Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXX, Public Diplomacy

73. Memorandum From the Advisor (National Security), Planning and Program Advisory Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Hanson) to the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans (Schneidman)¹

Washington, June 27, 1977

REFERENCE

• Notes on “The New IOP”

1. Relations with the NSC:

We’ve gotten off to a good start. I agree with the principle of showing them what we can do for them, then gradually ask for things from them, when a propitious time develops.

I propose two things:

A. More structured NSC briefings: These have been excellent as an indication of NSC goodwill and as (sometimes) providing useful news policy guidance on stories relating to the White House.² But what one expects from the NSC is a sampling of policy thinking, an indication of future trends, a source for answers to the really hard questions.

I therefore suggest that, when the current cycle of get-acquainted briefing ends, we propose to the NSC that we shift to a system in which USIS gets briefings at our request (not too often, of course) and that we prepare for them in advance. The appropriate IOP/P specialist (Hill for economics, e.g.) would analyze what we really need to know that we can’t get from State, write a list of questions, then assemble the media-area group that will go to the NSC, pre-brief them, distribute the list of proposed questions and ask for comments or changes.³ Then when the group finally troops off to the White House, we will be ready to make the most of the time of our very top experts. This will avoid the somewhat unproductive use of time at some of the recent NSC briefings. This leads to a related subject. . .

B. USIA receipt of info copies of PRMs and PDs

Unless and until USIA actually again gets the right to take part in PRMs (NSC studies or Program Review Memoranda) there is no need to set up a special NSC staff such as existed from 1969–71 under Dick Monsen and me, when our workload of NSSMs from Kissinger’s NSC was heavy.

But there is a more basic need for IOP to have the PRMs and PDs (Presidential Directives)—the latter are the final decisions made by the President after the PRMs have been discussed in the NSC itself. This basic need is not for participation, but for information—to keep up with the new policy thinking. There is no way to do this that is half as efficient as reading the PRMs and PDs. Actually, in the case of the PDs, it is really important that we have them, at least all but the most sensitive, because we might violate policy through sheer ignorance of what the President has decided.

The PRMs and PDs would be an invaluable aid in our thinking and planning ahead. It is particularly important in the complex fields—such as national security, economics, and science—because these take the longest to think through and come up with accurate formulations which are as clear and simple and non-technical as possible. The regional PRMs are also important.

We are really in left field as far as PRMs are concerned. Out of some 25 which have been prepared, USIA has received exactly two—on Latin America and on human rights.⁴ I can testify that we need them badly. For example, my job of preparing to guide our program on nuclear non-proliferation would be much easier if I had access to the PRMs in this field.

If the NSC is nervous about leaks (as they may well be after the leak of PRM 24⁵) we might accept the privilege of reading the PRMs on NSC or State turf. This would be second best but, I think, better than nothing. Or we might borrow and return them to NSC.⁶

I suggest that we ask for all the PRMs, strictly for information, both functional (security, economics) and regional. IOP should be the focal point, and we should see that areas got a chance to look at them. We might consider excluding some of the most sensitive subjects which we don’t really need, such as SALT.

A major use of the PRMs would be to better prepare for our contacts with NSC staff, as discussed under #1 above.⁷

If necessary, we could mention in low key to the NSC that never in USIA’s history has the Agency been so uninformed on policy study documents as now.

2. “Help” function

The big functional gap in IOP is that no one is charged with generalist intellectual leadership of the slow media. IOP/G does this for fast media, but slow media do have a peculiar need for an intellectual nerve center, a spark or catalyst of ideas, and not only in certain selected subject areas. So I propose the creation of a “generalist catalyst” staff within IOP. This should have enough people in it so that there would be at least one for each medium, preferably with some experience in that medium. The essential qualification would be a lively, wide-ranging mind exploring a variety of subjects and ideas. Beecham has a point: somebody should read their magazines. Not only that, but have discussions in the early planning stage, to explore this or that possibility.

These bull sessions should often—perhaps always—include representatives from one or more areas as appropriate.

All this comprises a separate function, “help”, which is conceptually different from “planning, guidance, and evaluation”, the IOP functions as listed by John Reinhardt. It would not only do a lot of good, it would also help IOP’s image with the media. I know whereof I speak: I am a graduate of IPS.

3. Content emphases

The country plan system and IOP’s role in it seems pretty good to me as is. But it seems to me we need more flexibility in themes and content emphases.

The way we do this now is through the precepts and area program memoranda. It seems to me that setting these up for a whole year at a time is too rigid. Perhaps we should consider cutting the period to six months, or maybe a better way would be to set them for a year but with the understanding that one or more could be changed during the year as the need arises.

Perhaps precepts are outdated and should be replaced by campaigns, much more specific and structured than the general language of policy themes. Finally, maybe the way to do it is to have one or two basic themes and one or two campaigns each year.

This leads me to. . .

4. Media coordination

Another obvious and long-standing hole in the USIA structure is operational coordination of the media. Some abortive attempts were made very early in the Agency’s history, but none recently. I do not have any strong feelings about whether this is sited in IOP or elsewhere, but it has been a crying need for many years. Frank Shakespeare carried media autonomy to a harmful extreme. It’s time to finally get ourselves organized.

5. IOR

IOR is slow, over-bureacratic, and deficient in good analysis. It should be oriented again, as it once was, to policy and regional questions. Some good regional experts should be hired—maybe some of the same ones who were fired or left when Fredman radically reorganized IOR early in the Marks era.⁸ It is hard to get good analysis quickly, but that is what a communications agency needs.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 306, Associate Directorate for Programs, Subject Files of Basic Operating Documents, 1969–1982, Entry P–100, Basic Documents—1977 [A]. No classification marking. Sent through Dizard, who did not initial the memorandum. Hanson did not also initial the memorandum. An unknown hand wrote “Mr. [Alan] Carter” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.
2. See Document 56.
3. Reference is to Senior Economic Adviser Robert B. Hill. In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, an unknown hand wrote: “good theory.”
4. References are to PRM/NSC–17, “Review of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America,” January 26, 1977, and PRM/NSC–28, “Human Rights,” May 20, 1977. PRM/NSC–17 is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXIV, South America; Latin American Region. PRM/NSC–28 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 46.
5. Reference is to PRM/NSC–24, “The People’s Republic of China,” printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China, Document 24.
6. An unknown hand underlined “borrow and return” and wrote in the margin below it “and promise not to use our Xerox machine?”
7. An unknown hand drew a rightward pointing arrow from “better” to “prepare.”
8. Reference is to Marks’s tenure as Director of USIA during the Johnson administration.