78. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Europe, United States Information Agency (Lewinsohn) to the Deputy Director (Bray)1

SUBJECT

  • A Further Word—But Perhaps Not the Last Word

Yesterday afternoon you focussed on my comment about the political fluidity in Europe and questioned how the USIS presence could affect it. Our presence and activities probably cannot affect it materially. This instability is one of the more important elements of the environment in which we operate. The reason I stressed this point was to illustrate that even in this economically and socially advantaged region there is no guarantee of stability or even constancy of purpose. Therefore, one major USIS role is to constantly reinforce the U.S. interest and relationship to Europe.2 No matter what political developments ensue, a firm foundation for the U.S. connection is vital to our interests. The U.S. (and USIS) presence and activities with elites help to focus and confirm the broad political and strategic framework within which political events develop.

Concerning your other question, I’ve attached a spellout of the highlights of what USIS Europe would lose at 95% of current resources in this road of the ZBB exercise.3

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 130, 7702800–7702809. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Reinhardt and Schneidman. Bray placed a checkmark on the memorandum, indicating that he had seen it; Liu also initialed the memorandum. A stamped notation on the reverse side of the first page of the memorandum indicates that it was received on July 19 at 4:42 p.m.
  2. On another copy of the memorandum, Reinhardt underlined “constantly reinforce the U.S. interest and relationship to Europe” and placed a question mark in the left-hand margin next to this sentence. (Ibid.)
  3. Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled “Europe at 95% of Current Resources.” On another copy of the memorandum, Reinhardt underlined “would lose at” and drew a line from it to the bottom margin, where he wrote: “not intolerable losses; it seems to me, even if these were the exact ones, as they aren’t. JER.” (Ibid.)