The current review of the Research mandate has raised the basic question of
what “publics” should be studied. In view of the fundamental importance of
this question to the Agency’s mission as well as to the research function,
we have prepared a paper (attached) which details some of the theoretical,
historical, methodological and policy justifications for including the
general public in our examination of foreign attitudes.
With respect to countries where survey research is feasible, these arguments
basically are that:
—while scholarly opinions differ on the degree and the appropriateness of
general-public influence on policy, there is agreement that at a minimum the
general public sets the outer limits of government action and the
informed-attentive public (which we include under the rubric of general
public for survey purposes) helps to set the inner limits;
—the postwar history of the interrelationship between public opinion and
foreign policy indicates that leaders are increasingly attentive to general
public sentiments on major foreign policy questions and that segments of the
public have developed an impressive array of
[Page 536]
instruments for pressuring governments, often invoking
vox populi as justification for their
actions.
—compared to those involving relatively small samples of the influential
publics (125–150 interviews), surveys of the general public (about 1,000
interviews) are statistically more reliable, facilitate cross-tabular and
multivariate analyses, and permit breakouts by sector (occupational,
political, demographic, education level, etc.); and
—in addition to the fact that the President has specifically charged the
Agency with assessing “public opinion abroad”,2
USICA is presently the only
agency—government or private—to conduct such research on a systematic basis
and is thus in a position to make a unique contribution to the foreign
affairs community.
—research on the general public lies at the heart of the Agency’s “listening”
function and enhances USICA’s capability
for developing effective programs for two-way communication.
For these reasons, this office is firmly convinced that the Agency should
conduct research on “general public” as well as “influential public” opinion
abroad toward major foreign policy questions.
We are attempting to improve turnaround time for assessing the views of both
the “influential public” and the “general public”. On August 24, we proposed
a new approach to surveying the “influential public,” which the Acting
Director approved.3 In a
separate memorandum of today’s date,4 we will propose a new pre-set mechanism, initially in
Western Europe and Japan, for surveying the general public.
Studying the general public, however, appears to be a more controversial
concept with Agency management than studying the influential public. As we
understand it, the principal arguments are that the general public has
negligible influence on foreign policy decisions of governments abroad and
that, in any case, Agency programming is directed toward influential
elites.
As discussed at greater length in the attached paper, we believe there are
very strong arguments for continuing research on the general public. This
question is so fundamental to research—and has such strong implications for
the Agency’s mission—that we believe it warrants the Director’s personal
attention.
We strongly recommend that you forward this memorandum and the attached paper
to the Director requesting that the mandate for this office specifically
direct that general public samples be included in our surveys when
appropriate.5
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Europe Research Division, Office
of Research, Directorate for Programs, International Communication
Agency6
Why Study the General Public?
The current discussion within USICA over
the selection of foreign publics to be sampled in opinion surveys poses
basic questions which require careful thought. Decisions related to the
selection of samples for study should be based upon consideration of
some of the theoretical, historical, methodological and policy
justifications for covering the general public in such surveys.
In setting forth these justifications, this paper focuses on public
opinion surveying in those countries where opinion polling is possible.
This does not mean to imply that public opinion in authoritarian states
cannot in some way affect government policies, nor that we should give
up efforts to ascertain such opinion through available means.
Theoretical Justification
The whole question of the degree to which the average citizen in a
democratic society can and should influence government policy decisions
is, of course, a subject of timeless debate. An extensive literature
argues for maximum public participation in order to check tyranny,
inform leaders of the popular will and encourage individuals to exercise
civic responsibility. Many other writers warn that extensive public
participation is dangerous to rational, orderly, stable government.
[Page 538]
Even those who are most concerned over populist excesses, however,
concede that there is a relationship between government and the mass
public which at least sets the “outer limits” of policy.7
Public sentiment can play a dynamic as well as a passive role. As Lord
Bryce observed at the turn of the century in The
American Commonwealth, “Nearly all great political and social
causes have made their way first among the middle or humbler
classes.”8
This point is reinforced by political scientist Jack Walker, who argues
that the primary agents of change in a democracy are movements emerging
from the political mass as a whole. Walker argues that even when the mass public is
unexpressive or apathetic, government officials, merely by anticipating
public reaction, grant the citizenry a form of indirect access to public
policymaking. Elites are forced to pay attention to public sympathies if
for no other reason than that, if they fail to do so, their rivals will
seize upon the resulting distrust to gain allegiance of the masses.9
Within the mass public there is a significant sub-group identifiable as
the “attentive public” which sets the “inner limits” of policy. Rosenau
defines this group as “consisting of opinion holders who are inclined to
participate but lack access or opportunity to do so.”10 Stated another way, those people who
follow political and governmental affairs “are in some sense involved in
the process by which decisions are made.”11
The degree to which publics in different cultures follow public affairs
varies dramatically. Almond and Verba demonstrated in the early 1960’s
that publics in Germany, the UK and the
US are far more attentive to public
policy than those in Mexico and Italy. In overall terms Rosenau
estimates this “attentive public” at no more than 10% of the population
and probably smaller.
Our findings would suggest that this is an accurate general estimate of
those who follow foreign affairs “very closely,” but an underestimation
of those who follow foreign affairs “fairly closely.” In a July survey
in three West European countries, we included the question, “How
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closely do you follow news
about relations between (our country) and other countries—very closely,
fairly closely or not very closely?” The percentages were as
follows:
|
France
|
FRG
|
UK
|
| Very closely |
10% |
7% |
14% |
| Fairly closely |
37 |
29 |
41 |
| Not very closely |
50 |
59 |
43 |
| Don’t know |
3 |
5 |
2 |
|
100% |
100% |
100% |
When knowledge questions were added to interest questions, we continued
to find a substantial proportion (roughly 7–25%, depending on the issue)
of the mass public in these countries who could fit the definition of
that part of the public attentive to and reasonably informed about
international questions.
For research purposes we are defining this group, a sub-sample of the
general public, as the “foreign affairs public.” While the members of
this group could not be classified as influential or elite, they do find
intellectual stimulation and satisfaction in matters pertaining to
foreign policy. As Rosenau points out, this group can be a critical
audience for opinion molders and a critical link in the chain of
communication to mass publics. Research on the general public is the
only way to identify this group and its attitudes.
Historical Justification
Whatever one’s assessment of the proper role of public opinion in
policymaking, there is no doubt that the general public has exerted
increasing influence on foreign policy in the postwar period.12 As Lloyd Free
states in his essay, “The Role of Public Opinion,”13 in
our recent history “the importance of public opinion has become more
self-conscious than it used to be.” He explains,
“The assumption that public opinion, both at home and abroad, is
somehow important is borne out by the efforts of political leaders
to woo it and by the practices of governments. Every major
government
[Page 540]
in the world
today, and many of the minor ones, spend varying amounts of time,
money, and attention on attempting to influence the opinions of
their own citizens and the citizens of other countries as if those
opinions really counted.”
It might be added that a recurring theme in Theodore White’s thoughtful series on The Making of the President14 is that foreign policy issues, not domestic issues,
have been the most critical factor in Presidential elections.
A brief list of just a few of the international developments in the
postwar period in which public opinion played a notable role illustrates
the impact of the general public on foreign policy:
The French National Assembly’s rejection of a European Defense
Force;15
Public opposition within the UK,
France, and the US to the derailed
Israeli-British-French invasion of Egypt;16
Public reaction to the first two Sputniks,17 resulting in revamped government programs toward
education and scientific research policies;
Hostility of British public opinion for so long toward Common Market
membership;
Restrictions against nuclear weapons placement and nuclear ship
visits in numerous countries because of public sentiment;
Cancellation of the Eisenhower visit to Japan18 and public demands for
Okinawan reversion;
The restraints which German aspirations for reunification placed on
East-West negotiations and West European defense integration;
Recurring tensions created between the US and its allies over European public opposition to
increased defense spending and burden-sharing; and
The impact of public opinion shifts in the US on Vietnam war policies and the fate of the
Johnson
Administration.
This list could obviously go on and on, and the precise degree of public
opinion influence on any such complex developments is, of course,
subject to debate. In more recent years, the impact of public
[Page 541]
opinion has perhaps become
even more pronounced. Demonstrations and terrorism in the Middle East
have made it more difficult for Arab governments to show moderation.
Anti-US riots in Panama led the
US to agree to revise the Canal
Treaty, and anti-Treaty sentiment in the US later placed the President on the political
defensive.19 Widespread religiosity and public
opposition to the Shah led to revolution in Iran with all of its
consequences for American foreign policy.20
NATO’s ability to conduct large-scale
maneuvers in Western Europe has been circumscribed by adverse public
reactions. Recent improvements in Japan’s Self-Defense Forces have been
greatly facilitated by increased public awareness and concern over
Soviet military expansion in the Far East. Regardless of what Western
leaders personally think about modernization of tactical nuclear forces
in Europe, it is predictable that their decisions will be influenced by
the views of the general public—just as public opinion affected their
decisions on the neutron bomb. Economic pressures emanating from the
public domain have just led Bonn to make the remarkable announcement
that the FRG would be unable to meet
its NATO commitment to a 3-percent
real increase in its defense budget.
An argument which the Administration has made repeatedly in favor of
SALT II is that surveys
demonstrate clear domestic public support for the Treaty. But a crucial
point in the debate has been the question of European support for the
Treaty. The Administration claims that the Allies solidly back the
agreement and points to the Guadeloupe Summit endorsement, while
opponents rejoin that the government has been arm-twisting our Allies
and that European officials concede in private their reservations.21 While there are currently
no hard data available to Administration spokesmen on West European public attitudes, such information could possibly
affect the posture of some Senators toward SALT II as well as official Allied attitudes toward the
Treaty.
It seems evident, therefore, that the force of public opinion has
affected foreign policy in democracies with increasing intensity and
[Page 542]
frequency. There are many
reasons for this, not the least being the very existence of opinion
polls themselves. Mass communication has played a critical role as well
in focusing and informing public opinion.
In addition, practical experience and modern technology have given
publics an impressive array of instruments for making their views felt
beyond the traditional means of the ballot, lobbying, and political
party, pressure group and trade union membership. The modern repertoire
would have to include public interest pressure groups, computerized
letter-writing, demonstrations, marches, whistleblowing, freedom of
information legislation, and the use of powerful mass media.
Indeed, the current debate is not whether public opinion is affecting
policy but whether it is affecting it too much.
The Carter administration has
frequently been criticized for basing its policies too much on opinion
poll results. But this criticism extends beyond the present government.
In his recent Foreign Affairs article, former
Senator Fulbright complained
“Our elected representatives, and the ‛communications’ experts they
employ, study and analyze public attitudes by sophisticated new
techniques, but their purpose has little to do with leadership,
still less with education. Their purpose, it seems, is to discover
what people want and fear and dislike, and then to identify
themselves with those sentiments.”
Most democratic governments abroad could be subject to similar criticism.
Over and again, for example, in disputes between the US and Western Europe on matters involving
trade, economics and defense, public pressures have exerted a strong
influence over positions taken by those governments—and have often been
cited by European officials as the reason for their inability to
accommodate US objectives.
Methodological Justification
Methods for polling the general public are time-tested. Public opinion
surveying procedures have been tested and refined through over fifty
years of experience. They are widely used and accepted, and usually are
cost-effective compared to other methods of gauging public
sentiment.
In our separate memorandum on developing a more rapid and economical
method for surveying the influential public, we propose samples of
125–150 drawn from a pre-selected list of 1,000.22 While we favor this approach for studying influential
opinion, it has clear disadvantages when compared with the customary
samples of 1,000
[Page 543]
involved in
general public surveying. In contrast to influential elite sampling,
full sampling of the general public will enable us to:
—obtain statistically more accurate and reliable figures;
—distinguish between different publics, such as the “foreign affairs
public” described above and the mass public;
—make distinctions between numerous other useful categories such as
occupation, age, political affiliation, education;
—carry out with a higher degree of confidence more sophisticated forms of
bivariate and multivariate analysis; and
—compare our findings with those generated by other researchers, the
great majority of whom base their work on general public samples.
The most effective methodological approach, and the one we strongly
prefer, is to sample both the influential public
and the general public. This approach will give us a more complete
measurement of the climate of opinion and enable us to compare general
public and influential public views.
There is inevitably a certain arbitrariness about how one segments the
full spectrum of opinion. For research purposes, one must also take into
account the research tools available to sample different elements of
this spectrum. In summary form, these are the categories and methods
preferred by this office for survey research in those countries where
opinion polling is possible:
Foreign Policy Elite (those political
leaders, government officials, and specialists actually involved in
foreign policy decision-making)—This group is the subject of regular
mission reporting. For systematic surveys of this group, we thus
prefer semi-structured mission reporting or use of qualified
scholar-interviewers. In most cases, we would counsel against using
private research organizations for interviewing this elite.
Influential Public (those persons who, by
virtue of their occupation, position and access, could exert
above-average influence on foreign policy decision-makers)—We have
recommended samples of 120–150 respondents from a pre-selected list
of 1,000 for most such surveys.
Foreign Affairs Public (those persons who
have a relatively high level of interest in and knowledge of foreign
affairs and who can serve as a link in the chain of communication to
the general public, but who lack regular access to
decision-makers)—We would use a sub-sample of general public
surveys, most to be conducted through a pre-set rider mechanism.
General Public—We would use general public
surveys, most to be conducted through a pre-set rider mechanism.
The combination of these methods will give this Agency an unusually
effective capacity for assessing in a timely fashion the views of
foreign publics in those countries where survey research can be
conducted.
[Page 544]
Policy Justification
As the Agency charged with assessing “the impact of actual and proposed
United States foreign policy decisions on public opinion abroad,” we
are, in any case, obligated to measure the opinions of foreign publics.
President Carter, in launching
ICA, announced that “the new Agency
for International Communication will help us demonstrate a decent
respect for the opinions of mankind. . . .”
In the absence of general public surveying by USICA, this information will not to our knowledge be
produced systematically by any other US
Government agency. This is an area where this Agency can make a valuable
and unique contribution to policymakers’ understanding of the currents
of foreign opinion.
This information is also unavailable with any consistency from data
produced by others. In exercising their “watching brief,” Research
analysts already are attentive to survey results produced by others
which have a bearing on Agency concerns. Experience has demonstrated
clearly, however, that such information is fragmentary, sporadic and
often superficial. Only USICA research
is focused specifically and in-depth on US policy and Agency programming concerns.
It also seems axiomatic that, in order to communicate effectively, the
Agency must know the mindset of the general public on major issues of
concern to the US. Although budgetary
considerations have forced the Agency to direct its activities primarily
to elite audience groups, several of these were selected because they
can serve as channels to the wider public.
Even if the Agency can speak only to a few, it should listen to the many.
It is only thereby that our program themes can properly relate to the
concerns, values and aspirations of the general public. Despite the
present emphasis on communicating with elites, many Agency programs
(VOA, TV placement, films) are aimed at the general public.
Research on general public attitudes is the backbone of the Agency’s
listening function and can be an important aid to developing effective
programs for two-way communication.
