Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

174. Address by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Chicago, October 31, 1983

Challenges of U.S.-Soviet Relations at the 50-Year Mark

The commemoration today of International House’s five decades appropriately coincides with the eve of another 50th anniversary—that of the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was, of course, in November of 1933 that the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement was concluded, giving us one of our first opportunities to undergo the rigors of the classic Soviet negotiating style.²

In the following years, every American Administration since F.D.R.’s has had to wrestle with the increasingly complex problems posed by this evolving relationship: How does the United States deal with the reality of a country that is both assertive and insecure in its dealings with the rest of the world? How do we build a constructive relationship with a nuclear superpower whose interests and values are so different from ours? How do we sustain a coherent policy in the face of wide swings in American popular opinion from euphoria to hostility? Honest men and women can have different views about these matters, both because the Soviet Union is far more complex than it was 50 years ago and because we still know far too little about it.

It is especially fitting, then, that we have come together at International House to take a fresh look at the issues involved in U.S.-Soviet relations of the 1980s—examining some problems that are familiar after 50 years and others that are quite new.³

As the keynote speaker to a conference entitled “The Search for Solutions,” I should not preempt the rest of the field by providing all of the definitive answers this early in the morning. Do not fear. If this Administration or those that recently preceded it had the final answers, you would not be having this conference. I can, however, aspire to setting the stage for the discussions to follow by reviewing with you those aspects of Soviet policy of the past decade that directly affect American interests. They are the facts of life, if you will, that any U.S. decisionmaker would have to face in considering the future course of Soviet-American relations.

I shall focus on three areas—the growth of Soviet military power, Soviet expansion, and the Soviet quest for absolute security.

Soviet Military Buildup

Let me begin by reviewing the steady increase in Soviet military strength during the past two decades, extending through periods of both tension and detente. I do so because it is the Soviet military establishment that provides the basis for the Soviet Union’s superpower status in the world of the 1980s.

The growth in Soviet resources for military purposes has been persistent and substantial. The burden of defense in the Soviet Union—the share of the gross national product (GNP) devoted to the military—has been about 14% through the past decade. By contrast, defense spending in the United States during this period averaged about 6%. With our planned increases, U.S. defense spending in 1984 will increase to about 7% of our GNP, still only half as much as the Soviet Union allocates to defense. Soviet military spending continues to grow in real terms. Though the growth rate may have slowed somewhat in recent years, the current high level of spending provides for very large annual increments in inventories of military equipment and extensive modernization of forces.

The Soviet military sector continues to have first claim on raw materials, transportation resources, personnel, and capital equipment. More than one-third of all Soviet machinery output now goes to the military and about one-half of all research and development expenditures are for military applications. In human terms, the Soviet military sector takes about one-seventh of total manpower and a substantially higher proportion of the best qualified scientific and technical personnel.

The military sector is truly a separate, fast-track economy with distinct organizations and a different set of rules and modus operandi from the civilian economy. Uniformed military personnel are present at defense plants to ensure schedules are met and to conduct quality control tests. The Soviet defense industries have a much more impressive record in developing new products and bringing them into production than their civilian counterparts. One reason is the close cooperation between producer and consumer, which is absent in the civilian economy. The resulting burdens of this separate military economy weigh heavily on the quality of life for the average citizen.

In view of the pervasive secrecy in the Soviet Union and the formidable intellectual issues involved, debates recur both within and outside the U.S. Government regarding our ruble and dollar estimates of Soviet defense spending. The concrete results of such spending programs, however, are clear. There is nothing hypothetical about the overall size and growth of Soviet military forces.

Over the past decade, for instance, the Soviets have manufactured approximately 2,000 new intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBMs]; by comparison, the United States built approximately 350 during the same time. The Soviets built 54,000 new tanks and armored vehicles; U.S. production was 11,000. The Soviet Union turned out 6,000 tactical combat aircraft; the United States, 3,000. The Soviets launched 61 attack submarines; the United States, 27.

It is not just a question of numbers. There have also been dramatic improvements in the quality of Soviet weapons. Within just the last 2 years we have seen:

• The first tests of two new Soviet land-based ICBMs (a large MIRVed [multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle] missile and a single warhead missile) and the continued improvement of their already deployed force of over 800 SS–17, SS–18, and SS–19 large, MIRVed ICBMs;
• Flight tests of a new strategic heavy bomber, which we call the Blackjack, and of an entirely new generation of Soviet cruise missiles;
• The first units of the 25,000-ton Typhoon-class strategic ballistic missile submarine and two new Kiev-class aircraft carriers to join the two Soviet carriers already in operation;
• Deployment of some 100 new SS–20 intermediate-range missiles carrying three nuclear warheads each, for a total thus far of 360 of these mobile missiles targeted on Europe and Asia;
• In space, an increase in the Soviet Union’s military-related programs, involving manned missions; satellites for reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting; and the world’s only operational antisatellite system.

Our attention is inevitably drawn to the new weapons systems. Yet the steady pursuit of longstanding programs, combined with the Soviet practice of keeping older but capable models in inventory much longer than in the West, has resulted over the years in a tremendous military inventory for the Soviet Union. The results are readily apparent in NATO-Warsaw Pact force comparisons: the East now fields some 42,500 main battle tanks, as compared to 13,000 in the West, and over 31,000 artillery pieces and heavy mortars, compared to less than 11,000 comparable Western weapons.

This inventory has also provided a reservoir for the ready supply of Soviet weaponry at concessional rates to an increasing number of countries. Since 1969 Soviet military aid to the Third World has increased tenfold. As a result, the Soviet Union has become the largest arms exporter to the Third World and the principal supplier of over 34 states, twice as many as a decade ago.

The Soviet military machine is not without flaws. Its highly centralized command structure inhibits initiative and flexibility, and Soviet strategists in the 1980s will have to consider the military implications of the Soviet Union’s long-term economic and demographic problems. The West, moreover, can bring to bear powerful advantages of its own in maintaining a common defense. In recent years, we have done much to redress past inadequacies.

The scope and persistence of the Soviet Union’s efforts to create an instrument of military power beyond plausible defense requirements are troubling. This quest for military superiority has been carried out in the face of mounting domestic economic difficulties. Our concerns over this Soviet preoccupation with the new instruments of power have been heightened by their increasingly disruptive international behavior over the past decade.

Soviet Expansion

The record of increased Soviet activism and influence, particularly in the Third World, is already familiar to you. The diversity of the Soviet Union’s ties with various client states of the Third World defies any simple summary or categorization. In recent years we have seen:

• The Soviet Union’s direct military intervention into Afghanistan;
• Its strengthened economic and military involvement with such regional communist powers as Cuba and Vietnam and its active support for the occupation of Kampuchea;
• Deployment of over 20,000 of Soviet and Eastern-bloc military personnel in more than 30 Third World countries, including Soviet crews for sophisticated air-defense missiles in Syria and Soviet advisers with surface-to-surface missilies in Syria; and
• Its extensive use of surrogate forces—some 40,000 Cuban military personnel are in Angola, Ethiopia, and Central America, not to mention Grenada.

However, Soviet relations with the Third World are not without friction. Soviet arms shipments do nothing to help resolve the serious economic problems of many Third World countries, leading these countries to turn to the West in increasing numbers. At times, the conflicting interests of the Soviet Union and a Third World nation or group have contorted Soviet diplomacy. The PLO’s [Palestine Liberation Organization’s] Arafat has recently discovered this to his misfortune, now that he is opposed by Syria and, as a result, has become a nonperson in Moscow’s eyes. Nor is it a game without risks for the Soviets. Their failures in Egypt and Somalia in the 1970s are well known.

Nonetheless, it is possible for us to identify two broad benefits that the Soviet Union has gained through its Third World relationships. First, these relationships have permitted the Soviet Union to project power into regions not immediately on its borders. Looking at today’s geopolitical map, we can see—for the first time—Soviet military presence in stategically sensitive points throughout the world: Cam Ranh on the South China Sea approaches to the Straits of Malacca; Asmara, Aden, and the Dahlak Islands at the access to the Red Sea and Suez Canal; Luanda in southern Africa; and a variety of installations in Cuba.

Second, these Third World relationships have now enabled the Soviet Union to involve itself in regional politics to a much greater degree than before. The causes of instability in the Third World are predominantly local in origin. But all too often the Soviets have used the opportunities provided by local instability to expand their power. To that end, their policies have frequently hindered efforts to resolve existing tensions. The difficulties—for instance, of securing peace in Lebanon in the face of Soviet encouragement of Syrian obstruction—are obvious and immediate.

Soviet Quest for Absolute Security

At the same time that the Soviets are playing this increasingly active, if unconstructive, role throughout the world, they strive for absolute security for themselves. But steps they take in the name of security have the result of making the entire world, including the Soviet Union, less secure.

If nothing else, the Soviet Union’s destruction of Korean Air Lines (KAL) #007, its subsequent attempts to deny any wrongdoing on its part in this tragedy, and its assertion that it is prepared to act again in a similar manner underscore a Soviet search for absolute security carried beyond all rational limits.⁴ Another manifestation of this search is Soviet insistence on maintaining levels of weaponry greater than those of many other states combined, which we now see in the INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] talks.

In the name of absolute security, the Soviet leadership continues to be unwilling to countenance either meaningful national autonomy for Eastern-bloc countries or free expression and initiative for its own peoples. They insist that states on their border duplicate the Soviet system, and in recent years a general internal crackdown has occurred within the Soviet Union. Jewish, German, and Armenian emigration is at the lowest level since the 1960s, and officially sponsored anti-Semitism is on the rise. The oppression of such prominent dissidents as Sakharov and Shcharanskiy continues unabated. Unfortunately, just in the past month two new trials have been held, resulting in the convictions of:

Iosif Begun, a noted Jewish activist, who was sentenced to 7 years in prison and 5 years in exile; and

Oleg Radzinskiy, a leader in the unofficial Soviet peace movement, who was sentenced to 1 year in prison and 5 years in exile.⁵

In both cases their alleged crime was dissemination of so-called anti-Soviet material.

Soviet infringements of the rights provided under the Helsinki Final Act are representative of the Soviet Union’s persistent violations of both the spirit and the letter of international obligations. In recent years, apparent Soviet contraventions of various agreements have increased with troubling frequency, including evidence of yellow rain and chemical and toxin warfare in Afghanistan and Indochina. Most recently, a series of Soviet activities involving radar construction and ICBM testing has raised serious questions about Soviet compliance with the ABM [antiballistic missile] and strategic offensive arms agreements.⁶ These Soviet efforts to stretch treaties and obligations to their very brink and sometimes beyond have disturbing implications for the future of the arms control process.

Soviet Behavior and U.S. Policies

Occasionally we hear the argument that the patterns of Soviet behavior that I have described are at least in part a response to recent U.S. policies. It is asserted that Soviet actions, however disproportionate in final result, have arisen out of deep-seated fears exacerbated by a perceived U.S. hostility. While this circular action-reaction model of U.S.-Soviet relations has a simplicity and symmetry that may appeal to those so inclined, the evidence available does not support it.

In considering Soviet actions over the past decade—whether in terms of military buildup, expanded Third World involvement, or domestic suppression—I am struck as much by the sense of continuity as of change. Obvious shifts in tempo and tactical emphasis have occurred, but the basic direction of the Soviet Union has remained much the same throughout its dealings with the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and now Reagan Administrations. The Soviets themselves say that their policies have not changed.

The Soviet military buildup started well before the United States began devoting increased attention to defense in the last 3–4 years. The large ICBMs that form the core of the Soviet strategic forces, for instance, have no counterpart in U.S. forces and certainly cannot be considered a response to any U.S. program. Soviet SS–20 deployments in Europe and Asia since the mid-1970s cannot be seen as a counter to U.S. actions, since the United States has no comparable missiles. The number of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe has, in fact, declined during this period. Last week we announced a further reduction of 1,400 nuclear warheads in Europe.

The degree to which particular American legislation and policies have affected Soviet emigration rates in the 1970s can be debated. The sustained crackdown on dissidents over the past years, however, has been based primarily on internal considerations. Soviet activism in various Third World areas appears to be far more opportunistic than defensive in the face of any supposed American provocation.

Similarly, it is hard to make the case that U.S. statements about the advantages of democracy over the Soviet system are themselves responsible for Soviet-American frictions. I recall that on one of his visits to Moscow, French President Giscard d’Estaing proposed to then-Soviet leader Brezhnev that detente in the diplomatic and economic sphere should be accompanied by a relaxation of ideological competition. Giscard was firmly rebuffed with the Soviet rejoinder that ideological coexistence was totally impossible. The Soviet reaction to our efforts to assist and support those who seek to build democracy within the Third World shows that this policy has not changed.

The inference should not be drawn, however, that we cannot influence the Soviets. On the contrary, U.S. policy can be a major factor in shaping Soviet policies. We should be wary, however, of illusions about the possibility of quick or dramatic breakthroughs.

In considering how we might respond to the Soviet actions that I outlined earlier, this Administration concluded that we should strive to create an international environment in which the Soviet Union is faced:

First, with tangible evidence of a renewed determination by the United States and its allies to strengthen both our common defenses and Western political and economic cohesion; and

Second, with drastically reduced opportunities and incentives for adventurism and intimidation.

In pursuing this strategy, we have sought to be prudent and realistic. In such an environment we expect that over time the Soviets will see greater restraint on their part as the most attractive option—not out of any sudden conversion to our values but out of sober calculation of how best to serve Soviet interests.

U.S. policy alone is only one part of such a strategy. The larger issue is how the West as a whole manages its dealings with the East. This is a subject beyond the scope of my talk today. This morning, I would only note one important point. There is some validity to the view that a lack of firmness on the part of the United States and a lack of cohesion within the Western alliance have encouraged the Soviet Union in its lack of restraint. This Administration believes that the converse is also true—that strengthened consultation and cooperation with our allies and friends can serve to discourage unconstructive Soviet actions.

We have worked to forge a cohesive alliance policy toward the Soviet Union at the successful Williamsburg summit and a series of productive meetings in NATO and other international organizations on common trade and security policies. Through this process, we and our allies reached a common position that economic relations with the Soviet Union should be conducted on a strict balance of mutual advantage and should not directly contribute to Soviet military strength. At the same time, the Western governments reaffirmed their support of the 1979 dual-track decision to restore a balance in intermediate-range nuclear missile forces—through negotiations or U.S. deployments. Such alliance approaches are much more likely to obtain positive results than efforts of individual countries acting alone.

Earlier this year, the United States began to step up the pace of our dialogue with the Soviets in a variety of channels—in both Washington and Moscow as well as in Geneva, Vienna, and Madrid. Our contacts included extensive sessions on the part of Secretary Shultz and myself with Ambassador Dobrynin. We pressed a comprehensive agenda—covering arms control, regional issues, human rights, and bilateral questions involving trade and exchanges.⁷ We were expecting no breakthroughs. Rather, we sought to discover where some progress might be made in resolving particular problems with the Soviets.

A number of modest, but nonetheless encouraging, developments occurred. In the summer rounds of the START [strategic arms reduction talks] and MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions] negotiations,⁸ the Soviets showed tentative willingness to contribute to making progress. The Soviet authorities allowed the emigration of the Pentecostalist families that had been living at our Embassy in Moscow for so many years.⁹ After rapid negotiations, a long-term grain agreement was signed.¹⁰ In response to our proposal, a meeting of U.S. and Soviet experts was held in Moscow to discuss upgrading the hotline and other crisis communications improvements.¹¹ We were beginning to discuss the possibility of both a new cultural exchanges agreement and the opening of new consulates in both countries.

I do not want to make too much of these modest steps. Contrary to some press speculation, they did not constitute a sudden warming in the relationship nor were they necessarily a prelude to an early summit. Nonetheless, by late August we were viewing the Secretary’s scheduled meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko at the concluding session of the Madrid CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] meeting as an opportunity to see whether the Soviets were willing to take genuinely constructive steps.

Then, on August 31, Soviet air-defense forces shot down KAL #007 and its 269 civilian passengers just as the Korean airliner was leaving Soviet airspace over Sakhalin. The manner in which the Soviets handled the KAL tragedy throughout and the way these events inevitably set back any hopes for early progress in our relations with the Soviets are well known.

The necessity of a firm American response to these Soviet actions was clearcut. We promptly took a number of steps on our own and in concert with other nations.¹² We pressed for the international condemnation of the Soviet actions. We were active in supporting the aviation boycott of the Soviet Union.¹³ Foreign Minister Gromyko’s performance in Madrid—both before the assembled CSCE participants and in this private meeting with Secretary Shultz—made clear that the Soviet Union was determined to stonewall on this issue and was not interested in finding a way to limit the damage this tragedy would cause to East-West relations.¹⁴

The domestic calls for a harsh and across-the-board reaction on our part were understandably strong and came from both liberal and conservative directions. However, the Administration believed that its basic approach in dealing with the Soviet Union was still valid. We were shocked but not surprised. This use of Soviet force merely confirmed what we had been saying all along about the Soviet Union and reaffirmed the need for realism and strength on our part. Similarly, we concluded that however justifiably strained our relations with the Soviets might become over the KAL shootdown, we should not be the ones to foreclose serious dialogue.

This balance of firm resistance to unacceptable Soviet actions with a readiness to pursue a meaningful dialogue was a central theme of the President’s address before the UN General Assembly on September 26.¹⁵ The President gave substance to that message by announcing a threefold initiative in the INF talks in Geneva. Within a week, he followed with a major new initiative in the START negotiations.¹⁶

I urge you to look closely at what we are proposing in those negotiations. In both cases, we are making a serious effort to address Soviet concerns and achieve equitable and mutually acceptable agreements. In INF, for example, we are moving on an issue—so-called forward-based aircraft—that the Soviets have been raising since the beginning of the SALT I [strategic arms limitation talks] process. Similarly, in START we have now explicitly committed ourselves to tradeoffs between our advantages in bombers and their advantages in missiles.

For their part, the Soviets have not yet responded in any way to reduce tensions. They have sought to maintain a pose of apparent moderation and reason toward the Europeans, while adopting an increasingly shrill tone toward the United States. Indeed, the intemperate language of Mr. Andropov’s statement of September 28 was designed to suggest that the Soviets have given up altogether on dealing with the Reagan Administration.¹⁷ This conclusion is not borne out by daily realities. Our channels to the Soviets are open and working. We continue to talk; they continue to talk. In some instances, it is tough talk. It is not yet clear, however, how the Soviets will proceed from here.

We are now in a period of uncertainty as to the immediate future of U.S.-Soviet relations. The Soviets are facing a major foreign policy setback. Should we not reach agreement this fall in Geneva, U.S. deployments of intermediate-range missiles will go forward—an event the Soviet Union has invested considerable political capital to try to block. The Soviets have rejected all efforts at an equitable solution, and all Soviet proposals, including Andropov’s offer last week, call for a Soviet monopoly of such weapons.¹⁸ Earlier this week, the Soviet Ministry of Defense announced intentions to deploy modern, short-range missiles in both East Germany and Czechoslovakia as a countermeasure to the potential U.S. deployments.¹⁹ It is not yet clear what the scope of so-called countermeasures will be, and we do not yet know the extent to which these measures represent improvements to Soviet forces in Eastern Europe that were planned long before the NATO decision was made on U.S. deployments.

We see no justification for “counters” to U.S. deployments, which are responses to Soviet SS–20 missiles already in place in much larger numbers. We also see no justification for suspending negotiations when U.S. deployments begin; over the 2 years of negotiations thus far, the Soviets have deployed some 100 SS–20 missiles. It remains uncertain how long and how widely they are prepared to chill East-West relations over the missile issue. We believe, as the Soviets have said to us and to others in private, that they do not want a confrontation.

Support for Soviet-East European Studies

These uncertainties and as yet unanswerable questions return me to my beginning point—that despite 50 years of intense preoccupation with our Soviet relationship, we still know and understand far too little about the Soviet Union.

In the Administration, and in the State Department in particular, we are acutely aware of the need to rebuild and to strengthen Soviet and East European studies within the United States. That is a resource we cannot afford to neglect any longer.

For those reasons, the Administration fully supports the goals expressed in the Soviet-East European Research and Training Act of 1983, a bill now before the Congress sponsored by Senator Richard Lugar and Representative Lee Hamilton.²⁰ This legislation would help to provide a stable base for the improvement of our professional Soviet and East European research. The State Department has taken the lead in the Administration’s efforts to obtain a separate annual appropriation to administer the programs envisioned in this bill. This financial and administrative mechanism would give us the means to achieve the objectives which all parties—the Congress, the executive, and the academic community—agree are essential to strengthening our understanding of the Soviet Union.

We still have far to go, both in the development of a more stable and constructive relationship with the Soviet Union and in the development of a better understanding of the Soviet system. I believe we have laid the groundwork for progress in both regards. I welcome your insights in both areas and thank you for inviting me here today.

1. Source: Department of State Bulletin, December 1983, pp. 26–30. All brackets are in the original. Dam spoke before the International House at the University of Chicago. In a note dictated on October 31, Dam recalled: “I was in Chicago this morning to give a speech on U.S.-Soviet affairs before the 50th Anniversary International House Conference at the University of Chicago on the Soviet Union. It was the first Administration speech on U.S.-Soviet relations since the KAL shootdown, and as a result, it was a somewhat difficult speech to craft. But a lot of work was done on it, and I imposed on the process an outline and a set of ideas which the EUR Bureau did a good job of developing into a polished speech with the help of Gary Edson, who is a superb craftsman, and Jim Timbie, who knows an enormous amount about security issues.” (Department of State, D Files, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984)
2. November 16, 1933; see Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, Documents 1–59.
3. In addition to Dam, Bosworth, Brzezinski, former Ambassador to Japan Robert Ingersoll, and former KGB officer Vladimir Sakharov spoke at the conference. (Lucia Mouat, “Experts say Soviets have not gained ‘hearts, minds’ of third world,” Christian Science Monitor, November 2, 1983, p. 6)
4. In a statement made on September 6, Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger said, in part: “Today the Soviet Government at last admitted that its forces shot down KAL #007. Their confession comes only after the truth was known everywhere, that the U.S.S.R., without any justification, shot down an unarmed civilian airliner with 269 people aboard. And their admission was made only after the entire civilized world had condemned the Soviet action. Yet the Soviet Union has still not apologized, nor has it accepted responsibility for this atrocity. On the contrary, the Soviet Government states flatly that it will take the same action in the future in similar circumstances.” (Department of State Bulletin, October 1983, p. 11)
5. Radzinsky was sentenced on October 13 and Begun on October 14. For additional information about the sentencings, see “Moscow Dissident Gets 1-Year Term on Slander,” October 14, 1983, p. A7, and “Case of Soviet Activist Brings U.S. Questions,” October 16, 1983, p. A9; both New York Times.
6. For an example of Soviet non-compliance, see footnote 11, Document 169 and footnote 3, Document 182.
7. See Document 159.
8. June 8–August 2 and May 19–July 21, respectively.
9. See footnote 4, Document 135.
10. See footnote 3, Document 147. Block and Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Nikolai Patolichev signed the 5-year LTA in Moscow on August 25. The LTA raised the annual Soviet purchase from a minimum of 6 million to 9 million metric tons and included a U.S. pledge not to block exports. (Dusko Doder, “U.S. Signs ‘Building Block’ Grain Pact in Moscow,” Washington Post, August 26, 1983, pp. A19, A22)
11. The talks took place in Moscow, August 9–10. In telegram 10051 from Moscow, August 10, the Embassy summarized the first day of talks. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830456–0537) In telegram 10102 from Moscow, August 10, the Embassy reported: “CBMs talks ended with agreement in principle on a follow-up meeting, with contacts through diplomatic channels to arrange the agenda.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830457–0360)
12. The President discussed many of these steps in his September 5 address before the nation; see footnote 8, Document 169.
13. Presumable reference to the International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations recommended 60-day ban on civil airline flights to Moscow. (Department of State Bulletin, October 1983, p. 12)
14. Reference is to Gromyko’s address delivered before the CSCE on September 7 and the meetings between Gromkyo and Shultz, which took place on September 8. Documentation for the latter are printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 104, 105, and 106. Shultz’s statement at the conclusion of his meeting with Gromyko is printed in Department of State Bulletin, October 1983, p. 12. In it, Shultz referenced Gromkyo’s September 7 address, noting that “Gromyko made matters even worse by claiming that his country had the right to do what it did and has the right to do it again.” He asserted that Gromyko’s response to him during their meetings that day proved “even more unsatisfactory” and “unacceptable,” adding: “This is not the end of the matter. In the days and weeks ahead, the United States, along with others throughout the international community, will press hard for justice for the families of those murdered and safety and security for innocent travelers.”
15. See Document 169.
16. In an announcement made on October 4 in the Rose Garden at the White House, the President indicated that he had directed Rowny, at the resumption of the START talks, to offer “new initiatives,” including “a series of build-down proposals” focused on building down ballistic warheads and bombers. Rowny was instructed to propose the establishment of a U.S.-Soviet working group to consider these proposals. Reagan added that the United States “will be willing to explore ways to further limit the size and capability of air-launch cruise missile forces in exchange for reciprocal Soviet flexibility on items of concern to us.” He concluded, “It’s fitting today to repeat what I said last week. The door to an agreement is open. All the world is waiting for the Soviet Union to walk though.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1983, Book II, pp. 1411–1412)
17. In telegram 12430 from Moscow, September 29, the Embassy provided its assessment of the Andropov statement, noting: “Andropov’s September 28 statement is the strongest and most comprehensive attack on the United States by a Soviet leader in years. The substance of most of his allegations (U.S. efforts to attain world dominance; administration ‘slander’ of the Soviet Union; Washington’s having undertaken a ‘crusade’ to rid the world of the USSR) have appeared regularly in Soviet press criticism of the administration over the past three years. Andropov has raised them to the most authoritative level and has catalogued them in unprecedented detail. He has also used his strongest language to date in describing President Reagan personally. Andropov characterizes the President’s UNGA performance as ‘convincing no one’ and accuses him of setting the tone of anti-Soviet rhetoric for the administration. He complains that unidentified leaders of the U.S. have resorted to ‘foul-mouthed abuse mingled with hypocritical sermons on morality and humanity’ in their attacks on the Soviet Union and its people.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830565–0577)
18. In telegram 13569 from Moscow, October 26, the Embassy reported: “The Soviet Union has made its long-awaited INF move. Answering questions from a Pravda correspondent, Yuri Andropov has made a three part offer in the negotiations. He says that the Soviet Union can accept equality in missile warheads with the British and French, which would mean 140 launchers for the USSR. He has offered to freeze Soviet INF missiles in Asia in the event of an agreement, and he has offered to agree on an equal level of NATO and Soviet aircraft different from the level in current Soviet proposals. At the same time, Andropov has flatly ruled out continuation of the INF negotiations after NATO deployments. If the US will postpone or cancel the deployments, he has offered to begin unilateral destruction of some 200 SS–4 missiles.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830624–0859)
19. On October 24, the Soviet Ministry of Defense announced the proposed deployment. (Eric Bourne, “As Soviets plan countermissiles, East Europe is visibly glum,” Christian Science Monitor, October 27, 1983, p. 11) In telegram 13439 from Moscow, October 24, the Embassy transmitted the text of the Ministry of Defense’s statement. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830618–0424)
20. Lugar introduced S. 873 in the Senate on March 21; Hamilton introduced H.R. 601 in the House on January 6.