to Spain in 1983. In his memoir, Shultz wrote: “Clark, I was later informed, had persuaded President Reagan to send John Gavin, the former actor, a fellow Californian and now our ambassador to Mexico, on a trip to Central America. Clark also wanted to fire Enders, saying that the president had lost confidence in him. In reality, Casey, Clark, and hard-line staffers at the NSC wanted no part of a diplomatic effort to accompany the military effort to defeat the Communists in the region. To them, diplomacy was an avenue to ‘accommodation.’” He noted, “I was now associated with this dual-track approach, strength and diplomacy. So was Enders. It was the right approach. The NSC staff effort was to move Enders out of the picture—and move diplomacy out of the picture—by moving Central America policy out of the State Department.” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 304–305)↩
- Shultz met with Duarte and senior Salvadoran officials in San Salvador October 10 before heading the U.S. delegation to Barletta’s inauguration in Panama City, October 10–11. He also met with de la Madrid and senior Mexican officials in Mexico City, October 11–12. En route to Washington on October 12, Shultz stopped in San Juan to meet with Pope John Paul II. For the text of remarks Shultz made during the trip, see Department of State Bulletin, December 1984, pp. 87–90.↩