180. Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- BIB and RFE/RL—Status Report (U)
I have attended meetings of both the BIB and the RFE/RL Corporate Board this week, talked to both about our priorities and policy goals as they relate to the radios, about some of the challenges we anticipate in the 1980’s and what we want to see the radios do to be in the best possible shape to meet them. I also answered questions of board members at some length. I have received warm thanks from everyone except the BIB Staff for coming and talking. (U)
The contrast between these two boards is striking when one experiences them in succession. The BIB and its staff leave one with the feeling that here is a randomly selected group of people who really have very little concept of what they are doing, preoccupied with trying to interfere in the management of the radios and magnifying petty problems into large issues. Only Gronouski has vision and a concept of what intelligent oversight is—and one feels sorry for him having to try to keep this motley crew in line. The RFE/RL Corporate Board, on the other hand, is a group of talented, serious first-rate men, experienced in business and public affairs, who know what the role of a supervisory body should be. They know and understand far more about radio operations than the BIB does and readily understand the goals and purposes of the radios as important foreign policy operational assets. (C)
It is more clear than ever that all of this hullabaloo about “relocation” of the radios to the U.S. is an issue that has been blown out of all proportion to its real importance by the BIB Staff in conjunction with a few congressional staffers. The Corporate Board members, to a man, understand this and are determined to keep the issue in perspective. I stressed to them that they all have an important role to play with Congress on this and other radio problems by helping build [Page 522] understanding and support of RFE/RL. This advice was seconded by Gronouski. I hope that in this way we have permanently scotched BIB staff efforts to monopolize congressional relations and prevent radio management from participating in the process. (C)
All these people are well aware of the radios’ need for more money. They are already operating with such efficiency that modest increases in budget can buy heightened impact more cheaply than it could be obtained in any other way. They are mindful of the challenges they will face in a succession situation in the USSR and in Eastern Europe, when leaderships change in the 1980’s, and they would like to have their programming capabilities, their news-gathering and analytical staffs and their technical facilities in optimum condition to meet them. Gronouski has declared that the main inhibition to accomplishing this is OMB’s restrictive attitude. They are getting talk from OMB about cutting the radios’ budget for FY 1981 back below the FY 1980 level! This is idiotic. But it will be hard to deal with if the President endorses it. Gronouski and I both need some estimate from you on how far you are willing to go to oppose this. We can then devise a strategy for trying to cope with OMB.2 (C)
Further talks with Ferguson, Walter, Hayes and Leonard Marks this week reinforce my feeling that a prime item on our agenda for the coming months must be reorganizing the supervisory structure—merging the BIB and the corporate board into a public corporation with half Presidential appointees, half public members representing a wide spectrum of interests and talents as the RFE/RL corporate board always has. (In the process the bothersome BIB Staff would disappear.) Leonard believes that he can get GAO to take the initiative in proposing the necessary legislation which the Administration could endorse and present to the next session of Congress. Alan Hovey, who spent eight years with RFE, is in a key position in GAO to help with this and Marks and Gronouski both know Elmer Staats (head of GAO) well. This has not been discussed with Gronouski yet, but there is increasing evidence that he would be ready to go along. You will be the best one to take it up with him, but it would be premature to do so yet. Do not say anything until you and I have had a chance to review all this further. (C)3
CONCLUSION:
This memorandum is for your information. As you will see, basically we have things going the way we want them to go. You need [Page 523] not get directly involved in anything relating to the radios for the time being. We will need your guidance and help on budget, however. I have the feeling we will need to make a real push on this no later than the end of September. If you wish to take it up directly with the President, I will prepare arguments for you. This may be better than taking it up with McIntyre—on the other hand, you may wish to raise it with him before or simultaneously with talking to the President.4 Anticipation of the Pope’s visit in early October can provide a good background against which to stress the radios’ role and capabilities. I am already working with Jan Nowak on this. (C)
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 9, Board for International Broadcasting (RFE, RL, VOA): 5/79–1/80. Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Brement and Larabee. An attached note in an unknown hand indicates that the copies were delivered on August 17. (Ibid.) An attached NSC Correspondence Profile indicates that Brzezinski “noted” the memorandum on August 20. (Ibid.)↩
- Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to the last two sentences in this paragraph. He also wrote “will help” in the margin.↩
- Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to the last three sentences in this paragraph. He also wrote “ok” in the margin.↩
- Brzezinski underlined “with him” and placed a check-mark in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.↩