Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXX, Public Diplomacy

196. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, December 12, 1979

SUBJECT

• Strengthening People-to-People Ties in the Caribbean and Central America

To help develop a program to strengthen private voluntary organization (PVO) activities in the Caribbean and Central America following the President’s December 7 meeting,² we offer the following comments and recommendations on objectives, issues needing resolution and specific courses of action.

I. U.S. Interests and Objectives

Widespread political instability, caused by rapid economic and social change exacerbated by Cuban activism, make the Caribbean and Central America of particular concern to the United States. Our basic policy response is to help overcome the extensive socio-economic problems which are the root causes of political vulnerability and to strengthen democratic and pluralistic elements and institutions where possible.

Private people-to-people activities, and the unofficial and extra-governmental relationships they create, already contribute importantly to U.S. interests throughout the area. They can contribute even more through improved coordination, focus and heightened visibility.

Our objectives therefore are to stimulate and encourage PVOs to:

—complement national development efforts, and

—improve mutual understanding through increased people-to-people contacts.

II. Issues

How can these objectives best be achieved? The President’s December 7 meeting brought into clearer focus several important issues. Most of them should be reviewed at the next meeting with PVO representatives.

We are also asking our Embassies to provide suggestions (without going to host government officials) for increasing the acceptability and effectiveness of our proposals.

1. U.S. Government Role

Our role should be to help awaken PVOs to the challenges, and to facilitate their work without undermining their private character.

Official actions must be carefully managed to avoid raising either nationalist hackles in the region, or appearing to seek undue influence over the PVOs themselves. This issue, in turn, raises a number of operational questions:

—should there be a Presidential letter to Chiefs of State along the lines we recommended earlier (S/S #7902557 Tab 2)?³

—should there be a White House announcement?

—should a USG aircraft ferry PVO leaders around the Caribbean and Central America?

—aside from such initial facilitating assistance, should there be some form of USG funding for this effort (and, if so, under which agency)?

—how should we handle liaison with voluntary groups; to what extent should we attempt to influence their policies?

Recommendations:

A. That we explicitly seek an authoritative sounding of opinion on this issue at the next senior level meeting with PVO leaders.

B. That, unless PVO or Embassy soundings are negative, we provide initial encouragement to get the project off the ground (possibly including a Presidential letter and/or announcement, or even a government aircraft) but make clear to everyone concerned that subsequent activities will be purely private in nature, designed to assist in achieving shared host country objectives.

C. That we not provide funding to U.S. agencies or private organizations for this specific purpose. (Some individual PVO projects may, as now, qualify for U.S. support later.)

2. Structure.

It is important to avoid the creation of new bureaucracies or layering. We believe the most effective structure would be

—An umbrella group or “steering committee” made up of no more than 20 PVO leaders, to serve as a private coordinating body for the overall effort. A few selected USG officials might be ex-officio members.

—Sub-groups, organized by country, to identify particular needs and stimulate efforts to meet them. These U.S. PVO sub-groups might ultimately have local counterparts—but their chief function would be to multiply the effects and impact of the steering group by including knowledgeable individuals active in particular countries.

Depending on how the question of initial field consultations is resolved (issue 6 below), steering group members might focus on consultations with prospective “donors,” and subgroup members on those with “recipients.”

Recommendation: That this proposed structure be fully reviewed at the next meeting with PVO representatives, and that formal decisions be delayed until the consultation process has been completed.

3. Geographic Scope and Third Country Involvement.

Countries in both Central America and the Caribbean should be included.

It would also be desirable to explore increased PVO-to-PVO contacts from other major democratic countries of the Caribbean littoral—Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia—as “donors.” These nations are active in the area, share similar objectives with us and could contribute a multilateral dimension and closer regional identification with the program, minimizing the stigma of U.S. paternalism. We might also consider inclusion of Canada, which has strong traditional ties with the English-speaking Caribbean.

Costa Rica, the Central American country with the strongest democratic and local PVO tradition, could play a pivotal duel [dual] role as both “donor” and “recipient.”

We do not know which countries might be receptive, but presume Venezuela will be positive, that Colombia and Canada will be ambivalent while Mexico may be reluctant.

Recommendation: This approach should be discussed with PVO leaders. We are also seeking the views of our embassies.

4. Program Emphasis.

Attempting to target this new effort toward specific U.S. objectives raises several difficult questions:

—should priority attention be given to economic development, or to participatory people-to-people activities, or both?

—would specific policy objectives increase the risk of foreign criticism of U.S. paternalism or intervention so as to jeopardize program objectives?

—what range of activities would be easiest to stimulate and coordinate?

We anticipate that a broad, inclusive mandate would allow the greatest latitude for achieving our objectives.

Recommendation: We should spell out possible objectives at the next meeting with private leaders, but should allow the steering group to formulate its own program emphasis.

5. Early PVO Participation

The initial White House meeting was extremely useful, but had few direct representatives of PVO’s themselves. We should include more currently active PVO leaders in the early planning stages to ensure future cooperation.

Recommendation: That participation in future meetings be broadened to include more representation from the voluntary organizations which will carry out the program. A list of suggested invitees for the next meeting is attached at Tab 1.⁴

6. Initial Field Consultations.

A. Scope. Based on prior Embassy reporting on this subject, we believe six recipient countries are good candidates:

—Nicaragua

—Honduras

—Panama

—Barbados

—Dominican Republic

—Dominica

Should we decide to also consult with possible “donor” countries, an early sounding might enable us to include PVO representatives from third countries with U.S. PVO leaders on the initial survey.

As noted above (issue 3), Costa Rica could play a key dual role and should also be consulted.

Recommendation: Consultations should include official and private sector representatives in both “donor” and “recipient” countries.

B. Method. At the December 7 meeting, the possibility was raised that a group of U.S. PVO leaders might travel together to a series of countries one after the other, possibly by USG aircraft. As this method would have high visibility, limit length of visits, and possibly lack country expertise in the composition of the delegation, an alternative approach might be to have initial soundings undertaken by one or two selected PVO leaders for each country, travelling commercially and taking the time to talk things through with their counterparts. Subsequently, a consolidated report might be prepared for discussion with the President.

Recommendation: That we seek the views of PVO leaders at the next meeting, keeping in mind the need to balance getting started quickly against ensuring the best country impact. We are also asking our embassies for comment.

7. Continuing Liaison.

We should decide at an early point the nature of our arrangements for continuing liaison with the new PVO structure. Possibilities include: (1) detail of an FSO, AID or Peace Corps officer with Caribbean/Central American experience to serve as staff for the PVO umbrella groups; and/or (2) designation of an Embassy or AID officer in each country to serve as local liaison with counterpart country groups.

Recommendation: that this question be raised at the next meeting with PVO representatives.

8. Planning.

To make the implementation of this proposal most effective, we need to plan very carefully and resolve issues such as those outlined above. Because we are breaking new ground, it is important that we be well prepared, present a convincing case to PVO representatives at the next meeting, to build confidence that we have thought through the proposal and that our ideas are feasible. Otherwise skepticism and parochial concerns may reduce receptivity.

Just as important, the teams visiting individual countries must be fully prepared to answer difficult questions, avoid exacerbating sensitivities and engage in a concrete dialogue. We must be able to convince both host governments and PVOs that this is not simply an effort to meddle haphazardly in ways that could backlash against them.

Recommendation: In dealing with both private groups and governments, it is very important that we (1) emphasize that our consultation is genuine (e.g. that our ideas are not set in concrete and we are open to suggestions), but (2) that we have done our homework, that these proposals are well conceived, workable and worthy of their enthusiasm.

Peter Tarnoff⁵
Executive Secretary

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 46, Latin America: 12/79–1/80. Confidential.
2. In a December 6 memorandum to the President, in advance of the December 7 meeting, Brzezinski stated that the meeting “will be small and informal to give you the opportunity to further develop your idea for an enhanced people-to-people approach to Central America and the Caribbean (CACAR).” (Ibid.) The meeting took place in the Roosevelt Room at the White House, beginning at 1:42 p.m. The President left the meeting at 2:33 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)
3. Not found attached. Presumable reference to Vance’s November 15 memorandum to the President (see Document 190).
4. The undated list, entitled “List of Key Individuals for Preliminary Consultation,” was not found attached.
5. Bremer signed for Tarnoff above Tarnoff’s typed signature.