Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXX, Public Diplomacy

194. Memorandum From James Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, December 3, 1979

SUBJECT

• Moslem Emotions and Anti-American Sentiment: Back to Basics (U)

Far more qualified minds than mine are no doubt addressing this problem at the moment, but for what they may be worth, I share with you some thoughts/suggestions which grow out of recent events in Islam and the risks we now confront of a spillover effect throughout the lands of Islamic allegiance. I am less concerned with immediate security concerns than the longer-range problem of how our country will be perceived in that part of the world. (C)

Assuming that the wave of anti-American expression we are now experiencing in the Moslem community may not be short-lived—especially if the present crisis in Iran is prolonged—and assuming too that any measures we take to deal with the Iran situation will be exploited by our adversaries as anti-Islam, we need to consider some prophylactic moves designed not only to contain Pak/Libyan-type contamination but, in a more positive sense, to amplify the President’s press conference² signal concerning our respect for Islamic religious teachings and tradition. This should be both a short- and longer-term effort. (C)

—Short-term: We could consider a variant of the VIP delegation idea we raised with you in connection with our proposals for the European Allies and Japan. Groups of respected private citizens, accompanied by appropriate USG officials and including, perhaps, some academic experts from universities with recognized departments in Middle East studies (Bill Quandt would probably have some ideas, and also Bill Griffith), could pay short visits to selected Moslem countries. Properly handled from a public affairs point of view (local press contacts, pre-departure publicity, etc.), these could help put the Iran crisis in perspective and, in a broader sense, associate the U.S. with an openness to the constructive aspects of the Islamic revival, a natural concomitant of a nation and people whose own society was founded on spiritual values (which retain vital relevance today). (C)

—Long-Term: ICA (including the VOA) should, on a priority basis, tailor its programs in Moslem countries to underscore American identification with or affinity for the things for which Islam stands. This can be done via seminar projects (focusing especially on the academic sector), speaker-bureau activity, circulation and placement of specialized publication material, cultural exchange efforts aimed at local scholars and journalists willing to examine America’s attitude on Islam and the world’s other major religions, etc.). It should not be too difficult for ICA people to devise a series of programs, valid over the next one to five years, which point up the commonality of values, spiritual and secular, that link our societies.³ (C)

In advancing the above thoughts I had in mind my own parochial concerns in North Africa—Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia—but clearly the focus of such an effort would ideally encompass many more Moslem countries or countries with important Moslem populations, including Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Mauritania, the UAE, Indonesia, possibly even Iraq, Somalia, and the Sudan. If any of this seems to you worth following up, I’d be glad to work on specifics. (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 10, International Communication Agency: 9–12/79. Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Hunter, Sick, and Griffith. Rentschler wrote “Jim” next to his name in the “from” line. Gates initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Brzezinski wrote in the top-right hand corner of the memorandum: “Develop with GS RH a memo to ICA from me along p. 2 ZB.” An unknown hand wrote “12/4/79” next to Brzezinski’s notation. According to an attached NSC Correspondence Profile, Brzezinski “noted” the memorandum on December 4. (Ibid.) The signed version of the memorandum Brzezinski requested is printed as Document 195.
2. See footnote 2, Document 195.
3. Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph and added a checkmark, designed to highlight his comment written on the first page of the memorandum.