Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXX, Public Diplomacy

42. Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 27, 1977

SUBJECT

• A PRM on Information Programs?

Rick Inderfurth has asked me to provide you with some pros and cons on a PRM on information programs directed abroad.

The basic argument for a PRM is that since the U.S. Government has many programs, it would be useful to assess how effective they are and how they complement each other, if they do.

Another argument for a PRM is to assess trends and requirements and see what we need to be prepared for in the future. This impinges upon PRM–10.²

Another useful aspect of such an exercise would be to add up what responsible people think ought to be done and then see how much of it is actually being done and how well.

Finally, there is the question of method of implementation: are our methods and instruments effective? Are we spending our money in the most productive way? Are we taking account of likely future developments in technology? Are we encouraging research on impact of our programs and feeding the results back into our programs and plans?

Conclusion: A good case can be made for a PRM.

On the other hand, there are arguments against one. We have a great many PRMs under way now on broad issues. From the point of view of our own workload, it may be too soon to add another major exercise to the list.

The various agencies who would be involved have not yet staffed or reorganized themselves fully—USIA, State/CU, BIB. We should give them more time.

There are no pressing problems in this area that require urgent solution.

The government is responsible for only a small part of the impact which the United States makes on foreign audiences: the role of the press, radio and TV networks, the American book and magazine publishing industry and the enormous and varied information and public relations efforts, educational exchange programs and person-to-person arrangements sponsored by industry, foundations and universities are more important than governmental efforts.

Only certain aspects of the issue are amenable to PRM treatment.

Conclusion: A PRM could become an unwieldy, sprawling undertaking that might not be very helpful to anyone and would take up time and effort that operating agencies could more usefully be expending in other ways.

There are certain philosophical issues: To what extent should or can the U.S. Government attempt to coordinate and guide private effort? How comprehensive should U.S. Government programs aim to be? What is most important—mass impact or influencing of selected audiences? Is a worldwide information policy feasible or desirable? How important is it to have a consciously orchestrated U.S. Government information effort abroad when the day-by-day, routine impact of everything we do and say on much of the world is already so enormous?

RECOMMENDATION

If, in the near future, priority issues in this field emerge, I recommend we issue a PRM confined to a separate issue. I suggest we defer a general PRM until the end of summer, at the earliest, and then design one very carefully in light of NSC Staff experience with other broad PRMs currently in progress. Meanwhile, I suggest we take measures soon to ensure that U.S. Government positions and tactics for the forthcoming Belgrade meeting³ and subsequent events are carefully worked out. We can expect a vigorous, polemic, aggressively defensive approach by the Soviets to Belgrade. More important, however, than elaborate policy papers, is selection of a good delegation that can stand on its own feet in Belgrade and meet Soviet initiatives with flexibility and imagination. The basic elements of the situation are all in our favor but we have to assert ourselves to take advantage of them.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 1, Chron File: 4–5/77. No classification marking. Sent for information. A notation in an unknown hand indicates that a copy was sent to Huntington. The Carter administration ultimately did not issue a Presidential Review Memorandum on information programs.
2. PRM/NSC–10, “Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military Force Posture Review, issued on February 18, 1977, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IV, National Security Policy.
3. See footnote 4, Document 25.