Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

161. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

GOALS AND PRIORITIES

In your memorandum to Cap and me on June 7,² you asked us to identify the priority objectives in foreign policy on which we should concentrate our energies over the next 18 months, with special emphasis on your activity and involvement. This paper lists these priorities and lays out our strategy for pursuing them.

As your memorandum said, we have achieved a great deal in the first half of this Presidential term. In the second half of the term, however, we will need to start drawing dividends from our efforts. The restoration of our military strength, our firmness with the Soviets, the greater unity of the allies, and the promising initiatives we have launched in many areas are a solid foundation from which we can now move forward. The next six months—before the full Presidential campaign begins—are particularly important.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Our foreign policy priorities through the remainder of this term, it seems to me, are the following:

— We must maintain allied cohesion through the difficult period of INF deployment. This will require intensive Presidential contacts with key allied leaders (including Japan); public diplomacy to neutralize the expected sharp Soviet reaction to our deployment; and efforts to ensure that the Soviets, and not we, are blamed if negotiations fail.

— We should use our new leverage with the Soviets to explore the possibilities of constructive dialogue aiming at visible progress on our own agenda, including arms control. The question of a summit should be considered in terms of whether it is a way to make the Soviets face up to the long-term direction of our relationship and whether it is an effective way to demonstrate to our public and our allies that we are not to blame for any tensions.

— In the Middle East, we continue to seek the removal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, and we should seek over the next 18 months to shape conditions in the area that will make possible an Arab-Israeli negotiation on the basis of your September 1 initiative. Syria is the key country blocking progress on both, and we need to consider what incentives and penalties we can bring to bear on Syria.

— In Central America, your personal leadership will be essential for maintaining public and Congressional support for what must be done. Success will depend on sustaining the highest possible levels of military and economic assistance. At the same time, we should have a diplomatic agenda and strategy in order to maintain political support in the region and at home.

— Restoring America’s position in Asia, a decade after Vietnam, can be one of this Administration’s lasting achievements. Our goal for the near-term future is to integrate Japan even more fully into the management of the free world global system, building on the achievement of Williamsburg. Consolidating our strategic relationship with China will block the Soviets’ recent attempts at Sino-Soviet rapprochement.

— In Southern Africa, we have a chance to get Cuban troops out of Angola, together with an agreement on independence for Namibia. It is essential to maintain the linkage between the two. Everything depends on perception of our staying power.

ANALYSIS

Success or failure in any one of these areas will affect our success or failure in the others. Our success in holding the democracies together obviously will affect our negotiations with the Soviets, and vice versa. Success in the Middle East would affect our Alliance relationships; a setback in Central America would weaken us in all areas. Bearing in mind these interrelationships, let me discuss each of the priority areas in turn.

The Democracies and INF

The electoral victories of Thatcher, Kohl, and Nakasone³ are reflections of a strengthened resolve among our democratic allies, and the Williamsburg Summit showed an impressive unity among free world nations. Nevertheless, we are still basically dealing with an uncertain and dispirited Europe, as reflected in the deep polarization in some societies (particularly West Germany). Therefore, it will be no easy task to help these leaders manage through this critical year. Plans have been announced for very large and possibly violent “peace” demonstrations this fall. This will put unprecedented strain on allied solidarity and on West Germany’s political cohesion. The Soviets will try to lure wavering allies into seeking a “delay” of INF deployments while negotiations continue, threatening new missile deployments and an increase in tensions if NATO deployments go forward.

Our strategy for maintaining allied unity in support of deployment will require, first of all, continual consultation at the highest level, drawing heavily on your close personal relationship with the key leaders. Bilateral and perhaps multilateral meetings with key leaders may well be essential as the December date of deployment approaches (particularly with the heads of government of the three initial basing countries: FRG, UK, and Italy). You will need to stay in constant touch with all of them. Next year’s UK-hosted Economic Summit will undoubtedly be an important occasion for reaffirming allied cohesion and our willingness to negotiate with the Soviets on INF.⁴

The second key component of our strategy will be public diplomacy. A bellicose posture is risky for the Soviets, since it could forfeit much of what they have gained through detente in Europe; we should be prepared to exploit it. As the Soviets prepare to stir up tensions to intimidate the allies, our job is to prepare the allies psychologically so they are not shaken by these pressures, and to ensure that European publics place the blame squarely on the Soviets for whatever tensions arise.

Related to this is the third component: our negotiating strategy toward the Soviets on INF. The allies will want reassurance that we have negotiated in good faith and that the blame for failure rests on the Soviets. This may require, down the road, some agile maneuvering and tactical flexibility, at least in presentation. Whether or not we make any further adjustments in our negotiating position, a major Presidential speech on arms control may be helpful at the appropriate moment.

A possible US-Soviet summit could come after the Soviets have given up hope of delaying the start of INF deployments. That timing would put you in the best position to move the dialogue to your agenda. Any such summit, in any case, should probably also be preceded by your meeting with at least Thatcher, Kohl, Mitterrand, and the Italians in Europe.

A Dialogue with the Soviets

Over the next 18 months, we are sure to come under increasing pressure at home and abroad to do more to improve Soviet-American relations and in particular to hold a summit meeting between you and Andropov.

At a minimum a summit could help demonstrate to our public and our allies that we are pursuing every avenue of possible progress, and that if no progress results, the Soviets are to blame. However, while the shaping of public attitudes is important, our real starting point in assessing a possible summit should be whether it contributes to attaining our policy goals.

Looking to the next year and a half we can distinguish between our minimum objectives in US-Soviet relations and a series of more ambitious but still reasonable goals:

— Regional conflicts: at a minimum, our aim is no new Soviet gain or critical US setback owing to Soviet sponsorship; if possible, a Soviet retreat from a major geopolitical position (e.g., Angola, Nicaragua).

— Arms talks: at a minimum, no uncompensated sacrifice of key Western weapon systems; if possible, a breakthrough agreement on acceptable principles.

— Human rights: at a minimum, sustaining unified Western pressures for improved Soviet performance; if possible, a major dissident release or emigration increase.

Our record to date gives reason for confidence that all the minimum goals are attainable. By the standards of the 70’s this will represent a real achievement. It will require vigilance and effort, especially to sustain public support at critical junctures.

What is less certain is whether meeting our minimum goals is sufficient for sustaining the tougher, more realistic policies this Administration has introduced. I believe that putting the superpower relationship on a more satisfactory footing for the long term may depend in part on whether we can move beyond minimum goals in the short term. If not, our policies may be vulnerable to charges of a poor return on our investment (and allowed to unravel, as happened to even the Nixon-Ford policies under Carter). Particularly if the Soviets react to our INF deployments by increasing tensions, the payoff for our firm approach may be still further questioned.

Protecting our minimum goals over the rest of the decade may depend, in short, on making a serious effort to attain at least some of our more ambitious objectives. For this purpose, the leverage we have developed over the past two years—especially our military strength as leverage in the arms talks, and the public consensus that gives all our policies credibility—will be invaluable. However, it is likely that we will have to give increasing attention, as in any negotiation, to defining acceptable adjustments in the two sides’ positions. And we will have to find ways of bringing these issues to a decision point for the Soviets.

My judgment is that a summit may prove a useful device for focusing Soviet attention on the longer-term direction of our relationship. While it cannot by itself substitute for leverage developed in other ways, it may help us to put this leverage to the test.

The prime worry in connection with a prospective summit is how to ensure public understanding of an event which might well produce only limited results or no results at all. I believe this problem will be manageable, especially as your political position continues to strengthen.

If the Soviets prove utterly inflexible and we end up having to tough out the next 18 months without any improvement in US-Soviet relations, we will not necessarily be any worse off whether or not a summit has taken place. In either case, we will face the real job of showing that the Soviets are to blame. Avoiding a summit will not free us of this task.

The problem of public expectations applies not just to a summit that does not produce results but perhaps even more to one that does. You will have to make a major effort to control expectations generated by whatever agreements we are able to achieve. We will need to make clear—within the government, in public, and to the Soviets—that we are capable of sustaining a competitive posture even if the Soviets try to use agreement in one area as a kind of safety valve. To put Soviet-American relations on this secure footing for the long term may be as challenging as restoring our competitive posture in the first place.

On balance, I believe you would enter a summit in a relatively strong position. Precisely because you will not need the meeting to attain your minimum goals, you should be able to shift the negotiating burden to the Soviets. But even if a summit does not produce major progress, as is quite possible, it could have some tangible benefits. The preparations are likely to have a constraining effect on Soviet conduct, and the follow-up to a summit could be quite productive if it became clear to the Soviets that the fact of holding it had strengthened your hand.

Making a decision in principle, of course, would still leave many issues unresolved—timing, preparations, content, and (perhaps crucially) how to protect against the possibility of failure. My tentative view is that a meeting relatively early next year might be desirable, especially to help keep the INF confrontation within bounds. If Andropov comes to the UN General Assembly in the fall, we will face a different set of considerations, which must be carefully examined. These questions will require thorough consideration over the rest of this summer, so that we can have in place by the fall a plan that can be well insulated against the coming Presidential campaign season. I will be sending you further analyses of these questions in the next several weeks.

Middle East

In the Middle East over the next 18 months, we have two specific objectives: getting Syria to withdraw from Lebanon, and creating conditions that will eventually make it possible to start an Arab-Israeli negotiation in accordance with your September 1 initiative. Our broader objectives are to maintain American dominance of Middle East diplomacy and reduce the Soviet role in the area by demonstrating to the Arabs that if they want progress they must come to us.

To achieve these objectives, it will be essential to maintain a relationship with Israel that is no less solid than now. As we see currently in Lebanon, the perception of Israeli weakness is only an encouragement to Arab radicals. In many parts of the world there are opportunities for useful US-Israeli geopolitical cooperation. At this point it is the Arabs, not the Israelis, who bear the onus for blocking our diplomacy on both Lebanon and the peace process. For all these reasons, any policy shift that required us to bring massive pressure on Israel would be futile and counterproductive.

In Lebanon, our strategy is to support and strengthen Gemayel’s government and the Lebanese Armed Forces; to mobilize moderate Arab pressures on Syria; to open our own dialogue with Syria; and to stay in close consultation with Israel to ensure that Israeli moves, such as a partial unilateral withdrawal, are coordinated with us and are part of an agreed strategy. It will also be essential to demonstrate to the Syrians and Soviets the risks of non-withdrawal. We have few positive incentives to offer Syria; we should explore whatever pressure points on Syria are available.

Lebanon could at any time produce a crisis, for which we should be prepared. If a crisis erupts from a Syrian-Israeli clash, our strategy will have to be to prevent Soviet involvement and ensure an outcome that deflates the present self-confidence and blocking influence of the Syrians.

Your meetings with Gemayel and Begin in July will be key occasions for concerting strategy.⁵ Continuing Presidential exchanges with all leaders of the area, particularly Fahd, will be essential. White House involvement will also be crucial in Congressional consultations on aid for Lebanon and on the role of the MNF.

On the peace process, there is no possibility of King Hussein’s stepping forward in the near future. The present Syrian self-confidence and perceived Israeli weakness in Lebanon are undercutting the peace process, since the result is to embolden radicals and cow the Arab moderates. West Bankers have increasing reason to be disillusioned with the PLO, which blocked a West Bank negotiation and which is now dominated by Syria. Nevertheless, something will probably have to happen to deflate or wear down the Syrians before any moderates will step forward (either Hussein or the West Bankers or both together).

Our strategy in the next 18 months should be to keep the September 1 initiative alive while we try to shape the conditions in the area so that progress will be possible at some future point. If you chose to address the UN General Assembly in the fall, it would be a natural forum for reiterating your commitment.⁶ A future trip by me to the area would carry the same message. A success in Lebanon should be parlayed into a renewed push on the peace process, which could well involve a Presidential statement.

In the meantime we might consider an initiative with the Israelis to modify their occupation policies in the West Bank and Gaza to improve civil liberties and economic opportunities for the Palestinians. This will have to be sought through quiet diplomacy with the Israelis, mainly Moshe Arens. In the longer run, success here could have a political payoff: It could enhance US credibility with moderate Arabs, and it could help nurture a creditable indigenous leadership in the West Bank and Gaza which may be willing to participate with King Hussein in a negotiation in accordance with the September 1 initiative.

The present demoralization of the Begin government suggests that major political changes may occur in Israel in the next 18 months. This too could create new prospects for the peace process.

In the meantime, we should deliberately frustrate all diplomatic efforts contrary to ours—whether by the UN, the Europeans, the Soviets, or any other trying to be “helpful”—in order to prove that anyone who wants progress has to come to us. Especially if our own diplomacy seems stalemated, it is in our interest to stick to our present course of demonstrating over and over again that the Soviets can deliver nothing.

Central America

Central America is our point of greatest vulnerability over the next 18 months. Our response to the Communist threat in Central America must cover two fronts: developments within the region, which promise to be difficult but probably not decisive; and reactions here at home, which can undermine our effectiveness, particularly if our tenuous bipartisan support breaks down.

The four elements of your speech to the Joint Session of Congress (democratization, economic development, an active regional diplomacy, and security assistance) are sound.⁷ We have made substantial progress over the last two years, with elections and military training in El Salvador and growing pressure on the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. But this has not yet turned the tide. The Communists and their allies still think they can outlast us. I believe our policy will work over the next two to four years if we stick to it and bolster the various components (e.g., economic and military assistance) as the situation evolves. The alternatives—either more direct US military involvement or a pulling back from our involvement—will be either not feasible or directly contrary to our national interest. The problem is that the lack of faster progress will increase pressures here at home for a policy shift.

Your personal involvement will therefore be critical in providing continuing leadership with the American public and the Congress. Your Joint Session speech had a major impact and helped convey the seriousness of the threat. Success will require that we be able to provide military assistance on a more certain basis than in the past. At the same time, we must still be seen as working seriously for a political solution consistent with our democratic values and with the interests of other countries in the region. This means continuing to give prominence to our own diplomatic activities, including the Stone mission and support for regional peacekeeping. This will be especially necessary if the Cubans and Soviets raise the ante militarily, forcing us to help our neighbors to further strengthen their defenses.

Two symbolic steps are available to hold the political high ground and strengthen bipartisan support. You could take advantage of CBI passage to hold a major ceremony including both government and private sector representatives from Central America and the Caribbean (perhaps outside the United States—in Kingston or Santo Domingo). You could also take advantage of the passage of legislation connected with your Democracy Program to reemphasize your commitment to democratic values in the hemisphere.⁸

To lessen the exclusive focus on controversial Central America, this could be supplemented by your greater personal involvement on issues affecting South America and Mexico. For example, a major disaster relief package to help deal with the devastation wrought on the West Coast of South America by “El Nino”⁹ could be publicized as help to “democracies in trouble” and make more credible our defense of democracy in Central America. Your August meeting with the Mexican President will also be important in this regard.¹⁰

Asia

A decade after Vietnam, we are in the process of reestablishing America’s position in Asia. This may well be one of your Administration’s major lasting achievements.

The economies of free Asia—particularly Japan, Korea and ASEAN—will be growing rapidly in the coming decade and playing an even greater role in the global economic system. The political importance of the region—as a counterweight to the Soviets, as a moderating influence in the Third World—will also grow. These important and reliable friends will merit Presidential attention.

The Japanese-American partnership has never been stronger. Your personal relationship with Nakasone is a key element of this. Our closer collaboration in the political and security fields is all the more remarkable against the background of our recent economic disputes, and in fact will provide the framework and impetus for resolving these economic disputes satisfactorily. We have the near-term objective of integrating Japan more fully into the management of the free world global system. This means building on the success of Williamsburg, at which Japan joined in the security declaration.¹¹ The importance of Japan’s role in the INF issue is now clear: It gives us important support and leverage against the Soviets and strengthens our hand with our European allies.

Consolidating our strategic relationship with China is also an important near-term priority. We have certainly gone as far as we can go with Beijing over Taiwan, but China’s global and regional importance is such that it is advantageous to maintain the relationship on an even keel. Rightly or wrongly, most Americans see the China opening since 1971 as an improvement in the US strategic position. Chinese rhetoric and behavior over bilateral questions are often unhelpful, but Chinese policy on most international issues is anti-Soviet and therefore parallel to ours—which is the real basis for our relationship.

The decisions you have already made to ease technology transfer should help consolidate these ties, provided that implementation produces some concrete improvements for the Chinese.¹² A visit to this country by Premier Zhao Ziyang in the next 18 months would be seen as a coup: It would demonstrate your effective management of China policy and would demonstrate also that the Soviets have not succeeded in weakening the US-China strategic relationship. It would also make it appropriate for you to visit China if and when you choose.

Southern Africa

Another priority objective for the next 18 months is Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola, in connection with an agreement on independence for Namibia. Besides being a success for our Soviet policy, this major achievement would strengthen the African and domestic flanks of our policy of constructive engagement with South Africa. It would thereby facilitate progress toward two other goals: encouraging South Africa as it makes gradual but practical changes in its apartheid policy, and encouraging dialogue and mutual restraint between South Africa and its neighbors.

A Presidential speech to the UN General Assembly would be an occasion to reiterate our objectives, but other forms of direct involvement by you are also likely to be required at the later stages of the process.

Our present strategy of linking Angola and Namibia is the right way to pursue our interests even if it does not produce immediate results. Everything depends on perception of our staying power; pressures will accelerate on whichever side seems most likely to yield. If we appear locked in concrete on this linkage—and as your reelection seems more and more likely—significant movement in our direction could occur in 1984.

If the Angolans continue to be interested in a dialogue with us but are unable to summon the political will to send the Cubans home, our response will depend on what we see as the main reason for their hesitation. If the reason is Cuban or Soviet pressures, we must maintain our counterpressures. If the reason is continued fear of the threat from Savimbi and UNITA, we should work closely with Savimbi to explore how this can be exploited through a UNITA–MPLA negotiation. Depending on how close we felt the Angolans were to a decision, we might consider a high-level mission (by me or Ken Dam) to the Front Line States, including a stop in Luanda. This would provide both an opportunity for high-pressure US diplomacy and a token of the relationship with us that would be possible if Angola shifted away from reliance on the USSR and Cuba.

If the obstacle turns out to be South African reluctance to accept an Angolan proposal we think is reasonable, we could dangle the prospect of [a] P.W. Botha visit to Washington. Given the political sensitivities here, a visit would probably be best in the context of final agreement on a Namibia solution coupled with US encouragement of further internal reforms. Your role will be crucial in building support at home for a Namibia settlement.

If no breakthrough seems possible on Angola/Namibia in the next 18 months, our task would become one of perseverance and damage-limitation. We would seek to preserve the framework of regional negotiations and shore up allied unity in the Contact Group. But we would shift our ground somewhat, from an emphasis on regional negotiations to a vigorous bilateral diplomacy aimed at holding down the level of violence in the region. This would obviously require maintaining our influence with South Africa, while encouraging it to negotiate with its neighbors: The trade-off would be black African restrictions on ANC guerrilla activities against South Africa in exchange for South African military restraint. Maintaining our relations with black Africa would probably require that we remain willing to speak out against internal South African transgressions not related to security.

Other Issues

In addition to the above high-priority objectives, there is another issue which may be of basic importance over the next 18 months.

This is the Third World debt problem, which still has the potential to produce a financial crisis in the next year or two. Our major objective here is to avoid a default by any of the large LDC debtors. This requires working patiently with Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina in particular and extending new financing as necessary over the next 18 months until global recovery begins to pull them out of danger. This will be a delicate operation, particularly in Argentina and Brazil where internal political pressures might produce leaders willing to defy us and declare default. On our side, we face two significant dangers: first, the impact on our banks (which the Federal Reserve could move quickly to counter); and second, the risk that the costs of default for these large-market countries would, after a painful transition, prove bearable, thus tempting emulation by many other countries. (If a smaller-market country is the first to default, the penalties could be made unbearably heavy and prolonged—virtually paralyzing their trade—to set an example.) Unless our own recovery stalls or we lose the IMF bill in the Congress,¹³ we should be able to balance these delicate requirements. Your personal involvement may be needed in the final Congressional push on the IMF bill.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Files, Memoranda and Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and Other Seventh Floor Principals: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons 6/16–30/83. Secret; Sensitive. Shultz sent the paper to Reagan under cover of an undated memorandum. (Ibid.) Hill sent Clark both the paper and Shultz’s covering memorandum to Reagan under a June 23 memorandum, indicating that the Department had treated the paper as “particularly sensitive” and had not distributed it internally. (Ibid.) Two drafts of the paper, which Bosworth sent to Shultz under covering memoranda dated June 17 and June 21, are ibid. Under a June 21 covering memorandum, Hill forwarded Bosworth’s June 21 memorandum and draft paper to Shultz and wrote on the covering memorandum: “OK—but the basic memo still does not recognize the existence of Asia—I think Asia (Japan, China, etc) should somehow rank an up front type of treatment.” (Ibid.)
2. Printed as Document 155.
3. Thatcher won reelection as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on June 9. Kohl was elected Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany on October 1, 1982. Nakasone was elected Prime Minister of Japan on November 28, 1982.
4. Scheduled to take place in London, June 7–9, 1984.
5. The President was scheduled to meet with Gemayel on July 22. The memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XVIII, Part 2, Lebanon, September 1982–March 1984. Begin did not travel to Washington in July.
6. For the President’s September 26 address before the UN General Assembly, see Document 169.
7. Printed as Document 152.
8. Reference is to “Project Democracy,” which the President had announced in his June 8, 1982, address before the British Parliament (see Document 104). Shultz outlined the contours of the program before members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 23, 1983. (Bernard Gwertzman, “Skeptics Pelt Shultz With Queries On Reagan’s ‘Project Democracy’,” New York Times, p. A6, and Don Oberdorfer, “Lawmakers Voice Skepticism On U.S. ‘Project Democracy’,” Washington Post, pp. A1, A26; both February 24, 1983) Both House (H.R. 2915) and Senate (S. 1342) versions of bills containing the Department of State authorization for FY 1984 and 1985 to finance the program through four private foundations run by the Democratic and Republican Parties, the AFL–CIO, and the Chamber of Commerce passed. (Congress and the Nation, vol. VI, 1981–1984, pp. 167–168) The Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (H.R. 2915; P.L. 98–164; 97 Stat. 1017), which the President signed into law on November 22, earmarked funds appropriated to USIA for FY 1984 and 1985 for the National Endowment for Democracy. Additional documentation on Project Democracy is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXXIX, Public Diplomacy.
9. Reference is to the 1982–1983 El Nino warm weather current, which arrived on the west coast of South America in December 1982.
10. The President met with de la Madrid in La Paz on August 14. In telegram 245003 to Mexico City, August 27, the Department transmitted a copy of the memorandum of conversation. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830498–0944; D830495–0045)
11. Reference is to the joint statement on security issues, issued by the heads of state attending the G–7 Economic Summit meeting in Williamsburg in May (see footnote 3, Document 159). Shultz read the text of the statement on May 29. The text is printed in Department of State Bulletin, July 1983, pp. 4–5.
12. During his trip to China in June 1981, Haig announced that the United States would relax controls on high technology and weapons sales to China. During his June 16 news conference, the President explained that “all we have done is—with the People’s Republic of China, we’ve wanted—and I’ve said for a long time—to improve relations with them, move them to the same status of many other countries and not necessarily military allies of ours, in making certain technology and defensive weapons available to them.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1981, Book I, p. 524) During his May 1983 trip to China, Baldrige indicated that the United States would raise the level of technology transfers as a result of Presidential directives to be implemented over the next several weeks. (Jonathan Broder, “New rules mean more high-tech data for China: Baldrige,” Chicago Tribune, pp. E9, E12, and Amanda Bennett, “Baldrige Tells China That U.S. Will Ease Restraints on High-Technology Exports, Wall Street Journal, p. 34; both May 26, 1983)
13. Reference is to pending legislation that would increase the U.S. contribution to the International Monetary Fund. The Senate version of the bill (S. 695) was reported by the Foreign Relations Committee on March 24 and the Banking Committee on May 16. The full Senate approved the bill on June 8. The House Banking Committee reported its version (H.R. 2957), which included reauthorization of the Export-Import Bank and additional funding for the multilateral development banks, on May 16. The full House would approve the bill on August 3. However, the legislation remained stalled for 3 months due to a variety of issues, including House Banking Chair Fernand St. Germain’s (D–Rhode Island) decision to hold up conference until Congress had passed a housing authorization. Eventually, the housing authorization and the IMF increase were combined and attached to the supplemental appropriations bill for FY 1984 (H.R. 3959), which the Senate and House approved on November 17 and 18, respectively. The President signed P.L. 98–181 (97 Stat. 1153) into law on November 30. The IMF component of the legislation increased the U.S. quota in the IMF by $5.8 billion and authorized a $2.6 billion increase in the U.S. contribution to the General Arrangements to Borrow. (Congress and the Nation, vol. VI, 1981–1984, pp. 104–105)