143. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the President for Media and Public Affairs (Jagoda) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1

SUBJECT

  • Focusing on the NSC/ICA Relationship

Two previous memoranda from me propose that NSC (1) carefully monitor the upcoming UNESCO meeting (particularly the “State control” of news media issue)2 and (2) consider ways of improving the relationship between ICA and the White House.3

We seem to be in agreement about the importance of the UNESCO issue.

This memo is in response to your request that I develop more fully my thoughts about ICA. I followed your suggestion that I raise some of the questions that might be pursued over the next months. I think the focus of my review will result from answers to some of the following:

1. What is the internal hierarchical structure of ICA and how are executive policy decisions implemented?

2. What are the external influences on ICA decision-making (and policy implementation)—including both governmental and non-governmental sources?

3. What are the channels of communication between ICA and the White House? Between ICA and State? Are these sufficient and appropriate for all concerned?

4. What has been the experience of NSC staff members with ICA? What conclusion can be drawn that might lead to more fruitful relationships?

5. How can the NSC better tap ICA’s understanding of foreign attitudes and perceptions? (ICA overseas personnel deal with non-[Page 409]governmental elites on a constant basis, while other U.S. overseas personnel (State) deal mostly with governments.)

6. How can NSC make better use of ICA to prepare foreign publics for impending policy decisions? (For example, could ICA have been helpful during the neutron bomb controversy?)4

7. In what ways can Presidential decisions, once reached, be better implemented through the “action” orientation of ICA, bypassing further bureaucratic “consideration”?

8. Is there a useful way for ICA to stimulate NSC consideration of problems and opportunities in policy formulation and implementation?

  1. Source: Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Barry Jagoda, Box 3, NSC. No classification marking. There is no indication that Aaron saw the memorandum. In a July 31 memorandum to Brzezinski, Jagoda commented that, as a result of working with Aaron, he had been able “to focus more clearly on how I might be helpful” in his role as a consultant to Brzezinski and proposed that he work under NSC auspices for 6 months, focus on the upcoming UNESCO meeting, and also “try to see how we can make ICA more responsive to White House/NSC initiatives.” (Ibid.) Jagoda’s assessment of the NSCICA relationship is printed as Document 161.
  2. See Document 141.
  3. See Document 142.
  4. Reference is to Carter’s April 1978 decision to defer production of the Enhanced Radiation Weapon (ERW). Documentation on ERW is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. V, European Security, 1977–1983.